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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the nexus of democratic development, international 
democracy assistance and local political cultures in one eastern region of Madagascar.  
In so doing, it questions whether common targets of the democracy assistance 
industry (i.e. electoral process, freedom of expression, rule of law) merely encourage 
the simulation of Western democratic systems or actually stimulate democratic 
development that makes sense to local people. While there are no doubt many 
explanatory factors for the (in)effectiveness of democracy assistance policies, in this 
thesis I propose that the perceptions, beliefs, and expectations of ordinary citizens 
(i.e. political cultures) could help account for the dogged persistence of hybrid 
regimes. My intention in undertaking this research is not to discredit other variables 
pertinent to democratic development, but rather to narrowly investigate how 
ordinary citizens interpret “democracy” and whether these interpretations are 
compatible with those assumed by the global democracy assistance industry.  
I also offer a step-by-step account of the methodological innovations 
employed in this research. Empirical data on political culture was collected using a 
modified version of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). The data analysis 
techniques used in this research were likewise visual, facilitating the translation of 
highly contextualised field data into thematic trends relevant to democracy assistance 
policy. The highly visual research process piloted here could be meaningfully applied 
to a wide range of research problems and contexts, including the emerging trend 
toward country-led democracy assessment procedures. 
The originality of this work lies in its exploration of a highly contested 
concept (political culture), using an innovative visual research method (the modified 
TAT) in a country not often researched by (particularly Anglophone) political 
scientists (Madagascar). This research is significant in that it proposes both a 
theoretical framework and original methodology for exploring how ordinary people 
perceive democracy in their countries, and relating these perceptions to specific 
policy goals.  
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INTRODUCTION 
I go downstairs and get a bottle  
of real vanilla extract from the cupboard.  
I take it upstairs and tell him to inhale.  
(Neville 2001: 228) 
My initial inspiration for undertaking this project came from a book of essays 
by Susan Neville titled Fabrication. In her essays, Neville explores not only how things 
ranging from globes to veneer to vanilla are made, but also the often-symbolic 
meaning these objects add to our lives. One essay in particular – S(t)imulation – got 
me thinking. Somewhere between Neville’s visit to a family-owned spice factory and 
her son’s mis-adventures in the cyber-world of the Sims, my mind began to wander. 
Being a political animal, I started to wonder whether democracy assistance policies 
actually do stimulate the creation of democratic states that not only meet Western 
expectations but also resonate with the societies they govern. Or, on the contrary, do 
these programmes merely foster simulation, producing synthetic replicas of a 
phenomenon that occurred organically elsewhere?  
Over a decade ago, an influential group of democracy scholars concluded 
that “groping toward the First World need not entail mindless imitation: it may lead 
to successful adaptation to the new international context” (Przeworski et. al. 1995: 7).  
It has also been argued, however, that democracy assistance is a fundamentally 
prescriptive exercise, commanding the reproduction of Western political institutions 
(Grugel 2002: 21, Wunsch 2000: 488). Synthetic vanillin is not vanilla, no matter 
what the label on the bottle says (Summers 1962). Exploring which metaphorical 
category better describes the so-called ‘third wave’ democracies seemed like an 
interesting challenge.   
Defining the Problem: Hybridity  
 I began this project nearly four years ago amid speculation that nascent 
democracies risked being pulled under by an autocratic undertow (see, for example, 
INTRODUCTION 
12 
Diamond 2002, Levitsky and Way 2002, Merkel 2004, Nathan 2003, Ottaway 2003). 
These cries have grown louder and ever more certain in the ensuing years,1 raising 
concerns that optimism and “financially extensive programmes” may yet prove 
insufficient guarantors of democratic progress (Merkel 2010: 17). Indeed, the number 
of countries rated “partly free” by Freedom House has fluctuated only slightly 
between 2002 and 2010. More significantly, although individual scores may fluctuate 
slightly from year to year, the vast majority of states rated “partly free” in 2002 
remained in this category for the duration of the 9-year period under review.2 These 
countries did not achieve “free” status; nor, however, did they slip into the “not free” 
category. This suggests that the real threat to democratic progress is not the 
autocracy of old, but rather what Burnell and Schlumberger call “renewed closure” 
of regimes previously classified as cases of ongoing democratic reform (2010: 2).  
In acknowledgment of this class of countries that exhibit few signs of 
continuing democratic transformation after three or four election cycles, some 
scholars have started to question labels like “transitional country” and “developing 
state,” arguing instead that these “hybrids” (Diamond 2002) or “complicated places” 
(Geertz 2004: 578) exist in a “political gray zone” (Carothers 2002: 9) or “twilight 
zone” (Diamond 1999: 20).3 They observe that “flailing states” (Andrews 2008: 379) 
may continue to hold regular elections and ensure citizens a modicum of political and 
civil rights; nevertheless the democratic credentials of these countries are blighted by:  
…poor representation of citizen’s interests, low levels of political participation 
beyond voting, frequent abuse of the law by government officials, elections of 
uncertain legitimacy, very low levels of public confidence in state institutions, and 
persistently poor institutional performance by the state. (Carothers 2002: 9-10) 
It could be argued that these states are merely experiencing the growing pains 
associated with democratic change and that they will eventually emerge from this 
                                                 
1 In addition to Puddington’s (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) analysis, see Diamond (2008b), Gat 
(2007), and Rupnik (2007). Similar views are expressed in a thematic section of the Journal of 
Democracy devoted to the topic of “backsliding” (2007, issue 4).  
2 Between 2002 and 2010, the number of countries included on Freedom House’s “partly free” 
list ranged from 54 to 62. 39 countries remain on the list for all nine years, with an additional 9 
countries appearing on the list at least seven times each.  
3 Collier and Levitsky (1997) famously exposed our predilection for masking democratic 
deficiencies with palatable adjectives. 
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stage like all awkward teenagers.4 Whether this will prove to be the case remains to 
be seen. In the mean time, the debate has shifted toward what – if anything – 
outsiders can do to influence the trajectory of states that have already engaged at 
least minimally with democratic reform but now appear to have stalled (Berman 
2007b: 14, Rakner, Menocal and Fritz 2007: 49).  
 A growing literature explores this conundrum (see, for example, Hyden 2010, 
Leininger 2010, Rakner, Menocal and Fritz 2007). One emerging trend in response to 
widespread recognition of the hybrid phenomenon is that sustainable democratic 
reform requires domestic support (Rakner, Menocal and Fritz 2007: 4, Hyden 2010: 
14, Wunsch 2000: 504). Without denying that institutions matter, human agency and 
human action surely matter as well. While attention has long been paid to political 
elites, the perceptions, expectations, and ambitions of ordinary citizens – still largely 
“untouched” by academic research – have become the subject of increased scrutiny 
(Burnell and Schlumberger 2010: 8, also see Merkel 2010: 26). When I began this 
research, I suspected that whether democracy assistance produces pure vanilla or 
synthetic vanillin depends in part on how closely local conceptualisations of 
democracy and domestic perceptions of the existing political system coincide with 
international democracy assistance priorities. The nature of this work is, therefore, 
comparative, exploring the interface between what local people believe about politics 
and what outsiders – namely those engaged in democracy assistance and assessment 
– expect.  
The Scope of this Research 
 “Given the tendency to become imprisoned in the assumptions of our 
context,” Fierke notes, “it is imperative that an ethical foreign policy creates the 
space and conditions for real dialogue” (2007: 134). To date, democracy assistance 
could more aptly be described as a monologue in which developed democracies 
profess their expertise. Therefore, is persistent hybridity really the mutation of 
democratic ideals that Western analysts make it out to be? Or could it be the genuine 
expression of a locally viable political alternative, misconstrued and misrepresented 
by outsiders masquerading as experts? Finding out requires entering into a dialogue 
                                                 
4 Berman (2007a) makes a similar point regarding political violence in developing democracies.  
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about the meaning of democracy in which both democracy assistance providers and 
recipients are allowed to speak.  
This thesis is an attempt to begin such a dialogue, analysing prominent 
democracy assistance priorities alongside ordinary people’s perceptions of politics 
and democracy in eastern Madagascar. In so doing, I suggest a new and slightly 
different way of thinking about the challenge posed by democracy assistance, one 
that may be particularly pertinent to the problem of hybrid regimes where 
standardised programmes and policies consistently fall short of achieving their 
objectives. Leininger (2010) stresses that the identification of explanatory factors for 
the (in)effectiveness of democracy assistance should be at the forefront of future 
research. While there are no doubt many facets to this complex problem, I propose 
that the perceptions, beliefs, and expectations of ordinary citizens (i.e. local political 
culture(s)) could provide one such explanatory factor.  
Much of the literature remains broadly interested in political ‘actors’, those 
individuals (often elites) who play defined roles within political organisations. In 
contrast, I suggest that studying the ways in which the audience, as it were, interacts 
with the political drama might enable outsiders to better understand the show.5 A 
play can be a masterpiece and the actors outstanding, but if it does not resonate with 
theatregoers its chances of success are slim. I hypothesise that this same dynamic 
applies to democratic development. Unless the practices and objectives of democracy 
(and democracy assistance) resonate with ordinary people, democracy will never be 
more than a charade. To this end, the following chapters address the question: 
How might local political culture(s) shape and constrain substantive democratic 
development?  
My intention in posing this question is not to discredit other variables pertinent to 
democratic development, but rather to narrowly investigate how ordinary citizens 
interpret “democracy” and whether these interpretations are compatible with those 
assumed by the global democracy assistance industry.  
                                                 
5 Lipset (1959: 69) and O’Donnell (1996b: 40) have both taken interest in how society interacts 
with institutions. To a lesser extent, Fukuyama (1995) also approaches this subject. 
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The chapters that follow are necessarily selective and several ideas, explored 
only fleetingly here, could benefit from further exploration. Different policies 
pursued by myriad agencies in various countries will no doubt produce a wide range 
of results. Bearing this in mind, the aim of this eclectic piece of research is to 
contribute to our understanding of how people in one particular region of the world 
understand their own political experience and define their democratic aspirations vis-
à-vis internationally recognized standards and expectations. Put slightly differently, in 
the following pages I set out to explore the s(t)imulation of democracy in a particular 
place at a particular time from the perspective of ordinary citizens. In so doing, I will 
suggest that this sort of context-specific knowledge could enable more nuanced 
assessment of the ‘demand side’ of democracy assistance, paving the way for more 
effective democracy assistance policies both in Madagascar and elsewhere (Hyden 
2010: 14).   
Human perceptions and institutional outcomes offer different, but 
complementary, perspectives; whether we focus on one or the other necessarily 
depends on the purpose and particularities of any given research project (Schedler 
2001: 5). This research is situated squarely in the human perceptions category. 
Therefore, the democratic institutions discussed throughout this thesis (i.e. electoral 
process, freedom of expression and rule of law) were not selected for their own sake, 
but rather because they are perceived to be important to democratic development, 
albeit in different ways, by both democracy assistance organisations and ordinary 
people in the eastern region of Madagascar where I conducted fieldwork.  
Choice of Case Study and Potential for Generalization 
 I discuss my rationale for choosing Madagascar as my case study at length in 
the Preface to Part II. Briefly, initial analysis of the state of democratic development 
in Madagascar provided compelling evidence to suggest a possible confluence of 
perspectives between democracy assistance providers and local people. Madagascar 
was the first country to receive funding from the newly christened Millennium 
Challenge Corporation in recognition of the country’s laudable commitment to good 
governance. More significantly, Madagascar performs remarkably well on a number 
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of democracy assessment indices – well within the fuzzy parameters of hybridity6 – 
despite falling short of the standards for economic and human development often 
identified as conducive to sustainable democratic change. With the usual suspects 
thus accounted for, Madagascar seemed a logical choice for exploring an alternative 
variable: political culture(s).  
 My reason for choosing the exact fieldwork location is more serendipitous. I 
had initially planned to do a comparative analysis of political culture(s) identified in 
the capital and another urban centre on the eastern coast.7 Upon my arrival in the 
country, however, it rapidly became apparent that I lacked the time and resources 
necessary to complete thorough research in two discrete regions. I had better 
contacts on the coast and generally found the people there to be more welcoming. 
Focusing on a single region where I could establish strong connections with local 
people also, somewhat unexpectedly, opened the door to a limited amount of 
research in a rural village. As Madagascar remains predominantly rural, this seemed 
like a valuable opportunity to add depth to my sample.  
 The inherent particularity of this research means that there are limitations to 
its potential for generalisation; as Schmitter observes, “single-case studies are rarely a 
convincing basis for generalisation” (2008: 290). The relevance of conclusions 
obtained from data collected in a single region of Madagascar to the country as a 
whole cannot be assumed. The same warning applies with regard to the relevancy of 
this research to analysis of democracy assistance and protracted hybridity in other 
African states or, for that matter, other countries around the world. As I 
acknowledged above, both democratic development and democracy assistance are 
likely to look different and work differently in different contexts and geographical 
                                                 
6 Madagascar is one of the 39 countries classified annually as “partly free” by Freedom House; 
see footnote 2 above. 
7 I initially planned on doing urban research for three very practical reasons. First, I was able to 
establish contacts in these urban centres while still in the United Kingdom. Secondly, both cities 
are relatively easy to reach in a country with notoriously bad infrastructure; this was an important 
consideration when I still thought that I would be conducting comparative research in two cities. 
Finally, I am highly proficient in French, which is widely spoken in urban areas but hardly at all in 
rural villages. By staying in urban areas I would, therefore, be somewhat less reliant on research 
assistants. 
INTRODUCTION 
17 
locations. Indeed, Chapters One and Seven will suggest that overly generalised 
democracy assistance policies could be part of the problem. 
 That said, when case studies are done well they provide useful points of 
reference for the study of similar cases elsewhere. In other words, even specific cases 
are capable of suggesting viable explanations or interpretations for comparable 
events in other places (Berg 2004: 259, Gledhill 2000: 7).  When dealing with 
complex social phenomena like hybrid regimes and political culture(s), the “inherent 
interest” of a particular case lies in what it can reveal about hitherto enigmatic 
variables (della Porta and Keating 2008: 29). Therefore, while I do not make any 
sweeping claims about the validity of conclusions deduced from this research, I 
nevertheless maintain that it contributes much-needed nuance to our understanding 
of democratic development and unfolding events in Madagascar. Moreover, it adds 
depth to the argument that sustainable democratic reform requires domestic support 
and ownership. The innovative method piloted while researching this particular case 
could also be refined and applied elsewhere in the pursuit of divergent research 
objectives.  
 The Structure and Purpose of this Thesis 
 The purpose of this thesis is threefold: 
• to hold a critical mirror up to democracy assistance policy (Fierke 2001: 
130); 
 
• to investigate whether political culture(s), though controversial within 
mainstream political science, might yet be a useful concept for better 
understanding how ordinary citizens interpret their political worlds and 
define their democratic aspirations; and 
 
• to provide a step-by-step guide to the innovative visual research method 
I piloted in Madagascar. 
On the first point, I have already noted above that democracy assistance remains an 
under-examined corner of an extensive democracy literature. I intend for the analysis 
dispersed throughout this thesis to make a critical contribution to policy discourse as 
we continue to rethink the role of democracy assistance in the context of hybrid 
regimes. With regard to the second point, the utility of political culture(s) as a 
variable pivots on how the concept is defined. “Whatever cultures are,” Shore 
astutely observes, “they do not fit inside nutshells” (1996: 44). I reject the truncated 
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and prescriptive culture concepts commonly found within the literature, developing 
instead a conceptual framework that does not shy away from complexity.  
Finally, I am not – nor have I ever been – a purist.  Initially frustrated by the 
“intellectual isolationism” (Greenblatt 1990: 4) pervading the literature on democracy 
assistance, democratic development, and anthropological studies of culture, I 
eventually gained the courage to test established research boundaries. This 
emboldened me to develop an innovative, visual research methodology for the 
purpose of investigating connections and complexities obscured or unnoticed by 
more traditional research methods (Sil 2004). Moreover, as participatory approaches 
to policymaking become more widely accepted, visual research tools like the one 
pioneered here could provide a collaborative alternative to focus groups, plebiscites, 
and surveys. It has also been demonstrated on several occasions that visual research 
tools reduce the likelihood of miscommunication between the researcher (or policy 
developer) and research participants (or programme stakeholders). Therefore, this 
thesis interweaves structured, detailed analysis with grounded, impressionistic 
interpretation in order to provide new insight into the innately complex democracy 
assistance enterprise.  
Part I lays the theoretical foundation for subsequent empirical research. 
Chapter One provides an overview of contemporary trends in international 
democracy assistance and assessment. This includes initial analysis of democracy 
assistance priorities espoused by a cross-section of prominent agencies, as well as 
benchmarks and indicators of democracy employed by organisations that compile 
influential democracy and good governance indices. From this analysis, I identify 
three predominant themes of democracy assistance and assessment: electoral 
process, freedom of expression and rule of law. I then discuss each of these priorities 
at some length, exploring why they are presumed to be significant with respect to 
democratic values including representation, participation, preference articulation, and 
accountability.  
Having established the position of the global democracy assistance industry, I 
turn to the controversial topic of political culture. After situating the culture concept 
in historical context and outlining some principal objections of culture critics, I 
suggest how political culture can be reconceptualised as a collection of perceptual 
lenses that colour how people interpret behaviour and events as well as their own 
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(political) agency. With this new tool in hand, I reformulate Held’s (2006) pertinent 
question What should democracy mean today? to What does democracy mean here? thereby 
indicating how a better understanding of local political cultures might lead to more 
grounded approaches to democracy assistance.  
In Chapter Three, I offer a step-by-step account of the methodological 
innovations employed in this research. Empirical data was collected using a modified 
version of the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT). After providing a brief history of 
the TAT in its native field of psychology, I go on to discuss previous modifications 
made to this method for use in social science research.  A detailed account of how I 
used a modified TAT to elicit local perceptions of democracy follows. Additionally, 
the data analysis techniques employed in this research were likewise visual. A 
synthesis of Framework and thematic networks facilitated the analysis and translation 
of highly contextualised field data into thematic trends relevant to democracy 
assistance policy, a process I explain in detail. 
The empirical content of this thesis is contained in Part II. The section 
begins with a brief Preface that both explains my rationale for conducting this 
research in Madagascar and recounts the country’s contemporary political history. 
The Preface leads in to Chapter Four, which presents my empirical findings on how 
elections and electoral participation are perceived by ordinary people in eastern 
Madagascar. I suggest that four likely perceptual lenses warrant consideration and 
can help explain why people view elections in a positive or negative light. I then 
reconsider whether elections are a reasonable indicator of democracy and if they 
provide a viable forum for political representation based on this empirical evidence.  
Chapter Five focuses on perceptions of free speech and informal political 
participation. The field data collected on this topic indicates the presence of three 
relevant perceptual lenses with noticeably different interpretations of free speech 
rights in Madagascar. I then consider whether free speech and access to information 
actually enable political preference formation in the way democracy assistance 
providers expect and similarly question, in light of the empirical data, whether free 
speech rights lead to political accountability.  
In Chapter Six I explore how ordinary people consulted for this research 
perceive the rule of law at street level, resulting in the identification of two discrete 
INTRODUCTION 
20 
perceptual lenses. This analysis leads to a discussion of the rule of law in relation to 
voting and free speech rights, concluding that it is a mistake to divorce democratic 
form from democratic function. Democratic rights – including voting and free 
speech rights – are formally enshrined in Madagascar’s constitution and contribute to 
assessments of the country’s democratic credentials. However, people who 
participated in this research often suggested that these same democratic rights do not 
exist in Madagascar or are only experienced irregularly. While the priorities pursued 
by the democracy assistance industry may resonate with Malagasy citizens, expert 
assessments of Madagascar’s democratic progress appear to conflict with the 
experience of ordinary people.  
Finally, in Chapter Seven I return to the idea of s(t)imulation. MISONGA, a 
multi-million dollar USAID democracy assistance initiative, struggled to achieve its 
objectives and was sometimes referred to by local people as a “joke.” The perceptual 
lenses identified in Chapters Four through Six suggest that at least three unique 
interpretations of democracy colour the political worldviews of people in 
Madagascar, and go some way in explaining why certain MISONGA initiatives 
encountered significant, local resistance.  These political cultures also provide an 
alternative framework for interpreting Madagascar’s most recent political crisis. I 
conclude by proposing that the international democracy assistance industry should 
adopt a decidedly more strategic approach to democracy assistance policy. Country-
led procedures recently launched by International IDEA and UNDP provide novel 
examples of how local points of view can be meaningfully incorporated into 
democracy assistance and assessment initiatives.     
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Part I
  
CHAPTER ONE: THE DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE AGENDA  
Our appetite for democracy is insatiable.  
Not content with its triumph over all other political forms… 
governments, international organizations, NGOs, civic associations,  
protestors and democratic theorists all want more.  
(Blaug 2002: 102) 
In a speech to the British House of Commons on 8 June 1982 President 
Ronald Reagan heralded the resurgence of the “democratic revolution.” In the 
decades that followed, an unprecedented variety of “geographies, climates, ecologies, 
economies, languages, ethnicities, and capabilities” have provided the back-drop for 
democratic experiments (Gould 2003: 6). Amidst talk of “the democratic century” 
(Lipset and Lakin 2004) and professions that democracy is the new “normal” 
standard to which all citizens of the world are entitled (Sen 1999a: 4), international 
political legitimacy has come to require – at minimum – ostensible adherence to the 
democratic cause (Faundez 2005: 615, Held 1993: 13). In 2009, Freedom House 
counted 116 electoral democracies around the world, down slightly from 119 the 
previous year but nearly double the number identified twenty years previously 
(Puddington 2010: 136).8  
Not surprisingly, perhaps, a plethora of agencies has emerged to assist states 
in their pursuit of “the democratic imperative” (Miliband 2008). While it is 
impossible to pinpoint the exact value of this burgeoning global industry, 
conservative annual estimates range from $2 billion (Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 
2007: 1) to over $5 billion (Burnell 2008: 415). Diamond notes that by 2005, the 
United Nations Development Program alone spent around $1.4 billion on 
democracy assistance in over 130 countries, predicting that democracy assistance 
would account for nearly half of UNDP’s entire budget in coming years (2008a: 128). 
Price similarly estimates that USAID’s annual democracy assistance budget lies 
                                                 
8 The 1989-1990 edition of Freedom House’s Freedom in the World report identified 69 states as 
electoral democracies. The organisation’s electoral democracy data is available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439. 
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somewhere in the region of $1 billion to $1.5 billion (2009: 165). Despite having 
blossomed into an expansive industry worth billions of dollars each year, “the 
amount of money spent, and the number of programmes and missions carried out, 
seem to bear no direct relationship with the success or failure of democratisation 
experiments” (Grugel 2002: 133).9 Nevertheless, our seemingly insatiable appetite for 
democracy compels us to push on (Blaug 2002: 102).  
In this chapter, I survey the stated objectives of various leading democracy 
assistance organisations to ascertain what exactly they aim to achieve with their 
sizable budgets and how they then go about accomplishing it. I also examine the 
underlying logic of several influential democracy and good governance assessment 
indices with the related purpose of identifying not only how they conceptualise 
democracy or good governance, but also what they measure in compiling their league 
tables. I begin by outlining the criteria and indicators of democracy used by 
prominent assessment indices and assistance agencies. Three priority areas emerge 
from this investigation: electoral process, freedom of expression and rule of law. 
Although there appears to be widespread agreement within the global democracy 
assistance industry over these three priorities, individual organisations proffer various 
explanations to substantiate their importance. I conclude by questioning whether the 
seemingly logical rationales behind these key democracy assistance priorities retain 
their validity when examined from the point of view of ordinary citizens in 
developing countries.     
Democracy Assistance and Assessment  
The vast literature on democracy has been compared elsewhere to a “tangled 
semantic thicket” (Kirkpatrick 1981: 326). Shoring up this assessment, Collier and 
Levitsky (1997) counted 550 nominal variations on the term in their comprehensive 
search for definitions of democracy while Schauer eventually concluded, 
“democracy…rarely appears without a modifier” (1982: 2). Confronted with a range 
of terms signifying assorted degrees of  “democratic imperfection” (e.g. pseudo-
                                                 
9 Multivariate analysis conducted by Knack (2004) provides compelling evidence that no 
correlation exists between foreign aid and improvements in democracy. He further stipulates, 
however, that this analysis should not be taken to indicate that none of the democracy assistance 
initiatives funded by external donors has any effects.  
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democracy, façade democracy), Posner and Young opt to eschew the term 
“democracy” altogether (2007: 137). It is easy to understand their frustration. 
However, to write about democracy assistance policy without ever using the word 
democracy seems to me to belabour the point. Indeed, significant policy differences 
may arise from the idiosyncratic nuances of how particular organisations and 
agencies conceptualise – and subsequently peddle – the virtues of democracy. 
It is not, however, my objective in this chapter to provide a comprehensive 
overview of global democracy assistance policy; reviews of that nature have been 
complied elsewhere (Burnell 2000, Carothers 1995, Carothers and Ottaway 2005, 
Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi 2000, Dichter 2003, Schraeder 2002). Instead, I focus 
on identifying key themes running through the published material of both democracy 
assistance and assessment organisations in order to establish the fundamental 
principles that guide their programmes and projects. While some organisations, 
particularly the development assistance branches of individual governments (i.e. 
USAID, DFID) may have unwritten ulterior motives, perpetually second-guessing 
their published statements would lose sight of the primary objective of this research 
– analysing whether international experts and local non-elites interpret democracy 
and complex issues of democratic development in similar, or at least compatible, 
ways. 
In this section, I distil the essence of what Ricci (1984: 299) calls a “small 
conversation,” identifying the ways in which this highly influential though finite 
community identifies and addresses its goal of improving the quality of political 
governance in developing countries. Although there are semantic and theoretical 
reasons to distinguish between democracy and good governance, empirically the 
policy objectives of organisations and indices coalesce around a few salient variables 
regardless of whether their language endorses the “good governance” or 
“democracy” agenda.  
Additionally, the objectives of good governance and democracy tend to 
merge; Schraeder, for instance, asserts that “democracy aid should be targeted 
toward fostering ‘good governance’ ” (2002: 230), while Hibou notes that good 
governance is “essentially the establishment of…political systems similar to those in 
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the industrialised democracies” (2002: 173).10 Similarly, although neither the World 
Bank nor Freedom House purports to measure democracy directly, both are 
commonly cited alongside the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, which do explicitly rank democracy. Furthermore, all 
four of these indices purport to measure the quality of similar indicators, including 
political freedoms, civil liberties, and accountability. Rather than climbing aboard the 
semantic merry-go-round, throughout this thesis I use the single term democracy 
assistance to refer to the efforts of these organisations for two reasons. First, this 
agenda, regardless of the language used, centres around promoting institutions of 
governance that advance the common good and reflect the general will of society 
(Shapiro 2003: 146). Secondly, good governance has the additional objective of 
making economic markets work better whereas I am narrowly interested in 
perceptions of political development. 
The pursuits of democracy assessment and democracy assistance coexist in a 
symbiotic relationship. Organisations engaged in democracy assessment including 
Freedom House, Bertelsmann Stiftung, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World 
Bank and Polity IV endeavour to assess the status of various aspects of democratic 
governance; policy makers at prominent organisations ranging from USAID and 
DFID to International IDEA and NDI devise and implement projects conducive, in 
theory anyway, to improving these results. Moreover, a country’s ranking on 
democracy indices can help determine its allocation of democracy assistance funds. 
The Millennium Challenge Corporation, for example, establishes eligibility for 
further development assistance based on 17 indicators including those measured by 
Freedom House and the World Bank (Millennium Challenge Corporation n.d.).   
The product of this interaction is an appreciable cohesion of democracy 
assistance and assessment, with professionals engaged in different aspects of this 
discussion using the same catch phrases and working (more-or-less) toward a 
common goal. In this section, I begin by studying a selection of democracy 
assessment indices before moving on to the policy statements of a collection of key 
                                                 
10 In his brief account of the history of the good governance concept in Africa, Mkandawire 
likewise associates good governance with state-society relations that are democratic and 
respectful of the rights of citizens (2007: 680). 
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democracy assistance agencies. What emerges is a broad consensus on the part of 
those who would influence “from the outside the political process inside a country” 
over the objectives of governance assistance (Leininger 2010: 64, emphasis original). 
How Democratic Development is Measured – Indices  
“The existence of different definitions of democracy,” Landman and 
Häusermann observe, “necessarily means the existence of different measures of 
democracy” (2003: 85). There are currently at least six comprehensive democracy 
indices in circulation, each with its own methods for measuring democratic 
performance and thresholds for categorisation (see Table 1). The best known of 
these is published by Freedom House;11 other indices included here are published by 
the World Bank, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Polity IV, the Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation and Bertelsmann Stiftung. All of these indices are updated at regular 
intervals and are prominently recognised within the wider democracy assistance 
community. Moreover, they attempt to empirically assess the progress of countries 
toward democracy, rather than predict democratic trends based on variables chosen 
for their relevance to a particular political theory.12  
Published by a diverse array of independent organisations, these indices give 
the appearance of being autonomous measures of generally comparable variables.13 
As  Erkkilä  and  Piironen  illustrate,  however,  “this is…a misplaced  belief” (2009a:  
                                                 
11 The country ratings complied by Freedom House result in broad classifications and do not 
technically result in an ‘index’. Indeed, Gastil, who complied the first survey published in 1973, 
insists: “It would not be useful to try to rank all 165 or so independent nations in one list, like 
tennis players” (1985: 162). Assessments made by Freedom House do, nevertheless, result in a 
clustered numerical categorisation of states. In so doing, Freedom House reports enable – even 
encourage – comparison of democratic credentials between countries. It is, therefore, reasonable 
to include Freedom House among producers of democracy indices for the purposes of this study. 
12 I have not included Vanhanen’s (1997) comprehensive study of democratic development 
primarily because it aims to predict democratic thresholds rather than measure democratic progress. 
It does not attempt to rank or otherwise index countries, nor is it updated regularly. Polity IV and 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators do not produce comparative indices; they 
do, however, monitor the political characteristics of individual states over time. A tool for 
comparing country performance on various indicators is available on the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators website, but it does not explicitly rank countries in the way an 
index does. 
13 The intricacies of individual index methodologies are beyond the scope of this research. For a 
technical critique of the standards of assessment maintained by a selection of democracy indices 
CHAPTER ONE 
27 
 
Table 1: Indicators of Democracy Used By Assessment Indices
 
Index Indicators 
Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index 
Produced by: Bertelsmann-Stiftung 
125 developing countries 
stateness, political participation, rule of law, stability of 
political institutions, political and social integration, 
elections 
EIU Democracy Indexa 
Produced by: The Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
167 countries 
electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the 
functioning of government; political participation; 
political culture 
Freedom in the World 
Produced by: Freedom House 
193 countries and 15 disputed 
territories 
electoral process, political pluralism and participation, 
functioning of government, freedom of expression and 
beliefs, associational and organisational rights, rule of law, 
personal autonomy and individual rights 
The Ibrahim Index 
Produced by: The Mo Ibrahim 
Foundation 
53 African Countries 
safety and rule of law, participation and human rights, 
sustainable economic opportunity, human development, 
elections 
Global Trends in 
Governance 
Produced by: Polity IV 
163 countries 
executive recruitment, executive constraints, political 
participation 
World Governance 
Indicators: Voice and 
Accountabilityb  
Produced by: The World Bank 
212 countries 
participation in selecting the government, freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, a free media, (rule of 
law*) 
* Rule of Law is a separate World Governance Indicator 
Sources: Unless indicated otherwise (below) all information is available on the respective 
organisations’ websites. 
a  Economist Intelligence Unit (2007: 2) 
b The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 
(2007: 2) 
                                                 
see Munck and Verkuilen (2002) and the subsequent discussion that occurred in Comparative 
Political Studies (Vol. 35 No. 1). 
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141). They go on to point out that the apparent conceptual consensus underwriting 
indices is easily explained by the working relationships – the small conversations – 
that exist between members of the various organisations producing them: 
In addition to the direct sharing of data, the conceptual consensus in the 
background of objectifications of good governance results in a range of activities: 
joint conferences, seminars, workshops, and publications… Developers of indices 
also use other indices to validate their own products; more than disqualifying the 
other, this relatively soft contrasting in effect serves to legitimate them both. 
(Erkkilä and Piironen 2009a: 141, also see Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003)  
The World Bank Governance Assessment, for example, is in actuality a compilation 
of assessments made by other organisations including Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
Freedom House, and the Economist Intelligence Unit. The Mo Ibrahim Foundation 
similarly includes Bertelsmann Stiftung, Freedom House, and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit among the sources for its index. Regional barometer public opinion 
surveys (e.g. Afrobarometer, Latinobarómetro) inform the country rankings of 
numerous indices, including the Economist Intelligence Unit, the World Bank and 
Freedom House. Although these indices project an air of scientific objectivity, on 
reflection their individual assessments are less autonomous than they first appear 
(Gastil 1985: 171). 
The conceptual consistency that Erkkilä and Piironen allude to is clearly 
evident in Table 1. All six democracy assessment measures include political 
participation as an indicator of democratic governance, for instance. Participation in 
the political process, particularly via elections but also through civil society 
organisations and political parties, should lead to representation in political decision 
making (Santiso 2000: 170). Similarly, The Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom 
House and the World Bank all evaluate evidence of an electoral process when 
measuring democratic development.14  Indeed, “the best established mechanism for 
giving citizens voice,” from the perspective of the World Bank, “is the ballot box” 
(Santiso 2000: 171). Even so, freedom of expression is a third indicator of 
democratic development used across several indices and is likewise included in the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s appraisal of civil liberties. A final indicator measured 
                                                 
14 The World Bank looks for “participation in selecting the government,” but in practical terms 
this is based largely on the quality of electoral contests as measured by Afrobarometer, The 
Global Integrity Index, Gallup World Poll, and Freedom House (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2009). 
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by multiple indices is rule of law. While other indicators are used less regularly to 
round out the democracy assessments produced by individual organisations (e.g. 
stateness, political culture), these four variables are widely acknowledged to 
contribute to democratic practice (see, for example, Barber 2003, Diamond 2008a, 
Grugel 2002, Santiso 2000, Scott 2002, Weale 2007).  
Though widely accepted among industry and academic establishments, 
democracy indices are not without critics. Some indices, including Freedom House 
and the Economist Intelligence Unit, rank developed and developing democracies on 
the same scale, a method of assessment that Andrews describes as “telling 
developing countries that the way to develop is to become developed” (2008: 383). 
On a similar note, Forje argues that democratic performance rankings crucially fail to 
consider the internal context of individual countries, including the human and 
economic resources at their disposal (1997: 318); it may be worth recognising states 
that have achieved much with little and, conversely, those that have sustained 
relatively weak democratic reforms despite boasting the resources (theoretically) 
conducive to sustained democratic governance. Seleti (1999) and Bradley (2005), 
meanwhile, question the appropriateness of judging African democracies by Western 
criteria, arguing that democracy’s core values (i.e. equality, liberty, etc.) will be 
realised differently in different contexts depending on local factors. Similar 
arguments framed in terms of cultural exceptionalism have also been made for Asian 
(Pye 1985, Zakaria 1994) and Muslim (Filali-Ansary 1999, Kedourie 1994) social 
orders.15 Although certain principles (e.g. rule of law, public participation) are widely 
recognized as intrinsic to democratic governance, critics contend that by presenting 
their findings as facts democracy assessment indices fail to acknowledge the full 
range perspectives from which people observe and judge their governments 
(Andrews 2008: 381, Beetham 1994a: 4, Erkkilä and Piironen 2009a: 131, Erkkilä and 
Piironen 2009b: 1, Parekh 1993: 167, Parry and Moyser 1994: 59-60). 
With the exception of the Polity IV measurement, which is still largely an 
academic exercise, the democracy assessment indices discussed above are not 
                                                 
15 For a critique of cultural relativism see Diamond (2008a: 35) and Weale (2007: 253). 
Additionally, the Ibrahim Index, an African initiative that assesses country performance in areas 
including rule of law, participation and human rights, appears to reconcile international norms 
with African governance. 
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compiled simply to track changes in democratic governance around the globe. The 
organisations that compile these rankings have a “policy-oriented motive” (Erkkilä 
and Piironen 2009a: 125). These indices are marketed and employed as tools that 
monitor the impact of democracy assistance policies, enabling funding bodies to 
draw correlations between the initiatives they finance and identifiable governance 
trends (Leininger 2010: 72, Knack 2004: 262). Consequently, the rankings established 
by democracy assessment indices are not only descriptive of the quality of 
governance in any given country, but are also prescriptive in the sense that they help 
determine areas requiring additional assistance funding (Erkkilä and Piironen 2009a: 
130). I now turn to the international democracy assistance agencies and identify their 
key priorities with regard to democratic governance. 
How Democratic Development is Assisted – Agencies  
The multi-billion dollar democracy assistance industry is founded on the 
simple premise that domestic democratic development in the global south “can and 
must” be encouraged and supported by external support and, where necessary, 
intervention (Rogers 2004: 124). This is not to suggest, however, that democracy 
assistance is “merely a matter of advocacy via an international megaphone” (Price 
2009: 159). While trumpeting the many virtues of democracy is surely one aspect of 
democracy promotion, the rhetoric is grounded and enhanced by pragmatic 
democracy assistance initiatives. Table 2 incorporates the priorities adopted by a 
cross-section of international bodies, government departments, and independent 
foundations all working towards the common goal of embedding democratic 
institutions in developing countries. The organisations discussed here are not a 
representative sample of the entire industry; none of them are from developing 
countries, for example. As some of the most established providers of democracy 
assistance, however, their priorities have shaped the evolution of democracy 
assistance over the past half-century and continue to influence contemporary trends.  
Whereas democracy assessment indices by their very nature rely on well-
defined indicators, the objectives of democracy assistance organisations can be more 
difficult to identify, particularly outside the context of a specific project. In the past, 
those  providing  democracy   assistance  have  tried   “to  do  a  little  of   everything  
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Table 2: Priorities Identified by Democracy Assistance Organisations
 
Organisation Priorities 
The Carter Center 
Country: United States 
elections, accountability, human rights, rule of law, 
participation 
Department for 
International Development 
(DFID)* 
Country: United Kingdom 
state capability, responsiveness, accountability, political 
parties, parliament, the judiciary, the media, and civil 
society, elections, human rights, rule of law 
The Ford Foundation 
Country: United States 
transparency, accountability, responsiveness, effective 
public institutions, participation, freedom of expression, 
human rights 
International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) 
Country: Sweden 
participation, representation, accountability, 
transparency, responsiveness, electoral processes, political 
parties, political institutions 
National Democratic 
Institute for International 
Affairs 
Country: United States  
political parties, citizen participation, electoral processes, 
strong legislatures, accountability, transparency, 
representation, pluralism, strong public-sector institutions 
Open Society Institute 
Country: United States 
accountability, safeguarding fundamental rights, justice, 
freedom of information, human rights, legal reform, public 
administration 
United Nations 
Development Program 
(UNDP) 
Country: Multi-national 
participation, accountability, access to information, 
equal rights, rule of law, electoral processes, human rights, 
public administration 
United States Agency for 
International Development 
Country: United States 
rule of law, elections and political processes, civil society, 
citizen participation, independent media, efficiency, 
responsiveness, accountability 
Westminster Foundation 
for Democracy 
Country: United Kingdom 
political parties, civic participation, elections, rule of law, 
media, human rights, pluralism, representation 
Sources: Unless stated otherwise (below) all information can be found on the respective agency 
websites 
* Department for International Development (2007) 
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according to a template of ideal institutional forms…falling back on a smorgasbord 
of democracy programs based on the vague assumption that they all contribute to 
some assumed process of consolidation” (Carothers 2002: 18). This approach, 
alternatively described as “democracy on the instalment plan” (di Palma 1990: 17, 
also see Burnell 2000: 25) reflects the influence of trends in democratic theory 
including sequentialism (Cammack 1994, Green and Kohl 2007, Mansfield and 
Snyder 2005, for a critique see Berman 2007a, Carothers 2007) and the transition 
paradigm (Blondel 2006, Goodin 1996, Linz and Stepan 1996, Zucker 1991).  
In recent years some analysts have suggested that a split is emerging between 
European and American approaches to democracy assistance. European democracy 
assistance programmes, they observe, have taken on a “developmental” character, as 
evidenced by a general “building-block” philosophy and emphasis on widespread 
technical reform (Carothers 2009a: 18, Youngs 2008: 167). Contemporary European 
aid initiatives rarely focuses on “democracy” as such, instead allocating resources 
according to themes associated broadly with social and economic development as 
well as human rights (Youngs 2008). The American approach to democracy 
assistance, on the other hand, has tended toward more overtly political priorities. Aid 
is often targeted directly at domestic actors perceived to be working for democracy 
including, for example, political parties and the independent media (Carothers 2009a: 
7).  
The distinct contours of American and European democracy assistance 
policies can be traced at least as far back as 1990 when USAID officially adopted the 
Democracy Initiative, cementing democracy promotion as a key facet of this 
organisation’s remit (Hirschmann 1995: 1291, Lawson 1999: 5). Prior to this 
directive, the agency’s rhetoric more closely matched that of its European 
counterparts, advocating less overtly ideological priorities like justice and human 
rights. A shift back towards foundational priorities may be eminent, however; both 
President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have voiced concern that the United 
States has put too much emphasis on elections (Carothers 2009b: 2). Although 
electoral assistance has been one of the more visible signs of USAID’s commitment 
to assisting democracy, Azpuru et. al. seek to dispel the common conception that 
American democracy assistance is “geared only toward ‘free and fair’ elections” 
(2008: 155-157). Citing 16 years of USAID spending records, they demonstrate that 
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funding allocated for “elections” assistance actually comes in fourth behind USAID’s 
other democracy assistance priorities (i.e. rule of law, governance, and civil society). 
Carothers confirms that less than 20% of American funding for democracy 
assistance is earmarked for electoral programmes (2009b: 3). While the financial 
figures may be indisputable, the authors’ evidence that “there is no ‘one size fits all’ 
model” remains somewhat less than convincing as they notably fail to provide any 
compelling evidence that funding earmarked for priorities other than elections is 
actually spent on bespoke projects and initiatives.16  
Despite the appreciable distinctions in how agencies on either side of the 
Atlantic frame their democracy assistance efforts and allocate their sizeable 
resources, they still appear to advocate largely the same objectives as the highlighted 
priorities in Table 2 clearly indicate. All of the organisations surveyed here identify 
either citizen participation or elections as a top priority of democracy assistance, 
reinforcing the “common sense” notion that democratic governance is 
fundamentally dependent on competitive elections (Zakaria 2003: 19, also see Adar 
1999, Huntington 1991, MacIver 1947, Przeworski 1986, Schedler 2001, Schumpeter 
1954, Wedeen 2004). However, as Table 2 also illustrates, there is broad consensus 
within the democracy assistance industry, if not in the academic literature, that 
democratic governance cannot survive by elections alone. Indeed, the emphasis that 
some of these organisations place on priorities including rule of law, accountability, 
and human rights suggests that what they really advocate is a liberal model of 
democracy that recognises the rights of citizens while limiting the power of 
governments (for a discussion of liberal democracy see, for example, Bútora 2007, 
Fukuyama 2007, Grugel 2002, Plattner 1999, Wolf 2007, Zakaria 1997). This is true 
of both American and European democracy assistance organisations. The National 
Democratic Institute proclaims, for instance, that its  “governance programs seek to 
promote effective public-sector institutions and processes that operate in a manner 
consistent with democratic values of transparency, representation, pluralism and 
accountability” (n.d., Democratic Governance) while the Westminster Foundation for 
                                                 
16 According to the dataset compiled by Azpuru et. al. (2008), the “civil society” sub-sector 
accounted for nearly 40% of USAID democracy assistance between 1990 and 2005. 
Unfortunately, however, they do not provide specific evidence that funding earmarked for “civil 
society” initiatives is spent on more bespoke projects than funds dedicated to “elections.”  
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Democracy similarly “believes that a strong constitution and respect for the rule of 
law are essential ingredients of a flourishing democracy” (2010, Rule of Law). In both 
of these instances, democracy is presumed to rely on substantially more than just 
elections.  
As a rule, democracy assistance initiatives tend to incentivise the creation of 
institutions that mimic the form of Western models of democracy. They often put a 
premium on electoral, legislative, and constitutional processes that should first 
encourage (and later ensure) democratic priorities including citizen participation, 
accountability, responsiveness, and rule of law. Indeed, apart from the Open Society 
Institute, all of the democracy assistance organisations included here mention 
institutional reform in the descriptions of their work published on their respective 
websites. Moreover, the prevalence of formal embodiments of these values around 
the world (e.g. electoral commissions, parliaments, high courts) suggests that the 
democracy assistance industry has actually achieved a great deal. Having established 
the institutional and organisations frameworks for democratic governance, questions 
are starting to arise about their functionality. As I pointed out in the Introduction, an 
unprecedented number of states now occupy the uncharted middle ground 
somewhere between democracy and autocracy. Technocratic democracy assistance 
initiatives, though successful at creating hybrid regimes, have thus far largely failed to 
meaningfully engage with the complex social processes, perceptions, and 
expectations that influence political behaviour (Grugel 2002: 136, Smith and Loudiy 
2005, Sørensen 2000). This observation provided the catalyst for this research and I 
will return to it again at the end of this chapter. 
Rather than reassessing the goals of democracy assistance when encountered 
with persistent hybridity, the democracy assistance industry appears to have remained 
largely committed to a standard agenda. One explanation for this may lie in the 
industry’s preoccupation with creating data and measuring performance (Andrews 
2008: 381). Berman posits, however, that the object of democracy assistance may 
have started to shift in recent years in response to the hybrid phenomenon discussed 
in the Introduction. Whereas regime change and the subsequent creation of 
democratic institutions (i.e. democratic transition and consolidation) was once the 
industry’s unmistakable objective, the “real debate,” she argues, has now turned to 
what, if anything, outsiders can do to influence the onward trajectory of states that 
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have already engaged at least minimally with democratic reform (Berman 2007b: 14). 
That may be true; Table 2 indicates, however, that democracy assistance agencies still 
appear to rely largely on “nearly standard portfolios of aid projects consisting of the 
same diffuse set of efforts all over” (Carothers 2002: 18, also see Rakner, Menocal, 
and Fritz 2007: 25, Wunsch 2000: 488). Widely recognised17 priorities of democracy 
assistance organisations (e.g. elections, participation, rule of law, access to 
information) are, moreover, largely shared by democracy assessment indices, 
enabling the industry to “track and celebrate” democracy’s progress (Diamond 1996: 
21-22). I will now turn my focus to electoral process, freedom of expression and rule 
of law, three prominent priorities identified above, in order to ascertain why they 
continue to be such central features of the democracy assistance agenda. 
Three Prominent Themes of Democratic Development  
As indicated above, the democracy assistance industry seems to have reached 
a general consensus over the interconnected fragments deemed necessary for 
democratic governance (Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007: 4, Sklar 1987: 714). As I 
specified in the Introduction, electoral process, freedom of expression and rule of 
law are recurrent themes throughout this research in part because they take 
precedence among a plurality of democracy assistance and assessment organisations. 
In Part II of the thesis, I explore the extent to which non-elites in one region of 
eastern Madagascar concur with the democracy assistance industry’s emphasis on and 
interpretation of these elements of democratic governance. First, however, I address 
the segues between concrete democracy assistance priorities (i.e. electoral process, 
freedom of expression, rule of law) and more abstract notions of accountability, 
responsiveness and participation so often trumpeted by influential organisations 
involved in the democracy assistance enterprise.  
Electoral Process    
Electoral assistance and monitoring remain among the most popular tools in 
the democracy assistance repertoire (Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007: 28). Although 
DFID, for example, adamantly maintains that elections are only one piece of the 
democratic puzzle, this bi-lateral development organisation spent £16.6 million 
                                                 
17 Packenham (1973) goes so far as to suggest that they are taken for granted. 
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(approximately $25 million) in support of Afghanistan’s 2009 presidential elections 
alone (UK Department for International Development 2009). Despite the almost 
farcical outcome,18 Douglas Alexander, the UK Minister for International 
Development at the time, said that his job would have been made “more difficult” 
had the elections not taken place, insisting “we always recognised these elections 
were never going to be perfect” (Gray 2009). This position reflects the international 
community’s long history of endorsing clearly flawed electoral processes (Lawson 
1999: 6, Joseph 1989: 368).  
Why do professionals engaged in democracy assistance cling so steadfastly to 
elections, even in places like Afghanistan where elections are admittedly flawed? 
Collier speculates that the overemphasis of elections was “inevitable,” pointing out 
that “electoral competition can be introduced with great speed even in the most 
unpromising conditions” (2007: 146). Common reasons given by democracy 
assistance and monitoring organisations for focusing on elections fall into three 
broad categories: (i) elections are an identifiable indicator of democracy, (ii) electoral 
processes enable political representation, and (iii) political participation (via elections) 
is a human right. These three lines of reasoning all contribute to the highly visible 
prioritisation of electoral process by the democracy assistance industry. 
Elections are an identifiable indicator of democracy  
It may be feasible to have elections without democracy, but it is virtually 
impossible that any country today could be considered democratic without them. 
Strengthening electoral processes is, therefore, a logical first step in assessing and 
assisting democratic development. This rationale appears prominently on the 
websites of various democracy assistance agencies including the Westminster 
Foundation for Democracy and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). For 
instance, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (2009) identifies elections as 
“a prerequisite for a flourishing democracy,” going on to conclude that electoral 
processes “indicate the state of a country’s democracy.” The NDI, meanwhile, sees 
elections as “a periodic test of the strength of democratic institutions” and specifies 
                                                 
18 See, for example, the first-hand account of Peter Galbraith (2009), former deputy special 
representative of the UN in Afghanistan. 
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that its programmes “promote the integrity” of electoral processes (n.d., Elections). 
When elections and electoral integrity are positioned as central to democracy 
assistance efforts, organisations can illustrate the success of particular projects in case 
studies and country reports by pointing to the deployment of newly trained national 
election monitors or increased voter participation (The Carter Center n.d., National 
Democratic Institute n.d., Who We Work With). Positioned at the forefront of 
election monitoring, The Carter Center alone has observed 79 elections in 31 
countries since 1989 (The Carter Center n.d.). Not only do internationally monitored 
and sanctioned elections demonstrate the democratic credentials of a given country, 
demand for electoral monitoring and support has cemented the role of international 
democracy assistance agencies in domestic electoral processes. 
 Widespread agreement over the utility of identifying democracy at least in 
part by elections also exists among organisations compiling democracy assessment 
indices, which similarly monitor electoral performance as an indicator of democratic 
vitality (see Table 1, above).19 Freedom House, Polity IV, the World Bank, 
Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Economist Intelligence Unit have all designed 
quantitative points-based systems for assessing governance around the world, each of 
which includes an appraisal of electoral performance. Examples of some of the 
questions they use in allocating marks are included in Figure 1.  It is also notable that 
elections are generally the first indicator assessed (i.e. Question 1 on the assessment 
rubric). Freedom House additionally assigns the label “electoral democracy” to 
countries capable of demonstrating (i) a competitive multi-party system, (ii) universal 
adult suffrage, (iii) regular free and fair elections, and (iv) open political campaigning. 
While there is no agreed upon definition of democracy or standardized way of 
measuring its development, there does appear to be widespread agreement among 
organizations tracking the democratic progress of developing countries that elections 
are a necessary, though not alone sufficient, indicator of democracy (for a critique of 
this position see Teivainen 2009). 
                                                 
19 Polity IV’s executive recruitment indicator is based in part on elections. Likewise, the World 
Bank’s criterion of citizen participation in government selection essentially equates to citizen 
participation in electoral processes. 
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Figure 1: Measuring the Quality of Electoral Process
 
Are elections for the national legislature and head of government free?  
Can citizens cast their vote free of significant threats to their security from state or non-state bodies?  
 – The Economist Intelligence Unit, Questions 1 and 5  
To what extent are rulers determined by general, free and fair elections?  
Are the legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
– Bertelsmann Stiftung, Questions 2.1 and PS1 
Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?  
Are the electoral laws and framework fair? 
– Freedom House, Questions 1 and 3 
 
Elections enable political representation  
While elections are widely regarded as a reasonable sign of democracy, the 
international community has been charged with “focus[ing] excessively on a one-off 
highly visible electoral event” (International IDEA n.d.). Some organisations, 
consequently, now recognise elections as only a small blip in a longer-term process of 
citizen representation and interest articulation.20 Merely holding elections, however, 
does not lead to the representation of citizens’ interests in the political system. In 
addition to whether elections are deemed ‘free and fair’, a crucial factor in 
determining whether elections fulfil their representative potential is whether voters 
are offered a genuine choice between competing political parties (Pitkin 1967: 240, 
Santiso 2000: 171). Effective democratic elections rely on political parties to organise 
articulated interests and coalesce likeminded social groups into organisations capable 
of effectively shaping political debate. In this way, political parties transform a basic 
box-ticking exercise into a hard-fought competition and opportunity for change 
(Grugel 2002: 73). Consequently, they have become a widely recognised 
“instrumental necessity” to electoral and democratic processes (Zakaria 2003: 94, 
also see Diamond 2008a, Jupp 1968, Randall 1988, Rosenblum 2008, van Donge 
1995). Before equal voting rights can translate into representative democratic 
governance, voters must be given a choice between competing ideologies or agendas. 
                                                 
20 Democracy indices also rely on a plurality of indicators in addition to elections to assess the 
degree of citizen participation in political processes. 
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Several democracy assistance agencies clearly specify that their support for 
elections is rooted in early preparations for representative electoral processes, rather 
than simple vote counting on the appointed day. Common democracy assistance 
initiatives aimed at enhancing the representative quality of elections include 
supporting political parties and engaging civil society organisations. International 
IDEA, for example, prioritises “enhancing voter confidence” in the electoral system 
and supporting political parties within its electoral assistance portfolio (International 
IDEA n.d.). USAID, which prioritises political parties as a beneficiary of democracy 
assistance, works to promote elections that “offer political parties and civic groups 
an opportunity to organise supporters and share alternative platforms with the 
public” (USAID n.d., Democracy and Governance, also see USAID 2003). The 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy likewise assists in the creation of policy 
based political parties capable of providing the electorate with genuine choice so that 
elections can “act as a litmus test of public support for current government policy” 
(2009, Elections). Finally, the Carter Center (n.d.), widely renowned for its dedication 
to electoral support and monitoring, takes a similar tack by initiating support to civil 
society organisations and voter education efforts “long before election day.” The 
presumption that elections are an important democratic prerequisite informs the 
initiatives of all of these organisations. Instead of valuing elections for their own 
sake, these democracy assistance initiatives emphasise the important role played by 
political parties in the electoral process and subsequent representative governance. 
The role of political parties in developing democracies is not uncontested, 
however. In contrast to the agencies cited above that advocate buttressing fragile 
political parties, some democracy theorists have questioned the suitability of multi-
party competition to the political context in developing countries. Political parties 
may be inappropriate, for example, to societies unused to individualistic forms of 
representation or where interest groups are established primarily along family or 
ethnic lines (Ake 1993: 243, Bradley 2005: 420-421). In such cases, political elites 
might manipulate social divisions and create political parties for the sole purpose of 
gaining power rather than establishing platforms to address widespread social issues 
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(e.g. health, education).21 Moreover, one-party dominance of the political landscape 
can result in rule changes that regulate or curtail who is allowed to participate in 
future electoral contests (Bratton 1998: 63, also see Cammack, Pool, and Tordoff 
1993, Chazan 1979, Ware 1986). Bearing these concerns in mind, party politics could 
actually be the “bane of democratic aspirations” in multi-ethnic, young democracies 
and “cannot be assumed or taken for granted as a universal norm” (Bradley 2005: 
420).  
Blind support for political parties, therefore, poses a similar risk to 
unconditional encouragement of elections, namely the assumption that “in one way 
or another, explicitly or implicitly, willy-nilly…the electoral contest will offer 
tolerable chances of representation to all” (di Palma 1990: 135-136). In Chapter 
Four, I use evidence gathered in eastern Madagascar to illustrate the dire effects of 
one-party dominance of an otherwise fractured party system from the perspective of 
ordinary citizens. Indeed, some people I spoke with suggested that the unbalanced 
power dynamic created by an oppressive ruling party and a fragmented opposition 
undermines the entire electoral process. Encouraging the development of 
representative political parties is easier said than done, however, as an example from 
a USAID funded project demonstrates in Chapter Seven. 
Political participation (through elections) is a human right  
According to Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives [and]…The will of the people shall be the 
basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by 
secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
This holistic approach to elections is consistent with the position outlined above that 
electoral results should represent voter interests. Indeed, participation and 
representation are closely linked when, as the Article states, people participate in 
politics though their elected representatives. Santiso goes so far as to say that 
“participation implies representation,” whether through electoral processes or 
                                                 
21 The out-sourcing of critical policy areas to international institutions (i.e. the IMF, the World 
Bank) has also been cited as a likely explanation for the lack of clear ideological distinctions 
among political parties in third wave democracies (Joseph, 1997: 374). 
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political parties and interest groups (2000: 170 emphasis original, also see Vanhanen 
1992: 22). In order to be meaningful, however, participation must be more than 
merely symbolic (Chazan 1979: 151, Saward 1998: 50). 
In this regard, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
highlights its commitment to “achieving a balance between supporting the ‘act’ of 
voting as exemplified by short-term, event-specific election assistance, and 
supporting the longer-term…processes that help to sustain democratic principles” 
(United Nations Development Program n.d.). These “longer-term” initiatives sustain 
and deepen representative bodies (i.e. political parties, civil society groups) and 
participatory values. The NDI likewise affirms that elections “are a fundamental 
human right linked to a broad array of institutions and the ability of citizens to 
exercise other civil and political rights” (n.d., Elections). This position from the NDI 
alludes not only to political rights (e.g. voting) but also civil liberties conducive to 
other forms of political participation (e.g. free speech and association). The Polity IV 
index takes a similarly ‘big-picture’ approach to democracy assessment, recalling the 
historical evolution of political participation as a right in Western Europe in order to 
explain why electoral participation is a reasonable indicator of democracy anywhere. 
It then applies this “recognition of citizens’ rights to voice and act on political 
opinions” to the creation of democracy and autocracy indicators (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2005: 12). In all of these instances, elections are identified as a vehicle for 
citizen participation in democratic governance, integrating the formal electoral 
process with broader values of political representation and participation. 
In this section, I have sought to unravel why a number of influential 
international democracy assistance organisations prioritise elections – seen to include 
electoral participation and political representation – as a fundamental building block 
of democracy. The democracy assistance efforts briefly discussed above acknowledge 
that legitimate elections must pass both technical scrutiny and the trial of public 
opinion. Citizens need to believe that participation in electoral processes is desirable 
and then actually choose to take part (Diamond 1993: 13-14). To what extent, 
however, do average citizens in developing democracies value their role as electors? 
Do they perceive opportunities for representation and participation in the same way 
that international experts do? While international observers can play a role in 
discrediting fraudulent elections, the data often used to judge whether elections were 
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“free and fair” may not accurately reflect domestic interpretations of elections and 
the regimes they sweep to power. On this point, Marcus and Razafindrakoto (2003) 
have warned that minimalist electoral processes that fail to produce indisputable 
outcomes may actually jeopardise democratic development rather than strengthen it.  
I return to these questions in Part II, but now move on to another priority engrained 
in the democracy assistance agenda: freedom of expression. 
Freedom of Expression  
As Collier bluntly declared: “Elections are not enough” (Collier 2007: 146). 
Though often less prominently displayed than electoral assistance, most international 
democracy assistance and assessment efforts also realise that functional democracy 
requires mechanisms for holding elected political representatives accountable 
between election cycles (Price 2009: 160). Rights of free speech and access to 
information occupy this established, though less conspicuous, pedestal (Weale 2007: 
193, also see Chazan 1979, Lawson 2000, Mackie 1998, Pitkin 1967, Price 2009, 
Whitehead 2002). Rationales for associating theses rights with democracy vary, 
however, ranging from a strong emphasis on freedom of expression as central to 
securing all other democratic freedoms to the more ambiguous assertion that a 
vibrant civil society depends on access to information. Though murky at first, this 
distinction is more than superficial.  
In this section, I will demonstrate that the nature of the assumed correlation 
between free speech and democracy has considerable policy implications. The 
perceived strength of association between freedom of expression and democracy 
gives rise to two very different policy positions with regard not only to freedoms of 
speech and access to information, but to the very model of democracy endorsed. 
Where freedom of expression and democracy are only weakly associated, support for 
free speech and access to information will likely be implicit in stated policy 
objectives. When a strong correlation is identified between freedom of expression 
and democracy, by contrast, explicit policy support for the right to free speech often 
results.  
Free speech is sometimes conceptualised as a tool, an instrument that enables 
or facilitates other processes more central to democracy. A common trend permeates 
the literature on democratic development, conceding that political rights and civil 
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liberties are important insofar as they contribute to an enabling environment for 
minimal electoral competition (see, for example, Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 
Clapham and Wiseman 1995, di Palma 1990, Schumpeter 1954, Vanhanen 1992). 
Practical extensions of this theoretical persuasion would include, for example, the 
ability of people to cast their votes free from intimidation and the ability of 
opposition parties to field candidates to challenge the incumbent. Alternatively, 
protection for freedom of expression or a free press formally enshrined in rule of law 
(e.g. the constitution) may prove sufficient, adherence to the rule of law also being a 
widely acknowledged (pre-)condition of democratic governance, a detail I return to 
below.  
The creation of an informed electorate capable of participating in democratic 
polls that produce results representative of voter interests can likewise be said to 
depend on some degree of access to information via a pluralistic media (e.g. 
newspapers, radio stations, the internet). “For all their shortcomings,” Donnelly 
observes, “free and open periodic elections carried out in an environment with few 
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association do provide a 
relatively reliable gauge of popular political preferences” (1999: 82). Freedom of 
expression and access to information, from this point of view, are acknowledged to 
enable and strengthen democracy but nevertheless remain peripheral to democracy’s 
electoral core.22 
 Policy objectives concurrent with this position similarly allude to freedom of 
expression and freedom of the press in pursuit of predominantly electoral objectives. 
USAID’s adopted policy position, for instance, candidly depicts free speech as an 
ancillary feature of democracy: “For an election to be free and fair, certain civil 
liberties, such as the freedoms of speech, association, and assembly are required" 
(2009: 16). Concrete policy aims in support of free and fair elections, however, 
concentrate on objectives more narrowly relevant to the facilitation of a transparent 
electoral process such as “training election commissions, poll watchers, and 
international election observers” and “developing civic and voter education 
                                                 
22 A slightly different argument holds that freedom of speech and access to information are both 
features of “liberal democracy” but are not necessary for a country to be considered an electoral 
democracy (see, for example, Diamond 1999, Zakaria 2003). 
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techniques” (USAID n.d., Democracy and Governance). USAID likewise associates the 
ability of people to express their views publicly and debate policy choices with its 
conceptualisation of a “free society.” Once again, however, freedom of expression is 
implicit in policy objectives such as increasing the advocacy skills of NGOs (USAID 
2005). While this organisation recognises freedom of expression and the existence of 
a free press as inherent to democracy, it does not appear to adopt policy positions or 
develop democracy assistance initiatives that focus explicitly on this issue. The 
contrast between implicit and explicit identification of free speech as an issue for 
democratic development will become more pronounced when the position taken by 
USAID is juxtaposed with those of other organisations below.  
Another, more compelling argument portrays freedom of expression and 
access to information as defining features of democracy, without which meaningful 
political participation is impossible. “The right to freedom of speech and expression” 
is, for instance, the first in Saward’s long list of “logically necessary conditions of 
democracy” (1994: 16, also see Cammack, Pool, and Tordoff 1993: 131, Forje 1997: 
317, Schmitter and Karl 1991: 78). Haworth similarly emphasises free speech as an 
“empirically necessary condition” for democracy (1998: 185). Both of these 
arguments concentrate on democracy in practice. In other words, they distinguish 
freedom of expression as a necessary prerequisite to any other substantial 
manifestation of democratic participation – including electoral participation. This 
stands in contrast to the implicit recognition of free speech as a mere facilitating 
condition, above. Indeed, freedom of expression and access to information make 
intrinsic contributions to democratic practice in three distinct ways: participation, 
preference formation and articulation, and accountability. 
Free speech and political participation  
Democratic participation entails more than just voting in periodic elections, it 
requires staying informed of current events and policy issues in order that votes cast 
accurately reflect the voters’ interests and opinions (Diamond 1993: 13, also see 
Barber 2003, Dahl 1971, Parry and Moyser 1994, Pateman 1970). Recognising that 
democracy begins with the everyday practice of ordinary people, attention must be 
paid to how people communicate with others, particularly in the public sphere (Chan 
1999: 216, Smith and Loudiy 2005: 119). While this can include identifying 
representative processes and opportunities for collective decision-making, freedom 
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of expression and participation in public life must equally be open to individuals, 
including new or previously submerged voices (Sunstein 1993: 246-247).  
Organisations engaged in monitoring democratic progress around the world 
often latch on to participation as a quantifiable measure of democratic strength. 
Indeed, apart from the Worldwide Governance Indicator Voice and Accountability, all 
of the democracy assessment measures listed in Table 1 include participation among 
their chosen indicators. In measuring ‘participation’ these organisations do not, 
however, turn to easily quantifiable readings of voter turnout. Indeed, participation is 
rarely linked directly to elections, referring instead to public participation between 
election cycles. A selection of questions used by various democracy assessment 
indices to determine country rankings for participation is included in Figure 2. In 
each of these cases, freedom of expression and the presence of a free press are used 
to gauge the ability of people to participate in public life. Greater opportunity for 
participation contributes directly to higher democracy and good governance 
rankings. While it is unlikely that a country would score well on participation 
indicators in the prolonged absence of regular elections, these indicators clearly 
identify participation as a democratic good in and of itself without reference to 
electoral procedure.  
Democracy assistance priorities identified by some key organisations 
demonstrate similar concern over openings for ordinary people to participate in 
democratic governance beyond voting in periodic elections. International IDEA 
(2005) states outright that a “culture of participation” is essential to democracy, 
identifying  policy  objectives  that  enable  citizens  to  acquire  a  political voice (e.g.  
Figure 2: Measuring Political Participation
 
Is there freedom of expression and protest (bar only generally accepted restrictions such as banning advocacy of 
violence)? 
– Economist Intelligence Unit, Question 46 
To what extent can independent political and/or civic groups associate and assemble freely? 
To what extent can citizens, organisations, and the mass media express opinions freely?  
– Bertelsmann Stiftung, Questions 2.3 and 2.4 
Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? 
Is there open and free private discussion? 
– Freedom House, Questions D1 and D4 
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media pluralism, an active civil society, competitive political parties). The Ford 
Foundation (2010a), meanwhile, singles out Freedom of Expression as a unique 
policy area separate from both Human Rights and Democratic and Accountable 
Government because “free expression is central to all other freedoms.” The Ford 
Foundation’s (2010b) work in this area aims to develop “a better-informed and 
engaged citizenry” which “is essential to strengthening democratic practice and 
securing social justice.” The Carter Center (n.d.), likewise links civil society to 
participation and participation to democracy, providing support to civil society 
groups with the specific aim of enabling active democratic participation, particularly 
among marginalised communities. This explicit focus on freedom of expression and 
more nuanced understanding of the practical impacts of this right on democracy 
contrasts sharply with the implicit respect for free speech briefly outlined in the case 
of USAID, above. And while DFID similarly identifies civil society as a potential 
partner and beneficiary, the interdependence it recognises between civil society, 
participation and democracy remains considerably more tenuous than the positions 
of other organisations briefly surveyed here.  
The relationship between participation in public debate and democracy in 
developing countries is well documented, if sometimes tumultuous. Once people 
have become accustomed to political participation, restricting their ability to engage 
in public debate by curtailing freedom of speech and the press can result in more 
violent outbursts. Bratton and van de Walle document the prevalence of this 
phenomenon across Africa in the 1980s, noting that populations habituated to mass 
political participation through regular, non-competitive post-independence elections 
generally found new outlets for participation (i.e. strikes, protests) (1997: 142-143). 
Like Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya and Zambia, Madagascar has 
historically experienced a “high frequency” of political protest (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997: 141). Possible explanations for why Malagasy society routinely resorts to 
protest as a mode of political participation are examined in detail in Part II. Whereas 
social unrest has sometimes been used as an excuse for clamping down on free 
speech, Warburton advocates “extensive protection” of this right, arguing: “without 
it government could not be genuinely participatory” (2009: 3). 
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Preference formation and articulation  
A second, though somewhat less evident, link between freedom of 
expression, access to information and democratic governance revolves around the 
crucial processes of preference formation and articulation. Before casting their 
ballots, voters “have an interest in hearing and contesting a wide range of opinions 
and having access to facts” that will enable them to identify and act in their own best 
interests (Warburton 2009: 3). Sen also identifies freedom of expression and 
discussion as “pivotal” political rights, noting the constructive role they play in the 
formation of values and priorities (Sen 1999a: 96). In order for freedom of 
expression to play this vital role, individuals must have open access to information 
upon which they can form individual preferences, including candid communication 
with their fellow citizens (Frankel 1962: 36). 
Political competition and participation cannot be genuine unless people have 
the capacity – and the opportunity – to make an informed choice (Ng 1997: 22). 
Without access to information, conversely, people cannot possibly cast their votes 
intelligently (Sunstein 1993: 252). For this reason, Schauer logically concludes, 
“denying access to…information is as serious an infringement of the fundamental 
tenets of democracy as would be denying the right to vote” (1982: 38). Restrictions 
on freedom of expression and access to information, therefore, weaken the very 
foundations of democratic society, rendering subsequent electoral processes suspect 
(Coliver 1998: 18). Where a genuine capacity to make an informed choice is lacking, 
democracy exists in name only (Cammack, Pool, and Tordoff 1993: 131). 
Current policy positions adopted by democracy assistance agencies also 
exhibit recognition of this important association between democracy and freedom of 
expressions. Among them, DFID identifies one’s ability to access alternative sources 
of information as fundamental to processes of social decision-making. This 
organisation accordingly supports “a range of partners” to “provide an environment 
in which freedom of information and expression can be promoted” (UK 
Department for International Development 2007: 19, 65). What form this advocacy 
takes varies from country to country, sometimes resulting in initiatives targeting civil 
society or political parties and in other contexts pushing for legislative changes 
outright (UK Department for International Development 2007: 65). These sorts of 
policy priorities specifically target individual freedoms of expression and information 
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that this organisation identifies as “crucial” to ensuring that ordinary people can 
influence political decision making processes. The NDI likewise advocates access to 
information as an essential building block of democratic development. This position 
is based on the guiding principle that fully functional democracy depends on citizens 
who know their own best interests and can voice them free from harassment and 
intimidation (National Democratic Institute for International Affairs n.d., Citizen 
Participation). Again, these positions support citizen participation in the political 
domain outside of formal electoral participation as integral to democratic 
development, and understand that citizen participation between election cycles 
crucially depends on freedom of expression. 
Accountability  
Thirdly, freedom of expression and access to information are commonly 
associated with the principle of accountability, another prevalent priority of the 
global democracy assistance industry. Instead of characterising public engagement as 
a way of preparing for elections, not unlike cramming for an exam, active political 
participation can be seen as an ongoing process in which democracy fulfils its 
promise of government by the people. Accountability bridges the gap between 
electoral contests by encouraging governance reflective of the public interest and 
responsive to popular demands (Merkel 2004: 39, O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 7). 
A citizenry capable of monitoring government decisions (i.e. requiring access to 
information) and deliberating these positions openly (i.e. engaging in free speech) can 
prevent elites from acting with impunity. Whereas electoral contests provide a limited 
forum for objection every several years, “individual rights to freedom of political 
speech provide a mechanism for immediate dissent” (Donnelly, 1999: 83). The 
foundation of democratic governance, therefore, is not elections, but rather active 
citizens who know how to hold their elected officials to account, can access 
information relevant to this purpose, and are able to voice dissent without fear of 
retribution.  
Those engaged in assisting and assessing democratic development around the 
world have largely come to a similar conclusion. Accountability is used as an 
indicator of democracy by all of the democracy assistance agencies surveyed here. 
Among democracy assistance organisations, UNDP identifies a free press and 
freedom of expression as essential mechanisms for securing accountable governance 
CHAPTER ONE 
49 
(2006: 116). DFID (2010) and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (2010a) 
take similar positions on the interdependence of government accountability, access 
to information, and freedom of expression. The most forthright argument for free 
speech as a necessary element of democratic accountability, however, comes from 
International IDEA. For this organisation, democracy “requires a set of political 
institutions and processes based on the principles of popular control over public 
decisions” further requiring “equality of…voice between citizens in the exercise of 
that control” (2005: 2). IDEA goes on to specify that citizens acquire political voice 
through “a culture of participation,” demonstrating how the three explicit 
justifications for linking free speech and democracy – participation, position 
formation, and accountability – are themselves interconnected.  
Rule of Law 
Having established the centrality of elections and freedom of expression to 
formal democracy, I turn now to the rule of law. While not irrelevant to successful 
elections, rule of law, like freedom of expression, is principally about what happens 
between election cycles. Modern democracy is founded on the premise that all 
citizens are equal. No one stands above the law, including elected political elites 
(O’Donnell 2004: 33, Cammack 1993: 131, Diamond 1999: 12). Whereas 
constitutional liberalism in now established democracies was mandated gradually in 
response to domestic political bargaining, formal rules in contemporary developing 
democracies were installed as a “strategic tool” for organising and constraining 
contested power relations (di Palma 1990: 135 also see Bates 2001, Zakaria 2003). 
Consequently, the rule of law in many developing democracies today is severely 
truncated (O'Donnell 2004: 42, Rogers 2004: 120).  Legal rights – free speech and 
universal adult suffrage among them – survive in formal constitutions and official 
legal codes. In practice, however, these rights may be subject to varying degrees of 
violation and are only irregularly experienced by the general public. While formal 
laws in hybrid regimes may pass muster, flaws in their application undermine the rule 
of law (O’Donnell 2004: 40). 
The literature on democratic development generally supports an affiliation 
between democracy and rule of law (see, for example, Burnell 2000, Rogers 2004, 
Santiso 2000; for a critique of this perspective see Becker 1999, Zakaria 2003). The 
position adopted by several democracy assistance organizations, discussed below, 
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likewise concentrates on how constitutions underpin democracy and provide critical 
legal foundations for the practice of democratic governance (O'Donnell 2004: 36, 
Saward 1998: 59). However, whereas democracy assistance organisations often 
endorse constitutional reform, democracy theorists are more likely to emphasize the 
importance of constitutional durability and reliability (see, for example, Santiso 2000: 
168, Whitehead 2002: 137). 
 Since the mid-1990s, organisations engaged in measuring and monitoring 
democratic trends have regularly incorporated appraisals of the rule of law into their 
country assessment procedures (Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007: 36). Crucially, in 
evaluating the fortitude of rule of law prominent assessment organisations, including 
Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit, attempt to look beyond 
formal constitutional or legal guarantees of rights (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008, 
Freedom House 2006). Greater emphasis falls instead on the practical fulfilment of 
these rights. That said, accurately measuring the extent to which constitutional rights 
are experienced on the ground remains problematic. A selection of questions drawn 
from the methodologies of various organisations in Figure 3 illustrates the subjective 
ambiguity hidden behind sterile quantitative scoring systems (also see Beetham 
1994b: 33, Browne 2006: 108). In each of these cases, analysts are asked the extent to 
which individual freedoms are protected by the rule of law. Although it is unlikely 
that a country would score well on these indicators if blatant attacks on civil liberties 
and political rights occur routinely, the accuracy of these assessments remains 
questionable where commonplace subversion of the rule of law is less extreme but 
pervasive.  
Figure 3: Measuring Rule of Law
 
The degree to which citizens are treated equally under the law. (Consider whether favored members of groups are 
spared prosecution under the law.)  
– Economist Intelligence Unit, Question 54 
To what extent is there a working separation of powers (checks and balances)? 
To what extent are civil rights guaranteed and protected, and to what extent can citizens seek redress for violations 
of these liberties?  
– Bertelsmann Stiftung, Questions 3.1 and 2.4 
Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, whether by groups that support 
or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and insurgencies?  
Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?  
– Freedom House, Questions F3 and F4 
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It is commonly understood that rule of law provides the cornerstone for 
democratic development, protecting the rights and freedoms conducive to a fair 
political system. Indeed the audit of key democracy assistance agencies carried out 
above suggests that they recognise the potential threat that a weak rule of law poses 
to democracy in developing countries. These organisations appreciate that lasting 
progress in areas of electoral reform and public participation depends on if and how 
well political rights and civil liberties – including voting and free speech rights – are 
protected by the rule of law. Salient features of rule of law identified by democracy 
assistance organisations include  “a free and fair political system” (International 
IDEA n.d.) and a democratic legal system that reinforces constitutional protection 
for individual rights (The Carter Center n.d.). DFID adopts a similar approach to 
addressing the rule of law, arguing that democracy requires a constitutional 
framework which “guarantees the rights of the citizen, sets the scene for free and fair 
elections, and gives legitimacy to properly elected governments” (n.d.: 3). In all of 
these cases, rule of law contributes to the durability of democracy by safeguarding 
some of its most basic features (i.e. individual rights, fair elections). Specific policy 
support for rule of law, however, is somewhat less pervasive than assistance targeted 
at either elections or free speech. 
Rhetoric can only take us so far. More important is how democracy 
assistance organisations address pervasive perversions of the rule of law in practice. 
While many of the organisations reviewed here claim to support initiatives aimed at 
strengthening rule of law (see Table 2), factual evidence of this remains surprisingly 
sparse. The funding objectives of USAID, International IDEA, and the Westminster 
Foundation for Democracy give some indication, however, of priorities known to 
receive substantial amounts of funding. In 2009, USAID’s Democracy and 
Governance program awarded a budget of $300 million to a consortium of 
contractors tasked with providing “international rule of law technical assistance 
services” to USAID missions in developing countries (2009: 13). Technical services 
covered by this contract range from “justice sector assessments” and “justice sector 
training” to “analysis of linkages between rule of law and economic growth 
objectives” (USAID 2009: 14, also see USAID n.d., Rule of Law). These strategic 
goals in respect to rule of law demonstrate USAID’s prioritization of constitutional 
reform and justice services.  
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International IDEA and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, 
meanwhile, are somewhat more direct about their activities targeted at strengthening 
rule of law in developing democracies. International IDEA is currently in the process 
of developing various resources, including a handbook and training curriculum, 
offering general guidance and comparative examples on the topic of constitutional 
development. At country level, IDEA (n.d.) currently plays a supportive role in 
constitution building in Bolivia, Georgia and Nepal. The Westminster Foundation 
for Democracy appears to take a slightly different approach to strengthening rule of 
law, focusing on grass-roots training instead of wholesale constitutional reform. 
Providing funding for grass-roots paralegal training initiatives in Uganda is one 
concrete example of this approach (Westminster Foundation for Democracy 2010b, 
2010c). Distinct from the initiatives of the other two organisations briefly addressed 
above, principal priorities of this project include educating people of their existing 
rights and providing community-level advocacy training. Whereas equal treatment 
under the law takes priority in USAID and IDEA initiatives, this Westminster 
Foundation for Democracy funded project emphasizes equal access to the law.  
The idea of equality also takes precedence in some of the literature (Merkel 
2004: 40).  That no one is above the law – including political leaders – distinguishes 
democracy from other forms of governance. The fundamental rights characteristic of 
democratic constitutions (e.g. to a fair trial, protection against arbitrary arrest) 
guarantee, in theory, both equal access to the law and equal treatment under it. 
Initiatives aimed at educating and empowering citizens with regard to their legal 
rights, like the project in Uganda funded by the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy, clearly fit within the parameters set by academic theory on democratic 
development. International advisors can play only a limited role, however, in framing 
expectations for rule of law. The norms and assumptions that ordinary people apply 
in quotidian daily encounters also shape how laws are applied and the extent to 
which political practice reflects democratic ideals.  
One facet in the literature not directly addressed by organisations that assist 
and monitor democratic development is the ability of constitutions and legislatures 
to constrain executive power (Diamond 2008b, Kapstein and Converse 2008: 64, 
O'Donnell 2004: 32, Welzel and Inglehart 2008, Pitkin 1967: 232, Wedeen 2004: 
278). At the core of this literature rests the conclusion that unless elites face 
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consistent pressure to respect institutional constraints on their power, they will likely 
corrode constitutional restrictions. A strong state, notable for capable central 
government institutions including the executive, simultaneously enables and 
threatens democratic governance (Sejersted 1993: 132). The government must be 
strong enough to get things done. Respect for the constitution and rule of law, 
however, should curb abuse of power and avert descent into illiberal democracy. 
While some responsibility for keeping elites in check surely rests on the shoulders of 
the citizenry, Welzel and Inglehart (2008) overestimate the practical ability of 
ordinary people to exert strong domestic pressure on a domineering executive. Fully 
recognising that foreign democracy advocates cannot force the elites governing 
developing democracies to respect the rule of law, Rogers (2004) argues that the 
international community can – and should – refocus the debate, putting greater 
emphasis on this important facet of democracy. To date, however, there are few 
signs that this is happening.  
Conclusion  
Although there seems to be a general understanding that democracy requires 
widespread acceptance from both the mass public and elites (Fox 1994, O’Donnell 
1996), ordinary citizens are rarely considered more than bystanders to the political 
game once election results have been tabulated (Grugel 2002: 61). The “logical 
possibilities” of democratic governance and democracy assistance are not, however, 
the same as “empirical probabilities in real-world democracies,” at least in part 
because democratic practice cannot be separated from its human agents (Gilley 2009: 
117). The empirical chapters in Part II will explore how ordinary people in one 
eastern region of Madagascar perceive the electoral process and their role as voters, 
opportunities for freedom of expression, and the rule of law at street level. The 
implications of socio-political attitudes and perceptions are difficult to predict (Weale 
2007: 245). Nevertheless, common points of view identified in eastern Madagascar 
can contribute to a more nuanced interpretation of the 2009 political crisis as 
illustrated in Chapter Seven. 
“Once we acknowledge that there is more to democratic life than a 
universally applicable one-size-fits-all, minimalist model of democracy,” possibilities 
begin to emerge for alternative incarnations of democracy that more closely 
correspond with local socio-political logic and the needs of ordinary people (Dryzek 
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and Holmes 2002: 9, also see Diamond, 2008a: 316, Bradley 2005: 427, Nazarea et. 
al. 1998: 168). It turns out that ‘democracy’ is itself a contested concept, once you 
begin to ask people what it means to them (Dryzek and Holmes 2002: 4). Before 
examining the contested nature of democracy in the Antsinanana region of 
Madagascar, however, it is necessary to conceptualise political culture and its 
implications for the “deep politics of society” (Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor 2003: 21, 
also see Migdal 2001, Sklar 1987). In the following chapter, I discuss why the 
concept of political culture has attracted so much controversy and propose how it 
might yet contribute to analysis of democratic development. 
  55 
CHAPTER TWO: ENGAGING THE POLITICAL CULTURE CONTROVERSY 
Political culture is one of the most popular  
and seductive concepts in political science;  
it is also one of the most controversial and confused. 
(Elkins and Simeon 1979: 127) 
The established indicators of and criteria for democratic development 
discussed in Chapter One suggest that democratic development can be assisted and 
monitored in an objective, technocratic way. But how well can we assess or, indeed, 
assist democratic development in other societies without first discovering how 
politics and democracy are understood locally? Do “internal models of reality” 
coincide with those of international experts (Keesing 1974: 90)? And if not, do the 
consequences matter? The international democracy assistance industry has 
historically eschewed discussion of political culture (Muller and Seligson 1994: 635). 
Compelling signs are beginning to emerge, however, that the policy community may 
be putting a new premium on indigenous knowledge (see, for example, de Lange 
2010: 22, Dietz et al. 2009: 19, Hyden 2010). Recent reports published by the UK 
Department for International Development (2006, Armon 2007) and the Advisory 
Board for Irish Aid (Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007) note the importance of 
‘culture’ while Sweden’s Ambassador for Democracy has likewise identified 
democratic culture as a “key feature” of sustainable democracy (International IDEA 
2008: 5). Even the World Bank now acknowledges that the “perceptions, 
impressions, and views” of citizens matter (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009: 
4).  
Rhetoric aside, however, democracy assistance providers continue to fall 
short of addressing problems associated with measuring, interpreting, or evaluating 
the relationship between political culture and democratic development. The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, for example, includes a “political culture” indicator in 
its index rankings. Heavily reliant on survey data, this indicator purports to measure 
variables including social cohesion, perceptions of leadership and separation of 
church and state, but neglects to interpret these “scores” in a contextualised way 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2008: 26-27). Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz (2007) 
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likewise recognise the evolution of a democratic political culture as crucial to 
democratic consolidation; they provide little indication, however, of how 
international democracy assistance in identified key areas of electoral assistance, 
political party support and judicial reform might contribute to this process. There 
seems to be growing consensus that the domestic context in which democracy 
assistance occurs matters. The next step, however, must be to develop tools that 
enable those engaged in democracy assistance to develop policies that reflect this 
paradigm shift away from technocratic blueprints. 
This chapter dissects the political culture concept with the objective of 
identifying how political culture variables might be studied empirically, a necessary 
precursor to the inclusion of cultural considerations in processes of policy formation, 
implementation, and analysis. If the development community is going to do more 
than pay lip service to this contentious topic, tools must be identified for measuring, 
interpreting, and evaluating local political culture(s) and gauging how these relate to 
democracy assistance objectives. This chapter begins by situating the culture concept 
in historical context and addressing why it is mired in controversy. I go on to 
reconceptualise political culture as a particular political worldview identifiable from 
patterns of individual competences and dispositions. I conclude the chapter by 
reformulating Held’s (2006) astute question What should democracy mean today? to What 
does democracy mean here? In so doing, the primary focus of inquiry shifts away from 
theoretical conceptualisations of and criteria for democracy to those that can be 
identified empirically in hybrid regimes like Madagascar.  
The Culture Concept in Historical Context 
 At one time or another, culture has been claimed by all of the social sciences 
(see, for example, Almond and Verba 1963, Eckstein 2000, Etounga-Manguelle 2000, 
Frake 1962, Fukuyama 1995, Handelman 1999, Kavanagh 1972, Pateman 1971, Sen 
1998, Starr 2007, Tully 1995, Willey 1929, Zucker 1991). In recent years, the 
contestability of this concept has even penetrated its native field of anthropology.23 
Political culture, meanwhile, has been used to variously account for the legitimacy of 
                                                 
23 For an overview of this discussion, see Bashkow (2004), Boggs (2004), Clausen (1996), 
Coombe (1991), Feinberg (1994), Gupta and Ferguson (1997), Handler (2004), Lewis (1999), 
Rosenblatt (2004) and Shore (1996). 
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a political system (Almond 2000), the functioning of a political system (Pansters 
1997), and the perceived role of a political system (Nuijten 2003). A disputed 
concept in its own right, political culture is generally understood to encapsulate the 
perspective from which individuals and groups interpret both political institutions 
and the political behaviour of fellow citizens, including political elites and elected 
representatives. Moreover, it provides a useful mechanism for distinguishing that 
worldview from the formal and informal institutional rules that govern society 
(Monaghan and Just 2000: 54, also see Kelly and Bening 2007, Mackie 1998, 
Mohamed 2007), a consideration discussed further below. A brief examination of the 
history of the culture concept in political science helps shed some light on why 
political culture is so contentious and how difficulties often associated with this 
concept might be overcome. 
The Civic Culture 
The idea of political culture has been traced back to ancient Greece (Obeidi 
2001). However, its modern incarnation – and much of the controversy – is rooted 
in the civic culture concept developed by Almond and Verba in the 1960s. Having 
defined political culture as “the political system as internalised in the cognitions, 
feelings, and evaluations of its population,” Almond and Verba go on to identify 
particular political culture variables that they believe are conducive to democratic 
governance (1963: 14, also see Bourdieu 1990). From their study of five countries, 
these authors conclude that a “balanced” political culture (i.e. the civic culture), in 
which political activism is tempered by “passivity, traditionality, and commitment to 
parochial values,” is not only compatible with but reinforces democratic governance 
(Almond and Verba 1963: 32). This hypothetical equilibrium is notable for its 
combination of civic activism (widely associated with democratic participation) and 
the simultaneous political passivity of most citizens. The defining feature of the civic 
culture, then, is moderation: “there is awareness of political issues, yet such issues are 
not the most salient for the ordinary man; there is involvement in politics, but the 
involvement is not intense” (Almond and Verba 1963: 500). While any number of 
political cultures may be demonstrated to exist, they argue that only the civic culture 
– characterised by a fusion of active participation and docile passivity – is conducive 
to democratic governance.  
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Like most research, this study was a product of its time. Adherents of 
modernisation theory, Almond and Verba presumed that a certain level of economic 
development underpinned the civic culture and, consequently, they did not consider 
the possibility that poor countries might also undertake the democratic experiment. 
Similarly, Almond and Verba’s seminal work champions a profound understanding 
of civic duty, a feature of the civic culture seemingly at odds with the liberal 
individualism typical of contemporary Western political culture. Indeed, Almond has 
publically recognised that the civic culture “has had its day,” concluding that the 
collapse of communism dramatically altered both international and domestic political 
environments and largely undermined the civic culture equilibrium in the process 
(1996: 10). Even so, Almond remained convinced of the interpretive power of 
political culture and advocated new research into the complex relationship between 
democracy and contemporary socio-political expectations. In acknowledging The 
Civic Culture’s shortcomings, Verba likewise stressed that their theory provided the 
impetus for other scholars to go “several steps further” (1989: 395). Indeed, while 
the civic culture remains the most widely recognised articulation of culture within 
political science, the spread of democracy has prompted fresh discussions of the 
democracy-culture equilibrium. 
Democratic Culture, Revisited 
Like most political theories, the civic culture eventually fell out of fashion. 
Then, in 1988, Inglehart published an article in the American Political Science Review 
claiming: “over half the variance in the persistence of democratic institutions can be 
attributed to the effects of political culture alone” (1988: 1220). Pointedly critical of 
the overemphasis that rational choice theory puts on economic variables, Inglehart 
sets out to demonstrate how models of development that ignore cultural factors 
remain incomplete. Likening culture to a “syndrome” of attitudes, Inglehart identifies 
a correlation between high levels of interpersonal trust and political satisfaction to 
the endurance of democratic institutions (1988: 1216). The article concludes that 
political culture is an “intervening variable” between economic growth and 
democratic stability, providing evidence that democratic governance is not the 
product of economic development alone (Inglehart 1988: 1229).  
Insufficient data was available in 1988 to conclusively establish this 
relationship; by 2005, however, Inglehart and Welzel could draw on copious amounts 
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of survey data to credibly suggest that political culture provides the bridge between 
economic growth and democracy. Economic development, they argue, creates an 
environment of existential security, which in turn gives rise to increased self-
expression values and political democracy. “Genuine democracy,” therefore, “is not a 
machine that, once set up, will function effectively by itself,” but rather an expression 
of human emancipation dependant on the aspirations of ordinary people (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005: 300). 
Lipset24 and Lakin (2004) have also recently advocated the revival of political 
culture, contending that democratic governance requires particular structures of 
political relationships and obligations. Critical that the civic culture concept focused 
too narrowly on the attitudes of citizens toward state institutions, Lipset and Lakin 
propose what they describe as an alternative, distinctively democratic culture concept 
(2004: 202). Specifically, these authors argue that that democratic culture is “rooted 
in secularism, tolerance, liberal individualism, [and] respect for and obeisance to the 
rule of law” (Lipset and Lakin 2004: 197-198). Democratic governance, they 
continue, requires a society to “swallow these values and adapt them to its own” 
(Lipset and Lakin 2004: 197-198). Lipset and Lakin state that prescribed democratic 
values must be “adapted” to fit the local culture, but the insinuation runs through the 
book that local cultures must, in effect, adopt these values as well as democratic 
institutions. They do concede, however, that sufficiently stable democracy requires 
only relative – not absolute – adherence to these norms. Indeed, this argument 
echoes previous positions advocated by Braybrook (1968) and Kirkpatrick (1981) 
who have similarly argued that values including individual liberty, political 
representation, and limited government should not be “defined away” as increasingly 
diverse states vie to gain the democratic stamp of approval. 
Culture Critics and Conceptual Truncation 
Critics of the culture concept in political science question whether the 
inclusion of a culture variable does indeed help explain the persistence of democracy. 
                                                 
24 Lipset’s interest in the complex relationship between society, politics, and democracy can be 
traced back to the middle of the last century (Lipset 1959, Lipset 1960, Lipset and Lowenthal 
1961). While his long career undoubtedly influenced the conclusions proposed in The Democratic 
Century, in this discussion I remain narrowly focused on Lipset’s final analysis of the interplay 
between culture and democracy. 
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What is it about culture that matters, precisely? Muller and Seligson (1994), for 
instance, carefully pick apart Inglehart’s (1988) claim that culture can explain a 
significant amount of variance in the persistence of democratic institutions. In brief, 
their study subjects Inglehart’s variables to a more complex modelling technique. By 
breaking the political culture concept down into its component parts, Muller and 
Seligson found that, rather than accounting for over half the variance of the stability 
of democratic institutions as Inglehart claimed, only the percentage of the population 
that prefers gradual reform (as opposed to revolutionary reform or no reform at all) 
has any positive correlation with democratic change (1994: 646-647). Moreover, 
Muller and Seligson found that interpersonal trust was not a relevant factor in 
democratic development, a conclusion at odds with previous research (Almond and 
Verba 1963, Dahl 1971, Inglehart 1988).  
The analysis completed by Muller and Seligson additionally demonstrated 
that experience of living in a democracy actually enhanced some aspects of 
democratic culture, including levels of interpersonal trust and political competence 
(Muller and Seligson 1994: 635). Therefore, while the results from this exercise 
appear to widely refute Inglehart’s claims about the explanatory power of culture, 
Muller and Seligson also add to the complexity of the debate by suggesting that the 
causal arrow may instead point from democracy to political culture. Schmitter and 
Karl come to the same conclusion, speculating that democratic culture may be the 
product of democratic experience while maintaining that persistent emphasis on the 
civic culture is “misleading” (1991: 83).  
In a similar vein, Przeworski, Cheibub and Limogi insist that people “can be 
taught to behave as democrats” even in places where democratic values have not 
previously prevailed (1998: 127). Instead, they argue, economic and institutional 
factors adequately explain why the democratic experiment succeeds in some 
countries and fails so miserably in others (for a critique, see Gallagher 2002: 338, 
Mainwaring 1999: 35-38). Ties between economic growth, political development, and 
cultural change have long been suspected (Almond and Powell 1966, Apter 1965, 
Apter 1987, Huntington 1968, Weiner 1966, Przeworski et al. 1995, Welzel and 
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Inglehart 2008).25 Inglehart’s 1988 study proposed that culture was an “intervening 
variable” between economic growth and political development, a speculation 
substantiated by his later collaboration with Welzel (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
Therefore, while there is some agreement that material progress, cultural change, and 
political – specifically democratic – development are complexly interrelated, 
controversy persists over causal influence and explanatory significance. Indeed, even 
Przeworski (2005, 2006) has expressed acquiescence to the viability of a “culture 
equilibrium” with democracy not dissimilar to that advocated by Almond and Verba. 
He maintains, however, that causal, interpretive power should not be attributed to 
the culture concept in the study of democratic development.  
Additionally, the indicators of culture used in quantitative studies may be 
“too crude” to accurately determine what causal relationship exists, if any, between 
social attitudes and democratic institutions (Muller and Seligson 1994: 647). On one 
hand, research attempting to test the linkages between culture and democracy has 
often truncated culture to religion based on the justification that the concept is 
effectively too complicated to be of analytical use when conceived of in any other 
way (Przeworski et. al. 1998: 125-126, also see Huntington 1997: 57-59, Migdal 2001: 
241). On the other hand, qualitative survey data may be useful in explaining the 
preferences of people in different societies, but its predictive and explanatory 
transferability to quantitative studies remains contested (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 
Przeworski 2006). The very need to conceptualise culture in such a way that it 
becomes suitable for quantitative analysis might be part of the problem. Culture 
cannot be “uncontaminated” of its association with human beings and the settings in 
which they interact and, consequently, requires qualitative analysis capable of 
considering complex social contexts and the more subtle influences of cultural 
attitudes on political behaviour (Keesing 1974: 90).  
 Equally, quantitative assessments of democratic stability and longevity fail to 
consider how democracy works, often relying instead on a minimalist definition of 
electoral democracy. Purely electoral standards, however, tell us very little about 
                                                 
25 The reverse argument – that good (i.e. democratic) governance encourages and enables 
economic development – has gained ground in recent years (see, for example, Light 2001: 75, 
Pankhurst 2000: 155). For a critical assessment of this position, see Lewis (2008). 
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either how states are governed or the political experience and agency of citizens 
(Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007: 16, 28). Indeed, there is considerable disquiet 
within the literature regarding overreliance on electoral evidence in democracy 
assessment and analysis (Carothers 2002, Diamond 1996, Karl 1995). Inglehart and 
Welzel’s (2005) analysis provides a notable exception. In their study, the authors 
largely manage to avoid this pitfall by making the important distinction between 
“formal” and “effective” democracy.  
A Brief Word on Institutions 
The relationship between institutions and culture comes up reasonably often 
in the literature, particularly among institutionalists. Helmke and Levitsky, for 
example, warn that it is “essential not to conflate these two phenomenon” even 
though the border at which they meet “can admittedly be difficult to discern” (2006: 
7, also see Shore 1996: 44). Thelen and Steinmo (1992: 29) and Archer (1995: 11) 
have likewise suggested that not all constraints on behaviour are necessarily 
institutional, and that further study into how institutions interact with other social 
forces is required. Although a growing literature on the prevalence and power of 
informal institutions goes some way in clarifying how people behave politically, it still 
does not adequately explain why (Goodin 1996: 21, also see Bratton 2007, Helmke 
and Levitsky 2006, Lauth 2000).26  
“The rules of a ritual are not a ritual, a grammar is not a language, the rules of 
chess are not chess, and traditions are not actual social behaviour;” rules are not 
irrelevant to social behaviour, but neither can they fully explain it (Flyvbjerg 2001: 
43). The meanings of actions are derived from the context in which they occur. 
Democratic institutions may account for part of that context, but it also has a 
cognitive dimension inseparable from the human participants in democracy. We 
cannot, therefore, accurately grasp the structure and function of institutions in any 
                                                 
26 Habits, understood as context specific repetitive behaviour, occupy the border region between 
institutions and culture. Hodgson attempts to clarify the relationship between culture, 
institutions, and habits, writing: “culture is essentially a complex of shared habits, whereas an 
institution is a system of rules, which in turn are grounded upon shared habits” (2001: 297-298). 
For a selection of culture concepts inclusive of habits, see Bourdieu (1990), Hyden (2010: 16), 
Murphy (1994: 537) and Willey (1929: 206). 
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particular locality without looking beyond them to the social context in which they 
are nestled (Barth 1993: 157, Flyvbjerg 2001: 49, Hutchings 2000: 50).  
Reconceptualising Political Culture   
Democracy is a way of life, not simply a collection of government institutions 
(Barber 1996: 146). In developing countries, the sudden injection of democratic 
institutions has drastically altered the political environment. As Putnam has pointed 
out, however, “that institutional reforms alter behaviour is a hypothesis, not an 
axiom” (1993: 18, also see Dryzek 1996: 122, Grugel 2002: 76, Lawson 2000: 78, 
Light 2001: 90-91). Rather than presuming that societies will adopt democratic 
postures in response to democratic institutions (Schmitter and Karl 1991, Muller and 
Seligson 1994, Przeworski et. al. 1998), we must also consider the possibility that it 
might be democracy that adapts to its new keepers. The objective of this research, 
therefore, is to develop a culture concept capable of identifying the “particular core 
syndrome” integral to the political life of a country (Carothers 2002: 19), at which 
point it becomes possible to at least provisionally determine whether and how local 
logic “complicates” or “resists” established democracy assistance objectives (Ralph 
2000: 215). 
In place of black and white performance indices and quantitative ranking 
systems, in this thesis I attempt to sketch in more subtle shades of gray “how people 
engage in the working out of a particular and distinctive sort of politics in a particular 
and distinctive sort of world” (Geertz 2004: 583).27 Departing from more 
conventional definitions, I conceptualise political culture as the composite lenses 
though which individuals view and interpret their political world. These lenses 
determine not only the visible ‘facts’ of the case, but also opportunities for individual 
agency and the meanings associated with particular sorts of behaviour. Political 
culture is, therefore, both a state of mind and, as Forje argues, a way of living that 
can be analysed alongside and in relation to the parameters set by democratic 
governance (1997: 318). It is my contention that empirical research on political 
culture(s) may reveal alternative interpretations of what might otherwise be labelled 
                                                 
27 Bell (1986: 40), Etounga-Manguelle (2000: 67), Obeidi (2001: 1) and Ross (2000: 40) all share a 
similar understanding of culture. 
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“deviant” behaviour in hybrid regimes. Indeed, it is possible that trends identified by 
international observers as un-democratic may actually represent “desires for 
different, perhaps more authentic, democracy” (Dryzek and Holmes 2002: 15). 
An Alternative Point of View 
I suspect that exactly what culture means “is still up for grabs” for two 
interrelated reasons (Kompridis 2005: 318). First, the sheer abundance of culture 
concepts present in various social science literatures has no doubt contributed to the 
common perception that culture (political or otherwise) is exceedingly difficult to 
define (Keating 2008: 99, Kompridis 2005: 318-319, Lawson 2000: 89). Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn (1952), for instance, identify 164 discrete definitions of ‘culture’ in their 
critical review of the concept. Second, among this profusion of culture concepts are 
some most notable for being “broad and clumsy” (Keesing 1974: 72, 83). The 
difficulty of defining culture can be used as an excuse for falling back on proxy 
definitions, as the conversion of culture to religion above illustrates. The search for a 
quantifiable culture indicator easily identifiable in large-n datasets has further 
contributed to the unsatisfactory nature of culture concepts in political science. 
These challenges, however, are not insurmountable (Keating 2008: 100). 
In this research, I take a different tack. Rather than defining political culture 
as a descriptive variable that can be isolated (and analysed quantitatively), I propose 
that it constitutes an interpretive framework or set of codes deeply embedded in 
society. These codes not only make the external world intelligible, but also instil 
individual actions with particular meaning and significance (Gledhill 2000: 8, Inglis 
1993: 22, Keating 2008: 103, Shore 1996: 68, Simpson et. al. 1961: 524). It is possible, 
moreover, for multiple political cultures to coexist within a society at any given time, 
accounting for why groups of people may interpret a single incident in conflicting 
ways. In stark contrast to conceptualisations that portray (political) culture as 
stagnant norms and values, the cognitive interpretive framework promoted here is a 
dynamic and changeable composite of social learning and individual experience.  
This conceptualisation of culture does not presume to account for everything 
that individuals know about their worlds, but rather how they interpret and make 
broader sense of particular experiences, observations, and human interactions. In 
other words, it is an individual’s “theory of what his fellows know, believe, and 
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mean, his theory of the code being followed, the game being played…” (Keesing 
1974: 89, also see Hyden 2010: 15). Fukuyama (2005) calls this phenomenon “habits 
of the mind” while Geertz (1973) refers to the same idea as “the informal logic of 
actual life.” Dryzek similarly contrasts institutional “hardware” with the cognitive 
“software” that enables it to function (Dryzek and Holmes 2002: 5, also see Dryzek 
1996). Crucially, these ingrained patterns of meaning may not be immediately 
intelligible to outsiders, including other domestic political culture communities and, 
in the case of this research, democracy assistance experts (Dryzek 2005b: 9). 
Somewhat unusual in the context of democracy assistance, this approach to 
understanding the (political) world from the ‘native’s point of view’ has much in 
common with ethnographic research (Brown 2005, Stack 1997, Tucker and Taylor 
2007, Theiss-Morse 1991) and is not dissimilar to reconstructive democratic theory 
(Dryzek and Berejikian 1993).28 These approaches open up the possibility for 
engaging in new discourses, as they pay particular attention to how ordinary people 
‘out there’ explain their political world instead of relying solely on the language used 
in academic or professional circles (Dryzek and Berejikian 1993: 48, Dryzek and 
Holmes 2002: 4). In other words, the focus of research shifts away from identifying 
ideal attitudes and behavioural patterns and toward determining how real people 
understand and experience democracy. Consequently, the purpose of political culture 
research is to neither test nor develop existing theories of democratic development, 
but rather to provide new interpretations of perplexing, observable phenomena (i.e. 
protracted hybrid regimes, the 2009 political crisis in Madagascar).  
Previous approaches to reconciling democracy and political culture have 
often started by identifying particular democratic norms and then proceeded to 
construct or identify supportive cultural patterns,29 leading to a constricted discussion 
within mainstream political science over what political culture is instead of how it 
might be used as an analytical tool (Hyden 2010: 15). The conceptualisation of 
political culture advocated here recommends an alternate approach that begins by 
empirically examining non-elite political cultures in a hybrid regime (Madagascar, in 
                                                 
28 I would like to thank John Parkinson for bringing this body of literature to my attention. 
29 See, for example, Diamond (1993), Ellis and Thompson (1997), Harrison and Huntington 
(2000), Holm (1996), Kavira (1996), Larmour (1996), and Obeidi (2001). 
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this case) and then considers the possible implications of these existing political 
cultures for democratic development and democracy assistance policies. In other 
words, it aims to discover how ordinary people in developing countries interpret 
notions of legitimacy, accountability, participation and representation identified in 
Chapter One as particularly salient to democracy assistance policy. 
 This model recognises that culture is political in three distinct ways. First, 
political culture refers to the subjective meanings that people attribute to their 
specifically political world (e.g. the system of governance, authority figures) (Forje 
1997: 327). Secondly, it demonstrates the contested character of political concepts 
(e.g. elections, free speech), dislodging assumptions embedded within both the 
literature and prominent policy initiatives about what things mean and the 
subsequent consequences of these meanings for rational action (Theiss-Morse et al. 
1991, Whitehead 2002: 16, 190). Finally, in highlighting the contested nature of 
political experience, this definition of political culture discourages default acceptance 
of the language that presently dominates democracy assistance and assessment while 
encouraging the exploration of local concepts and understandings. Importantly, 
political culture includes knowledge of the political system that may not necessarily 
coincide with objective truth (Dietz 2009: 21). For instance, general knowledge that 
elections are rigged is not less valid to the analytical study of political culture if 
empirical research can demonstrate that electoral processes are transparent and well 
regulated. Although political cultural perspectives may not correspond with objective 
fact, they nevertheless constitute the truth for people interpreting their world in this 
particular way. 
Forging an Analytical Tool 
Having loosely defined political culture as a cognitive interpretive framework 
for political agency and events, how can it be used empirically as an analytical tool? 
The diagram in Figure 4 demonstrates that political culture as employed in this 
research has three analytical levels. The pyramid is capped by political culture – the 
overarching interpretive framework; in this case, how people understand democracy. 
As Chapter One demonstrated, however, democratic governance is widely 
understood to result from a combination of, among other things, electoral processes, 
freedom of expression, and the rule of law. It is, therefore, useful to know how 
ordinary  people  interpret   these  component  parts  of  democracy  and  how  these 
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Figure 4: The Building Blocks of Political Culture
 
interpretations fit together. I call this middle level of political culture analysis 
perceptual lenses. As I explain further below, perceptual lenses select for attention 
particular features from what would otherwise be a hopelessly complex reality, and 
organise these details in an intelligible way. Competences and dispositions, located at 
the base of the pyramid in Figure 4, are the discrete expectations and beliefs about 
desirable and appropriate political behaviour. These are the least abstract elements of 
the analytical model and, as the following chapter illustrates, can be collected as raw 
data in the field.  
This model of political culture illustrates how alternative cultures are created 
from shared meanings and interpretations. Which is not to say that the perceptions 
of individuals always overlap exactly (Simpson et. al. 1961: 522). As the empirical 
chapters in Part II demonstrate, however, identifiable patterns of competences and 
dispositions suggest the contours of shared points of view (i.e. perceptual lenses) that 
make particular events and behaviours commonly intelligible in different ways to 
different communities (Keesing 1974: 89, Simpson et. al. 1961: 522-523). The 
example of rules-based democracy in Figure 4 is one of three distinct political cultures 
identified from this research, indicating that multiple systems of interpretive codes 
can coexist even within a small region. All three political cultures, their component 
perceptual lenses and patterns of competences and dispositions are discussed in full 
in Part II. Before moving on to a discussion of how this analytical conceptualisation 
of political culture can be applied to the study of democracy, I will first expand on 
what I mean by perceptual lenses, competences and dispositions, demonstrating in 
Competences/
Dispositions 
Perceptual Lenses 
Political Culture Rules Based Democracy 
Positive         
(re. voting) 
competence 
e.g. voting is a 
free choice 
disposition 
e.g. people 
are happy to 
vote 
Passivist          
(re. protest) 
competence 
e.g. discuss 
current events 
disposition 
e.g. strikes 
are bad 
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the process how this model goes beyond aggregating individual attitudes to represent 
complex patterns of meaning evident within society.30 
Perceptual lenses 
The innumerable tacit conclusions that enable us to coherently and 
meaningfully comprehend the events we experience and the places we live are 
conceptualised here as perceptual lenses. In other words, when we habitually “select 
for attention a few salient features and relations from what would otherwise be an 
overwhelmingly complex reality” we unconsciously view the world through a 
particular perceptual lens (Schön and Rein 1994: 26, also see Elkins and Simeon 
1979: 128, Leininger 2010). This habituation can, however, blind us to the vast 
plurality of other equally correct conclusions. Determining “what is true or false, 
good or bad, useful or useless, beautiful or ugly, is a cultural process,” that we all 
engage in unconsciously on a daily, even hourly, basis (Dietz 2009: 19, also see 
Keesing 1974: 89). Only very rarely, if ever, will everyone in a community perceive or 
interpret events or actions in exactly the same way. Even so, these intuitive 
judgments enable inter-personal communication and contribute to social cohesion. 
An analytical political culture concept must, therefore, be able to account for a 
plurality of competing perspectives, which is what the mid-level analytical concept of 
perceptual lenses effectively does (Coombe 1991: 113, Schneider and Schneider 
2005).  
The conceptualisation of perceptual lenses here remains tightly focused on 
three primary features: (i) they are tacit, (ii) they distinguish some elements of an idea 
or situation over others, and (iii) they determine the realm of possible or appropriate 
action.  Most of the time we take the lens through which we view the world for 
granted (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 23, Schön and Rein 1994: 187). There are, of 
course, exceptions to this rule; academics, for example, often overtly subscribe to a 
particular paradigm or philosophy and consciously interpret their subject accordingly. 
Generally, however, most people do not make this sort of conscious decision or 
distinction. Instead, interpretations of quotidian situations are based on learned 
                                                 
30 This analysis of political culture does not account for how culture is learned or how culture 
changes over time. 
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beliefs and unconscious impressions that allow us to make sense of current 
phenomena based on past experience.31 In other words, we automatically interweave 
new experiences of events and people into an existing social narrative (Oberschall 
2000: 989). These unconscious judgments that enable us to understand and assign 
order to our environment have been described elsewhere as an interpretive screen 
(Vickers 1995), a frame of reference (Schön and Rein 1994, also see Lebow, 
Kansteiner, and Fogu 2006, Nazarea et. al. 1999a) a cognitive frame (Oberschall 
2000, 2007), and patterns of assumptions (Elkins and Simeon 1979). Perceptual 
lenses, therefore, tacitly influence the way an individual (or organization) interprets a 
situation by determining the very facts of the case (Vickers 1995: 28).  
Perceptual lenses enable us to recognise the scope and appropriateness of 
our own agency within a particular context. “This sense of the obviousness of what 
is wrong and what needs fixing” is emblematic of the influence perceptual lenses 
have on human judgment and subsequent behaviour (Schön and Rein 1994: 128, also 
see Elkins and Simeon 1979: 93). In other words, our tacit assumptions about the 
world around us “focus our attention on certain features of events, institutions, and 
behaviour,” thereby narrowing the perceived realm of possibilities in any given 
situation (Theiss-Morse et al. 1991: 133). I must be clear, however, that while 
perceptual lenses distinguish possible actions as appropriate while unconsciously 
discrediting others, they are not deterministic. Instead, they predispose individuals 
toward particular options and “whether they perform these actions will depend on 
the opportunities afforded them” (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 83). While it may seem 
from this brief description that the influence of perceptual lenses has been unduly 
exaggerated, it should be remembered that without them “we could not see or value 
or respond to anything” (Vickers 1995: 4, also see Dryzek and Holmes 2002). 
Having accepted the theoretical premise that divergent, though not by 
definition mutually exclusive, perceptual lenses exist, we are faced with the inevitable 
problem of identifying other people’s tacit point(s) of view. While this may initially 
seem an insurmountable barrier to empirical research, reconstructive democratic 
                                                 
31 This past experience does not have to be personal, but may come from historical communal 
experience or knowledge of how others have coped with a similar situation previously (also see 
Obeidi 2001: 11). 
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theory sets a useful precedent. As noted above, this novel approach to studying 
democracy contrasts implicit “democratic software” (i.e. what people think they are 
doing) with explicit “democratic hardware” (i.e. institutional prescriptions) (Dryzek 
and Holmes 2002: 5, also see Dryzek 1996, Dryzek and Berejikian 1993). By 
emphasising the competences and dispositions of individuals – what they deem 
possible and appropriate action or response – it becomes possible to at least partially 
identify the perceptual lenses through which other people interpret politics and 
democracy without being hopelessly hampered by one’s own interpretive perspective.  
Competences and dispositions 
As Figure 4 illustrates, competences and dispositions are understood here as 
the building blocks of perceptual lenses and are the most basic analytical concepts 
contributing to this political culture model. Competences include knowledge of and 
access to the political sphere. They also include beliefs or convictions about one’s 
ability to act in particular circumstances and what those actions signify. The example 
in Figure 4 of a political culture supportive of rules-based democracy is built in part 
on competences including “voting is a free choice” and “[people can] discuss current 
events.” They are known facts and available actions. Keesing similarly understands a 
competence as “all of what an individual knows and thinks and feels about his 
world” (1974: 89). While I agree that competences include all that is thought and 
known, I designate feelings to a separate category: dispositions. In addition to 
feelings, dispositions include attitudes, inclinations, and tendencies (Barber 2003: 5). 
They are more emotive than competences and are only indirectly linked to action or 
agency. This distinction is exemplified by the examples of dispositions included in 
Figure 4: “people are happy to vote” and “strikes are bad.”  
Empirically researching competences and dispositions requires the researcher 
to actively engage with research participants in a collaborative way, discussed at 
length in Chapter Three. Briefly, integrated patterns of competences and dispositions 
– indicative of perceptual lenses – emerge when people express their beliefs in the 
context of interpreting a particular situation (e.g. voting, a public demonstration). 
The analytical conceptualisation of political culture as a compilation of perceptual 
lenses each made up of distinctive patterns of competences and dispositions is 
interactive in two respects. First, it examines the symbolic relationship between 
ordinary citizens and democracy by emphasising that the expectations and abilities of 
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individuals are products of a particular social context and have identifiable 
consequences for how people interpret democracy locally. Second, like 
reconstructive democratic theory, this political culture model is built on a foundation 
of indigenous concepts and codes of meaning instead of relying solely on the 
researcher’s own theoretical and linguistic traditions.  
What Does Democracy Mean Here? 
One advantage of the model of political culture advocated here is that it 
bridges what people think with how they themselves believe they (could) behave, 
making connections between attitudes about politics and (likely) actions (Raab 2008: 
431). In other words, “how individuals construct reality is inseparable from the roles 
they think they can, do, and should play in relation to that reality” (Dryzek and 
Berejikian 1993: 50). As conceptualised above, political culture can be employed to 
identify the logic that local people use when observing their political environment 
and deciding (perhaps unconsciously) how to respond to those observations (Barth 
2000: 20). While this notion of political culture deviates somewhat from definitions 
used elsewhere in the literature, it relates seamlessly to established democratic 
theories, which, after all, “are built upon assumptions about the capabilities and 
dispositions of individuals” (Dryzek and Berejikian 1993: 59). Not only does this 
imply that the expectations laid down by democratic institutions, whether implicit or 
explicit, are neither neutral nor universal, it similarly reveals that people’s beliefs and 
expectations regarding those institutions are of significance.  
In this thesis, I propose that local political culture influences the shape that 
democracy takes in any particular state. One distinction between a hybrid regime and 
a functional democracy is that the latter benefits from a fusion of institutional and 
cultural understandings on the part of both political elites and average citizens (Blaug 
2002: 109). The democratic rules championed so ardently by theorists and experts 
from the democracy assistance industry are implicitly understood and valued. In 
hybrid regimes, however, this fusion may have yet to develop. Alternatively, 
nominally democratic institutions and local political culture(s) may have merged at a 
common juncture that is neither fully democratic nor blatantly autocratic. This 
research, therefore, proposes that accurately assessing democracy in a particular place 
compels the researcher or analyst to try to understand if and how this fusion between 
political culture and democratic institutions has occurred by learning how local 
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people interpret their own political environment and agency. This approach also 
shifts away from disputes over quantity (e.g. electoral democracy) and concentrates 
instead on the quality of democratic governance perceived by different stakeholder 
groups (e.g. international democracy assistance providers, ordinary local people, 
domestic political elites). 
When democracy is taken down off its ideological pedestal and trusted to the 
grubby hands of real people, it often loses some of its sheen but invariably gains 
substance. The nuance of democracy is augmented in the context of cross-cultural 
research (and democracy assistance for that matter) where local manifestations of 
democracy often demonstrate “a peculiar mixture of familiarity and strangeness” 
(Schaffer 1998: ix). In this chapter I have defined political culture as the way in which 
people make sense of the socio-political landscape, conceptualised here as perceptual 
lenses identifiable from discrete patterns of competences and dispositions. I further 
specified that political culture not only makes the behaviour of others intelligible but 
that it also establishes the contours for one’s own political agency and the 
identification of an appropriate response given the (always subjective) ‘facts’ of any 
situation. Political culture is, in other words, not only a lens for interpreting political 
phenomena and recognising appropriate responses, but “a way of looking at the 
world that requires an account of how symbols operate in practice, why meanings 
generate action, and why actions produce meanings, when they do” (Wedeen 2002: 
720).  
To date, those concerned with democratic development have largely ignored 
how people living in hybrid regimes interpret ‘democracy’ and how those perceptions 
duly influence political behaviour. Instead of asking what democracy means today, as 
Held (2006) does, we should be asking: What does democracy mean here? The notion 
that the democratic ideal is malleable to diverse cultural contexts is neither new nor 
controversial. Both Sweden and Switzerland consistently rank among the top ten 
democracies in the world according to the democracy indices; yet few would deny 
that significant differences exist between Sweden’s constitutional monarchy and 
Swiss federalism. The process and local importance of the Iowa caucuses provides 
yet another example of democratic diversity not immediately intelligible to people 
living outside (and even inside!) the United States. 
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In the previous chapter, I highlighted the emphasis that the international 
democracy assistance industry places on electoral processes, freedom of expression 
and rule of law. There is reasonable evidence that these priorities are not without 
grounds in even some of the poorest developing countries. Throughout the world, 
democracy is associated with voting and the idea that decisions are made by those 
who show up (Sen 1999b, Plattner 1999, Crick 2002). Participation in elections, 
however, is only consequential insofar as people are free to say what they mean and, 
conversely, actually mean what they say (i.e. actually support who they have voted 
for). Meaningful political participation is, therefore, predicated upon a political 
culture that tolerates dissent (Diamond 1999, Economist Intelligence Unit 2007, 
Lipset 1959, Wolf 2007). Indeed, “one of the paradoxes of democracy is that 
sustainable self-governance must be respectful of government authority and also 
distrustful of it,” suggesting that in any democracy there must be room for open, 
critical dialogue (Diamond 2008a: 155). Meanwhile, accommodation and 
compromise encourage participants in democratic governance not only to challenge 
each other to tests of who can shout the loudest, but to reach some modicum of 
agreement on the path forward. Where citizens have the formal right to dissent but 
only do so mutedly, and where the opposition exercises severe self-restraint, 
democratic institutions may continue to function, but only weakly.  
Democratic governance is likewise founded on notions of citizenship and the 
rights that this status confers. Safeguarding these rights requires respect for the rule 
of law at elite and mass levels so that citizens’ rights are neither impinged from above 
(e.g. state sponsored censorship) nor dismissed from below (e.g. fear to speak freely). 
In other words, rights must not merely exist on paper; it is imperative that people 
can and do choose to put them into practice. Cox has similarly described 
constitutionalism as “the development of a political culture in which power is subject 
to the rule of law” (2003: 273, also see Kedourie 1994, Sklar 1987). Where local 
perceptions match those of democracy assistance providers, it stands to reason that 
democratic development will be reasonably robust. On the other hand, one would 
expect to find hybrid regimes in places where local political cultures interpret politics 
and democracy differently from the international community. Political culture can 
help explain variations between international and local perceptions of democracy, 
democratic development, and acceptable political behaviour. In Part II, I 
demonstrate how perceptual lenses identified in eastern Madagascar can reveal how 
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non-elites perceive politics. Once recognized, these can be used to identify 
discrepancies between the expectations of international democracy assistance experts 
and those of local people with regard to aspects of democratic development 
including electoral process, freedom of expression, and rule of law. I then return to 
the question of what democracy means here (i.e. in the Antsinanana region of 
Madagascar) in Chapter Seven. 
How Might This Be Useful? 
 Over two decades ago, Sklar concluded “there are no reliable blueprints of 
developmental democracy, no models for third-world development in the late 
twentieth century, democratic or otherwise” (1987: 714). At a time when most 
countries are at least experimenting with democracy, it strikes me as odd that the 
international democracy assistance industry would continue to rely on the same 
standards and criteria in all – or even most – country contexts. The institutions 
commonly associated with democracy today – such as electoral processes and rule of 
law – are essentially frameworks for securing the basic principles of life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness identified by the framers of the American constitution. 
Likewise, the ideal of equality, commonly associated with democracy and democratic 
governance, is a derivative of this same premise. However, whereas Western liberal 
democracy often extends this emphasis on equality to support individual liberty; 
societies that do not understand individuality in quite the same way may interpret the 
social tenets of democracy somewhat differently (see, for example, Kavira 1996, 
Mohamed 2007). 
 Organisations now tasked with assisting democratic development around the 
world might, therefore, be fighting a losing battle when the liberal democratic 
institutions they advocate are not congruent with local attitudes and expectations 
(Linz and Stepan 1996: 5). Indeed, Nodia has warned of the “malign legacy of an 
undemocratic political culture” suggesting that institutional changes alone may not be 
enough to inspire real political change (2002: 18). Lipset and Lakin similarly 
concluded that institutional changes might result in the implementation of 
democracy “but that lack of value changes may lead to instability” (2004: 195). 
Existing local political cultures may, therefore, have significant consequences for the 
successful implementation of democracy assistance policies (An-Na’im 1999: 47, 
Light 2001: 90). Despite the perceived complexity and limited popularity of political 
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culture within political science, in the chapters that follow I explore the possibility 
that this much neglected analytical tool might be able to help explain why some 
states like Madagascar fail to meet the expectations of international donors and so 
often get stuck in the mire of hybridity. A better understanding of local political 
cultures might also be able to inform more credible democracy assistance policies.  
Conclusion 
 In the contemporary political science literature, culture is often either 
dismissed as too difficult to measure or truncated to ‘religion’. Democracy assistance 
organisations appear to take a largely similar view, sometimes suggesting that culture 
is important but failing to adequately address why that might be or how to go about 
researching its significance. In neglecting to take culture fully into account, both 
democracy theorists and democracy assistance professionals fall short of 
acknowledging that democratic institutions and processes might look very different 
when viewed through a perceptual lens other than that which created them. This 
difference of perspective is neither captured nor addressed by either prescriptive 
typologies or formal institutional frameworks. Nor should the difficulty of collecting 
the necessary data rescind a researcher’s obligation to consider all relevant variables, 
culture included.  
 Political culture, as defined in this chapter, has the potential to help 
determine whether democracy assistance will have the lasting results intended by 
those who fund and implement multi-million dollar democracy initiatives. Or if, 
instead, they produce only an externally imposed set of rules that has very little to do 
with how people live their daily lives. Taking this concept seriously challenges the 
researcher to pay particular attention not only to the ordinary people on whom 
democracy ultimately depends, but also to the assumptions implicit in applied 
definitions of democracy itself. Held has similarly stated: 
In examining past, present and perhaps future models of democracy, it is important 
to inquire into their key features, their recommendations, their assumptions about the 
nature of the society in which democracy is or might be embedded, their fundamental 
conceptions of the political capabilities of human beings and how they justify their 
views and preferences. (2006: 7, emphasis added) 
In this chapter, I have made the same argument, but have approached it from a 
different angle. Instead of focusing on the sort of ideal society in which democracy 
will flourish, as Almond and Verba and Lipset and Lakin, among others, have done, I 
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recommend that we start by looking at the political culture(s) already present in 
countries struggling with democratic development. Only then does it become 
possible to assess whether current democracy assistance efforts are appropriate and 
assessment criteria are accurate, or, alternatively, whether common preconceptions 
prevent democracy experts from accurately understanding complex local realities. 
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CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPING A NEW METHOD  
“What is the use of a book,” thought Alice,  
“without pictures or conversations?” 
  (Carroll 2000: 19) 
How will you know it when you see it? This question haunted me in the 
months leading up to my fieldwork. It seemed like no matter who I talked to – my 
supervisors, my parents, my friends – the topic of what exactly I would be doing in 
Madagascar inevitably came up. Everyone knew that the objective of my trip was to 
research how ordinary Malagasy understand democracy and their own political 
agency; what exactly this entailed, however, remained frustratingly elusive to all of us. 
Stereotyped as “fluid, porous, unbounded, and ever renegotiable” culture is 
notoriously difficult to measure, a challenge I acknowledge in Chapter Two 
(Kompridis 2005: 319) Indeed, a quarter century ago German political scientist Max 
Kaase compared measuring political culture with trying to nail jell-o to a wall (Dalton 
1996: 338).32 Shaken but undeterred I pressed on, spurred by the conviction that 
when something is difficult – in this case empirically measuring political culture – 
there is all the more reason for doing it (Rilke 2002).  
 My task was further complicated soon after I arrived at my research site 
when it quickly became apparent how fearful people were of speaking openly about 
anything remotely related to politics or democracy. The mixed bag of qualitative 
methods I had settled on in the United Kingdom, including semi-structured 
interviews, cognitive mapping exercises and focus groups, proved incompatible with 
this new and unexpected setting. Wax observes that while most discussions of 
fieldwork focus on the data collection phase – “the period of tangible 
accomplishments” – it is in the overlooked initial interlude when a researcher 
discovers whether or not the project is in fact feasible (1971: 16). Those first few, 
uncomfortable days in Madagascar, it seemed as though my project, or at least the 
way I had envisioned it only one week previously, was not.  
                                                 
32 I would like to thank Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt for bringing this apt analogy to my attention. 
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 In short, I faced the grim prospect of failing to pin political culture down not 
because it is wily and elusive but because I was unequipped to even begin the chase. 
With five months remaining before I could get on a plane and fly home, I opted to 
experiment with a research method not previously used in political science: the 
Thematic Apperception Test.33 Adapted from clinical psychology, the modified 
Thematic Apperception Test piloted for this research involves asking research 
participants to tell a story about a cartoon, and then analysing their responses. As 
demonstrated below, this method has considerable potential both for investigating 
sensitive, controversial or interdisciplinary topics, and for generating data distinct 
from that obtained using more traditional methods.  In this chapter I establish the 
empirical credentials of the modified Thematic Apperception Test before illustrating 
how the similarly visual thematic network approach to data analysis makes the 
proverbial task of nailing jell-o to the wall tricky – but possible.  
The chapter begins by contextualising my decision to adopt and adapt a 
visual research technique in the quasi-ethnographic approach I took to fieldwork. I 
go on to situate the Thematic Apperception Test in historical context before 
recounting how this method has been modified twice previously for use in social 
science research. Though developed independently of similar visual research 
methods sometimes used in sociology and anthropology, modified Thematic 
Apperception Tests sit comfortably alongside more-established visual research tools 
including photo elicitation and participatory mapping. I then describe how I adapted 
this method to my particular project while in the field. Sorting through my data back 
in the UK, it became clear that this eclectic methodology would also require an 
innovative mode of analysis conducive to translating my data for an audience of 
democracy experts and policymakers. Using two analytical devices – Framework and 
thematic networks – in combination resulted in the production of visual models or 
maps that convincingly approximate the perceptual lenses ordinary people in eastern 
Madagascar use to interpret their political world.34  
                                                 
33 In future publications, I will refer to the method developed during fieldwork and discussed at 
length in this chapter as the Visual Interpretation Narrative Exercise (VINE). A short précis of 
the VINE technique as a distinct visual research tool can be found in Appendix 4. 
34 One of the 51 modified TAT interviews was conducted with a project manager working in the 
upper echelons of KMF-CNOE, a local NGO that focuses on electoral monitoring and civic 
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A Quasi-Ethnographic Approach to Fieldwork 
While the five months that I spent in Madagascar hardly qualifies as 
ethnographic fieldwork in the classical sense, it was that experience of immersion 
that I sought to emulate, both before my departure and once I had arrived. In order 
to collect the sort of intimately subjective data I needed, I would have to find a way 
of “break[ing] into the enchanted world of others,” of understanding and 
interpreting politics and democracy from someone else’s point of view (Barth 1993: 
158). The feasibility of this endeavour has been questioned elsewhere and I 
acknowledge that the only experience one can ever hope to fully understand is one’s 
own (see, for example, Bryman 1988: 73). However, I agree with Barth that this is an 
inherent flaw not in ethnography but in the human condition itself. There is no 
reason, consequently, why a researcher conscious of his or her own subjectivity 
should not also be able to gain a closely approximate point of view to that of 
research participants in the same way that different individuals roughly understand 
the perspective of their colleagues or neighbours in common social interaction.  
In 1922 Bronislaw Malinowski wrote: “The goal [of ethnography] is, briefly, 
to grasp the native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realise his vision of his 
world” (25, emphasis original, also see Bray 2008). Anthropology as a discipline has 
evolved considerably since Argonauts of the Western Pacific was first published, but the 
objective and emphasis of ethnographic fieldwork – to better understand how others 
understand themselves – remain firmly intact. What makes this approach distinctive 
is the overt acknowledgement “that the eyes of the beholders and the I’s of the 
beheld see things differently and see different things” (Cohen 2000: 5, also see 
Thomas and Thomas 1928: 572, Oberschall 2007: 24). Indeed, the realisation that 
other lives create other worldviews and rationalities is the most important 
contribution of an ethnographic approach to studying democratic development, 
contrasting starkly with the common expectation that democratic institutions will 
look the same and perform similar functions no matter where one finds them.  
                                                 
education efforts. Though perhaps more articulate, his responses do not differ significantly from 
those of other research participants and are identified as coming from Todilahy when cited in 
subsequent chapters. I additionally completed traditional semi-structured interviews with senior 
officials from CARE and KMF-CNOE. These interviews, however, are not pivotal to the 
research presented in the following chapters and are only occasionally referred to for 
triangulation purposes.  
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Therefore, my objective of establishing how non-elites in Madagascar 
understand and interpret democracy does not equate to “getting into the heads of 
informants” but rather to carefully observing “the ways in which people attempt to 
make apparent, observable sense of their worlds – to themselves and to each other” 
through a collaborative research process (Wedeen 2002: 721). In other words, “the 
social world is of our making” (Banks 2007: 10, Kratochwil 2008: 97). This research 
into world-making processes is, therefore, exploratory in nature rather than an 
attempt to definitively confirm why Madagascar has experienced difficulties in 
consolidating democracy. As such, the qualitative investigation recounted here 
evolved organically from a constructivist motivation to identify local factors likely to 
influence democratic development in a particular place and time (Flyvbjerg 2001: 
77).35  
The question remains, however: How exactly can a researcher come to 
understand the world as the people s/he is studying do, and then relate this 
worldview to others? The most coherent framework that I have encountered for 
doing this sort of research, and the one that I turned to for guidance in Madagascar, 
is that proposed by Barth so I will quote him at length:  
…with a reasonable amount of patience and genuine interest in the lives of 
particular individuals we encounter in another society, their intentions and 
interpretations can become to a large extent accessible to us…We achieve this 
attunement progressively through observation, reflection, conversation, and 
participation, i.e. through social and cultural immersion. There is no way we can 
enter inside the skin of another person, but this is an impediment inherent in the 
human condition…it is as true of a person at home as of a person doing… 
fieldwork, so it is a circumstance all communication and social participation are 
designed to handle. We cannot stop the moment’s action and demand to have 
delivered to us the keys people are employing to interpret that passing moment. But 
there is nothing to prevent us from progressively equipping ourselves…with the 
knowledge and insights needed to make increasingly intelligent guesses at what is 
going on as further events unfold. (1993: 160) 
Ethnography, therefore, essentially entails “a contradictory synthesis of insider and 
outsider” which, though somewhat counterintuitive, is not impossible to achieve 
during even a relatively short visit to the field (Barfield 1997: 190, also see Bryman 
                                                 
35 Quantitative datasets and responses to large-n surveys are useful for comparative analysis but 
offer few explanations for why respondents provide the answers they do (Marsh and Furlong 
2002: 21, 27, also see Barabas and Jerit 2010). That said, Q-methodology notably attempts to 
refine and attune surveys to the population under investigation (see, for example, Dryzek and 
Berejikian 1993, Theiss-Morse 1991). 
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1988, Neuman 2003, Toren 1996). Fieldwork that emphasises empathy and 
understanding with research participants can lead to insider ‘expertise’ which informs 
more detached, critical analysis when the data is translated for a new audience (Bray 
2008: 307, Collier and Collier 1986: 105, Lebow, Kansteiner, and Fogu 2006: 5). 
Fundamental to this approach to fieldwork – and research more broadly – is 
the innate understanding that the people we are researching, who we rely so heavily 
on for ‘data’, are indeed people and not just repositories of information. This is what 
Barth means when he says that ethnography entails taking a “genuine interest” in the 
individuals encountered during fieldwork. Image-based collaborative research 
methods, discussed further below, are inherently ethnographic, as discussion of the 
image leads researcher and research participant toward common understanding over 
the course of the interview. These techniques also blur the traditional roles of 
interviewer and interviewee, as both participants become just two people trying to 
work out the meaning of an image together (Banks 2007: 70, Collier and Collier 
1986: 105, Harper 2002: 20).   
The second point of guidance offered by Barth above is that ethnographic 
fieldwork requires patience. Acutely aware of the return plane ticket locked away in 
my luggage, my instinct in the first few days, and indeed weeks, was to hit the ground 
running. Make first contact with potential research participants. Scout out interview 
venues. Finalise the interview schedule. As noted in the Introduction, I had originally 
decided on Madagascar because all of the available signs suggested that it was a 
budding democracy; I (naively) expected the streets to be teaming with fledgling 
democrats clambering to share their experiences with me. Where were they? 
Patience. A researcher cannot simply “drop himself among an alien people like a man 
from Mars” to collect data (Wax 1971: 15, also see Rachel 1996: 123). As the 
analytical chapters that follow demonstrate, I did encounter many would-be 
democrats eager to have their voices heard. Before they would reveal themselves, 
however, I had to earn their trust. The tense, though not overtly heated, political 
climate in Madagascar during the period of my fieldwork coupled with the blatantly 
political theme of my research may have increased people’s reservations about 
answering a stranger’s questions. After several weeks “wandering about” I gradually 
gained the trust of a handful of individuals who facilitated the wider access necessary 
for completing my research (Wax 1971: 17).  
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The initial reluctance of people to be interviewed and the increasingly 
ethnographic approach I took to fieldwork resulted in a marked shift in how I 
perceived the interview process and, consequently, the methods I used. 
Communicative conventions inherent in standard interview and survey techniques 
are learned and can be misinterpreted when transferred to a new setting (Pittenger, 
Hockett, and Danehy 1960: 4). Eggert, for instance, found that asking direct 
questions was considered rude by local Malagasy standards, admitting: “my questions 
were endured as the yammering of someone lacking sense enough to know how to 
speak politely” (2001: 317). Farnworth encountered similar setbacks while 
completing fieldwork in Madagascar, recounting how respondents were hesitant to 
mark an x on paper in order to fill out a survey (2008b). Inappropriate methods can 
reinforce the barriers a researcher invariably faces when making contact with a new 
community.  
Faced with the stark realisation that mainstream research techniques were 
inappropriate for this particular research context and unlikely to yield data of the 
quality I desired, I turned to modified Thematic Apperception Tests in the hope that 
this new method would encourage people “to say what they think is relevant” (Bray 
2008: 310). Ordinary people “know more about their own lives than a visiting 
researcher can ever hope to;” convincing them to collaborate in my research 
necessitated that I find a method that was already somewhat familiar and could 
facilitate cooperation (Banks 2001: 178-179). Malagasy culture has a strong oral 
tradition, making the modified Thematic Apperception Test, discussed at length 
below, a particularly suitable interview technique. 
Embracing Eclecticism 
The thrill found in a photograph comes from the onrush of memory. This is 
obvious when it’s a picture of something we once knew. That house we lived in. 
Mother when young.  
But in another sense, we once knew everything we recognise in any photo. That’s 
grass growing. Tiles on a roof get wet like that, don’t they. Here is one of the seven 
ways in which bosses smile. This is a woman’s shoulder, not a man’s. Just the way 
snow melts.  
Memory is a strange faculty. The sharper and more isolated the stimulus memory 
receives, the more it remembers; the more comprehensive the stimulus, the less it 
remembers. This is perhaps why black-and-white photography is paradoxically more 
evocative than colour photography. It stimulates a faster onrush of memories 
because less has been given, more has been left out… (Berger 1991: 192-193) 
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The development of rigorous image-based research has been one casualty of the 
futile pursuit of a social science. Photo elicitation, for instance, was introduced in the 
1950s to much fanfare but remains “a waif on the margins” over half a century later 
(Harper 2002: 15); visual anthropology has likewise struggled to secure more than 
marginal acceptance (Ruby 1989: 9). The predominance of language-based tools in 
the social sciences (e.g. interviews, surveys, written reports) has made us suspicious 
of images: “As Alice noted before she disappeared down the rabbit hole, the absence 
of pictures denotes the intended adult readership of a book” (Banks 2001: 9). 
‘Serious’ newspapers and journals are likewise devoid of pictures, while the tabloid 
press and glossy magazines are seen as less substantial; as, if you will, childlike. 
Meanwhile, the predominance of language-based research tools has resulted in 
suspicion of images and image-based research. Despite the growing number of 
researchers venturing to dabble with visual methods, they remain largely segregated 
by their disciplines. Consequently, the abundant potential of visual research 
techniques, poetically described by Berger above, remains largely unrecognised 
(Harper 2002, Pink 2007, Prosser 1998). This effective banishment from mainstream 
social science research has been detrimental to the integrated development of visual 
research techniques, largely obscuring their abundant potential. 
Collaborative and respondent-led visual research methods largely avoid an 
inherent difficulty with surveys and word-based interviews whereby the answers 
provided to questions mean substantially different things to interviewer and 
interviewee (Mattes and Bratton 2007: 193, Gilley 2009: 118, Theiss-Morse et al. 
1991: 16). Visual methods, by contrast, are “anchored in an image” that invites 
research participants to identify what is meaningful and important while 
simultaneously imposing order on the information being gathered (Harper 2002: 20, 
also see Bray 2008: 310). Although the researcher and research participant may 
initially interpret an image quite differently, over the course of the interview they 
should be able to reach a common understanding as “fellow travellers” in the 
research process (Tully 1995: 23). The physical presence of the image can also aid in 
developing rapport with research participants (Clark-Ibáñez 2007, Gold 2007: 145, 
Samuels 2007). Despite the growing number of researchers venturing to dabble in 
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visual methods, they remain segregated by their disciplines.36 The methodology 
developed in this chapter is, therefore, eclectic in that it draws together information 
and experiences from otherwise disconnected literatures.  
Visual approaches to research are largely foreign to political science.37 Even 
so, mainstream acceptance of the study of discourse, with its patent interest in 
storylines, lends credence to the possibility of a vigorous story-based research 
methodology (Dryzek 1990, Ferguson 2002, Gee 2005, Hinds 2008, Howarth, 
Norval, and Stavrakakis 2000, Jørgensen 2002). Though still considered outcasts 
(Gold 2007, Harper 2002, Prosser 1998), image-based research methods are 
experiencing something of a revival and have demonstrated “significant untapped 
potential and vigour across a broader scope of disciplines” (Stanczak 2007: 3). Visual 
research methods including photo elicitation (Banks 2007, Clark-Ibáñez 2004, Clark-
Ibáñez 2007, Harper 2002, Samuels 2004, Samuels 2007), participatory mapping 
(Maman et al. 2009, Margolis 1990, Medley and Kalibo 2005), photovoice (Wang and 
Burris 1997, Wang et al. 2004), and FotoDialogo (Ramos 1999, Ramos 2007) are 
breaking new ground in other research disciplines ranging from sociology and 
anthropology to health science and education studies. In addition to widespread 
adoption and adaptation within its native field of psychology (Aronow, Weiss, and 
Reznikoff 2001, Dana 1999, McClelland 1999), the Thematic Apperception Test has 
previously been modified for social science research projects in both the Philippines 
(Nazarea et al. 1998) and Madagascar (Farnworth 2007). Therefore, although this 
particular method remains an eclectic – and underdeveloped – tool available to social 
science researchers, the potential of visual research techniques is well documented. 
Adapting a research technique from psychology also fits neatly within my 
research framework. As defined in Chapter Two, political culture is a cognitive 
phenomenon, indicating the ways in which members of a society understand and 
develop expectations for political encounters (also see, for example, Almond 1989: 
26, Hyden 2010: 11). It is based on the understanding that people act on their own 
subjective agency at least partially independent of the institutional rules theorised by 
                                                 
36 I discuss this issue at length in a forthcoming article to appear in Field Methods. 
37 For a provocative discussion of interdisciplinarity and political science, see Greaves and Grant 
(2010). 
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political scientists (Theiss-Morse et al. 1991: 93). The Thematic Apperception Test 
was originally developed to measure individual cognition and is, therefore, likewise 
appropriate for researching the subjective ways in which people “name and frame” 
their socio-political environment (Schön and Rein 1994: 26). Moreover, because 
subjective perspectives are largely unconscious, it is difficult for people to “fake” 
their answers, a known weakness of survey methods that collaborative research 
techniques also largely avoid (Elkins and Simeon 1979: 137).  
(Modified) Thematic Apperception Tests: The Evolution of a Method 
 The Thematic Apperception Test (henceforth TAT) is a mode of personality 
assessment based on the premise that projection is “the best way of learning about 
somebody next to his being aware and anxious to tell you” (Anderson 1999: 26). A 
modified version of this procedure proved to be an invaluable research tool, both for 
learning how people interpret commonplace socio-political situations and for 
creating an environment in which they felt safe to speak openly. Not only did the 
modified TAT become my primary research tool, I suspect that I would not have 
been able to access the information required by this research project without it.   
The Thematic Apperception Test: A Brief History38 
 Henry Murray and Christina Morgan developed the TAT throughout the 
1930s and early 1940s at the Harvard Psychological Clinic.39 They built the technique 
around the notion of apperception: “the process by which new experience is 
assimilated to and transformed by the residuum of past experience of any individual 
to form a new whole” (Bellak 1975: 15). In other words, apperception denotes the 
way in which people meaningfully interpret new perceptions of their environment or, 
in the case of the TAT, an abstract image. Projective techniques like the TAT work 
because what we perceive in the present is invariably influenced by past perception 
and experience organised and stored in our memories. Contemporary accounts of 
historical events may likewise reflect a person’s current condition or “how they 
                                                 
38 I would like to thank Professor Richard Dana for generously aiding my research into this 
methodology. 
39 Though adapted from clinical psychology, use of the modified TAT should not imply that I 
sought to identify signs of pathology. 
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presently construe the past to have been” (Eggert 2001: 310). Even if an account 
does not match the accepted historical record of events, it nonetheless belies 
potentially useful information about the person telling the story (Pittenger, Hockett, 
and Danehy 1960: 3). When subjects are asked to tell a story about an abstract image 
in the course of a TAT procedure, they naturally construct narratives derived from 
their own personality traits and unique experiences. The test in clinical usage 
examines personality “as it manifests itself in interpersonal relations and in the 
apperception of meaningful interpretation of the environment” (Bellak 1975: 39). 
This general premise resulted in a very versatile research tool that has been widely 
used and modified within psychology, and served as Murray’s compass throughout 
his career.  
 The ‘official’ TAT, published in 1943, consists of 31 black and white, hand 
drawn images or “plates” that can be broken down into four 20-plate tests; one each 
for men, women, boys, and girls. It was thought that each picture included in a test 
should contain at least one figure with whom the patient could identify both in terms 
of age and gender. That said, four exceptions were made to include plates that 
demonstrate exceptional stimulative power in all four tests (Anderson 1999: 30-33). 
This version of the TAT, referred to henceforth as the 1943 TAT, is still in use today 
and commonly considered the standard set of images. There is reason to believe, 
however, that happenstance had much to do with which images were included in the 
1943 TAT. In 1943 Murray left his position at Harvard, apparently deciding to 
publish the TAT as it existed at that time (Anderson 1999: 32).  
Nevertheless, the TAT remained a work in progress. For Murray “there was 
no set way to use or interpret the TAT and, for that matter, no set TAT” (Murray 
1999: xi). Over the course of his career, Murray developed several versions of the 
test, each with its own set of plates, based on such disparate themes as Jungian 
archetypes, the New Testament, and Ethiopian personality traits. Clearly, innovation 
is in the very spirit of the method and Murray’s wife commented that he would “be 
thrilled” to know that the tool has been used in so many different contexts (Murray 
1999: ix). The common thread that binds all successful TAT procedures is their 
effectiveness as a stimulus, “a method of eliciting and gathering information in a 
nonthreatening manner” (Gieser and Stein 1999: 6). 
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 Murray’s experimental procedure has been widely adapted within psychology, 
providing researchers and clinicians alike with a template from which they can create 
bespoke procedures tailored to particular avenues of inquiry. Well known 
modifications of the TAT include the Children’s Apperception Test (CAT), which 
uses full-colour images of animals (Bellak 1975), and the Senior Apperception 
Technique (SAT), designed specifically for use with elderly patients to address issues 
such as illness and loneliness (Aronow, Weiss, and Reznikoff 2001: 62). The TAT 
has also been modified in several instances for the purposes of cross-cultural 
research (Aronow, Weiss, and Reznikoff 2001: 2, also see Dana 1999, Dana 2006, 
Nazarea et al. 1998, Retief 1987, Sherwood 1957). The relative ease with which the 
procedure can be modified for use in a wide array of projects and pursuits has been 
attributed to the innate ambiguity of the method (Gieser and Stein 1999: 7). All 
variations of the TAT share a common conviction, however, that careful analysis of a 
subject’s spontaneous thought can provide insights that would likely not have 
emerged from more self-conscious responses (McClelland 1999: 173).  
 Although the psychometrically oriented branch of psychology never fully 
accepted the TAT, this scepticism has neither diluted its appeal to clinical 
psychologists nor banished it to the realms of pseudo-science. Quite the opposite, 
the TAT is commonly cited as one of the top four or five tests that should be 
included in a psychologist’s repertoire (Aronow, Weiss, and Reznikoff 2001: 32, 
Gieser and Stein 1999: 6). The most common critique of the TAT is its uncertain 
validity as a psychological “test,” a fault it shares with Rorschach’s popular Inkblot 
test. However, many clinicians within psychology find this scepticism a blessing that 
enables them to downplay the evaluative connotation of the method, providing the 
possibility of establishing a more relaxed or non-threatening relationship with their 
patients. This perspective seems in line with that of Murray, who preferred to call the 
procedure an “educator” or a “technique,” as opposed to a “test” (Gieser and Stein 
1999: 6). Of more importance, surely, than its status as a “test” is whether the 
method succeeds in soliciting useful information; according to Murray: “When [a 
procedure] works, it works…and [it] tells you something you didn’t get any other 
way” (Anderson 1999: 28). In this regard, the TAT has fewer sceptics. 
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Developing a TAT 
 Before discussing various modifications of the method for use in social 
science research, it is necessary to expound briefly on the general technique. This 
section provides an overview of three stages common to the development of all TAT 
procedures: deciding on a number of plates, choosing images, and selecting a system 
of scoring or analysis.  
 The first step in developing a TAT is deciding how many plates or images to 
use and over how many sessions. The 1943 TAT specifies that 20 plates should be 
used: 10 plates over the course of each of two one-hour long sessions (Murray 1943). 
According to Aronow, Weiss, and Reznikoff, application of the TAT in 
contemporary psychology generally consists of 10-14 plates; although, they suggest 
that fewer may be used “in the interests of practicality” (2001: 16). Bellak is of the 
similar opinion that “an optimum of material” can be collected using between 10 and 
12 pictures (1975: 47). The Apperceptive Personality Test (APT) uses only eight 
images (Holmstrom, Silber, and Karp 1990). Murray, however, was sceptical of 
research that relied on fewer than 20 plates, complaining: “They run through six or 
eight cards in 50 minutes and let it go at that” (Anderson 1999: 36). While it may be 
true that the type of psychological research that most interested Murray required 
more plates, it is also reasonable to conceive that different types of research taking 
place under other conditions and with disparate research objectives might necessitate 
fewer (or more) images.  
 The second task for all TAT practitioners is choosing the images that will be 
used throughout the procedure. For Murray and Morgan, this process took years and 
resulted in numerous instances of pictures being altered or removed altogether. In 
other cases, considerably less time is allocated to this stage (see the discussion of 
Farnworth’s modifications below, for example). Regardless of how exactly images are 
chosen, the guiding principle for making selections must be an image’s ability to 
stimulate storytelling through its depiction of characters and contexts relevant to the 
people interviewed (Aronow, Weiss, and Reznikoff 2001: 67). When the subject can 
both identify and identify with the scene depicted in a TAT plate, s/he will tell a 
story reflective of his or her own experience and emotions (Aronow, Weiss, and 
Reznikoff 2001: 13). In the realm of personality and other psychological research, it 
is this insight into the patient’s subjective reality that is valuable to the researcher; the 
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objectives of other types of research vary, but generally share an interest in subjective 
beliefs and attitudes.  
 In addition to being provocative, other criteria for selecting TAT images 
include: the depiction of a “critical situation,” ambiguity, and at least one character 
with whom the storyteller can identify (Anderson 1999: 30-33, Collier and Collier 
1986: 125). For instance, Wesley G. Morgan (1995), of no relation to Murray’s 
collaborator Christina Morgan, points out that in the process of selecting images for 
the 1943 TAT Murray and Morgan often edited or reproduced images to make them 
more ambiguous. Indeed, Murray thought that one of the most successful images 
was one in which the figure is so abstract that out of a sample of 50 male 
respondents 44% were sure that it was a boy, 50% were sure that it was a girl and 
only 6% of respondents remained undecided (Anderson 1999: 31). Clear images, on 
the other hand, would likely elicit responses bogged down in the identification of 
particular whos, whats, and when’s “instead of [interviewees] identifying with the 
scenes and projecting their own wishes and self-conceptions” (Nazarea et al. 1999b: 
348). Anderson also points out that an often unacknowledged factor in the 
development of TAT picture sets is the psychologist’s (or researcher’s) own 
personality. He goes on to attribute the dark character of many of the 1943 images to 
Murray’s own depressive character, a suggestion that Murray did not deny (Anderson 
1999: 32). 
 While Murray conceded that the exercise would probably work without 
images, he concluded that the pictures “force the subject to deal, in their own way, 
with certain classical human situations” (1943: 2). Certainly storytelling more 
generally has been acknowledged as a useful device for learning about how people 
order the world and what they consider possible (Nuijten 2003: 12). This type of 
research has the potential to yield important findings about the way non-elites – 
particularly low-literacy level groups – perceive their social reality (Ramos 1999, 
Wang and Burris 1997). Visual tools can, likewise, be particularly useful when doing 
research in “other language cultures” (Farnworth 2008a). The ability to ‘read’ a 
photograph or other visual image transcends educational and, to a point, linguistic 
barriers because it does not depend on fluency in a particular language or knowledge 
CHAPTER THREE 
 90 
of grammatical rules.40 Whereas reading and interpreting a text involves deciphering 
the particular meaning inherent in the words on the page, reading an image in the 
context of visual research methods enables mutual understanding between the 
researcher and research participants (Banks 2001: 9-10). Feelings, opinions, and the 
research participant’s perceptions of reality are all displaced onto the image, further 
facilitating the discussion of complex or sensitive material. While the researcher 
chooses the images, and often the circumstances of their viewing, the properties of 
the images – what subjects will read into the visual stimuli – are not fixed (Banks 
2001: 11). 
 Finally, having determined the number of images to be used, selected those 
images, and administered the TAT, the researcher must decide how to assess or 
analyse the stories collected. One feature that distinguishes the TAT from other tests 
and, I believe, makes it particularly open to innovation is the lack of a standardised, 
universally adopted scoring system. The unwieldy and cumbersome nature of 
Murray’s interpretive scoring system prevented it from being widely adopted by 
other early TAT practitioners.41 As a general rule, researchers must develop a method 
for systematically examining “corroboration among stories and among different areas 
of interpretation” (Aronow, Weiss, and Reznikoff 2001: 27). Two methods of 
analysis, including my own, are introduced below.   
Modifications for Use in Social Science Research 
 The versatility of the TAT led not only to its use for cross-cultural research 
within psychology, but also to its application in anthropological research as early as 
the mid-1940s (Dana 1999: 178). This trend appears to have been short-lived, 
however. McClelland, for instance, laments that the TAT has not been adopted more 
widely by cultural anthropologists in particular, insisting that “the method has 
important applications for the study of culture…[and] is much less labour intensive 
than national public opinion polls for explaining key characteristics of culture” (1999: 
                                                 
40 What any particular individual reads into an image and, indeed, the very creation of images, 
depend on perspectives and conventions that may be culturally bound. This is not so different, 
however, from diversity of interpretations possible for literary works.  
41 For a comprehensive discussion of alternative scoring techniques that have been used in 
conjunction with various TAT procedures see, for example, Jenkins (2007) and Winter (1999).  
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170). He goes on to suggest that the TAT has opened the door for psychological 
contributions to other disciplines including economics, history, political science, 
international relations, and sociology, although this opportunity has yet to be fully 
exploited (McClelland 1999: 173). Although TATs remain relatively unknown to 
mainstream social science research, some better-established methods bear an 
uncanny resemblance; photo elicitation techniques are particularly similar.42 While 
some would argue with McClelland’s description of the TAT as “much less labour 
intensive” than other, more common research methods (Farnworth 2008a), its 
applicability to social science research is decidedly underappreciated.  
 Nazarea (1998) and Farnworth (2007) are two contemporary social scientists 
who have pioneered the use of modified TATs beyond the traditional boundaries set 
by psychology (see Table 3). Nazarea and her research team used the method in 
conjunction with oral history analysis and close ethnographic observation to research 
indigenous understandings of internally defined standards of sustainability and 
quality of life in the Manupali Watershed in the Bukidnon province of the 
Philippines.43 Their modifications to the 1943 TAT were largely limited to changing 
the images used. The team replaced the 1943 images with 20 photographs taken by 
Nazarea “of scenes from around the Manupali Watershed…[to] elicit people’s 
perceptions of different environmental features and agricultural practices” (Nazarea 
et al. 1998: 159). Their sample, consisting of 51 interviewees from three research sites 
around the watershed, was selected to ensure equal representation by gender, 
ethnicity, and age (Nazarea et al. 1998: 162). Both tape-recorded interviews and 
transcription were conducted in the interviewees’ native dialect and then translated 
into English by researchers from three different national backgrounds and academic 
disciplines in an  effort to  avoid mistranslation  and bias.  The team then  performed 
                                                 
42 Photo elicitation is a research technique developed by sociologists that uses photographs to 
provoke discussion in the context of a semi-structured interview. I would like to thank Lucy 
Mayblin and Steve Birks for bringing this method to my attention at Breaking Boundaries 2009. 
For more information on this particular technique see Banks (2001), Banks (2007), Collier and 
Collier (1986), Stanczak (2007). 
43 Nazarea (2009) has also supervised a kind of reverse TAT, known as photovoice (Wang and 
Burris 1997, Wang et. al. 2004). In this procedure, interviewees are given the camera to take 
pictures that they think best represent the concepts that the researcher is interested in. This is 
similar to a twist on photo elicitation developed by van der Does et. al. (1992). 
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Table 3: Comparison of (Modified) TATs
 
 
 
 
 1943 TAT Nazarea Farnworth Hinthorne 
Location USA The Philippines Madagascar Madagascar 
Number of 
plates 20 20 8 5 
Type of plates Hand drawn Photograph Photograph Hand drawn 
Length of 
interview 2 hours 
No data 
available 
Up to one 
hour 
30 minutes 
(average) 
Number of 
respondents 
Individual 
testing 51 4 51 
Method of 
recording 
Written 
notes 
Tape-
recorded 
Tape-
recorded 
Tape-
recorded 
Triangulation No data available 
Semi-
structured 
interviews, 
oral history, 
observation 
Semi-
structured 
interviews, 
mapping 
exercises, 
observation 
Semi-
structured & 
written 
interviews, 
observation 
Method of 
analysis 
Interpretive 
scoring 
Quantitative 
scoring Qualitative 
Qualitative: 
Framework, 
network 
analysis 
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statistical analysis based on a scoring system that identified 32 themes in four 
categories (Nazarea et al. 1998: 163).  
 This slightly modified TAT procedure enabled the team to identify 
“contextually sensitive indicators” of sustainability and quality of life that they 
concluded differ significantly from indicators in common usage. More specifically:  
…the results demonstrate that the quantitative indicators of sustainability and 
quality of life or end states used in development planning are not co-terminus with 
the indicators that the local community, or sectors thereof, consider relevant and 
significant. (Nazarea et. al. 1998: 166) 
The modified TAT was particularly useful, for instance, in identifying how local 
people evaluated “opportunities and constraints” that help define their 
understanding of natural resources (Nazarea et. al. 1999a: 219). These researchers 
further believe that the variations uncovered by their modified TAT could be used 
tohelp establish common ground between international standards of development 
and those that resonate with local people (Nazarea et. al. 1998: 160).  
 This research is not without critics. First, Marlor, Barsh and Dyhaylungsod 
are quick to point out that public opinion is not the same as scientific expertise 
(1999a: 217). Nazarea et. al. concede this point, but insist that, while studying expert 
accounts is a reasonable pursuit, it was not the objective of their research (1999a). 
They go on to suggest that Marlor, Barsh and Dyhaylungsod have “misread” the 
methodology, and persist that there is intrinsic merit in giving voice to marginalized 
populations unlikely to participate in more formal research practices (e.g. surveys, 
focus groups). Secondly, Marlor, Barsh and Dyhaylungsod are quite critical of 
Nazarea et. al.’s sampling techniques, which relied largely on “whether informants 
were known to the researchers and readily available and willing to participate in the 
study” (1999a: 217) and, consequently, fail to “investigate systematic reasons for 
nonparticipation” (1999b: 347). Importantly, none of these criticisms is directed at 
the modified TAT itself, but rather at the assertions made by Nazarea and her team 
about the meaning and significance of their findings. The real dispute between these 
research teams lies in identifying whose knowledge counts and how this knowledge 
might be used in the identification of culturally sensitive indicators.  
Of more serious concern is the TAT’s proneness to the “attitude-behaviour 
problem;” what people say they did or will do may not in fact correspond with their 
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actions (Procter 2001: 139, Theiss-Morse et al. 1991: 92). The difficulty of making 
inferences about behaviour from limited data is also common, however, to accepted 
research methods including interviews and surveys (Bellak 1975: 2) and is less 
relevant to research into belief or perception patterns. Moreover, the way in which 
an individual interprets a given situation will surely influence if not constrain the 
range of appropriate behavioural responses (Ramos 2007: 215). Therefore, a 
grounded understanding of how people are likely to perceive or interpret events can 
yield meaningful clues about how they would most likely act in response. 
 Farnworth (2007) used a similarly modified TAT while conducting her 
respondent-led research on the effects of participation in international organic food 
chains on the quality of life of farmers in eastern Madagascar. She adopted Nazarea’s 
research model for the TAT with one significant exception: she reduced the number 
of images from 20 to 8 to avoid tiring her interviewees (Farnworth 2007: 283).44 Like 
Nazarea, the images Farnworth used were photographs of the local environment (e.g. 
a school, a market scene) taken from an unusual angle “to capture everyday, yet 
slightly defamiliarised, scenes in a familiar landscape” (2008a). Images were selected 
over a period of two weeks. Despite having reduced the number of images, 
Farnworth (2008b) found the TAT to be a very time consuming and “arduous” 
method. This could be attributed, at least in part, to the interview format. Following 
the procedure outlined by Murray, interviewees were shown the pictures and asked 
to respond “by themselves, with a tape-recorder running, in the presence of a silent 
facilitator” for up to an hour (Farnworth 2008b). It was, therefore, necessary to have 
established a rapport with interviewees before conducting the TAT and Farnworth 
did not start using this method until several weeks after she arrived on site. Like 
Nazarea’s team, Farnworth used the modified TAT in conjunction with other 
qualitative research methods, including semi-structured interviews and participatory 
mapping exercises.  
 It is significant that Farnworth conducted her research using a modified TAT 
in the Antsinanana region of Madagascar not far from my own fieldwork site. Not 
only did Farnworth’s experience instruct my own modifications to the TAT, her 
                                                 
44 Farnworth’s small sample size prevented her from adopting Nazarea et. al.’s quantitative data 
analysis technique.  
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observations also prepared me for the sorts of encounters I was likely to experience. 
Farnworth’s interviewees, for instance, came from a similar demographic to many of 
my own, specifically: working class, poorly educated, non-elites. She notes that all of 
her respondents were illiterate and hesitant to put an x on a piece of paper in case 
they were signing away their land (Farnworth 2008b). Her experience warned against 
research methods (e.g. surveys) that pose direct questions and require respondents to 
leave a mark on papers that they neither trust nor understand. In contrast, modified 
TATs are entirely spoken, can be recorded (ideally verbatim) in a way that is 
acceptable to the respondent (either electronically or by taking notes manually), and 
do not pose any specific questions but rather prompt interviewees to respond to 
themes evident in the images. Farnworth is quick to point out that the TAT was a 
“particularly useful method…which produced some of the fieldwork’s richest and 
most finely-tuned data” and suggests that one reason for this could be the strong oral 
tradition that exists within Malagasy society (Farnworth 2007: 276, Farnworth 
2008b).  
 It is worth noting that in both of these cases the researchers waited to select 
the images for their modified TATs until they arrived in the field. Writing about 
photo elicitation, Banks reasons that if one reason for choosing visual research 
methods “is to increase the degree of intimacy between researcher and subject, then 
arbitrary images, removed from one context and deployed in another, would seem 
unlikely to promote this” (2001: 94). This is an important point, particularly when the 
research subject is sensitive or controversial. As noted above, one strength of visual 
research methods is that the image can act to de-formalise the interview by, for 
instance, transforming the interview process from an interrogation to a more 
congenial story-telling exercise or providing an escape route from awkward silences 
(Clark-Ibáñez 2004: 1512, Samuels 2004: 1547). The presence of the image means 
that there is always something to talk about (Collier and Collier 1986: 105-107). As I 
stated earlier, however, the ability of an image to fulfil this role and, indeed, to 
generate any data at all, depends on its accessibility to the interviewee. Both Nazarea 
and Farnworth ensured that their TAT images would be familiar, though not too 
familiar, to interviewees by taking photos of their daily surroundings from an unusual 
angle. Clearly an image taken of a nature preserve in the United States or a market 
scene in Germany would not have had the same effect on interviewees in the 
Philippines or Madagascar.  
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Using a Modified TAT to Elicit Local Perceptions of Democracy 
 The principal strength of the TAT and similar image-based research methods 
is their ability to draw out information that could not be gathered through direct 
questioning (Anderson 1999: 36, Banks 2007: 4, Farnworth 2008a, Stanczak 2007: 8). 
My experience with this method in Madagascar verifies this claim. Although 
Madagascar ranked relatively well on many democracy indices, upon my arrival in 
2008 I found that freedom of speech and expression was severely curtailed. Whether 
this was due to actual restrictions or self-censorship is insignificant – most people 
were not prepared to discuss overtly political subject matter. The abstract nature of 
the TAT enabled me to approach political themes in a nonthreatening, roundabout 
way that was acceptable to most research participants and resulted in the collection 
of data that would not have been accessible via more direct questioning. The images 
create settings in which research participants can explain the meaning behind 
different types of socio-political interaction, thereby enabling the identification of 
political culture(s) within the social contexts that give rise to them (Keesing 1974: 
90). It also resulted in an informal collaboration between myself and the people I 
interviewed that, while guided by my broad research themes, reflects local 
perceptions of democracy and the genuine concerns people have about their 
country’s political future.  
 The number of images that I used was primarily determined by two factors. 
Firstly, Farnworth used eight images for her modified TAT in Madagascar and 
concluded: “this seemed to be the right number” (2008a). However, even with this 
reduced number of images, she still found the method a time-consuming and 
challenging exercise for interviewees and the research team alike. Drawing on 
Farnworth’s experience, I decided early on not to use more than eight pictures, and 
possibly fewer as I had a larger target sample. The second factor in determining the 
number of pictures I used was the time it took to collect them. Like Nazarea’s team 
and Farnworth, I had initially intended to use photographs. Not only had 
photographs been used in the other modified versions of the TAT, I suspected that 
they would be readily available by tapping sources such as newspaper archives. Soon 
after my arrival in Madagascar, I gave the task of finding a wide selection of 
photographs to a research assistant who had come highly recommended and whom I 
knew had access to newspaper archives. A considerable amount of time was lost 
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waiting for this research assistant to assemble a collection of newspaper photographs 
that I ultimately decided were not appropriate prompts.45  Fortunately fieldwork has a 
proclivity for serendipitous encounters. Not long after rejecting the photographs, I 
met a young artist who agreed to draw cartoons for me. Having commissioned the 
images, I had to allow time for the artist to draw them. Five pictures encompassing 
the themes we had discussed were complete by the time I absolutely had to start 
conducting interviews. In retrospect, I believe that this was an appropriate number 
of images.46  
 Due to the difficulty of obtaining appropriate images, my image selection 
process did not conform to the process employed by both Nazarea’s team and 
Farnworth. As I was commissioning the images, I was able to discuss the general 
themes that interested me with the artist (e.g. elections, political authority, freedom 
of speech, etc.); she was then at liberty to interpret these themes in a way that was 
appropriate to the local context. This collaborative process resulted in a set of 
sketches that are contextually relevant and could be interpreted by the people I 
interviewed relatively easily. Sketches and cartoons, for that matter, are often used to 
make complex material easier to understand. Madagascar’s constitution was recently 
translated into a comic book for distribution among citizens with low levels of 
literacy (KMF-CNOE and Nova Stella 2009); likewise, comic strips have been 
printed on food packaging in Venezuela to educate people on parts of that country’s 
constitution.47 The fact that my images are cartoons also helped to disarm research 
participants; most people immediately accepted that I was not going to probe into 
their perceptions of particular events or political figures (also see Clark-Ibáñez 2007, 
Gold 2007, Samuels 2007).  
                                                 
45 After a month, it became evident that this researcher was unreliable and the pictures that he 
eventually provided (e.g. cockfights, cityscapes) did not meet the criteria that we had discussed.  
46 If I were to use the method again, I would opt for a set of ten images to use over the course of 
two interview sessions. Initially, research participants were prone to descriptive accounts of the 
pictures; however, the quality of stories improved as they grew in confidence. I expect that a 
second interview session would yield more interesting stories because research participants would 
be accustomed to the method and likely more comfortable with the researcher.  
47 I would like to thank Craig Wirt for bringing this to my attention. 
CHAPTER THREE 
 98 
 It could be argued that my images are not particularly abstract or ambiguous 
in that they were drawn to elicit responses on particular themes relevant to 
democracy. While it is true that my images are more obviously themed than the 1943 
TAT plates, this is not necessarily inappropriate. I address this here in part because 
Nazarea et. al.’s process of image selection was one stumbling block that Marlor, 
Barsh and Dyhaylungsod never got over. In their second response to Nazarea et. al., 
these critics  say that they have difficulty understanding how the images could be 
both ambiguous and grounded in ethnographic observation, and go on to question 
how images “deliberately chosen to avoid specifics such as ‘who? where? and 
when?’” could possibly lead to the identification of specific indicators (Marlor, Barsh, 
and Duhaylungsod 1999b). Nazarea et. al. defend their choice of photographs, 
explaining:  
Ethnographic grounding helped us identify scenes that had a higher likelihood of 
evoking a response; there was no preconception about who among the local 
informants would respond, or in what length, with what depth, and in what 
direction they will respond…As every impressionist painter knew, haziness has its 
value. (1999b)  
Likewise, although my images were created to provoke responses on particular 
themes, I had no way of knowing how individual research participants would 
respond to or interpret them. Indeed, there is considerable variation in how people 
interpreted the same image (see Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Examples of Ambiguity in TAT Images
 
Picture A     Picture B 
  
Identified as: a businessman, the president,  Identified as: old, young, angry, eager,  
a professor, a mayor, a dictator, interesting,   confused, confident, decided 
boring 
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Table 4: Sample Demographic Details
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A brief word on sampling is also in order. As the TAT was originally 
developed for use with individual patients in a clinical setting, sample selection is not 
included in Murray’s method. I interviewed 51 people (27 men, 24 women) from two 
sites: one rural and one urban (see Table 4). All research participants were non-elites 
of various backgrounds and professions. Conscious that class (Farnworth 2007) and 
age (Dina 2001, Sharp 2002) remain two particularly persistent social cleavages, I was 
careful to collect a sample broadly representative on these grounds. That said, it was 
difficult to know exactly how to judge the economic class of research participants.   
In the end, I developed a four-tier class structure for the purposes of analysis.  I 
classified research participants as “lower class” if they were day labourers or on a 
meagre subsistence income. “Middle class” for the purposes of this research refers to 
people who have a steady income, generally providing some sort of service (e.g. hotel 
receptionist, secretary, waiter). Although all of the people consulted for this research 
are non-elites, I decided to classify those as “upper class” who had a post-graduate 
degree, were government bureaucrats, or owned a business employing non-family 
members. Finally, I decided to classify members of religious orders as belonging to 
their own socio-economic class because, despite their simple lifestyle, they have a 
standard of economic security not experienced by most people.  
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My sampling strategy was similar to that of Nazarea et. al., counting initially 
on the participation of individuals known to my research assistants or myself.48 This 
reliance on known contacts gave way to snowball sampling, with research 
participants recommending other people that we should speak to. Although 51 
people is not a large sample by some standards, I was keenly aware in the early stages 
of fieldwork planning of the trade-off between large and small target samples. I 
decided that the sort of information I needed requires “studying a smaller sample 
more intensely” and it was a struggle to meet my target of 50 modified TAT 
interviews in the time remaining once the commissioned images were delivered 
(Arber 2001: 59). 
The tense political climate in Madagascar also precluded random sampling 
techniques. Many people were not comfortable talking about political issues openly 
with a stranger. Moreover, although I was told by the Embassy of Madagascar in 
London that a research permit was not required and my lack of a permit was never 
an issue during the three-month-long process of validating my visa, my urban 
research assistant was still worried that the police might stop us if we were not 
careful about both who we spoke to and where interviews took place. Being able to 
approach potential research participants by saying that someone they knew and 
trusted thought they might like to participate in this research noticeably improved the 
likelihood that someone would agree to be interviewed (also see Burnham et al. 2004: 
91, Lewis-Beck, Bryman, and Liao 2004: 1044). The handful of people that we 
approached without any personal connection sent us away. While this sampling 
method does prevent me from carrying out systematic analysis as to why people may 
have opted out of participating (Marlor, Barsh, and Dyhaylungsod 1999a), I am 
convinced that it was the only way of collecting a reasonable amount of authentic 
data with the limited time and resources available.  
                                                 
48 I terminated my relationship with the first research assistant after he failed to deliver suitable 
photographs in a timely manner and found two new research assistants who I was able to work 
with much more productively. Theresa, my rural research assistant, provided much needed 
introductions to both the village president and people to interview. She also provided 
simultaneous translation from the local Malagasy dialect to French during TAT interviews. 
Urmine, my urban research assistant, similarly provided introductions and acted as a translator 
when necessary, although I conducted most urban interviews in French. I would like to thank 
both of them for their encouragement and perseverance; this project would not have been 
possible without them.  
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Having made my modifications to the TAT, the interview process was 
relatively straightforward. The 1943 TAT includes these instructions to read to 
patients before beginning the procedure:  
This is a test of imagination, one form of intelligence. I am going to show you some 
pictures, one at a time; and your task will be to make up as dramatic a story as you 
can for each. Tell what has led up to the event shown in the picture, describe what is 
happening at the moment, what the characters are feeling and thinking; and then 
give the outcome. Speak your thoughts as they come to your mind. Do you 
understand? Since you have fifty minutes for ten pictures, you can devote about five 
minutes to each story. Here is the first picture. (Murray 1943: 3-4) 
Although these instructions sound quite stiff and formal, Murray was aware that the 
creativity on which the TAT depends “can not be forced to flourish in a stiff, frigid, 
intellectually superior, or otherwise uncongenial atmosphere;” it is important, he 
continues, “that the subject have good reason to feel the environment as sympathetic 
and to anticipate receptivity, goodwill and appreciation from the examiner” (1943: 3). 
The success of any interview depends on the quality of engagement between 
interviewer and interviewee, and a modified TAT can only enhance this relationship 
if the researcher allows it to (Pittenger, Hockett, and Danehy 1960: 3).  
More specifically, the directions offered at the outset indicate the cultural 
credibility of the examiner and, according to Dana (2009) “markedly influence 
compliance [thereby] rendering the stories useful for the intended purposes, or not if 
rapport and cooperation have been minimal.” Nazarea and her team began TAT 
interviews with the simple instruction “Please tell me what you see” or “Tell me a 
story about what you see;” no follow-up questions were asked (Nazarea 2009).49 
Farnworth likewise stuck quite closely to Murray’s prescription that the interviewer 
remains silent. I, however, often engaged with research participants by asking what 
had led up to the event they had described or seeking clarification if something said 
was unclear, probing for their meaning. Crucially, neither my research assistants nor I 
ever attempted to correct anything that was said during a TAT interview. I can 
understand why it may not be advisable to give feedback in a clinical setting, but 
                                                 
49 Nazarea (2009) notes that while interviewees in the Philippines had no problem telling stories 
in response to the TAT images, in China and Ecuador people insisted that the researchers tell 
them more about the photos, for instance who the people are and where the photos were taken. 
She suggests that perhaps the instruction to simply make up a story about an image is culture-
bound.  
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maintain that this was an appropriate modification to make in my particular research 
context. 
When encountering visual research methods for the first time, people 
commonly begin to assess an image descriptively, applying labels to the things that 
they most confidently recognise (Banks 2001: 3, Bellak 1975: 7). Many of my 
research participants likewise began by identifying what was familiar in the pictures. I 
noticed, however, that they often grew in confidence as the interview progressed, 
sometimes returning to an image at the end to expand on his or her original story.50 I 
attribute this gradual change in attitude to informal feedback exchanged throughout 
the interview. Interviews lasted around 30 minutes on average, with stories about 
each image taking approximately 5 minutes to tell. Very occasionally interviews lasted 
between 45 minutes and an hour, usually because the research participant went off 
on a tangent. In these rare circumstances, I decided against cutting the story off or 
trying to re-direct the response because I did not want to interrupt the flow of the 
interview. In retrospect, however, I probably should have intervened when people 
rambled for an exceptionally long while, as these stories did not yield better data than 
shorter stories.51  
Murray concluded the instruction booklet for the 1943 TAT by warning that 
“the conclusions that are reached by an analysis of TAT stories must be regarded as 
good ‘leads’ or working hypotheses to be verified by other methods, rather than as 
proved facts” (1943: 14). Indeed, the modified TAT piloted here could be easily 
integrated with other research techniques, adding depth to data collected using more 
conventional means. Restraints set by time and circumstances, however, limited my 
                                                 
50 Research participants were not encouraged to tell stories about the Images in any particular 
order. I would hand each research participant the stack of sketches at the beginning of the 
interview and s/he was then free to choose his/her own sequence for discussing them.  
51 In two cases, the tangents of research participants substantially detracted from their TAT 
stories. In response to the image depicting a newspaper vendor, Voary spoke at length about the 
need for better public-service announcements warning people of the dangers posed by the illegal 
production of rum. The interview was then abruptly terminated when her baby woke up from his 
nap; consequently, she did not tell a story for several of the images. Michel likewise neglected to 
tell TAT stories about several images, preferring instead to explain the continued significance of 
Merina royalty for social cohesion among the Merina. He was the only person to participate in 
this research who did not respond well to the modified TAT technique. 
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opportunity for rigorous triangulation.52 In addition to the modified TATs, I 
conducted semi-structured interviews with senior project managers from CARE and 
KMF-CNOE, an indigenous NGO that focuses on electoral monitoring and civic 
education. Structured follow-up interviews were completed with ten key non-elite 
research participants. Most of these “interviews” were agreed to on the condition 
that I provided a list of questions that could be answered by anonymous, written 
response.53 I also took extensive ethnographic field notes and maintained consistent 
email contact with several primary contacts as I engaged in data analysis. The 
conclusions drawn in the chapters that follow do provide fodder for deeper 
hypotheses about why democracy assistance and assessment policies have not been 
as effective as they perhaps could have been. That said, the data extracted from TAT 
stories does provide a compelling portrait of how typical Malagasy in one region of 
Madagascar perceive democracy and politics, original data of value in itself.  The 
remainder of this chapter discusses the method of analysis I used to interpret TAT 
stories and generate my findings.  
Visual Data Analysis Techniques  
How do you transparently extract meaningful data from 244 short stories? 
Trying to access other people’s conceptual worlds has been compared elsewhere to 
walking along a hall of mirrors; careful steps are required (Barth 2000: 34). I found 
that translation provides a useful metaphor for data analysis: in both cases the 
                                                 
52 While Samuels (2004) agrees that visual research methods like photo elicitation should be 
combined with other techniques (e.g. interviews, ethnographic observation) Clark-Ibáñez (2004) 
has successfully used photo-elicitation as a stand-alone method.  
53 I modelled my written interview questions after some of those included in International 
IDEA’s country-led democracy assessment framework. Although some written responses to 
these questions do corroborate the themes I identified in TAT stories, others are simple “yes” or 
“no” answers. My inability to monitor the quality of written interview responses proved to be a 
significant shortcoming of this approach. Two additional methods that I had initially anticipated 
using – focus groups and cognitive mapping – proved unworkable. Focus groups were quickly 
eliminated from my toolbox since people were generally suspicious of talking openly about 
political topics with others they did not know. Although Farnworth had been successful at 
encouraging her interviewees to engage in mapping exercises, I found this method to be too 
abstract; instead of producing ‘maps’ of how people perceived the political arena identifying 
sources of power and pathways for getting things done, trials with a few research participants 
resulted in linear diagrams of social and class structures. While useful to a point, early on I 
decided that this method was not providing the sort of information I sought and focused instead 
on refining my modified TAT. One likely explanation for the different experiences Farnworth 
and I had with mapping exercises is that her research topic (i.e. fair trade farming) has an overtly 
geographical sub-text which democracy does not.  
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product is a provisional solution for making something previously indecipherable or 
foreign newly comprehensible (Benjamin 2000). The result is an independent 
interpretation that, if done well, accurately echoes the original (Basit 2003: 146, 
Keesing 1974: 92).  
In Fabrication, Neville brilliantly achieves this objective while researching 
assorted modes of creation. Intricate, incomprehensible processes for manufacturing 
globes and extracting pure vanilla become clear and immediate. Recounting the 
manufacturing process for veneer, Neville recounts: 
Two and a half million square feet a day, the pale logs are loaded on a machine that 
runs on rails, so when you’re standing on the catwalk it’s like looking down onto 
subway tracks, with that same rush of the train, only this time it’s a log that rushes 
toward you on the tracks, with red laser beams pointing out where the log is to be 
cut and a sawyer sitting in a room above you. As if he were playing a video game, he 
points the laser and then there’s the horrible sound of the blade squaring the log. It 
all happens so quickly, with so much sound and violence, and you’re standing on the 
edge and right below you is this enormous blade and the wood and the tracks and 
you think of Anna Karenina and subway suicides and you just want out of there. 
(Neville 2001: 86) 
Even the initial stages of fabricating veneer make perfect sense with the help of 
references to trains and Tolstoy. (Although I doubt that either of these references 
would make the process any clearer to my research participants in Madagascar.) 
In the context of this research, the underlying objective is to find a means of 
identifying and understanding one way of seeing things (i.e. non-elite perspectives of 
Madagascar’s socio-political environment) and then intelligibly transferring this 
particular worldview to academic and policy debates, an altogether different venue. 
Verbatim, word-by-word transcription is unlikely to prove effective, lacking the tone 
and nuance that surely contribute to the meaning of the original text or experience. 
Instead, a researcher may be better served by remaining intuitively faithful to the 
internal logic and emotion of the research experience. With that same rush of the train, 
only this time it’s a log that rushes toward you on the tracks. “Rendering the sense” of a day 
labourer in Madagascar’s socio-political worldview similarly requires not only 
attention to linguistic detail in transcribing the interview but also appreciation for the 
previously imperceptible parallels between his experience and that of someone living 
in the United States or Europe (Benjamin 2000: 21).  
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Having met the myriad challenges posed by fieldwork, I confronted the even 
more daunting task of data analysis with this idea of translation in mind. The primary 
objective of the analysis process was to build a schematic framework or model 
capable of accurately describing local political logic and how this might become 
manifest in political behaviour. This was achieved using a three-stage analysis strategy 
entailing: (1) systematic deconstruction of TAT stories into thematic text segments 
(i.e. data extrapolation); (2) exploration of pervasive themes and theme clusters (i.e. 
identification of perceptual lenses); and (3) interpretation and analysis of the 
information (see Figure 6). Data analysis, in other words, entails a creative process of 
describing trends, identifying relationships, and interpreting meaning (Basit 2003). In 
so doing, this process examines the concepts that ‘normal’ people actually use to 
interpret their political environment. It should also shed light on how concepts 
associated with democracy (e.g. elections, political competition) are re-appropriated 
in new settings. 
A researcher’s “interpretations are always partial, in both senses of the word, 
and provisional; they are not ‘true’ ” (Marsh and Furlong 2002: 19, also see Spencer, 
Ritchie,  and O'Connor 2003: 199).  This,  however,  is no bad thing.   Self-conscious  
Figure 6: Stages of Analysis
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subjectivity allows the researcher to draw from his/her unique “appreciation of the 
enormity, contingency, and fragility” of the qualitative data when making 
interpretations, nuances that may be lost on someone else reading the data cold 
(Attride-Stirling 2001: 403). I do not, therefore, claim that my analysis of TAT stories 
is absolute, or even complete, but do believe that the analytical process I utilised is 
reliable because it remains grounded in the TAT stories themselves. My desire to stay 
as close to the original stories as possible also resulted in an acute awareness of the 
need for transparency in establishing clear links between thematic conclusions and 
what individuals actually said. This is all easier said than done, of course. For a start, 
the challenge of conceptualising “the elements of political culture, and their inter-
relationships” has been pushed to one side, largely neglected by scholars trying to 
make sense of democracy’s third wave (Dalton 1996: 341). Lacking a cohesive 
framework on which to build, I would have to cobble one together myself. The 
result is an eclectic analytical process that synthesises Framework (Spencer, Ritchie, 
and O'Connor 2003) with thematic networks (Attride-Stirling 2001), enabling the 
construction of conceptual schema that reflect likely perceptual lenses adopted by 
people living in the Antsinanana region of eastern Madagascar. 
Data Organisation: Framework 
 Before data analysis could begin in earnest, TAT interviews required 
transcription and organisation. Having collected nearly 250 TAT stories, data 
reduction proved a crucial first step in making sense of what I had learned (Attride-
Stirling 2001, Lee and Fielding 1996). This section explains how breaking up the 
mass of transcribed text using Framework helped me to identify broad clusters of 
themes. Although these initial theme clusters were still too abstract for detailed 
analysis of potential perceptual lenses, this initial process of breaking the TAT stories 
down into more manageable chunks was crucial before undertaking the second, 
more nuanced stage of analysis. 
Framework is an interactive data management technique that uses matrices to 
organise data by case and theme (National Centre for Social Research 2007, Ritchie, 
Spencer, and O'Connor 2003). While specialist software is available (such as 
FrameWork), I achieved the same result using a series of Excel spreadsheets. A 
Framework consists of a set of thematic charts (or matrices); each chart is dedicated 
to a unique theme, which is then broken down into sub-themes. All charts conform 
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to a standard format (i.e. row height, column width, number of rows and columns 
per page) and while the themes across the horizontal header of each chart are 
different, the vertical location of cases (or research participants) remains consistent 
across all charts. This format allows the researcher to analyse data either by case (by 
looking at the same row across charts) or theme (by looking at all rows on a single 
chart). My Framework consisted of six charts: a central chart, identifying research 
participants by number and corresponding demographic information (i.e. interview 
number, sex, age, occupation, education, urban/rural, did they vote in the previous 
presidential election) and one chart for each of the five images. Each chart had eight 
columns; in addition to columns dedicated to appropriate sub-themes, each chart 
based on a thematic image included columns labelled “identifier” (i.e. interview 
number), “interpretation of scene”, and “other” (for interpretive notes).  
Having established the uniform chart format, I began to sort through TAT 
stories to determine how best to organise their contents. Data is typically entered 
into a Framework either by theme (if data is coded) or directly from interview 
transcripts (National Centre for Social Research 2007). The words that we use 
“define and delimit our world in important ways” that require careful, contextual 
interpretation rather than literal transcription (Pitkin 1967: 1, also see Keesing 1974: 
92). Wary of moving away form the original language used by research participants 
too soon in the analysis process, I made the unconventional decision of entering 
quotes from TAT stories directly into the Framework verbatim rather than 
summarising or relying on a pre-determined coding system. TAT stories were 
generally told and recorded in French; when a research participant preferred to tell 
his or her stories in the local dialect, a research assistant provided simultaneous 
translation to French. In an effort to remain true to the original stories for as long as 
possible, I completed this initial stage of data organisation in French.  
In the spirit of “data-driven” coding, I began to fill in each chart by reading a 
random selection of transcribed TAT stories about each image, usually around 10, 
looking for common ideas or explanations (Gibbs 2007: 45). I would then sort 
through the remaining stories about that image to fill in the chart, returning to the 
original stories at the end to make sure that the original analysis remained consistent 
(Gibbs 2007: 98). This meticulous sifting process resulted in the identification of key 
terms and ideas inherent in the data itself that may have gone unnoticed had I 
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approached the stories with a preconceived list of codes in mind (Frake 1962: 54). I 
should reiterate that this first stage of coding using Framework was more for general 
data sorting than in-depth data analysis. Consequently, I prefer to call the categories 
identified at this point “sub-themes” rather than “codes,” a term I use with specific 
meaning in the context of constructing thematic networks below.  
To illustrate, I identified the following sub-themes in TAT stories about the 
image depicting people in a voting queue: practice/procedure, transparency, political 
parties/opposition, democracy, and corruption. TAT story excerpts classified under 
these headings might contain contradictory competences and dispositions about, for 
example, voting procedure. Moreover, the same story snippet could be classified 
under multiple headings; if someone said that the voting procedure is transparent, 
that clip from the story was filed under both practice/procedure and transparency. 
This data sorting process led to the creation of a “conceptual scheme” grounded in 
the data itself and providing the foundation for more complex data analysis (Basit 
2003: 144). All sub-themes demonstrate a clear and immediate connection with the 
TAT stories: “it makes no sense trying to explain something that is there by means of 
something that proves not to be there” (Barth 1993: 165, also see National Centre 
for Social Research 2007). 
 I found filling in Framework charts to be an organic process; something that 
I learned by doing. Though overwhelming at first, the process of sifting through the 
244 unique TAT stories became less daunting once I began to look at them one at a 
time, temporarily forgetting about the rest. Although I initially identified sub-themes 
from a rather small selection of TAT stories, these categories were prone to 
modification as I methodically pieced data from the remaining stories into the 
Framework. To briefly illustrate, in the case of the image of people in a voting queue, 
above, the political parties sub-theme was eventually broadened to include 
discussions of the political opposition, which were too rare to warrant their own 
column. Likewise, I added the corruption sub-theme rather late after it emerged 
more often in TAT stories than I had anticipated. I then went back through all of the 
stories I had already completed to pick-out the excerpts newly identified as relevant. 
When a TAT story did not include reference to a particular sub-theme, that cell in 
the chart was left blank.  
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After TAT stories had been organised in the Framework, they were analysed 
for competences and dispositions (see Chapter Two). While this could have been 
achieved on the computer (using the highlighter tool, for example), I printed all 78 
A3 pages of Framework charts and circled competences and dispositions manually 
with coloured markers. The classification of a word or phrase as a competence or 
disposition was not arbitrary, but rather reflects the context of this particular theme 
within its TAT story. I distinguished, for example, between whether research 
participants indicated that they could do something (i.e. a competence) or that they 
wanted to do it (i.e. a disposition). Saying that people can take part in protests (i.e. a 
competence) is not the same as indicating that people want to protest (i.e. a 
disposition) but are not actually able to. The competences and dispositions identified 
as pertaining to the various sub-themes then became codes for my first order or 
“basic” themes.  
At this point, I decided that I needed a tool other than Framework that could 
better illustrate the texture and nuance of competences and dispositions included in 
TAT stories both as independent codes and interdependent themes. While 
Framework facilitated data-sorting and the identification of meanings commonly 
attributed by research participants to various socio-political interactions and contexts, 
I found it to be of only limited use for interpreting – for translating – these meanings 
into perceptual lenses that could be compared to the expectations and criteria of the 
international democracy assistance industry (Basit 2003: 144). Thematic networks 
achieve this second aim, providing a visual blueprint of the characteristic contours of 
various perceptual lenses. Linking the language used by research participants to more 
abstract analytical themes, the thematic networks described in Chapters Four 
through Six transparently interpret the perspectives from which different social 
groups in the Antsinanana region of Madagascar likely view the political sphere.  
Data Analysis: Thematic Networks 
 Thematic networks, which emphasise the interactive and non-linear aspects 
of themes, are useful for organising competences and dispositions identified through 
the Framework procedure into visual analytical representations of likely perceptual 
lenses. The process of creating thematic networks, described in detail below, was 
designed specifically to “unravel the mass of textual data and make sense of others’ 
sense-making, using more than intuition” (Attride-Stirling 2001: 402). The result is a 
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visual model that transparently links abstract analysis to the original, primary-source 
data. The thematic networks created in undertaking this research therefore provide 
an approximate map of the logic used by ordinary Malagasy in the Antsinanana 
region of Madagascar to interpret their political environment. Admittedly imperfect, 
these maps nevertheless provide new depth of insight into how the familiar ideas and 
language commonly associated with democracy can be re-appropriated by local 
actors.  
 Thematic networks are especially well suited to the analysis of perceptual 
lenses because any form of cultural description is always an “abstracted composite” 
(Keesing 1974: 89, also see Simpson et al. 1961: 522). Likewise, research into 
cognitive reasoning suggests that thought processes rely on “clumped networks of 
signification” not conducive to linear modelling (Bloch 1992: 128). In which case, it 
makes sense that culture has been described elsewhere as a “cognitive map” (Almond 
1989: 27, Thompson, Thianthai and Hidayana 2007: 270) and a “mental map” 
(Simpson et al. 1961: 523), metaphors that signify the complex intermingling of 
routes and topography encountered between Point A and Point B. Finding a way of 
visually approximating this map, as thematic networks do, seems like a worthwhile 
undertaking. The story told by thematic networks is, however, more than a simple 
aggregation of individual points of view. For example, the relative sizes of basic 
themes are proportional to their frequency among the group of research participants 
whose TAT stories contribute to any particular thematic network, suggesting how 
variations among individual perspectives relate to common themes (Keating 2008: 
114-115, Simpson et. al. 1961: 522). 
 “One of the main challenges in qualitative reporting,” note White, 
Woodfield, and Ritchie “is to find ways of telling the ‘story’ of the research in a clear 
and cogent way” (2003: 301). Accurate translation of elusive field material, as 
described above, depends on a delicate balance of description and interpretation. By 
capturing the data’s “subtlety, richness, and detail” it becomes intelligible to a new 
audience with its integrity still intact (White, Woodfield, and Ritchie 2003: 301). 
Thematic networks achieve this balance between description and interpretation by 
creating a web of interconnected themes of varying orders of abstraction. The 
sample thematic network in Figure 7 illustrates the interconnectedness between raw 
data (i.e. basic themes) and underlying patterns of meaning (i.e. organising and global 
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Figure 7: Sample Thematic Network
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54 Translation from the original French is included in the interpretation and analysis of individual 
thematic networks in Chapters Four through Six. 
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and Collier 1986: 195). Organising themes also provide the basis for making over-
arching claims about what the data means.  
Finally, super-ordinate global themes “group organising themes to present an 
argument,” “concluding tenet,” or “principle metaphor” of the text (Attride-Stirling 
2001: 388-389).55 Each thematic network has a single global theme at its core. 
Analysis of a text may, therefore, yield several thematic networks. While some 
competences and dispositions are widely prominent across the sample, others are 
attributable to a narrower group of research participants. These groupings, 
observable in the data, provided the basis for organising themes and distinct global 
themes, each reflecting a distinct frame of reference with regard to the various 
scenarios depicted in the images. In the end, my analysis of the 244 TAT stories 
resulted in 10 discrete thematic networks, each suggesting a different political lens or 
point of view on three specific themes pertaining to democracy. Unlike basic themes, 
I have entered organising and global themes into the thematic networks in English. 
Thematic networks therefore provide a transparent transition from original source 
data to abstract themes as well as a seamless shift from French to English.  
The basic themes in the model thematic network above (see Figure 7), like 
those found in subsequent chapters, are different sizes and colours. Blue basic 
themes indicate competences while green basic themes signify dispositions. This 
distinction between beliefs and capabilities was sometimes blurred in individual TAT 
stories. As a general rule, things that people believed they could do were classified as 
competences, whereas dispositions are linked to emotions. The basic themes are also 
of various sizes, reflecting the frequency with which a particular competence or 
disposition appeared in TAT stories. Word size, determined using Wordle,56 
accurately portrays the relative distribution or prevalence of a particular idea or 
emotion among those research participants whose TAT stories are indicative of a 
                                                 
55 The hierarchy of basic, organising and global themes used here mirrors that of codes, 
categories, and themes/concepts used by Saldaña (2009: 12). 
56 Wordle (www. wordle.net) is a free, web-based tool for creating “word clouds” from a text. 
Words that appear more frequently in the text are displayed proportionally larger than words 
cited less often. Using Wordle Advanced, I entered competences and dispositions weighted for 
their frequency into the programme. I then cut the re-sized competences from the resultant word 
cloud and pasted them into the thematic networks. This is similar to the notion of 
“groundedness” in standard coding procedures, including Atlas.ti., whereby a code is considered 
more or less grounded depending on the number of quotations it applies to.  
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particular perceptual lens (i.e. aggregated in that thematic network) without resorting 
to numerical frequencies. The extent to which frequency should be reported 
alongside qualitative analysis has been described elsewhere as “irksome” because the 
scale and design of qualitative research methods do not support statistical analysis 
(White, Woodfield, and Ritchie 2003: 311). This visual representation of frequency 
strikes a balance between forthright reporting and distinctly qualitative explication.  
Figure 8, illustrates the multi-step process used here for translating individual 
TAT stories into aggregate perceptual lenses. This nine-step approach was completed 
five times, once for each image. For the sake of clarity, I refer to Image 1 in this 
description of the analytical process, but it applies equally to the analysis of each of 
the other four images. The first two steps are relatively straightforward: listen to and 
transcribe each TAT story told about Image 1. The next step was to enter text 
fragments into my Image 1 Framework spreadsheet; described in some detail above. 
It was then possible to identify specific competences and dispositions.  
Step four is where the process begins to get complicated. An index card was 
made for each research participant and labelled with his or her pseudonym. Using the 
Framework spreadsheet  as a reference,  the competences and dispositions contained 
Figure 8: Translating TAT Stories 
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in each person’s TAT story about Image 1 were then listed on his or her note card. 
Whereas the position of research participants on the Framework spreadsheet is 
permanently fixed, the note cards allowed me to move people around, compare 
individual lists of competences and dispositions side by side, and eventually identify 
groups of research participants who shared several competences and dispositions in 
response to Image 1. During this comparative process, two or three competences or 
dispositions generally emerged as particularly dominant (i.e. shared exclusively by a 
reasonably large number of people). The dominant dispositions for Image 1 
depicting a polling place, for example, were: (i) some people are happy to vote and 
(ii) voting is not worth the trouble (see Chapter Four). On the rare occasion when a 
research participant’s TAT story did not include one of the dominant basic themes, 
that research participant was included in the thematic network (i.e. perceptual lens 
group) that resulted in the best fit based on the competences and dispositions that 
were present in the TAT story; this often, though not always, was the most loosely 
defined thematic network for that particular image. The table in Appendix 1 includes 
the demographic details of each research participant as well as which thematic 
networks (i.e. perceptual lenses) his or her TAT stories contribute to.  
Having identified like-minded groups of research participants for Image 1, 
the frequency of each competence and disposition was counted and entered into 
Wordle, described above. I then cut apart the word clouds produced by Wordle and 
re-grouped the variably sized competences and dispositions into clusters revealing 
organising themes. In the final step, a single global theme is identified for each 
thematic network.57  
This account of my translation process should not suggest that there is a 
simple or exact fit between the perceptions of individuals and the analytical 
representation of perceptual lenses in thematic networks (Gibbs 2007: 93). 
Consistent with Elkins and Simeon’s prediction, some perceptual lenses have themes 
that are “highly consistent and strongly interrelated” while others “encompass a wide 
range” of only loosely connected competences and dispositions (1979: 128). 
                                                 
57 Ideally, I would have liked to discuss the thematic networks that I constructed with research 
participants to verify their validity (Lewis and Ritchie 2003). Unfortunately, financial restraints 
prevented me from making a second trip to the field.  
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Furthermore, the boundaries between perceptual lenses are sometimes vague and 
there are instances in the chapters that follow where two perceptual lenses share 
common basic and even organising themes (Keating 2008: 113). At the same time, 
however, not every research participant whose TAT story is included in a particular 
thematic network exhibited exactly the same competences and dispositions in his or 
her TAT story, as the different sizes of basic themes clearly illustrates (Keesing 1974: 
89). Nor, for that matter, did research participants telling similar TAT stories about 
Image 1, for example, necessarily share similar common perceptions of the other 
images.  
 As the following empirical chapters demonstrate, thematic networks provide 
a “robust and highly sensitive” tool capable of illuminating the “meaning, richness, 
and magnitude of the subjective experience of social life” (Attride-Stirling 2001: 385, 
403). The thematic networks included in Chapters Four through Six each represents 
a particular perceptual lens through which certain research participants view and 
interpret certain sorts of socio-political situations (i.e. voting, protest, etc.). The TAT 
stories told by research participants are incredibly rich in their diversity and thematic 
networks are capable of not only reflecting this complexity but also explaining it in 
an intelligible way (Gibbs 2007: 93). In Chapter Seven, I will suggest that some 
perceptual lenses tend to overlap, resulting in a more complex analysis of how 
different groups of people in this region of Madagascar identify and understand 
democracy. Though deduced from a relatively small sample, interpretation of 
perceptual lenses in light of the 2009 political crisis suggests that this analysis can be 
scaled up to predict patterns of response to evolving political events (Saldaña 2009: 
13).  
Throughout the course of this in-depth qualitative analysis, the thematic 
networks facilitate empirical interpretation of the data by disclosing observations and 
higher level concepts constructed by the researcher while simultaneously providing a 
visual reference or map for the reader (Attride-Stirling 2001: 389-390). While the 
adoption of this sort of diagram is, perhaps, unusual, it is not unknown (White, 
Woodfield, and Ritchie 2003: 314-315). The thematic networks are a model, a tool, 
an imperfect approximation that nevertheless help to make sense of the non-elite 
perceptions that contribute to political culture, a notoriously complex phenomenon. 
The method of analysis as described here can doubtless be refined with further use. 
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Collectively, the empirical chapters that follow provide one example of how this 
innovative, visual analysis technique can be practically applied.  
 One final note of methodological clarification is in order. The original 
purpose of TATs, as for all methods of personality assessment, was to establish 
criteria that applied to identifiable groups of people: “Mr Jones perceives in such a 
way that he must be considered a schizophrenic…or an engineer” (Bellak 1975: 2). 
This does not preclude recognition of the uniqueness of each individual. Instead, it 
recognises that meanings, though not identical, are shared within a community. Far 
from hypothetical, this “magic” results from “the collective application of the general 
to the particular, the private to the social” (Keesing 1974: 90-91). It is, therefore, 
possible to discern collective patterns of meaning from individual interpretations of 
socio-political events, or scenes in the case of modified TATs here. The thematic 
networks support this process of establishing likely systems of perception and 
meaning by illustrating the interpretive patterns underlying various political points of 
view common within the community where research was conducted. They 
demonstrate the credible presence of shared meanings by providing evidence for 
certain general perceptions commonly applied to particular experiences (e.g. voting, 
encounters with the police) by identifiable groups of people.  
Conclusion 
“Then you should say what you mean,” the March Hare went on.  
“I do,” Alice hastily replied; “at least – at least I mean what I say – that’s the same 
thing you know.” 
“Not the same thing a bit!” said the Hatter. (Carroll 2000: 69).  
It is not my intent here to suggest that visual research methods are somehow 
superior to mainstream techniques or even that all research projects would benefit 
from the inclusion of image-based research tools. I do, however, believe that 
research based on data collected using visual methods like the modified TAT does 
have much to contribute – particularly with regard to better understanding how 
people make sense of their own lives. When tactfully created and adroitly introduced, 
images can create an atmosphere in which research participants feel at ease to mean 
what they say and the researcher can be confident that s/he understands what they 
mean. 
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The most challenging aspect of fieldwork – particularly the first time one is in 
a particular location – is surely adapting to the existing environment and conditions. 
We prepare ourselves for the physical and psychological demands of living and 
working someplace new, reading up on the history and culture, buying equipment 
like mosquito nets and practical shoes that we would never use at home. It is 
assumed that we will automatically adapt once we get there, making adjustments 
necessitated by circumstance. Extending this sensibility to methodology requires an 
open mind and genuine commitment to the original research questions. 
Circumstances on the ground may be vastly different to those we anticipate and 
unsuited to the armament of methods with which we have equipped ourselves. When 
such challenges arise, the researcher has two options: Change the focus of the 
research to fit the data retrievable by conventional means, or have faith in the 
original mission and acquire the requisite knowledge using uncommon – even 
untested – methods. For social science researchers of the second persuasion, eclectic 
approaches can prove particularly useful not only for producing distinctive insights, 
but also encouraging communication between segregated research communities 
(Clark and Zimmer 2001: 325, Murray and Overton 2003: 34, Sil 2004: 322-323).  
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PREFACE: WHY MADAGASCAR? 
Why Madagascar? As I suggested in the Introduction, I could have 
investigated the perceptions and beliefs of ordinary people toward democracy 
anywhere. Over the course of completing this research it has occurred to me that it 
would, for instance, be interesting to conduct a similar study in the United States, 
particularly in the wake of the so-called tea party movement. Interest in the efficacy 
of democracy assistance policy narrowed the realm of possible fieldwork locations 
somewhat, but still afforded a great deal of choice. So, “Why Madagascar?” is a 
reasonable question. In this short preface, I will explain my choice of case study and 
lay the scene for the empirical chapters that follow.  
The Short Answer 
Madagascar is one of the few countries in the world that remains a mystery to 
outsiders. In fact, despite being the fourth largest island in the world,58 a fact that was 
not appreciated until the Second World War (Feeley-Harnik 2001: 59), it remains 
largely invisible.59 In my experience, people most commonly associate the word 
“Madagascar” with the successful animated film and the lemurs (occasionally 
penguins!) it popularised. On a more serious note, Madagascar is sometimes quite 
literally ‘off the map’. The Canadian Association of African Studies once left the 
island off its logo, for example (Lambek 2001: 301). Madagascar is likewise 
conspicuously absent from the logo of the NGO Partnership Africa Canada as well 
as the outline of Africa that graces the cover of Strategies of Democratization (Vanhanen 
1992), despite ample room in the lower, right-hand corner. Moreover, although 
Madagascar was the first country to receive Millennium Development Account 
funding, in comparison with other developing countries the political sphere in 
Madagascar remains largely understudied (Millennium Challenge Corporation 2005). 
                                                 
58 To put the size of the island into perspective, it is roughly the size of Oregon and California, or 
France and Belgium (Kaufmann 2001: 3). 
59 Sharp goes one step further, and characterises it as “neglected” (2002: 6).  
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The sparse information available (particularly in English) made it a bit difficult to 
research this country from the United Kingdom in the early stages of research; even 
so, the prospect of exploring a relatively unknown country appealed to me.  
The Longer Answer 
The more practical explanation for conducting this research in Madagascar is 
founded on the country’s performance on a number of the democracy indices 
discussed at some length in Chapter One. As the scatter plots in Figure 9 indicate, 
Madagascar consistently stands among the leading least developed countries 
(LDCs)60 with regard to democratic development, despite being one of the poorest.61 
For instance, in 2008 Madagascar qualified as having achieved an ‘advanced’ political 
transformation on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index with a score of 7.45 out of 
10.62 Likewise, a combined political rights and civil liberties score of 3.5 places 
Madagascar towards the upper half of Freedom House’s “partly free” category and 
among the top third of LDCs. Indeed, the only country to score better than 
Madagascar on all three indices is the tiny West African country of Benin.  
This finding is relevant because, as discussed in Chapter One, democratic 
development is often associated with economic development. As Madagascar 
remains one of the poorest countries in the world, it stands to reason that economic 
growth is not a significant factor in its apparent democratic accomplishments. 
Indeed,  since 1990  per capita  GDP has  remained below  the  $1,000  threshold for 
                                                 
60 The UN identifies least developed countries using measures of low income, weak human 
capital, and economic vulnerability. In 2009, the United Nations included 49 countries on its list 
of LDCs. The following countries are not included in Figure 9 because they do not appear on the 
BTI index: Comoros, Djibouti, Gambia, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Lesotho, 
Maldives, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. 
Additionally, per capita purchasing power parity gross national income (PPP GNI) figures are not 
available for Afghanistan or Somalia, so they are not included in the scatter plots either.  
61 Although PPP GNI alone gives only a partial account of a country’s economic development, it 
is the method favoured by the World Bank for measuring poverty and personal wellbeing. While 
national wealth (measured as GNI in US$ using the Atlas method) can indicate the ability of the 
state to provide vital services (e.g. education, basic infrastructure), Inglehart and Welzel have 
linked individual financial security to increased emphasis on human autonomy and democratic 
free choice. PPP GNI is, therefore, the more appropriate indicator of economic development in 
relation to democracy assessment.  
62 Madagascar’s 2008 combined score for political and economic transformations is somewhat 
lower at 6.23. 
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Figure 9: LDC Democracy Rankings 
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Figure 9 (Continued): LDC Democracy Rankings
 
 
democratic survival identified by Przeworski, Cheibub and Limogi (1998).63 Nor does 
it seem likely that Madagascar’s standout performance could be attributable to 
urbanisation or ‘human development’, two additional variables sometimes associated 
with democracy (see Figure 10).  
With the usual suspects accounted for, Madagascar seemed a logical place to 
investigate a possible correlation between local political culture(s) and democratic 
development.  To be clear, although Madagascar ranks relatively well on several 
democracy indices, my intent in going to Madagascar was never predicated on the 
presumption   that   I   would  find   “democracy”  as   defined   by  the  international  
                                                 
63 Approximately 85% of people in Madagascar live on less than $2 per day (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2007: 2, Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 32). In recent years, there has been an influx of private capital 
to the mining sector, most notably by Rio Tinto and Sherritt. It is too soon, however, to know 
whether this private investment will trickle down to ordinary people and what effects it may have 
on Madagascar’s political trajectory. 
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Figure 10: Charting Madagascar's Development
 
† Source: World Bank Human Development Reports 1990-2008 
‡ Source: World Urbanisation Prospects – United Nations Population Division [Available at 
http://esa.un.org/unup/p2k0data.asp] 
* Source: World Bank Human Development Report 2009 
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democracy assistance industry (see Chapter One). Rather, I set out to discover the 
political predispositions of ordinary people living in Madagascar and how these 
compare to the model of democracy that is everywhere advocated by democracy 
assistance practitioners. It has been argued elsewhere that “where democratisation 
has strong domestic foundations, pro-democracy policies can serve to assist and 
deepen democracy” (Grugel 2002: 136). I reasoned, therefore, that Madagascar’s 
internationally sanctioned democratic credentials might be attributable to a 
combination of democracy assistance efforts and domestic commitment to the 
democratic norms identified in Chapter One (i.e. electoral participation, freedom of 
expression, rule of law).  
The plausibility of this hypothesis increased as I proceeded with preliminary, 
pre-fieldwork reading. One Malagasy scholar stresses, for instance: “there exists in 
Madagascar a history of political and popular democratic culture;” before adding that 
democratic ideals have been “betrayed...by independence” (Randrianja 1999: 185). 
Survey data collected by Afrobarometer throughout the first decade of the 21st 
century appears to confirm Randrianja’s assertion. The 2005 Afrobarometer survey 
found, for instance, that 65.8% of urban Malagasy supported democracy; that figure 
rises to 88.8% among respondents who had completed secondary school. The same 
survey also found, however, that about half of those questioned could not explain 
what ‘democracy’ means and that only a quarter of people sampled were satisfied 
with how well democracy works in their country.64 Therefore, although this research 
could have been conducted anywhere, in practice a solid rationale underpinned my 
decision to go to Madagascar. 
A brief word is also in order on why I chose to conduct this research in the 
Antsinanana region. Prior to my arrival in Madagascar, I had anticipated conducting a 
comparative study of two urban areas: Antananarivo and another urban centre. In 
addition to being more accessible than rural areas, urban centres seemed like 
reasonable places to look for democratic ambitions because “all major changes which 
                                                 
64 The most recent survey results, compiled in 2008, are slightly less optimistic. These surveys, 
conducted at roughly the same time as my own field research, reveal that 58% of urban residents 
and 33% of rural residents think that democracy is the most preferable form of governance; 28% 
of those interviewed said that they did not know (Afrobarometer 2009). 
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have characterized Madagascar’s political history were initiated in the cities” 
(Randrianja 1999: 183). The Antsinanana region likewise seemed like a sensible 
starting point. Located on the eastern coast of the island, it is home to the country’s 
largest shipping port and on the “route of longtime [sic] Malagasy exchange between 
the interior and the coast…[which is also] the route of persistent efforts of 
Europeans to take over Madagascar and Malagasy efforts to block them...” (Feeley-
Harnik 2001: 69). As I pointed out in the Introduction, however, upon my arrival it 
became clear that I lacked the time and resources necessary to complete thorough 
research in two discrete regions. Moreover, conducting this research required that I 
gain people’s trust but my finite timeframe necessitated that I get to work quickly. In 
the end, staying in the Antsinanana region was a practical choice: I had better 
contacts on the coast and generally found the people there to be more welcoming.  I 
reasoned, therefore, that I had a better chance of meeting my research objectives by 
concentrating my efforts in the costal area rather than the capital.   
The Antsinanana region has particular historical significance. Not only has it 
served as a historical point of entry to the country – for people, goods, and ideas 
alike – it is also the ancestral region of former President Didier Ratsiraka. As I 
discuss at some length below, Ratsiraka has played a leading role throughout much of 
Madagascar’s contemporary political history. Moreover, during the 2001-2002 
political crisis Ratsiraka attempted to shore up his political power by transferring the 
seat of government to the regional capital, Toamasina. It is, therefore, possible that 
the political perspectives and expectations of people living in this region may be 
coloured not only by their unique experience but also by regional or ethnic allegiance 
to a particular political elite; the region is predominantly côtier and Catholic. That said, 
the urban community that I encountered was a veritable melting pot. Included 
among research participants are both long-time residents of the region and relative 
newcomers, Merina and côtier, Catholics, Protestants and even a Mormon. 
Furthermore, Malagasy society is known to be “fundamentally incorporative” 
(Lambek 2001: 134), conducive to the development of “pluri-identities” that shift 
with the changing context (Alvarez 1995: 82, also see Kent 1962: 156-157). 
Therefore, although the region has particular historical significance, this experience is 
remembered and reconstructed by inhabitants in a multitude of ways (see, for 
example, Cole 2001). 
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Nine Hundred Years of International Influence (In a Nutshell) 
Madagascar has a long history of international engagement dating back to the 
Mesopotamian slave trade in the twelfth century (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 54-55). 
Portuguese traders first arrived in Madagascar in the early 16th century; Europeans of 
various nationalities soon followed, establishing semi-permanent trading posts. 
Along with international trade came exposure to Christianity. The first Catholic 
missionaries arrived on the island over 400 years ago, and the country has been 
influenced by followers of all religious denominations ever since (Randiranja and 
Ellis 2009).  
French and British influence in the Indian Ocean amplified throughout the 
early 19th century. Though officially annexed as a French protectorate in 1895, the 
English presence remained strong for a further five years while the two countries 
determined their respective spheres of influence in the region (Randiranja and Ellis 
2009: 150-152). All told, Madagascar was a French colony for less than 70 years, and 
was temporarily under Allied control after France fell to Germany during World War 
II. Bearing in mind that Madagascar has “never been insulated from world history” – 
whether experienced as intercontinental trade, the Napoleonic wars, the Second 
World War, or changes in global capitalism (Bloch 2001: 294) –  scholars are at odds 
about the extent to which the French colonial period deserves special attention (see, 
for example, Cole 2001, Covell 1987: 7, Farnworth 2007: 273, Feeley-Harnik 2001: 
35, Kaufmann 2001: 5, Randiranja and Ellis 2009: 12, Sharp 2001: 208). Other 
groups, including the Arabs, the East Indians and the Chinese, have been similarly 
influential on the island’s long-term development (Eggert 2001: 311). 
More to the point, it has been suggested elsewhere that the Malagasy 
themselves – particularly those born since the departure of France in 1960 – are 
inclined to look forward rather than dwell on the colonial past, a position also 
attributed to Ravalomanana (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 187). Indeed, neither the 
colonial past nor its legacy was ever alluded to by research participants in their TAT 
stories and is not, therefore, subject to analysis in the chapters that follow. While 
linguistic65 and architectural remnants of the French occupation remain, precisely 
                                                 
65 It has been argued that “…reality for each society is constructed to a significant degree out of 
the specific qualities of its language and symbols” (Greenblatt 1990: 32, emphasis original). Indeed, 
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how these and other vestiges of the colonial past are integrated with contemporary 
experience is extremely complex and beyond the scope of this research.66 Without 
denying the significance of Madagascar’s multifaceted engagement with various 
foreign powers and the influence this continues to have on the people who live there, 
the chapters that follow remain tightly focused on contemporary perceptions and 
experiences of politics and democracy without trying to guess their origins. 
Accordingly, I will confine my overview of the country’s political history that follows 
to the past two decades and Madagascar’s participation in the infamous third wave of 
democratization.  
The Political Back Story 
Technical assessments of Madagascar’s commitment to good (or at least 
better) governance and democracy were augmented in recent years by the 
international community’s faith in the man forging the way. Despite a contentious 
rise to power in 2002, President Marc Ravalomanana’s international reputation as a 
reformer was secured in April 2005 with the announcement that Madagascar would 
be the first country to receive development assistance from the new Millennium 
Challenge Corporation. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that Ravalomanana has 
been described as a “firm favourite” of the Bush Administration (Randrianja and 
Ellis 2009: 208). Both the World Bank and IMF likewise heralded him as a “good 
guy” in recognition of his stated political agenda of fostering democratic 
participation alongside economic reforms (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007: 22; also see 
Valette 2005: 5-6). The proliferation of media outlets in recent years has likewise 
been interpreted as an indicator of democratic change and a facilitator of political 
accountability (Andriantsoa et. al. 2005).  
However, these recent accolades mask a tumultuous political history. Like 
many of its continental neighbours, Madagascar has been engaged in the process of 
democratisation since the early 1990s. In the ensuing years, the country’s political 
                                                 
Schaffer (1998) has written at length on the discrepancies in meaning between Western 
democracy and demokaraasi in Senegal. This thesis, by contrast, focuses on local meanings 
identified through the collaborative research process discussed in Chapter Three; technical 
linguistics and the role that language plays in culture are beyond its remit.  
66 For an anthropological study of this sort, see Cole 2001.  
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experience has been punctuated by a series of “disguised coups and attempted coups 
and rapid swings of political fortune” (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 187). Meanwhile, 
Bertelsmann Stiftung has described the country’s approach to democratic reform as 
“disparate, asynchronous, and haltingly pursued” (2007b: 3). Should the 
characteristic lurching of democratic reform be attributed to domestic political 
turmoil? Or, conversely, has illusory commitment to democracy on the part of 
political elites instigated the scenes of social unrest? I will not attempt to answer 
these questions fully here. I will, however, illustrate that the 2009 political crisis 
provides a tragic example of history repeating itself.  
Return of the Admiral 
 Madagascar’s post-colonial history has been divided into four distinct 
periods: the First Republic (1960-1975) during which President Tsiranana retained 
close ties with France; the Second Republic (1975-1992) known primarily for Didier 
Ratsiraka’s commitment to a disastrous socialist experiment; the short-lived Third 
Republic (1993-1997) brought an end to the country’s “self-imposed isolation” 
(Sharp 2002: 10) but concluded with the impeachment of President Zafy in 1996; 
and the Fourth Republic (1997-Present), which has already witnessed considerable 
turmoil. The brief account of the Third and Fourth Republics that follows is only 
meant to introduce the context in which empirical research was conducted.  
 In the summer of 1991, months of mass demonstrations and general strikes 
effectively toppled the already fragile regime of Admiral Ratsiraka. Emboldened by 
the autocrat’s visible loss of control, opposition leader Albert Zafy established a 
shadow government and declared himself Prime Minister (Marcus 2004, Randrianja 
and Ellis 2009: 201). This brazen move eventually forced Ratsiraka to concede to 
demands for the creation of a transitional government and subsequent constitutional 
convention, heralding the beginning of a nearly two-year-long democratic transition 
(Marcus 2004, United States Department of State 2009).67 Importantly, throughout 
the protracted democratic transition and “despite pleas from both sides to 
intervene,” the military remained neutral (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 201). 
                                                 
67 For a general account of the National Conference phenomenon that spread throughout much 
of Francophone Africa in the early 1990s and played a part in instigating the social unrest that 
ultimately unseated Ratsiraka, see Clark (1994) and Robinson (1994). 
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presidential run-off elections in February 1993 pitted Ratsiraka squarely against Zafy, 
but the incumbent only managed to secure 33% of the vote and was forced into exile 
(Marcus 2004).   
 Zafy’s political reign was short-lived, however. Although his coalition of 
opposition parties gained a majority in Parliament, his administration was plagued by 
infighting and political rivalries (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 203). Accused of 
corruption and overstepping the constitutional bounds of his office, the National 
Assembly voted to impeach Zafy in July 1996; the High Constitutional Court ratified 
his impeachment that autumn (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 204, United States 
Department of State 2009). Despite scandal and disgrace, Zafy was not barred from 
running to reclaim the Presidency, and in 1997 once again faced Ratsiraka in a 
presidential run-off. This time, however, the people voted for the “reformed” 
military leader. Marcus has characterised this turn of political fortune as “a case of 
Zafy Albert losing the election rather than Ratsiraka winning it” (Marcus 2004). 
 Ratsiraka wasted little time in consolidating power, holding a constitutional 
referendum in the spring of 1998. This move notably won him the right to appoint 
not only the Prime Minister, but also the Council of Ministers and an unclear 
number of Senators (Marcus 2004, United States Department of State 2009). Marcus 
(2004) also notes that by the summer of 2001 Ratsiraka had consolidated power in 
the executive and was able to pass his legislative agenda “effortlessly;” he had also 
established an extensive patronage network with handpicked associates in key 
positions across the public and private sectors. With firm control of the state 
apparatus and the opposition fragmented, the December 2001 presidential election 
appeared to pose little threat to Ratsiraka’s renewed hegemony (Marcus and 
Razafindrakoto 2003: 31).   
Enter the Self-Made Millionaire 
The first round of presidential polling in December 2001 attracted unusually 
high voter turnout (67%), although the voting itself proceeded uneventfully (Marcus 
2003: 218, Randrianja 2003: 315). Although six candidates contested the election, 
only two accounted for almost 86% of the vote: incumbent Didier Ratsiraka and the 
former Mayor of Antananarivo Marc Ravalomanana (Randrianja 2003: 315). Prior to 
running for President, Ravalomanana’s political experience remained limited to the 
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three years he had served as Mayor, and he remained relatively unknown outside the 
capital city. Ravalomanana was able mobilise the resources of his dairy empire not 
only to campaign but also – crucially – to collect final voting records from polling 
stations, a task normally carried out only by the Interior Ministry (Randrianja and 
Ellis 2009: 207-208). Significant differences between the official results and those 
generated by Ravalomanana’s team paired with distrust of the High Constitutional 
Court (to which Ratsiraka had made new appointments just before the election) 
sparked what would become six months of political upheaval. 
  Over a month transpired between election day and the proclamation of final, 
official results by the High Constitutional Court. As the dispute wore on, 
Ravalomanana’s supporters organised daily demonstrations in all of Madagascar’s 
main cities as well as a general strike that crippled the government. Once again, the 
army remained neutral (Randrianja 2003: 317). Then on 22 February 2002, amidst 
preparations for a second round of voting, Ravalomanana declared himself President 
insisting that he had won the first round outright. Mirroring the strategy employed by 
Zafy a decade previously, Ravalomanana’s supporters peacefully proceeded to take 
over government buildings (Marcus and Razafindrakoto 2003: 39, Randrianja 2003: 
318). This prompted Ratsiraka to play the ‘ethnic card’ as he attempted to transfer 
the seat of government from Antananarivo to his stronghold, Toamasina (Randrianja 
2003: 318). Retrospectively, this manoeuvre may have signalled his downfall, which 
was only hastened by the desperate measures of overzealous supporters (i.e. erecting 
barricades, blowing-up bridges). It has also been reported that Ratsiraka hired 
mercenaries (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 208) and “told supporters to pretend they 
were Merina and threaten coastal groups with the hope of inciting ethnic conflict” 
(Marcus 2003: 219). Fortunately, these ploys were unsuccessful. In fact, Randrianja 
points out that, political rhetoric aside, there were few signs “of a radical split in 
political opinion along ethnic lines” and asserts that Ravalomanana had support not 
just in the capital and highlands, but also in the some of the provinces (2003: 318, 
also see Bertelsmann Stiftung 2007).  
 By April, the country “was heading down a blind alley” and the international 
community finally started to take notice (Randrianja 2003: 319). The intricacies of 
international manoeuvring during this period are beyond the scope of this summary 
and have been documented elsewhere (Marcus 2003, Randrianja 2003). The eventual 
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outcome of often-opaque foreign gestures, however, was a noticeable shift in the 
balance of power. When it reconvened on 29 April, a newly constituted High 
Constitutional Court announced that a recount indicated Ravalomanana had won 
51% of the vote compared to Ratsiraka’s 36% (Randrianja 2003: 324). On 6 May 
2002, Ravalomanana was legally inaugurated President. Unrest gradually ebbed, and 
the crisis finally ended when Ratsiraka fled to France for a second time in mid-June. 
Ravalomanana’s TIM party went on to win a clear majority in the 2003 National 
Assembly elections and he won re-election to the Presidency on 3 December 2006 
with a strong majority.68  
 By the end of 2008, however, conflation of public and private sector interests 
had begun to cause concerns both domestically and at the international level. When 
he came to power in 2002, Ravalomanana was already the richest man in Madagascar. 
His “business-style” approach to running the country (The Africa Report 2007: 134) 
earned him the nickname “CEO of the republic” (Iloniaina 2009a). In November 
2008, details began to surface of a recently negotiated contract with the South 
Korean firm Daewoo Logistics in which the Government, without conducting any 
public consultation, had conceded a 99-year lease over nearly half of the country’s 
arable land (Burgis 2009).69 Daewoo Logistics paid nothing for the contract and 
openly intends to ship all food produced from agricultural cultivation abroad, but 
argues that the jobs created will be beneficial to the local economy (Jung-a 2008). 
Mounting evidence of corruption provoked the EU and World Bank to suspend 
budgetary support to Madagascar in December 2008, in stark contrast to the 
“unflagging international support” international donors had previously offered 
President Ravalomanana (IRIN 2009b). In spite of these developments, however, 
Ravalomanana’s hold on political power seemed secure.  
                                                 
68 Ravalomanana won 54.8% of the vote. None of his main opponents could claim more than 
10% of votes cast, an indication of the severely fragmented party system (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2007: 20). 
69 This deal did not become public until shortly before I left Madagascar and the handful of 
people I asked specifically about it either had not yet heard about it or had not yet formed an 
opinion. It would not, therefore, have influenced the perceptions and expectations expressed in 
TAT stories. That said, it is not surprising that word would have spread in the weeks that 
followed, and that details of the deal – either real or rumoured – could have contributed to the 
malaise evident in the public unrest that followed in early 2009. 
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Postlude –The Media Mogul 
 I returned to the United Kingdom (post-fieldwork) in December 2008. The 
events outlined briefly below obviously did not, therefore, influence my decision to 
go to Madagascar or colour my experience there. The political crisis that unfolded in 
the early months of 2009 began just as I sat down to tackle data analysis. As I sifted 
through TAT stories collected just a few short months earlier, I could not help but 
reflect on current events in light of what research participants had revealed. While 
the largest demonstrations took place in Antananarivo, protests were not restricted 
to the capital. Indeed, several research participants emailed me during this period 
with reports of local unrest and looting; one even wrote to say that he feared for his 
life. It seems reasonable, therefore, that perceptual lenses identified in the 
Antsinanana region could have interpretive relevance to the political crisis. 
Therefore, although I do not address the most recent political upheaval in relation to 
my research findings in any detail until Chapter Seven, it makes narrative sense to 
briefly recount Andry Rajoelina’s meteoric rise to power here. 
 In December 2008, an interview with former President Ratsiraka (still in exile 
in France) was broadcast on the private television station owned by Andry Rajoelina, 
Mayor of Antananarivo. State security forces promptly moved to shut down the 
television station. While some interpreted this response by the government as a 
blatant attack on free speech rights (Lough 2009b), it can also be interpreted as 
President Ravalomanana jockeying for position ahead of a potential rival. Remember, 
Ravalomanana likewise launched his political career by holding the capital’s mayoral 
office. Moreover, after his unexpected victory over the candidate supported by the 
President in the 2007 race for Mayor, Rajoelina became one of Ravalomanana’s most 
outspoken critics (AFP 2009a, Lough 2009a, Bearak 2009c, IRIN 2009a). 
 In public addresses to his supporters, Rajoelina accused Ravalomanana of 
being a dictator who was more interested in self-enrichment than fulfilling his duties 
as the country’s President (Bearak 2009a).  After more than 100 people were killed 
during protests and looting,70 Rajoelina announced that he was filing “a request for 
                                                 
70 Marc Ravalomanana, presently in exile in South Africa, was convicted of murder in absentia in 
August 2010 and sentenced to life in prison with hard labour. Although this occurred after the 
original submission of this thesis and does not bear on the analysis that follows, it will 
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the immediate resignation of the President” with Parliament (Bearak 2009a, Iloniaina 
and Maina 2009). Ravalomanana promptly responded by firing his rival from his 
position as Mayor, citing failure to fulfil the obligations of his post (Bearak 2009c).71 
Although high-ranking army officials remained neutral, tensions rose still further 
when guards at the Presidential Palace opened fire on advancing protesters (Berger 
2009, Hogg 2009). 
Mirroring the actions of past opposition leaders – including Ravalomanana – 
Rajoelina established a shadow administration the following week and his supporters 
took control of four government ministries (Iloniaina 2009a). The hijacking of 
government offices was short lived, opposition supporters were evicted within hours, 
but Rajoelina had made his point and Ravalomanana’s miscalculated response would 
prove decisive. On 17 March, after several rounds of failed negotiations between 
entrenched parties, Ravalomanana announced that he had decided to dissolve the 
government and hand power over to the military so that a new government could be 
formed (Lough 2009c). This move strayed from constitutional convention, which 
stipulates that the leader of the Senate takes over in the event of a presidential 
resignation. More to the point, Ravalomanana had misjudged his support within the 
military, which passed the Presidency hot-potato-style to the last man standing – 
Rajoelina (Corbett and McGreal 2009). 
 Despite labelling his administration a “transitional authority” rather than a 
Presidency and promising new elections within two years, Rajoelina has been 
shunned on the international stage. The Africa Union, the Southern African 
Development Community, the United States, the European Union, and Norway all 
condemned the unconstitutional transfer of power as a coup and non-emergency aid 
                                                 
undoubtedly affect any future electoral contest aimed at normalising relations between 
Madagascar and the international community. 
71 This accusation rings of irony. Following his candidate’s defeat to Rajoelina, Ravalomanana 
suspended financing of garbage collection services in Antananarivo so that “the opposition 
inherited a garbage-filled capital” (Lindijer 2009). While I was in Madagascar, I also heard 
accusations that the building designated as the mayor’s office kept being changed, effectively 
undermining Rajoelina’s ability to address more serious problems.  
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has been suspended (BBC News 2009c, Iloniaina 2009e, Tighe 2009).72 Further 
analysis of this most recent political crisis can be found in Chapter Seven. 
Conclusion: Five Observations 
 The brief sketch of contemporary Malagasy political competition above is 
not intended to provide a complete picture of the country’s quasi-democratic system. 
It does, however, illustrate the contours of five recurrent themes that likely 
contribute to the back-story in which ordinary people contextualise their political 
experience.  
1. A Divided Society 
Much is made in the literature on Madagascar of it being a divided society 
that continues to grapple with historically salient socio-ethnic divisions. From this 
perspective, in one corner you have the Merina who have traditionally occupied the 
highlands around the capital Antananarivo. In the other corner are the 17 other 
ethnic groups commonly referred to collectively as côtier, a catch-all term that literally 
translates to “coastal people” despite the fact that many côtier live nowhere near the 
coast (Covell 1987: 13, Marcus and Razafindrakoto 2003: 34, Marcus and 
Ratsimbaharison 2005: 498, Polity IV Project 2007: 3). Moreover, the term côtier is 
used primarily by people living in the highlands, while the ‘côtier’ themselves only use 
the word in an “anti-Merina sense” (Alvarez 1995: 70). Likewise, not only Merina live 
in the highlands. In fact, the word Merina actually originates from the dynasty of a 
particular ruler, as opposed to any homogenous cultural or tribal group; it has always 
been – and continues to be – a potent political label (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 112, 
150-151).  
That said, competition between Merina and côtier remains a topical issue. 
Transcending the political sphere (Covell 1987: 13), it has been suggested that this 
ethnic struggle represents a “conflict over access to modernity” with complex 
implications of the relationship between state and society (Bertelsmann Stiftung 
2007: 18). Covell traces this trend to colonial practices that initially perpetuated 
regional disparities in, for example, access to education (1987: 19). More recently, 
                                                 
72 There are conflicting reports about the extent to which aid has been cut (Iloniaina 2009c). 
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perceived inequality of development has become a popular campaign issue for 
aspiring politicians (Randiranja and Ellis 2009: 230). It is worth noting, however, that 
sensitivity to underdevelopment is not limited to people living in the periphery; 
Alvarez observes that “from the perspective of the Malagasy state, outside the capital 
is the desert, the brousse, intellectually, economically, and socially impoverished” 
(1995: 76). The chapters that follow illustrate how social, economic, and political 
inequalities are intricately interwoven and contribute to complex assessments of 
socio-political reality.  
However, while much has been made of the Merina-côtier divide, to view 
Malagasy politics along such narrow lines risks oversimplification. Indeed, Bloch 
powerfully warns against hastily jumping to ethnic conclusions and the reification 
this engenders (2001: 298, also see Kaufmann 2001: 88-89, Randrianja and Ellis 
2009: 42). The undesirable consequence, he argues, is that ethnic terms gradually gain 
acceptance as an “innocent description” rather than one of many possible 
exploratory frameworks (Bloch 2001: 296-297). To illustrate, Ravalomanana (a 
Merina) received a plurality of votes in six of the country’s seven provinces when he 
ran against incumbent Ratsiraka (a côtier) in the 2001 presidential election (Marcus 
and Razafindrakoto 2003: 43). Both contenders for the executive in the 2009 political 
crisis, moreover, were ethnic Merina; although some have speculated that Rajoelina 
may have received backing from Ratsiraka’s political allies (IRIN 2009c). This sort of 
political intrigue has led some observers to conclude that ethnic rivalry is the 
currency of political entrepreneurs (Alvarez 1995: 71, Dina 2001: 13, Lambek 2001: 
305, Marcus and Razafindrakoto 2003: 40, Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 201, Southall 
1986: 425-426). There may be some truth to this; however, the evidence above 
suggests to me that political disquiet has resulted in all three instances from 
perceptions of executive abuse of power rather than ethnic bias.  
Further frustrating attempts to identify clear ethnic boundaries, each of the 
18 recognised ethnic groups is subject to additional, internal subdivisions (Covell 
1987: 12, Randiranja and Ellis 2009: 224). Indigenous Malagasy have a complex 
mixed heritage emanating from Southeast and South Asia, East and Central Africa, 
and the Arabian peninsula (Sharp 2002: 7). Over the centuries, new immigration to 
the island, the slave trade, and domestic migration have all contributed to racial 
heterogeneity (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 136-137). Distinctions between 
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descendents of nobles and commoners, freemen and slaves result in complex 
systems of social stratification that vary from region to region (Covell 1987: 13, 
Bloch 1986a).73 Randrianja and Ellis also comment on the historically porous nature 
of the so-called ethnic groups, explaining how “buffer groups” on the margins easily 
move from one group to another (2009: 222). Indeed, anthropologists have 
concluded that Malagasy ethnic groups cannot be identified by distinct genetic 
differences (Bloch 1986b: 12, Dewar and Wright 1993), leading some researchers to 
conclude that ethnic labels are meaningless (Alvarez 1995, Covell 1987: 81, 
Esoavelomandroso 2001, Lambek 2001, Southall 1986). 
The Merina/côtier schism is also commonly portrayed as a religious clash 
between Protestants (Merina) and Catholics (côtier). However, as with ethnicity, it 
would be remiss to jump to conclusions about religious dualism. Indeed, religion has 
often played a conciliatory role in contemporary Malagasy politics. Like ethnicity, 
formal religion in Madagascar is intertwined with indigenous customs that venerate 
family, ancestors and nature (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 94-95). A persistent 
connection dating back to the 1860s also exists between organised religion, 
education, and politics.  Since the 1980s, bible quotations and religious services have 
gradually replaced secular public debate, a development that Randrianja and Ellis 
attribute in part to a decline in the quality of Madagascar’s universities (2009: 203). 
Given these circumstances, it becomes relevant that Ravalomanana was national 
vice-President of the country’s largest Protestant church at the time of his election 
(Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 206). Not only did this position endow him with 
additional authority, it provided a vast social network for mobilising a national 
campaign strategy. Meanwhile, the Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar 
(FFKM), an umbrella organisation that unites all Christian denominations on the 
island and boasts approximately 3 million followers, has played an “essential” role in 
moderating politics during the period under review, particularly with regard to the 
2001-2002 political crisis (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 201-202, also see 
Mukonoweshuro 1990: 393, Valette 2005: 3).  
                                                 
73 Ties of kinship are closely related to traditional ancestral lands; Sharp explains: “To ask who 
one is, and therefore where one comes from, one typically poses the question, ‘Where is your 
ancestral land?’ That is, ‘Where are your most valued ancestors entombed?’ ” (2001: 109, also see 
Walsh 2001: 252). 
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Aware of the Merina/côtier cleavage, I watched for expressions of ethnic and 
religious tension or division as I analysed TAT stories. The chapters that follow 
demonstrate that, while some research participants did identify ethnic tension or 
conflict in one or more of the images, this was hardly pervasive.  
2. Consolidation of Resources 
Without delving into the minutia of constitutional reform, it is clearly evident 
from the account above that successive political elites have done what they could to 
consolidate political power in the executive. While there is little notable about this 
fact in and of itself, what is striking is that legal channels appear to have been 
followed throughout this process. In the case of Ratsiraka’s political resurrection, for 
instance, he regained the Presidency via the ballot box, secured constitutional 
changes through a popular referendum, and “solidified his power base in the other 
instruments of governance through decidedly constitutional processes” (Marcus and 
Razafindrakoto 2003: 31). Ravalomanana’s move to oust his political rival from the 
powerful mayor’s office likewise followed constitutional protocol (Bearak 2009c). 
The problem, as Marcus and Razafindrakoto see it, “is that the constitution, 
never a stellar document, has been so manipulated over the past decade that it no 
longer acts as a guarantor of institutional independence” (2003: 31). In other words, 
while political elites may stick to the letter of the law, democratic checks and balances 
are substantively absent. Perceptions of the Presidency and political accountability 
more generally are discussed in Chapters Four and Five. 
3. The Limited Role of Political Parties  
In Chapter One I suggested that the international democracy assistance 
industry identifies a particular role for political parties in the democratic process. 
However, political parties have had little, if anything, to do with Madagascar’s 
contemporary democratic experience. Personal loyalties, as opposed to political 
ideology, remain central to the country’s politics (Alvarez 1995: 67, Covell 1987: 23, 
Marcus 2003: 218).74 Indeed, both AREMA and TIM were created by Ratsiraka and 
                                                 
74 Personal loyalty and individuality have always characterised Malagasy electoral practices. Covell 
notes how in the earliest elections candidates ran sans partis (i.e. as individuals as opposed to party 
affiliates) (1987: 29). 
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Ravalomanana respectively after each man became President. It is less clear when 
Rajoelina founded his TGV party.75 Nevertheless, Zafy, Ratsiraka, Ravalomanana, 
and Rajoelina have all acted as lightning rods for mass public disillusionment; they 
have all served a term as President of the ‘anyone but --- club’. Public perceptions of 
political parties are discussed at some length in Chapters Four and Seven.  
4. Military Neutrality 
Ratsiraka (an Admiral) aside, the military has consistently resisted the allure 
of political power (Covell 1987, Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 201). In the midst of the 
most recent political crisis, one army general was quoted as saying: “We are trying to 
avoid violence between the two sides by using moral power of persuasion, not 
guns…This is not Africa, our culture is much more like Asia. We will negotiate to the 
last, because the people of Madagascar are one big family” (Lindijer 2009). 
Consequently, the military does not appear to pose a threat to democracy in 
Madagascar and has, one might say, buttressed the political process in times of crisis 
by maintaining its resolve. Although the military eventually backed Rajoelina in the 
spring of 2009, this was the direct result of Ravalomanana’s own breach of 
constitutional protocol and is better classified as a force majeure than a military coup.  
While it could be argued that the military has actually played a critical role in 
Madagascar’s democratic development (i.e. by staying resolutely in the barracks), at 
no time does it appear to have been an instigator of political events. Consequently, 
public perceptions of the military did not factor into my research. 
5. Shadow Governments 
It was not until I read about the 1991, 2001-2002 and 2009 political crises in 
parallel that I recognised the significant role that shadow governments have played in 
Madagascar’s contemporary political history. Fierke notes that one way of changing a 
situation is to act as if the situation has changed already (2001: 135-136). As the brief 
history above demonstrates, on several occasions opposition movements have 
prematurely assumed the mantle of authority (i.e. declaring shadow governments, 
                                                 
75 Rajoelina had also gained the backing of other opposition parties by the end of January 2009 
(Maina 2009).  
PREFACE TO PART II 
 139 
taking over government offices). Moreover, by acting “as if” the authorities are 
forced to respond, often by overreacting to quotidian acts (e.g. holding a political 
rally, broadcasting a television interview). This overreaction brings “the implicit 
violence of the structure into the open, making it impossible to maintain the veneer 
of moral justification” (Fierke 135-136). It appears that this logic has historically 
come to fruition in Madagascar: in all three cases where a shadow government has 
been declared, that government has eventually assumed office.  
It is also significant that all parties in the various political upheavals have 
tried to frame their actions with democratic rhetoric. In 2001-2002, for instance, 
Ratsiraka claimed to follow the letter of the law while Ravalomanana asserted that it 
was the people’s democratic right to protest. In 2009, there was a notable reversal of 
roles; Ravalomanana, now the incumbent, appealed for calm, saying: “We have to 
obey the law in Madagascar” (Bearak 2009a) while his challenger Rajoelina defiantly 
proclaimed: “We are here because we refuse to be gagged” (AFP 2009a). Though 
simplified, this synopsis highlights the gap identified by Marcus and Razafindrakoto 
“between Madagascar’s liberal democratic populace and its minimally democratic 
government” (2003: 43). Additional evidence for this characterisation of 
Madagascar’s contemporary political context is provided in Chapters Four through 
Seven, leading me to suggest that finding a way of strategically addressing this void 
should be a primary concern of future democracy assistance efforts. 
It is worth pointing out that the recent spate of shadow governments might 
have roots in the competing spheres of influence and patterns of resistance that have 
historically governed political life on the island. Middleton notes that prior to the 
colonial era, Malagasy kingdoms were identifiable by their core zones of power rather 
than defined boundaries (2001: 175). Centuries of aversion to outside intrusion has 
resulted in “a rejection of state structures external to the local community” and 
contributed to a defensive strategy that deliberately eschewed the construction of 
roads (Covell 1987: 7, 9). In attempting to move the seat of state power from 
Antananarivo to Toamasina in 2002, the besieged Ratsiraka was attempting to shore 
up his own sphere of influence in his ancestral homeland. The bombing of bridges 
could be interpreted as an attempt to sever this core zone from that of his rival. 
Randrianja and Ellis attribute enduring patterns of resistance to Madagascar’s 
size, which has both caused people to congregate “for sustenance and self-
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protection” and enabled their “escape” (Randrianja and Eills 2009: 7). They explain 
this phenomenon using the metaphor of the traditional Malagasy board game 
fanarona. In this game of strategy and skill, victory “is obtained not by occupying the 
opponent’s position, nor in removing his pieces from the board entirely…but rather 
by restricting the opponent’s freedom of movement by steady approach, through 
turning the enemy into an ally.” They add that “only a poor fanarona player attempts 
to eliminate the adversary entirely” (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 7). Play of this game 
is characterised by patience, give-and-take, and farsighted strategy. Withdrawal and 
avoidance are integrated with subtle manoeuvring until the time is right to pounce. 
Sometimes misinterpreted by outsiders as docility (Covell 1987), avoidance resistance 
of external intrusion is in fact coupled with strategic, localised engagement 
(Kaufmann 2001). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION 
Like Lincoln, I would like to believe that the ballot  
is stronger than the bullet. Then again,  
he said that before he got shot. 
(Vowell 2006: 7) 
Elections are the contemporary sine qua non of democracy. As Chapter One 
demonstrates, this simple truth has become deeply ingrained in how we think about 
– and evaluate – democratic practice in developing countries. Both development 
practitioners and democracy theorists commonly cite the regular execution of free 
and fair elections as the minimal condition under which democracy can be said to 
exist (Bratton 1998: 52, Chazan 1979: 136, Collier 2007: 146, Schedler 2001: 7, 
Schmitter and Karl 1991: 78, UNDP n.d., USAID n.d., Democracy and Governance). 
That elections are observable and, therefore, quantifiable (e.g. frequency, voter 
turnout, the presence of opposition parties) surely contributes to the appeal of 
electoral indicators. Other reasons for studying elections range from the belief that 
the strength of a country’s democracy can be assessed at least in part by the level of 
public participation in that country’s politics76 (Barber 2003, Dahl 1971, Pateman 
1970, Zakaria 2003) to the presumption that even sub-standard elections, when held 
at regular intervals, contribute to democratic deepening (Brown and Kaiser 2007: 
1144). While elections do not necessarily lead to democracy, it is almost 
inconceivable that a country could be considered democratic without them.  
Democratic means (e.g. elections, political parties) do not, however, always 
lead to democratic ends (e.g. representation, domestic political legitimacy). The 
evolutionary process that eventually led to universal suffrage in the West has been 
turned on its head for third wave democracies. This “interesting reversal,” though 
irregularly acknowledged, has been evident since the middle of the last century when 
Organski, among others, observed: “the franchise [in developing countries] does not 
expand in response to the increase of political consciousness, as in the West, but 
                                                 
76 For a thorough critique of this logic see Parry and Moyser (1994). 
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precedes and helps expand that consciousness…Thus the meaning and the effects of 
the political institutions in new nations are not the same as in the old” (1965: 42, also 
see Bates 2001, Nayyar 1998, Ware 1986). The pervasiveness of illiberal democracy 
(Bratton 1998, Zakaria 1997) and the masking of autocratic rule by elections (Merkel 
2004: 55, Price 2009: 164), provide two, well documented examples of this 
observable reality. While it is arguably true that electoral procedure and universal 
suffrage preceded democratic (though not political) consciousness in many of today’s 
developing democracies, the extent to which elections have expanded democratic 
consciousness through meaningful political participation and effective representation 
is less clear.   
This chapter provides empirical evidence to illustrate how non-elites in an 
eastern, coastal region of Madagascar perceive electoral processes, their role in those 
processes, and their own political agency. I conclude by arguing that this evidence 
from the field raises serious doubts about notions of political participation and 
representation that underwrite Western reliance on elections as a reliable indicator of 
democracy. This finding leads me to further question whether the democracy 
literature and multi-billion dollar democracy assistance agenda place undue emphasis 
on electoral process, perhaps to the detriment of other aspects of substantive 
democracy (e.g. free speech, rule of law).   
What Do Elections Mean in Eastern Madagascar? 
Although the reasons for promoting elections may vary, democracy 
assistance organisations, assessment indices, and theorists all agree that the electoral 
process is a defining ingredient of modern democracy (see Chapter One). But do 
non-elites in Madagascar value electoral participation and believe that electoral 
outcomes are genuinely representative? In order to better understand what elections 
mean to ordinary people, I commissioned an image that would prompt TAT stories 
indicative of people’s attitudes toward and expectations for electoral processes. The 
artist drew a scene recognisable as the interior of a polling place (see Figure 11). 
Candid responses to this image, coupled with information about whether or not 
research participants had voted in the most recent presidential election provide 
unique insight into how people in the Antsinanana region of Madagascar perceive 
elections and interpret their role in the electoral process.  
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Figure 11: Image 1
 
 
The TAT stories told by research participants revealed the possible presence 
of four distinct, though somewhat overlapping, perceptual lenses with regard to 
elections and electoral participation. A clear dichotomy emerged between people 
who indicated that they held a generally affirmative view of voting in response to 
Image 1, conceptualised throughout this thesis as the positive lens, and those who 
were more pessimistic about electoral processes in Madagascar, evoking the tedious 
lens.77 Two additional perceptual lenses emerged in a more holistic fashion. The 
pluralist lens is characterised by support for an element of political opposition while 
the local lens is notable for the primary interest demonstrated by these research 
participants in distinctly local issues. There is considerable overlap between some 
perceptual lenses, allowing for a more nuanced understanding of the complex ways 
in which people living in this region of Madagascar understand politics and their own 
political agency. That said, the positive and tedious lenses are mutually exclusive – 
people either demonstrated positive dispositions towards elections or they did not.  
                                                 
77 Three out of 51 research participants chose not to tell a TAT story about Image 1. 
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The Positive Lens 
The prevalent disposition that people are generally happy to vote delineates 
the positive perceptual lens. In their TAT stories, these research participants 
described people who think of voting as a responsibility and demonstrate a 
reasonable understanding of electoral procedure beyond simply marking a ballot 
paper. Several people, for instance, initially identified the scene by the ballot box and 
went on to talk about candidates and the electoral campaign. Others indicated that 
people reflect on their choice before casting their vote. Only very infrequently, 
however, did any of these TAT stories refer to multiple political parties. The belief 
that most people view voting positively was often supported in these TAT stories by 
other competences and dispositions suggestive of a wider theme that people are 
generally confident in the electoral process. That two thirds of people telling this sort 
of TAT story said that they had voted in the previous presidential election suggests 
that this positive perception of elections may correspond with a proclivity to vote. 
Demographic Trends 
Roughly one third of research participants from both the rural and urban 
samples told TAT stories exhibiting signs of this perceptual lens (see Table 5). Men 
were noticeably more likely to tell TAT stories including this particular cluster of 
basic themes;  remarkably,  no rural  women are included in this group.  While results  
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from this sample are necessarily inconclusive, this clear distinction between rural 
men and women in particular may suggest an interesting point of departure for 
further research. Apart from sex, however, no other demographic characteristic 
stood out amongst people whose TAT stories displayed signs of the positive 
perceptual lens. Accordingly, research participants whose stories are analysed in this 
section represent all age groups, although the 31-45 year-old age group was 
marginally over-represented in relation to the demographic composition of the entire 
sample (see Table 4 in Chapter Three). These TAT stories were similarly told by a 
cross-section of social classes and represent a wide array of educational backgrounds 
roughly proportionate with the sample.  
Positive Lens Analysis 
The overwhelmingly dominant disposition of this perceptual lens is that 
some people are happy to vote (quelques gens sont contents de voter), as demonstrated in 
the thematic network (see Figure 12). This belief was supported in TAT stories by 
other  competences  and  dispositions  suggestive of  a wider  theme  that  people are  
Figure 12: Positive Lens Thematic Network 
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generally positive about voting and confident in electoral outcomes. Occasionally 
these research participants specified that people reflect (réfléchir) on their choice 
before casting their vote, indirectly implying that the names of multiple candidates 
appear on the ballot.  
Julie: During the elections we have democracy. The people are free to 
choose their candidate. Here, many parties are free [to participate]. 
To vote is to exercise free choice. 
Jo: Voting is the power to change things because often there are 
different candidates and everyone is free to choose who they like.  
While less common, it is still significant that some TAT stories also included the 
competences that elections are transparent (transparence) and voting constitutes a free 
choice (un choix libre). These basic themes suggest the likelihood that at least some 
people positively predisposed toward voting are also confident in electoral results.  
Familiarity with elections coupled with an urge to participate reflects the sort 
of attitude anticipated by both democracy assistance policies and the vast literature 
on democratic development (see Chapter One). Some have even dared to speculate 
that this sort of public affinity for elections could eventually lead to “an African 
derived formula for constructive political participation” (Bratton and van de Walle 
1997: 141, also see Chazan 1979). This implies, however, that people not only 
embrace the chance to partake in periodic polls, but that they imbue them with 
meaning. In this regard, the positive lens is somewhat less encouraging, however, as 
these research participants rarely associated the formal practice of voting with the 
ability to influence political decisions that affect their daily lives. It would seem that 
some Malagasy voters, though of a positive disposition toward elections in general, 
have become habituated to participating without also adopting a critical position on 
either the issues or the candidates. This scenario may be partially accounted for by 
the theory that African voters primarily value participation. Ake, for instance, 
suspects that in Africa “[m]ore often than not, it is the involvement in the process 
rather than the acceptability of the end decision which satisfies the need to 
participate” (1993: 243). Participation, when viewed from this perspective, puts 
greater emphasis on the act of taking part (e.g. showing up at the polls) than any 
eventual outcome (e.g. which candidate gets elected). 
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People who told generally positive TAT stories about elections also 
commonly described voting as a duty (devoir). The particular connotation of this word 
was occasionally difficult to ascertain, however, as some of these research 
participants oscillated between describing voting as a right and an obligation; this 
trend recurs more prominently in TAT stories indicative of the tedious perceptual 
lens, discussed below.78 Reflecting a typical partial-response in this vein, Jo 
continued: “People have to vote, it is how they fulfil their duty as citizens.” On the 
whole, however, classifying voting as a duty coincided with a diminishment of 
enthusiasm. While these research participants rarely indicated that all three people 
depicted in Image 1 thought of voting as a duty, those described in this way were 
usually also attributed with other more sceptical dispositions as well. For instance, 
these research participants sometimes singled out one person in the voting queue as 
less enthusiastic than the others. In the TAT story about Image 1 told by Daniel, the 
woman (second in the queue) was very enthusiastic about voting. The man wearing a 
hat behind her, however, thinks that voting is not very important (pas trop important), 
an infrequent – though not insignificant – theme to emerge from TAT stories 
analysed in this section. Interestingly, none of the three people in the image was 
singled out more consistently than either of the others, negating the likelihood that 
something particular about Image 1 provoked these descriptions. Some people who 
told TAT stories indicative of the positive perceptual lens described the man at the 
front of the queue as excited to vote while others said that he was not taking his 
responsibility seriously (see Figure 11). 
One frequent explanation offered for these mixed feelings, discouragement 
(découragé) in particular, is suspicion of electoral fraud or cheating (tricher).  
Guillaume:  People have various reactions to elections. When there are 
elections, there is always cheating. That’s why some people are 
discouraged. 
Serge:  After the elections, the elections we have here, the people don’t 
want to participate anymore because of all of the problems.  
                                                 
78 Further complicating this point, the words droit (n. right) and doit (v. to have to, conjugation of 
devoir) sound remarkably similar. I often asked research participants for clarification only to learn 
either that they could not decide whether voting was a right or an obligation, or that they did not 
see a significant difference between the two words and could use them almost interchangeably. 
For an example of detailed linguistic analysis of words associated with democracy see Schaffer 
(1998). 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 148 
These dispositions, though far less prevalent than the notion that most people 
willingly take part in the electoral process, nevertheless cast a shadow of doubt over 
the degree of importance that some people attribute to elections. Consequently, we 
must at least temporarily entertain the notion that electoral process may be a less 
reliable indicator of domestic democratic legitimacy than democracy experts regularly 
anticipate.  
The TAT stories of several research participants included in this group 
additionally addressed technical aspects of the voting process, demonstrating a 
reasonable understanding of the procedural aspects of voting beyond simply marking 
a ballot paper. Some people, for instance, initially identified the scene by the ballot 
box (l’urne) and went on to talk about candidates (candidats) and the electoral 
campaign (campagne électorale).  
Lalao:  There is a ballot box and people have formed a queue to vote. 
They have already gone past the entrance because they have their 
envelopes. 
Moravelo:  There is a ballot box in front of the voters. Usually someone guards 
it. Before you get your envelope [ballot], the members of the voting 
office check your identity card and all that. 
The evidence of discouragement above, however, provides reason to question 
whether this technical fluency masks lingering uncertainty about what elections are 
actually for. This is particularly true if endemic fraud prevents electoral results from 
accurately reflecting the choice of voters.  
Remarkably, very few research participants who told TAT stories about 
people positively predisposed toward voting suggested that elections are interesting. 
Indeed, this disposition does not appear in the positive lens thematic network 
because its proportional size would be illegibly small.  
Todilahy: There are many voters who have come, and they aren’t the first 
[indicating that there are already envelopes in the ballot box]. They 
reflect before voting, but when they think about their choice, do 
they really have the information that they need to decide? Even if 
you think about it, if you don’t have the necessary information, it 
means nothing. 
Kamisy:  The first person is very happy to vote. The others need to think a 
bit first. The one at the back is trying to decide what to do by 
watching the others. He doesn’t know who to vote for. 
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TAT stories like these raise the prospect that, although many people are genuinely 
amenable towards voting they may simply be going though practiced motions when 
showing up at the polls. This speculation is shared by a Malagasy political observer 
who notes that “voting is like flipping a coin for most people” (Raharizatovo 2008: 
10). The evidence above suggests that some voters, though of a generally positive 
disposition toward elections in general, have been habituated to participating without 
also adopting a critical position on either the issues or the candidates. Moreover, they 
remain uncertain whether electoral outcomes always reflect the choice of voters. 
Positive Lens Voting Patterns  
 As I explained in Chapter Three, projective research techniques presume that 
people will self-identify with at least one figure depicted in the abstract prompt. 
Exploring whether competences and dispositions evident in TAT stories are 
reflected in the behaviour patterns of research participants can provisionally verify 
the reliability of this claim. While it is beyond the scope of this research to perform a 
thorough assessment of people’s behaviour patterns, I did ask people who agreed to 
take part in this research a series of basic questions about themselves after they had 
told their final TAT story, including: Did you vote in the last presidential election? In 
addition to broadly confirming the method’s reliability, responses to this question 
also raise some unexpected concerns about the role of elections in buttressing 
developing democracies.  
Most research participants whose TAT stories contained the clusters of basic 
themes indicative of the positive lens (roughly two-thirds) also confirmed that they 
had indeed voted in the previous presidential election (see Figure 13). An 
overwhelming majority of these people also indicated that they were familiar with 
KMF-CNOE, a national NGO that focuses principally on civic education and 
electoral monitoring. That said, some people in this group who said that they did not 
vote where also aware of KMF-CNOE, somewhat obscuring any connection 
between the work of this organisation, a tendency for people to vote and the positive 
outlook people have towards voting. Additionally, it was sometimes unclear whether 
rural research participants responding in the affirmative to the question “Did you 
vote in the previous presidential election?” meant instead that they had participated 
in elections for their village president (président fokontany). This possible inconsistency, 
however, is not particularly important for the discussion here, as the real issue is  
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Figure 13: Voter Turnout by Perceptual Lens
 
 
 
whether or not people are habituated to voting and familiar with the process.  
Perhaps the most interesting group of research participants discussed in this 
section (approximately one-third of people included in the positive perceptual lens 
group, evenly split between rural and urban research participants) revealed that, 
despite telling TAT stories about people who are generally positively inclined toward 
voting, they themselves did not vote in the previous presidential election. This 
inconsistency is somewhat surprising and could suggest a number of things. It may 
indicate, for instance, that the TAT stories do not accurately represent the sentiments 
of storytellers. It is possible, for example, that research participants told TAT stories 
characterised by generally positive competences and dispositions because they 
thought that was the ‘right’ response. Without rejecting this possibility outright, I 
reiterate that participatory, imaged-based research methods are less prone to this sort 
of distortion than traditional, language-based research methods (see Chapter Three). 
A more compelling explanation for this discrepancy between attitude and action is 
that some research participants may have self-identified with the person in the story 
who they singled out as less positive about voting but thought themselves in the 
minority when explaining that other people take part in elections without reservation. 
Alternatively, some people may have been prevented from voting by extenuating 
circumstances (e.g. ill-health, time constraints). Many rural research participants, for 
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example, struggle to meet their basic subsistence needs and may have had more 
pressing concerns on election day than casting a vote.  
Finally, that some people did not vote could indicate that, although they are 
generally positive about voting, their attachment to electoral participation remains 
minimal. Dispositions including discouragement and lack of importance, though 
cited infrequently in the TAT stories analysed here, may nevertheless prove relevant 
if afforded closer scrutiny. It is, therefore, entirely possible that some people who 
continue to have relatively good faith in electoral processes remain somewhat 
indifferent to their right to vote. Some may even consider it little more than an 
obligation or duty that must be fulfilled. Suspicion of cheating and acknowledgment 
that elections can be rigged, though not prominent among this group of research 
participants, could still deter some people from voting, particularly those faced with 
more pressing obligations.  
I must also acknowledge that one research participant who told a TAT story 
indicative of the positive perceptual lens did not vote because he is under the legal 
voting age (see Table 5). Age may likewise have prevented other young people 
included in my research sample from voting at the time of the last presidential 
election. There are no clear demographic connections (i.e. sex, age, class, education) 
between people who told TAT stories indicative of the positive lens and yet did not 
vote themselves.  
The Tedious Lens 
 The majority of people who agreed to take part in this research indicated that 
they are disenchanted with the electoral process and do not believe that their vote 
matters, suggesting the likely existence of a second perceptual lens. Whereas the 
positive lens, above, was identified rather narrowly by the common disposition that 
people are generally agreeable toward voting, I identified the tedious lens from a 
plurality of interrelated basic themes that all characterise voting as a waste of time 
and election results as unreliable. Many of the TAT stories analysed in this section 
also illustrate how voting can become a burden when people begin to doubt that 
casting a ballot will make any difference to their daily life. This assessment seems to 
be particularly relevant when people are only just managing to survive. It is also 
noteworthy that fewer of these TAT stories contained a procedural account of the 
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voting process than those indicative of the positive perceptual lens and the technical 
issues they raised also differ somewhat. Analysis of whether or not the people who 
told TAT stories reflective of the tedious lens admitted to participating in the 
previous presidential election reveals the unexpected trend that even though some 
people say they do not find voting worthwhile, they still tend to turn out on election 
day. 
Demographic Trends 
Roughly two-thirds of all TAT stories about Image 1 contained clusters of 
basic themes suggesting the tedious lens (see Table 6). Women were more likely to 
associate the voting scene depicted in Image 1 with voter fatigue and electoral fraud 
than their male counterparts. While this trend is clear for both the urban and rural 
samples, it is slightly more pronounced among rural women. People who told these 
TAT stories do not appear to share any of the other demographic traits considered 
here. Research participants whose TAT stories are analysed in this section are 
representative of all age groups and economic classes roughly proportional with the 
overall sample. These people also come from a wide sweep of educational 
backgrounds, ranging from very little formal education to a masters degree.  
Table 6: Tedious Lens Demographic Details
 
 
 
 
M
al
e 
Fe
m
al
e 
V
ot
ed
 
D
id
 n
ot
 v
ot
e 
U
nd
er
 1
8 
18
-3
0 
31
-4
5 
46
-6
0 
60
+
 
U
pp
er
 
M
id
dl
e 
Lo
w
er
 
R
el
ig
io
us
 
Urban 12 (21)*  
12 
(19) 13 11 1 7 11 4 1 3 17 2 2 
Rural 2 (6)  
4 
(5) 6 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 1 5 0 
Total 14 (27) 
16 
(24)  19 11  1 8 13 7 1  3 18 7 2 
*Numbers in parentheses denote the total number of men and women included in the sample. 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 153 
Tedious Lens Analysis  
TAT stories representative of the tedious perceptual lens characteristically 
depict voting as a wearisome exercise and indicate extensive voter fatigue. A 
common disposition attributed by these research participants to one or more people 
in Image 1 is that they are tired (fatigué) (see Figure 14). Many of these research 
participants similarly described the people in Image 1 as discouraged (découragé), 
saying that when they go to the polls it is not in their heart (pas dans leurs cœurs). 
Andoniaina: It isn’t in their heart [to vote] because they know that the results 
will be changed by the party in power. 
Hantanirina:  The people are tired but it is their duty; they are obliged to go and 
vote. 
Lezoma: It’s always elections, all the time. It’s tiring. The people [in the 
picture] are tired. The first one is angry or fed up. 
Figure 14: Tedious Lens Thematic Network
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The onerous tone of these TAT stories contrasts starkly with the more positive 
outlook characteristic of the positive lens discussed in the previous section.   
Another factor contributing to this organising theme that voting is tedious is 
the considerable uncertainty within TAT stories as to whether voting is a right (droit) 
or an obligation (obligé, devoir), as the thematic network in Figure 14 illustrates.  The 
ambiguity of this language coupled with the fact that all three words were used often 
enough to stand out as basic themes suggests greater uncertainty over whether voting 
is a right or obligation than was evident for the positive perceptual lens.  
Amélie: They are there because it is their right, or rather because they have 
to [vote].  
Rose:  It’s something they have to do. Voting is a right, so they have to do 
it. 
Stéphane:  Everyone has the right to vote, but it’s crazy. They are all tired but 
they don’t have any choice. 
The prevalence of TAT stories like these suggests that many people may understand 
the concept of rights in a way that is somewhat counter-intuitive to Western logic. 
The right to do something to a liberal, Western mind, implies a guaranteed privilege 
that cannot, under normal circumstances, be taken away. Nor, however, is it forced.79 
By contrast, the idea that you have to do something or that it is obligatory suggests 
an element of coercion. Moreover, the presence of the disposition crazy (fou) in the 
thematic network, though small, demonstrates that Stéphane is not entirely alone in 
his assessment.   
For many research participants whose TAT stories suggest that they perceive 
elections through the tedious lens, the monotony of voting is augmented by a clear 
conviction that elections in their country are neither free nor fair. These research 
participants often told stories indicating their suspicions of electoral fraud; Léa, for 
example, explained Image 1 this way: “A lot of people are discouraged. There is 
always cheating during elections.” Furthermore, the thematic network illustrates 
several commonly cited dispositions and one competence supportive of this 
conclusion. Most blatantly, both the competence of cheating (tricher) and the 
                                                 
79 For example, the right to bear arms guaranteed by the second amendment of the American 
Constitution does not mean that every American citizen must own and carry a weapon.  
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disposition that elections do not present voters with a real choice (pas un choix) were 
included in most of the TAT stories analysed here.  
What distinguishes many TAT stories about cheating told by this group of 
research participants, though, is the elaborate detail used to describe exactly how 
electoral outcomes in this region of Madagascar are manipulated. I have classified 
cheating as a competence (i.e. a behaviour, even though the storyteller is not the 
person engaged in it) instead of a disposition (i.e. an attitude or suspicion) because of 
this technical understanding and ability to give specific examples. The most 
prominently cited method for fixing elections discussed by research participants was 
withholding voter registration cards (carte électorale) from known opposition 
supporters. Soazy explained: “There are people who don’t have voter registration 
cards or identity cards, so they can’t vote.” Indeed, a handful of people who 
participated in this research said that they personally do not vote for precisely this 
reason.80 They speculated that the government, meaning leaders of the ruling party, 
ask local loyalists for the names of people known to oppose the regime or support 
alternative candidates. Even if these research participants register to vote, they insist 
that either they never receive their registration card or their name does not show up 
on the electoral roll at the polling station.81 Whether or not this is what actually 
happens is, for the purposes of this study, irrelevant. In the minds of these people it 
is the truth. Moreover, this conviction shapes their behaviour (e.g. they stop 
bothering to turn up at the polls), values (e.g. voting is not worthwhile), and attitudes 
(e.g. the ruling party is autocratic).  
 People without such specific ideas about how elections might be fixed 
similarly voiced scepticism about electoral transparency (pas de transparence) and the 
subsequent reliability of results remarkably often. Concern over transparency was 
particularly common among research participants with a university education.  
Rose: It’s an election with a transparent ballot box. But the election is not 
transparent; I mean the results.  
                                                 
80 Marcus and Razafindrakoto have similarly identified problems with voter registration cards as a 
significant defect of recent electoral processes in Madagascar (2003: 37). 
81 An anonymous response to the written interview questions similarly noted: “Everyone has the 
right to vote, but manipulations exclude a lot of people.” 
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Mahefa:  You can’t guarantee the transparency of elections because there are 
too many government obstacles. 
According to some of these research participants, lack of transparency facilitates 
cheating; as a result,  the party in power always wins (le pouvoir gagne toujours). The 
irony of the transparent ballot box is not lost on people like Rose and Mahefa who 
remain unconvinced that elections are anything other than a show for the benefit of 
election monitors and the ruling political elite. When viewed though this lens, the 
contribution that elections theoretically make to democratic governance is severely 
muted.  
The common conviction that elections are not free and fair was often further 
accentuated by the disposition that, since it does not change anything (ne changer rien), 
voting is not worth the trouble (pas de la peine). Many research participants whose 
TAT stories included this theme described the people depicted in Image 1 as 
unconvinced (pas convaincu) or as having doubts about the elections. These basic 
themes contribute to the conclusion that voting, though sometimes perceived as 
required, is not really worth the trouble.  
Julien:  Every time there are elections, you have to go vote but the result is 
already decided. It’s always the same story. In my opinion, the 
President is a dictator: it’s the government that decides, not the 
people. 
Nathalie:  Everyone thinks “even if I vote, he [the President] will always win.” 
Kalo:   Elections don’t change anything. 
Severiny:  They think that it is always the same. Even if someone new gets 
elected, it is always the same thing. 
The common attitude running through many TAT stories analysed in this section is 
that electoral results are of little significance. These research participants anticipated 
that the ruling party would automatically win any electoral contest, but were equally 
discouraged by the conviction that all political leaders behave the same way once in 
office regardless of party affiliation. 
Moreover, voting takes time out from the working day, something that 
people barely scraping together a subsistence living can ill-afford (c’est difficile quand les 
gens sont pauvres) and are unlikely to value when casting a ballot will do nothing to 
improve their lives. Only very infrequently did any of these research participants 
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associate voting with improving their lives. Mamisoa, for example, described Image 1 
as “an election of equals: the Chinese, the Indians, the rich Malagasy. On the other 
hand there are people who don’t know what to eat.” Notably, research participants 
whose TAT stories contain the themes indicative of the tedious lens often attributed 
dispositions to “everyone,” whereas the TAT stories analysed in the previous section 
were much more likely to depict “some people” as feeling or acting in a particular 
way. These research participants perceive the fundamental flaws in Madagascar’s 
electoral system as obvious and seem to expect that everyone else must be aware of 
them as well. It is also worth noting that a significant proportion of these people did, 
however, indicate that they think protest is an appropriate way of demanding change 
(see Chapter Five). 
Like research participants who told TAT stories indicative of the positive 
perceptual lens, the people whose stores are analysed in this section occasionally 
referred to or described technical aspects of the voting process. This indicates that, 
regardless of how they feel about elections, Malagasy citizens usually have some 
awareness of the technical aspects of voting. However, whereas TAT stories 
suggestive of the positive perceptual lens described procedural aspects of voting like 
the ballot box or the candidates in a neutral if not positive light, the TAT stories 
discussed in this section referred to these competences rather less often and in a 
noticeably different manner. Election cards (carte électorale), for example, were brought 
up in the context of fraudulent elections, as explained above. Election results (annonce 
des résultats) were similarly degraded in these TAT stories, as research participants 
believed that the official results were decided long before a single vote had been cast. 
A few of these people also referred to the law (la loi) in order to explain that voting is 
required.82 Lastly, some TAT stories included descriptions of electoral campaigns 
(campagne électorale). This is perhaps the most encouraging of the technical 
competences evoked by this group of research participants, as it suggests that they 
may perceive an element of debate or discussion prior to elections even if the 
electoral process itself is hopelessly flawed. Alternatively, election campaigns in 
developing countries like Madagascar often gain a high profile domestically not for 
                                                 
82 Voting in Madagascar is not compulsory. Why these research participants were under the 
impression that it is remains unclear. 
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the calibre of their political discourse, but rather the freebees on offer. It was not 
uncommon, for example, to see day labourers wearing t-shirts with a photograph of 
President Ravalomanana printed on the front, surely a pre-election offering. Even so, 
people often identified the scene in Image 2 (see Figure 15, below) as an electoral 
campaign despite the absence of any gifts.  
Tedious Lens Voting Patterns  
As indicated in Figure 13 above, roughly two-thirds of people whose stories 
reflected this perceptual lens said that they had voted in the most recent presidential 
elections. This indicates that lack of faith in electoral procedures and accompanying 
pretences of transparency do not automatically preclude people from voting. As the 
discussion above suggests, one partial explanation for this surprising trend might be 
the perception that people are obliged to vote rather than understanding voting as a 
matter of choice or personal conviction. The TAT stories discussed here appear to 
undermine the reliability of voter turnout as an indicator of democratic quality if 
many people who turn up at the polling station have little confidence in the electoral 
process. People whose TAT stories provide evidence of this political lens and did 
nevertheless vote come from both urban and rural backgrounds, demonstrate a wide 
range of educational achievement and represent all social classes. Interestingly, all of 
the people who did not vote were urban and relatively well educated. Some urban 
research participants also insisted that they were prevented from voting by the party 
in power. This may indicate that rural people feel greater pressure or obligation to 
vote if they harbour suspicions about the process, whereas urban people may come 
under less pressure and are, therefore, more likely to abstain. Neither age nor gender 
appears to contribute to the likelihood that someone would choose to vote.  
Sthella aptly summed-up the view of the political sphere through the tedious 
perceptual lens this way: “They’re crazy, elections!” Crazy in this context was clearly 
intended to denote foolishness or instability, as opposed to excitement or 
invigoration.  The above analysis of this rather pervasive perceptual lens gives 
credence to Clapham and Wiseman’s analysis that “[t]he assumption that democratic 
government will lead to measures that favour the long-term interests of the mass of 
the population is undermined by the continued electoral influence of political 
bosses” (1995: 228). Indeed, as discussed further in the following section, the 
dominant political party seems to function more like a political machine adept at 
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winning elections than as the vehicle of political representation advocated by 
democracy assistance agencies. Machine politics further skews the representative role 
of political parties, contributing to the diminished political legitimacy clearly evident 
in these TAT stories.   
The Pluralist Lens 
As discussed in Chapter One, democracy assistance agencies, assessment 
indices and theorists alike have concluded that political parties have a role to play in 
democratic governance. Practically, however, the ability of political parties to fulfil 
this function in some developing democracies remains highly questionable. During 
data analysis, a distinction emerged between TAT stories that included a role for 
opposition parties – or even simply “the opposition” – and those that did not even 
allude to an element of political opposition. TAT stories that specifically address or 
acknowledge the presence of an element of political opposition shared enough 
common basic themes to suggest the presence of a unique perceptual lens broadly 
supportive of political pluralism and an often-undefined element of opposition. 
Moreover, these TAT stories consistently paint the opposition in a positive (if 
ineffectual) light that contrasts sharply with expressions of open distrust of President 
Ravalomanana and his TIM party. The overt suspicion of autocracy present in many 
of these TAT stories coupled with ambiguity as to what “the opposition” stands for 
tends to suggest that these research participants support the opposition as an 
alternative to the President or ruling party rather than for substantive policy reasons. 
I distinguish here between political opposition and political competition, a 
distinction evident in the TAT stories themselves. Research participants like Julie, 
quoted above in the discussion of the positive perceptual lens, said that there exists 
in Madagascar a plurality of political parties and candidates that offer voters a choice 
come election day. This point of view recognises electoral competition without 
reference to political opposition to the party in power. This sort of competition 
without opposition is grounded in Madagascar’s contemporary political experience. 
Between 1975 and 1990, for example, President Ratsiraka allowed nominal multi-
party electoral competition on the condition that all parties joined the National Front 
for the Defence of the Revolution (FNDR), an umbrella organisation closely 
monitored by the regime; political organisation against the regime was illegal 
(Mukonoweshuro 1990: 387, Mukonoweshuro 1994: 364). People who told TAT 
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stories specifically about the political opposition, by contrast, invariably argued that 
opposition parties and candidates are suppressed. In this view, voters are denied 
pluralistic political debate or, worse, are left unaware of the positions held by 
opposition candidates who would offer genuine choice even if multiple names 
appear on the ballot paper come election time. 
Before proceeding to the perceptual lens analysis, a brief methodological note 
is in order. I specified above that the pluralist and local perceptual lenses emerged 
from a more holistic analysis of TAT stories that were often told in response to more 
than one image. While some stories in response to Image 1 featured electoral 
campaigns, insinuating at least the existence of multiple candidates, evidence of 
support for the opposition most often emerged from TAT stories told in response to 
Image 2 (see Figure 15).83 TAT stories specifically about opposition parties – and the 
themes that characterise them – were neither solicited nor a pre-determined focus of 
this research. Instead, they emerged from information spontaneously volunteered by 
research participants.  I have no  way of  knowing if other people  may have also told  
Figure 15: Image 2
 
 
 
                                                 
83 Some of these research participants told one continuous story bridging Images 1 and 2. 
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TAT stories indicative of this perceptual lens had I intentionally researched it in a 
systematic way. That said, people who candidly told TAT stories about the 
opposition spoke with intense conviction, if not always hope.  
Demographic Trends 
 There are several demographic trends evident for people whose TAT stories 
indicated support for the opposition. TAT stories about the opposition or inclusive 
of an element of political opposition were far more prevalent among urban research 
participants than their rural counterparts, accounting for roughly half of the urban 
sample (see Table 7). While approximately equal numbers of urban men and women 
chose to talk about the political opposition, support for the opposition was 
disproportionately strong among research participants aged 45 and younger.  
Perhaps the most interesting demographic fact about this particular group of 
research participants is that they came from all socio-economic classes. One possible 
explanation for the discrepancy between urban and rural research participants is that 
rural people were predominantly concerned with local issues immediately relevant to 
their community, a tendency discussed further in the next section. It would be 
presumptuous to speculate what a locally appropriate role for the political opposition 
is or might be in a rural context without conducting additional research in rural 
communities.   A second  consideration is that  urban research  participants may have  
Table 7: Pluralist Lens Demographic Details
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been more comfortable talking about the opposition because their TAT interviews 
took place in more discrete locations, most often in private homes or offices where 
there was little chance of being overheard. Rural interviews, by contrast, took place 
in huts – often the research participant’s place of business – that offered 
considerably less privacy; people casually passing by could easily hear the discussion 
taking place inside. This could be relevant because many people who took part in this 
research were afraid of political imprisonment or other possible consequences of 
speaking out against the regime (also see Chapter Five).  
Pluralist Lens Analysis 
Some research participants told TAT stories that overtly advocated political 
pluralism. Indeed, what initially distinguishes the thematic network resulting from 
these TAT stories – and, indeed, this perceptual lens – from the others discussed 
above is the clear presence of some element of opposition (l’opposition), depicted in 
Figure 16. Faramalala explained in one of her TAT stories that there are two political  
Figure 16: Pluralist Lens Thematic Network
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parties in Madagascar: “There are those for the mandate84 and those against it.” By 
distinguishing between the party in power and a nebulous opposition in the context 
of a mandate or political programme, this woman suggests party distinction along 
ideological or policy lines. The infrequency of accounts like this, however, raises the 
possibility that this may be a distinction lost on most people. Moreover, this woman 
speaks of the existence of only two political parties when over 160 parties are 
officially registered in the country. While many of these are doubtless small, regional 
parties, it seems remarkable that candidates from only two parties would be on the 
ballot in the region where my research was conducted. While these research 
participants spoke clearly of opposition political parties (partie politique) or (less 
frequently) candidates, most people whose TAT stories demonstrated support for 
“the opposition” never conceptualised it in an organised manner, but rather 
described it in a vague and unarticulated way. 
While TAT stories inclusive of an element of political opposition first caught 
my attention, it gradually became apparent that what actually defines these TAT 
stories and a few others that do not explicitly refer to the opposition directly is a 
clear inclination toward discussion and debate, indicated by the size of the 
competence to talk amongst themselves (parler entre eux) and the slightly less 
frequently cited disposition of diversity of opinion (diversité d’opinion). In a small 
minority of TAT stories, it was unclear whether people described as talking amongst 
themselves in Image 2 indicated aptitude for discussion or, rather, conveyed 
disrespect for the political leader at the podium. Occasionally someone telling this 
sort of TAT story would explain that the people in the audience were talking 
amongst themselves because the man at the podium was only repeating stale 
propaganda (propagande). In most cases, however, these research participants specified 
that the audience was intently discussing the proposals made by the man before 
them.  
A decisive split emerged, however, among descriptions of the authority figure 
stood at the podium speaking to the crowd. As demonstrated by the size of the basic 
themes dictator (dictateur), not convinced (pas convaincu, pas d’accord) and not interesting 
                                                 
84 It is unclear what exactly Faramalala meant here by the word “mandate;” contextually, it makes 
the most sense to interpret her meaning as political agenda or proposed programme.  
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(pas intéressant) in the thematic network, a significant proportion of these research 
participants distinguished the opposition as standing against the political 
establishment. Only a few actually said that the opposition is against the President, 
however (contre le président). Moreover, although the opposition is seen to oppose the 
ruling party, these research participants do not believe that it represents a viable 
alternative. Indeed, the pessimism with which they described the inability of 
opposition candidates and their supporters to openly participate in the political arena 
is striking given Madagascar’s applauded performance on democracy indices.85 
Mamisoa:  There is only one political party in Madagascar. The party of the 
President, the party in power – the TIM party. The party in power 
does not want to discuss things, it doesn’t want to work together. 
There is an opposition party too, but they can’t do anything 
because they are oppressed by the party in power. They don’t have 
the right to call meetings, to organise themselves, to vote for 
themselves. 
Velohasina:  There are people who are opposed to the party in power who 
would like to run in elections, but they don’t manage to gain 
permission…this is not a democracy because people must be able 
to discuss ideas both for and against, but now that isn’t possible. 
After his TAT interview ended, Fabrice similarly expressed concern that people 
wanting to form an opposition party are prevented from meeting by the police. He 
asked how the country could be considered a democracy when people are not 
allowed to discuss their ideas openly. These TAT stories also plainly exhibit the 
disposition that people are not equal (les gens ne sont pas égaux). While inclination 
toward discussion and debate could lead to a more vibrant democracy, many of these 
TAT stories indicated that support for the opposition resulted from distrust of the 
party system and an acute suspicion of autocracy.  
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that very few stories including references 
to the opposition also contained descriptions of electoral fraud or cheating. One 
                                                 
85 Likewise, an anonymous, written response to structured interview questions disclosed that 
“The notion of political equality does not exist in Madagascar because only the party in power 
can function normally and at the same time it can influence the media. The opposition parties, by 
contrast, always come up against obstacles like censors and sabotage.” Another anonymous 
research participant similarly observed: “At present, many political parties don’t work well 
because their leaders are intimidated by the state or their supporters are discouraged from 
political participation,” while a third anonymous response simply stated: “Political parties work 
so long as you aren’t against the party in power.” 
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reason for this could be that efforts to exclude opposition parties and candidates 
from elections (e.g. not allowing them to organise or hold meetings) would occur 
well before election day and, consequently, not be identified as cheating at the polls. 
While too few research participants spoke overtly about censorship in the context of 
the opposition for it to appear in this thematic network, it was often implied. As 
Chapter Five illustrates, many research participants seem to take pervasive 
censorship for granted. 
Although research participants telling these TAT stories gave the impression 
that they identified with opposition supporters depicted in the crowd in Image 2, it 
was not uncommon for their stories to include an element of support for the 
President or ruling regime as well. The man standing at the podium, though 
sometimes identified as a dictator, was also described as the President (président) 
making an address or explaining his political agenda (programme du président). While the 
basic themes dominating the pluralist lens thematic network indicate that research 
participants telling these stories tended to make negative associations with the 
President’s speech, some occasionally conceded that there are some people who do 
agree with him (quelques gens sont d’accords). Just as often, however, they suggested that 
those supporting the President or the regime did not understand (ne comprendre pas).   
Despite the infrequency with which rural research participants told TAT 
stories that referred to the opposition, two stories did attempt to explain the status of 
the opposition in rural villages. Speaking about the opposition presence in rural 
areas, Kotomaro explained, “Sometimes in the villages, opposition candidates are 
intimidated. So, even if there are several candidates it is always the President’s 
candidate who wins.” While this position harks back to the discussion of ruling party 
dominance of elections above, it says little about how a rural voter might respond to 
opposition candidates. Echoing a description told from the tedious perspective lens, 
Nathalie pointed out that: 
…people prefer to stay home than to vote for the opposition because when you 
vote for them you’re scared. There is always cheating, so it isn’t worth the trouble. 
In the last election, the problem was that they [the ruling party] asked the présidents 
fokontanys [village Presidents] which people [in their villages] were for the opposition 
and then they didn’t give those people their voter registration cards. So…[the TAT 
story ends here] 
There is no way of knowing whether this story results from the perceptions of an 
urban woman about village life or if, more likely, it recounts a situation that occurred 
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in a village familiar to her. This second scenario seems probable since many people 
who live in urban centres maintain close ties with their families residing in the 
surrounding towns and villages.  
Pluralist Lens Voting Patterns 
The pluralist perceptual lens is the only lens identified here that demonstrates 
a clear, though not statistically relevant, negative correlation with voting. Relatively 
low voter turnout among research participants who advocate political pluralism and 
indicate support for the opposition further emphasises their detachment from the 
electoral process (see Figure 13). Not surprisingly, perhaps, over half of the people, 
both men and women, whose TAT stories exhibited signs of this perceptual lens also 
told stories about people who find voting tedious. Although a high proportion of 
people who told TAT stories about the opposition were familiar with KMF-CNOE, 
this does not appear to have increased their inclination to take part in elections. 
There does seem to be some correspondence, however, between voting and income. 
Research participants who did not vote tended to be either on subsistence incomes 
or members of religious orders. In contrast, those who suggested that they supported 
the opposition and did vote were likely to be members of the middle and upper 
classes. Age and gender do not appear to have been consequential demographic 
factors here.  
The Local Lens 
 A final perceptual lens that speaks directly to people’s values, attitudes, 
expectations, and behaviour with regard to elections and electoral participation is 
characterised by a predilection for local politics and deference to authority. Stories 
about local political leaders corresponded with a distinct interest in local issues that 
directly impact people’s daily lives (e.g. education, taxes, security). The analysis below 
suggests that respect for local political leaders stems from the belief held by these 
research participants that local authority figures have the power to improve their 
lives and will represent their interests. The high voter turnout among this group of 
research participants supports the truism that all politics is local. 
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Table 8: Local Lens Demographic Details
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12 
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*Numbers in parentheses denote the total number of men and women included in the sample. 
 
Demographic Trends 
As demonstrated in Table 8, a clear majority of rural research participants 
told TAT stories that had a distinctly local flavour compared to a rather smaller, 
though still relevant proportion of urban research participants. The relatively high 
proportion of lower class research participants included in this group can be 
attributed in part to the large contingent of rural people whose TAT stories provided 
evidence of this perceptual lens. This demographic group similarly helps to account 
for the disproportionately high number of TAT stories told by people with only a 
basic education. Finally, the local perceptual lens emerged from TAT stories told by 
people in every age bracket and does not appear to be particularly common among 
any single age group. 
Local Lens Analysis 
In contrast to the TAT stories described in the previous section, the stories 
about Image 2 analysed here were unanimous in their portrayal of an interested and 
deferent crowd (écouter l’autorité) as the thematic network in Figure 17 clearly 
illustrates. Kamisy told a fairly typical TAT story indicative of this perceptual lens: “It 
is a meeting with the président fokontany. The people accept what he says. He’s the 
authority so they have to accept everything he says.” While these research 
participants sometimes said that people are not equal (les gens ne sont pas égaux), this 
was stated  as a banal  matter of  fact instead of  an accusation of dictatorship, as was  
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Figure 17: Local Lens Thematic Network
 
 
 
the case for people whose stories contained theme clusters reflective of the pluralist 
perceptual lens.  
Claudia: The Mayor is telling the people what he will do in the future and 
what he has already accomplished. There is always someone who is 
higher than the others. The people are always at the bottom. There 
is no equality between people.  
Pierre:  In life, equality doesn’t exist. The President or the leader is always 
above his subordinates. 
When I asked these research participants how they felt about this inequality, they 
replied that it was just the way the world was and did not give any indication of being 
particularly troubled by it.  
During data analysis, I was first alerted to the possible presence of this 
distinct perceptual lens when I noticed that several research participants identified 
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the man at the podium in Image 2 as a local political leader, either the Mayor (maire de 
la commune) or village President (président fokontany). Only occasionally did someone 
included in this group identify this figure simply as “the President” (président) (see 
Figure 17). I then began to discern other shared themes among TAT stories in which 
these political figures were identified. For instance, the dispositions that these 
research participants relied on to account for the response of the crowd contrast 
sharply with those identified in the previous section. The notion that the people in 
the audience would be talking amongst themselves (parler entre eux), for instance, is 
only of a moderate size in this thematic network, whereas it dominated the thematic 
network discussed in the section immediately above. Instead, the dominant 
disposition here is that some people agree (quelques gens sont d’accords) with the man at 
the podium and his agenda (programme). According to Lucien: “There are some 
people who believe everything that the President tells them. For some others, they 
aren’t happy [about what the President says] but I don’t know why.” A minority of 
these research participants similarly said that the members of the audience were 
convinced (convaincu) while a few suggested that the speech was just electoral 
propaganda (propagande).  
These TAT stories often recalled a situation in which the Mayor or village 
President is giving important information to the community that could have 
ramifications for people’s daily lives. Setraniaina provided a common example of this 
type of story, beginning: “The village President is making a speech. He is giving 
important information to the people about the laws of the village.” Often these 
public meetings were said to be on at least one of three topics: education (éducation), 
taxes (il faut payer des impôts) or the law (la loi, droits). These concerns were, however, 
sometimes conflated. For example, several rural people told TAT stories that raised 
the issue of illiterate people’s right to education. Other local issues, by contrast, were 
more narrowly defined. One common storyline, for instance, involved the village 
President holding a meeting to discuss security (sécurité du village) because, as Tidahy 
explained, “there are thieves in every village.” In these TAT stories, paying attention 
to proclamations by local leaders was described to be especially important when the 
topic under discussion has direct repercussions on daily life.  
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Local Lens Voting Patterns 
  A striking majority of people whose TAT stories focused on local issues and 
political leadership said that they had voted in the previous presidential election (see 
Figure 13). In fact, research participants who told TAT stories indicative of the local 
lens were more likely to vote than people associated with any of the other perceptual 
lenses described in this chapter. This could indicate that the basic theme clusters 
common to the local perceptual lens may be particularly relevant to understanding 
why ordinary people in Madagascar would choose to vote. This trend also contrasts 
sharply with the relatively low voter turnout among people whose TAT stories 
demonstrated support for the opposition and deep-rooted scepticism that their 
preferred candidate could actually be elected. 
This exceptionally high voter turnout is particularly notable given the high 
proportion of rural people in this category for whom voting likely entails a 
considerable opportunity cost. It was not uncommon for TAT stories about 
elections told by rural people to describe voting as a hardship; this excerpt from 
Felana’s TAT story is typical: “In villages the people are poor, and every day they 
need to find something to eat. Voting in elections takes time.” The propensity of 
people who talked about local politics to vote further contributes to the notion that 
all politics is local. It makes sense that where people either personally know the 
candidates vying for a position (as is undoubtedly true at the village level) or think 
that decisions made by elected authorities will affect their lives (e.g. issues of security, 
educational opportunities) they are more likely to vote. Indeed, of the people I spoke 
with while conducting this research, the rural poor affirmed that they had voted in 
the most recent presidential election much more frequently than the urban poor, 
perhaps in part because of their more direct connection to local politics.  
Beware the Fallacy of Electoralism 
Three of the four perceptual lenses analysed in this chapter cast doubt on the 
reliability of elections as a meaningful or reliable indicator of democratic 
development. Having deemed Madagascar’s December 2006 presidential elections 
free and fair, the international community happily concluded that incumbent 
President Ravalomanana had received a clear mandate from the people when he won 
the election with approximately 55% of the vote. The empirical evidence above 
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suggests, to the contrary, that a reasonable proportion of the population may be 
resigned to the ruling party’s “inevitable dominance” (Bratton 1998: 65). This raises 
serious questions about the true nature of electoral participation in Madagascar and 
whether even multi-party elections actually result in political representation. Contrary 
to much of the established literature and the aspirations of those working in the 
democracy assistance industry (see Chapter One), the act of voting appears to have 
little or nothing to do with political legitimacy in the minds of most of the people I 
interviewed.  
Over a decade ago, Terry Lynn Karl famously articulated concern about the 
“fallacy of electoralism” (1995: 73, also see Diamond 1996: 21-22). This assertion 
sparked a vibrant debate about how much we can reasonably expect from elections 
in developing democracies, and duly influenced the ways in which contemporary 
analysts and practitioners talk about their work. Recall, for instance, that the UK 
Minister for International Development insisted that elections in Afghanistan made 
his job easier, but that he had never expected them to be perfect (Gray 2009). Nor, 
for that matter, does DFID or any other democracy assistance organisation discussed 
in the context of this research explicitly equate democracy with elections. Despite the 
increasingly nuanced nature of the democracy discourse in recent years, the empirical 
evidence from eastern Madagascar suggests that a very wide gulf still separates the 
way ordinary people evaluate elections in their country and the conclusions drawn 
from those same election results by outside observers. 
Are Elections a Reasonable Indicator of Democracy? 
Although the above analysis is representative of the views of a rather small 
sample of people in one region of Madagascar, the empirical data raises suspicions 
about the accuracy of democracy assessment indices that place too much emphasis 
on quantifiable electoral statistics such as voter turnout. Freedom House, for 
instance, has consistently labelled Madagascar an electoral democracy since the 
publication of its 1993/1994 Freedom in the World Report. Granted, this organisation 
only classifies Madagascar as “partly free,” a rating that reflects persistent limitations 
to political rights and civil liberties as well as only superficial political pluralism. Even 
this assessment, however, fails to accurately reflect the majority position of research 
participants who perceive their basic right to vote as meaningless (i.e. the tedious 
lens) and an absence of political pluralism (i.e. the pluralist lens). The Bertelsmann 
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Transformation Index presents, perhaps, the most encouraging assessment of the 
quality of electoral processes in Madagascar, giving the country a score of 8 out of 10 
for both the “free elections” and “democracy performs” categories in the 2008 
assessment. Scores of 6 through 8 indicate that: 
General elections are held and accepted in principle as the means of filling 
leadership positions. However, there are some constraints on the principle of 
equality. These may include withholding suffrage or the right to campaign for office 
de jure or de facto from part of the population, inconsistent assurance of free and 
fair elections, unelected officeholders, or elections that have perceptible but only 
minor influence on political outcomes. (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2009: 18) 
That Madagascar ranks at the top-end of this scale, however, should indicate that 
elections in this country are subject to very few of these serious constraints. While 
this may be the view from the perch of international observers, the perspective from 
the ground is quite different. I do not deny the possibility that assessments made of 
some countries will correspond more closely with reality than the recent scores for 
Madagascar appear to. Even so, the fissure between internal and external assessments 
of elections in this country deserves closer inspection. 
One critical factor contributing to free and fair elections is the ability – both 
legal right and logistical opportunity – to vote. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
high voter turnout is often cited in statements declaring elections – especially those 
taking place in developing democracies – free and fair.  It occurs to me, however, 
that statistics on voter turnout are similar to statistics on unemployment. 
Unemployment figures are generally calculated based on the number of people 
actively seeking work and are often criticized for their omission of people who are 
under-employed and those unemployed who have ceased looking for employment 
(and are not claiming benefits). I suggest that a similar phenomenon might exist with 
electoral statistics, where some groups of people repeatedly slip under the radar.  
Specifically, voter turnout is calculated based on the number of registered 
voters who turn up at the polls and does not reflect the number of people who are 
not registered. Consequently, the potential for unrepresentative voter turnout figures 
is particularly high in developing democracies where attaining both legal citizenship 
and voter registration can prove prohibitively onerous. Reported voter turnout in 
Madagascar is consistently registered at or above 60%. However, this figure does not 
take into account disenfranchised segments of society (e.g. third and fourth 
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generation immigrants, people in remote areas) who are not registered voters or do 
not have official birth certificates. Another group of non-voters I encountered were 
people who had registered to vote but who, for whatever reason, routinely fail to 
show up on voter registers and have consequently stopped bothering to show up at 
the polls altogether.  
Problems such as these may not be widely recognized outside of a particular 
community or region but I found them to be very influential in shaping the contours 
of the perceptual lenses described above. The positive and tedious perceptual lenses 
both indicate that even people who do vote readily admit that electoral irregularities 
cast a shadow over their assessment of Madagascar’s democratic credentials. This 
scepticism is, I anticipate, a contributing factor to the creation of alternative 
definitions of democracy that make more sense to communities who have started to 
lose faith in electoral processes (see Chapter Seven). More research would need to be 
done in order to fully explore whether the way in which voter turnout is calculated 
has significant effects on calculations used to determine whether elections are ‘free 
and fair’. 
Confusion as to whether voting is a right or an obligation blurs both the 
positive and tedious lenses, further diluting the significance that can reasonably be 
attributed to voter turnout.  
Botozaza: In poor countries we are always told that it is your duty to vote, but 
in other countries it is your right. I think that democracy from this 
point of view is different here. We are a little bit obliged to vote.” 
Serge:  Actually, the only way that people experience democracy is through 
elections. Other than that, everything is closed. There aren’t other 
opportunities to voice your ideas.  
And yet, the informal data on voter turnout collected directly from research 
participants clearly indicates that, despite these reservations, people continue to show 
up at the polls (see Figure 13). While it might seem paradoxical that people so 
disenchanted with the electoral process would continue to vote, it should be 
remembered that at least some of these people interpret voting as an obligation or 
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something they have to do, while others suspect that they may face repercussions if 
they fail to participate.86 
It is possible, though improbable, that electoral deficits described by 
participants in this research are the exception to the rule. Critical analysis of elections 
in other developing democracies paints a remarkably similar picture. Of the 40 
multiparty elections carried out in sub-Saharan Africa between the beginning of the 
third wave in 1989 and 1997, Brown and Kaiser found that only 15 were 
“significantly free and fair” and that a change of leadership resulted approximately 
one third of the time (2007: 1143). Chege similarly observes that “the assumption 
that a semi-honest election is better than no election at all” has resulted in external 
observers endorsing imperfect polls after which “autocratic rulers have subsequently 
tightened the screws of repression and sought to divide and intimidate legitimate 
opposition movements” (1995: 47). Where real prospects for political representation 
do not already exist, elections alone are unlikely to fill the void (di Palma 1990). 
Seriously flawed elections, furthermore, have the potential to strip future electoral 
processes of public legitimacy, as TAT stories indicative of the tedious and pluralist 
lenses clearly demonstrated. In some contexts, elections may signal little more than 
the illusion of choice, contributing only to a “parody of democracy” that should not 
be hurriedly mistaken for the real thing (Collier 2007: 147).  
Do Elections Provide a Forum for Political Representation? 
 In Chapter One, I pointed out that many organisations engaged in 
democracy assistance couch their support for elections in language supportive of 
multi-party competition and political representation. The ability of alternative 
political parties to legally compete in the political arena is said to demonstrate the 
presence of a “somewhat real and independent opposition,” at least enough to 
distinguish hybrid regimes from non-democracies (Diamond 1999: 16). Often 
admittedly imperfect – far from perfect, even – the regularisation of political 
competition is expected to mature over time into an indigenously appropriate model 
                                                 
86 Research participants had mixed opinions of the likely consequences for not voting. Some said 
that there would not be a consequence, or that the consequence would be the party in power 
announcing a landslide victory. Others, however, anticipated a more draconian punishment, such 
as having applications for official documents denied.  
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of representation (Chazan 1979: 153). In the mean time, even underdeveloped 
political parties can make a start at mobilizing voters, formulating policies, and 
aggregating public interests (Ware 1986: 130). This rationale makes logical sense and 
offers some credibility to the ritual rubber-stamping of flawed electoral processes by 
international observers. I do not take issue with the indicator itself, but rather the 
way opportunities for political representation via electoral processes (and political 
parties) are assessed by democracy experts.  
Although the international democracy assistance industry widely regards 
political parties as an important mechanism for generating representative electoral 
outcomes, the analysis above should spark suspicions that external assessments of 
Madagascar’s party system may not coincide with local evaluations. To briefly cite 
just one example, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index for 2008 gave Madagascar 
a score of 9 out of 10 in the category Association and Assembly Rights; this means: “The 
freedom of association and assembly is unrestricted within the basic demographic 
order.” Experts would argue that multi-party politics are not foreign to Madagascar, 
tracing their existence back to the 1960s and the early days of independence.  In the 
early 1990s, after more than two decades of either military rule or a one-party state, 
multi-party politics returned to the country and within a year Madagascar had more 
than 120 registered political parties (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005: 496). The 
Bertelsmann Stiftung BTI 2008 country report likewise documented that there are 
currently around 160 registered political parties and “a large bloc of independents” 
crowding the political landscape.87 But is formal electoral competition a reasonable 
guarantee of political inclusion and representation (Hawthorn 1993: 343-344)? 
TAT stories indicative of the pluralist lens paint a very different picture, one 
in which opposition parties are prevented by authorities of the state from 
organising.88 While the pluralist lens may not accurately represent the experience of 
opposition parties throughout the country, the 2008 BTI score does not seem to 
accurately reflect the experience of people in one of the country’s urban centres. The 
                                                 
87 Independent candidates have long featured in Madagascar’s elections. Covell notes how in the 
earliest elections candidates ran sans partie (i.e. without party affiliation) (1987: 29). 
88 This phenomenon is not unique to Madagascar; Forje similarly illustrates in the case of 
Cameroon that the legalisation of over 100 political parties should not be taken as an indicator of 
democratic participation in that country (1997: 317). 
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meta-analysis in Chapter Seven further illustrates how electoral representation 
advocated by democracy experts can face resistance from local communities. The 
local perceptual lens, by contrast, seems to suggest that it may be possible to achieve 
more meaningful political representation, for the time being anyway, outside of 
elections at the local or community level. Public meetings that allow people to 
discuss priorities like education and taxes without recourse to political parties have 
the potential to encourage informal participation that results in policy decisions 
representative of locally identified needs.89 The empirical data analysed above may 
not be representative of the entire country; even so, that roughly half of urban 
people participating in this research believe that the opposition is barred from 
organising should trigger alarm bells.  
Another important factor to consider is that political parties in Madagascar 
tend to rise and fall with the fortunes of their leaders; the analysis above illustrates 
that this disarray is not lost on Malagasy society (see Appendix 2). Many of the 
people taking part in this research lamented that political parties do not work, or at 
least not well. Indeed, the President’s dominant Tiako i Madagasikara (TIM, I Love 
Madagascar) party was created after he came to power in 2002 and “is only as strong 
and autonomous as he allows it to be” (Marcus and Razafindrakoto 2003: 44, Marcus 
and Ratsimbaharison 2005: 307).90 Cammack, Pool and Tordoff call these “parties of 
the state” and note that they are at high risk of being dominated by the executive 
rather than representing constituent interests in any practical way (1993: 95). With 
vast state resources at their disposal, opposition to such parties of the state becomes 
a hopeless cause and the long-term prospects for democratic governance grow dim 
(Cammack, Pool, and Tordoff 1993: 95, Chazan 1979: 136, Ng 1997: 21-22, 
Sørensen 2000: 298). Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz likewise identify political parties as 
“one of the weakest links in democratic development” in many emerging 
democracies around the world  (2007: 48). More sophisticated measurements better 
                                                 
89 According to a programme coordinator working in CARE’s regional office, community 
development plans have successfully encouraged public participation in decision-making 
processes while helping donors and programme developers anticipate – and avoid – potential 
blockages (Interview, 4 August 2008). 
90 This was not, however, the first time that a President had established his political party after 
being elected. Ratsiraka likewise founded his ruling AREMA party after winning the executive in 
1975 (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 194).  
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able to distinguish “democracy without choices” are therefore needed before multi-
party competition and elections can be reliably used as an indicator of political 
representation (Krastev 2007: 61, Pitkin 1967: 230).  
Is Democratic Participation a Human Right? 
As noted above, one line of reasoning within the literature on democratic 
development lends credence to this position, suspecting that African voters value the 
act of participating over any eventual electoral outcome (Ake 1993: 243). 
Participation, when viewed from this perspective, emphasises the act of showing up 
at the polls and taking part in the electoral process rather than the perceived 
desirability of electing one particular candidate over the others. The dominant 
competences and dispositions of the positive perceptual lens discussed above 
broadly reaffirm Ake’s suspicion. These research participants demonstrated a clear 
understanding of voting procedures and affinity for the process; yet betray a lack of 
knowledge about candidates and certain disregard for the results. Only one person, 
for instance, brought up the announcement of election results in his TAT story 
about elections. That said, the political crisis that erupted in response to controversial 
election results in December 2001 casts some doubt on how pervasive this 
perceptual lens might be across the country as a whole. Alternatively, it is also 
possible that the positive perceptual lens yields to more dominant points of view in 
times of uncertainty or all-out crisis when more aggrieved emotions and patterns of 
behaviour become widespread.  
While the perceptual lenses identified in this chapter suggest that elections in 
Madagascar may not meet people’s participatory standards, TAT stories provided 
ample evidence that Malagasy citizens do value political participation. Sometimes 
equating participation and free speech with democracy, research participants whose 
TAT stories provided evidence of the tedious and pluralist lenses stated repeatedly 
that meaningful political participation was not possible in Madagascar at the time of 
my fieldwork. Although elections do not provide these people with the participatory 
outlets they crave, some research participants did provide clues about how they quell 
their democratic desires. As the next chapter illustrates, “when opposition views do 
not find a platform in government, they often find an outlet in the streets” (Price 
2009: 164). Alternatively, the rural women I interviewed often told TAT stories 
suggesting that they did not find voting in elections worthwhile, yet some of their 
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stories about Image 2 indicate that they value contact with local political leaders (e.g. 
attending meetings).  
While TAT stories indicative of the local and pluralist perceptual lenses 
suggest that the people telling them value political participation, it was less clear how 
highly these same people valued voting as an expression of political participation. 
Specifically, it was common for research participants telling TAT stories reflecting 
the positive or tedious perceptual lens to describe voting as a duty or an obligation, 
something that they were required to do whether they wanted to or not. The 
linguistic ambiguity between rights and duties characteristic of many TAT stories 
about voting suggests that although people value political participation as a human 
right, additional research would be required to determine whether people in the 
Antsinanana region of Madagascar make the same association between political 
participation and voting that international democracy experts are prone to endorse 
(see Chapter One). 
 The original contribution of these findings is that they reaffirm the idea that 
democratic participation is a human right even while simultaneously negating the 
accuracy of electoral indicators. It has been widely acknowledged that “African-style 
democracy,” particularly at the local level, has a distinctly communal flavour, in 
juxtaposition to the individual interest articulation promoted by liberal democratic 
electoral processes (Bradley 2005: 418, also see Adar 1999, Ake 1993, Hawthorn 
1993: 345). This communal political dynamic can, however, be a double-edged 
sword. The local perceptual lens analysis above suggests that locally focused politics 
can contribute to greater and more meaningful political participation. Some worry, 
however, that it can also lead to competition among communities rather than the 
establishment of ideologically driven political parties (Bradley 2005, Joseph 1997). If 
the relationship between the individual and the collective is indicative of the 
character democracy is likely to take in a society (Ake 1993: 243), knowing what 
people think about local politics, how they participate, and what this participation 
means may be useful starting points for understanding democratic dynamics at the 
national level. More to the point, if local politics, particularly local level democracy, 
can be demonstrated to function relatively well in a country like Madagascar where 
national politics remain little short of dysfunctional, it may represent an opportunity 
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for more innovative bottom-up approaches to democracy assistance that capitalise 
on the willing engagement of ordinary citizens.  
Conclusion 
 The speculation that public affinity for electoral participation and consistent, 
if flawed, electoral contests might eventually yield a distinctly African model of 
political participation implies that people not only embrace the chance to partake in 
periodic polls, but that they imbue them with meaning. In order for this vision to 
come to fruition, however, elections must become more than ceremonial. The local 
evidence from eastern Madagascar presented in this chapter raises doubts about the 
prospects of this transpiring in Madagascar any time soon. Both the positive and 
tedious lenses identified from TAT stories about electoral processes indicate that 
Malagasy citizens understand technical electoral processes; it remains less certain that 
they find electoral participation either engaging or meaningful. One reason for this 
dearth of meaning identified by research participants whose TAT stories align with 
the pluralist perceptual lens is that they perceive the political arena as off limits to 
anyone who does not support the ruling regime (i.e. opposition parties, candidates, 
and supporters). Formal political competition is not the same thing as meaningful 
political opposition that offers voters a genuine choice. This has not prevented some 
research participants, both urban and rural, from engaging in alternative forms of 
political participation at the local or community level, however, as the local 
perceptual lens analysis above demonstrates.  
Taken together, these four perceptual lenses suggest that purely electoral 
indicators of democracy may fail to accurately reflect local perceptions of political 
representation. Moreover, the international democracy assistance industry puts a 
premium on electoral participation while failing to recognise prohibitive conditions at 
the local level (e.g. voter registration irregularities, belief that elections are a waste of 
time) and, more importantly, alternative avenues for political participation that 
people may find more rewarding than voting (e.g. community meetings).  
The generally high scores that Madagascar received from democracy indices 
prior to the outbreak of political unrest in the spring of 2009 contradict the local 
interpretations of Madagascar’s electoral process discussed above. This raises the 
distinct possibility that an outwardly democratic electoral system may in effect mask 
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the absence or insufficiency of other basic democratic rights (Cammack, Pool, and 
Tordoff 1993: 131). Form, in other words, deviates drastically from function 
(Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith: 2005: 199, Quigley 1997: 565). The following chapter 
follows through on this theme by investigating how people in the Antsinanana region 
of Madagascar interpret freedom of expression and their ability to access information 
necessary for making political choices. Despite the continued popularity of electoral 
indicators, we must not lose sight of the fact that “there is life after elections, 
especially for the people who live there” (Zakaria 1997: 40). How people experience 
politics and democracy between election cycles adds depth to assessments of a 
country’s longer-term democratic prospects beyond formal electoral procedures. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FREE SPEECH AND INFORMAL POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
Before there can be freedom to act, protest, or legislate,  
there must be freedom to think  
and then freedom to speak. 
(Wolf 2008: 92) 
Although considerable attention is paid by the international community to 
the assessments made by election observers and whether or not they bestow their 
much-coveted stamp of approval, the interim period between election cycles is when 
democracy is really tested. Periods of public apathy and withdrawal from politics 
intermittently punctuated by intense, often violent outbursts of extreme discontent 
have defined Madagascar’s post-independence history (Mukonoweshuro 1990). 
Growing pains commonly associated with modernisation could account for this 
cyclical pattern of social turbulence (Eisenstadt 1964: 352). The most recent political 
crisis, for instance, has been variously attributed to market fluctuations in the price of 
rice, the social impact of large-scale mining projects and a “tightening” of civil 
liberties (AFP 2009b, Bobb 2009, IRIN 2009b). Even so, this explanation, while 
accounting for the existence of grievances, fails to adequately resolve why a 
seemingly docile public would suddenly take to the street in protest.  
Where the formal political arena remains closed to the general public, reliable 
information about policy decisions is sparse and free speech is suppressed, people 
may eventually resort to surrogate forms of participation outside of formal politics 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 142-143). As the previous chapter demonstrated, 
short-term policies that focus narrowly on supporting electoral procedure risk failing 
to address the latent political grievances capable of undermining sustained 
democratic development in the longer term. Although some people interviewed for 
this research did find participation in elections meaningful, others indicated that 
electoral competition and participation in Madagascar are little more than a charade. 
Research participants of the second persuasion ardently pointed out, moreover, that 
most people lack the information required to make a meaningful or informed choice 
on election day, in part because the political opposition cannot organise or offer a 
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viable political alternative, as identification of the pluralist lens in the previous 
chapter demonstrated. The empirical evidence presented in this chapter largely 
supports Bratton and van de Walle’s (1997) expectation that people primed for 
political participation by the institutionalisation of regular, if unsatisfactory, elections 
will eventually begin to look for alternative venues in which they can exercise their 
political voice. 
 Chapter One identified three prominent reasons why key democracy 
assistance agencies (e.g. UNDP, the Ford Foundation, International IDEA) continue 
to prioritise initiatives aimed at strengthening free speech, namely: (i) it enables 
political participation, (ii) it makes a fundamental contribution to the process of 
preference formation and (iii) it is essential for ensuring political accountability. In 
short, electoral participation and democratic governance more generally hinge on the 
ability of people to access relevant information and openly discuss political 
preferences between election cycles. Indeed democratic control and accountability 
have been characterised as necessary long-term accompaniments to short-term 
electoral processes. Before people can express their approval or discontent, they 
must be able to identify their own preferences and use these partialities to pass 
judgment on decisions taken by elected officials. This process of preference 
formation is not possible without access to relevant information, gleaned both from 
media outlets and open conversations with fellow citizens. Consequently, the free 
and independent media plays a vital role in monitoring the behaviour of elected 
officials (Whitehead 2002: 118). In addition to exerting control over the state 
apparatus and advancing the public interest, democratic governments must be 
responsive to the demands of the people (Pitkin 1967: 232). The informal 
participation of ordinary citizens in ongoing political dialogue, whether through the 
media or other forums (e.g. civil society groups) is essential in ensuring democratic 
accountability.  
The perceptual lenses analysed in this chapter go some way in validating the 
theory that unsatisfactory elections can incite disgruntled citizens to endorse 
alternative brands of participation. They also provide a partial explanation as to why 
some people think displays of social unrest (e.g. protests) are legitimate or even 
necessary while others do not. These varying points of view have poignant 
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consequences for how ordinary citizens perceive democracy and democratic 
development locally.  
How Do Ordinary Malagasy Perceive Free Speech Rights and Informal 
Political Participation? 
Although an intuitive connection exists between freedom of speech and 
access to information, I opted to treat these concepts as distinct topics of inquiry in 
TAT interviews. While it is true that a free press relies on the ability of journalists 
and commentators to openly discuss topical issues of their choosing without fear of 
persecution or censorship, I hoped to ascertain whether prevalent differences 
distinguish non-elite perceptions of an individual’s right to free speech from the 
ability of the media to report on political issues and current affairs. It has been noted 
elsewhere that freedom of expression is sometimes considered a luxury in societies 
“where the majority of people are both poor and illiterate” (Smith and Loudiy 2005: 
1114). Does this theory hold among non-elites in Madagascar, or are free speech and 
informal political participation within reach of even the poorest citizens? The 
interconnected reasons given by democracy assistance agencies for encouraging 
freedom of expression and a pluralistic media in developing democracies are 
relatively straightforward. Open political communication is itself a form of informal 
participation that enables citizens to form preferences and convey these preferences 
to their elected representatives. Does this logic hold in Madagascar? And, if so, do 
ordinary people believe that they are able to engage in the political sphere in this 
way? 
I commissioned two images to solicit information pertaining to how people 
understand freedom of speech and political participation outside of elections. The 
first aimed to portray ordinary citizens speaking out about or protesting against 
something, while the second depicts a newspaper vendor (see Figure 18). This 
research did not enquire about alternative media outlets (i.e. radio, television, the 
internet). In retrospect, it could have been interesting to have had an additional 
image depicting radio communication to see if differences emerged in perceptions of 
different media outlets. 
Having thus distinguished between free speech and access to information as 
discrete  avenues for  informal participation  during the  interview process,   the three  
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Figure 18: Images 3 and 4
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perceptual lenses that emerged during analysis demonstrate that these concepts are 
commonly conflated in the context of daily life. TAT stories indicate that both 
individuals and the media are prone to censorship, for example. That this might be 
the case is neither surprising nor unreasonable given that a free press depends on 
protected freedom of expression for journalists. Likewise, the ability of individuals to 
express political views relies in part on their ability to access relevant information. 
The analysis of tacit perceptual lenses in this chapter provides empirical evidence of 
an interconnected relationship between free speech, access to information and 
informal political participation.  
Analysis of TAT stories revealed the possible presence of three discrete 
perceptual lenses with regard to free speech and access to information among people 
participating in this research. A clear schism emerged between those who indicated 
that protest – revolt even – is justifiable on the one hand, and those who believe that 
public demonstrations are either sometimes or always undesirable on the other. 
Underlying these embedded perceptions, however, rest more nuanced notions of free 
speech, with salient repercussions for how people seemed to construe democracy 
and their political environment at the time fieldwork was conducted. Careful 
consideration of these perceptual lenses also suggests some possible alternative 
interpretations of the country’s most recent political unrest.  
The dissident lens91 emerged from stories suggesting that people value 
freedom of speech as a means of evoking change and improving their quality of life. 
These research participants were often acutely aware, however, of barriers to free 
speech and restrictions limiting their access to information. Others associated 
political speech and competition with perceived social – particularly religious – 
divisions and identified poverty as the most significant barrier obstructing their 
access to relevant information; I have labelled this point of view the social divisions 
lens. Finally, the passivist lens refers to the position voiced by a clear minority of 
research participants who indicated that they primarily associate free speech with 
learning about current affairs, particularly in the run-up to elections. While all of 
these perceptual lenses are treated as mutually exclusive in the following analysis, 
                                                 
91 Two of the 51 research participants opted out of telling a story about TAT Image 3 (see 
footnote 51); only Voary did not tell a TAT story about Image 3 or Image 4.   
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they do demonstrate some notable similarities (e.g. concern about censorship, 
interest in current affairs). 
The Dissident Lens 
 The dissident perceptual lens suggests that some people view public protest – 
revolt even – as a way of instigating change and improving their lives. People who 
view the world through this particular lens also consistently expressed interest in 
current affairs but appear split over whether newspapers provide reliable 
information. Moreover, while they may be inclined to discuss current events, these 
research participants also suggested that people in positions of authority or power do 
not listen to the views of ordinary citizens. A small number of people who told TAT 
stories indicative of the dissident lens said during their TAT interviews that they were 
afraid to speak openly for fear of political imprisonment; many more voiced similar 
concerns after the recorder had been turned off.  
Demographic Trends 
 It was relatively common for urban research participants to tell TAT stories 
evoking the basic themes discussed here, accounting for roughly half of my urban 
sample of both men and women. By contrast, a relatively small proportion of TAT 
stories told by rural men reflect this perceptual lens and no rural women told stories 
indicating this particular cluster of themes (see Table 9). Research participants who  
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told TAT stories indicative of this point of view represent all age groups. People I 
would classify as middle class most often told TAT stories suggestive of this 
perceptual lens, a finding partially attributable to this group’s urban bias.   
Furthermore, it is worth noting that over half of the people who told TAT 
stories reflective of these themes had at least some university education and nearly all 
of them had finished high school. They were also, for the most part, familiar with the 
work of KMF-CNOE. Even so, these research participants indicated that they were 
less likely to vote than people whose TAT stories reflected the other perceptual 
lenses discussed in this chapter, resulting in the highest proportion of people from 
any perceptual lens category to be familiar with the work of KMF-CNOE and yet 
abstain from voting in the previous presidential election.  
Dissident Lens Analysis 
TAT stories indicative of the dissident perceptual lens highlighted underlying 
tensions between common perceptions of free speech as a desirable democratic right 
and practical, structural constraints on this freedom regularly experienced by research 
participants. The thematic network in Figure 19 illustrates the recurrent themes 
around which these research participants from the Antsinanana region conceptualise 
their ability to engage in informal political discourse between election cycles. These 
ideas cluster around three principal organising themes: interest in current affairs, 
aspiration to improve one’s circumstances and prevalent obstacles preventing 
effective participation and political debate. The evidence provided by these TAT 
stories reinforces the important role that freedom of speech plays in informal 
participation and democratic accountability while simultaneously highlighting 
practical challenges to its implementation. In other words, free speech and access to 
information emerged as key points of contention between this group of research 
participants and (what they perceive as) an overbearing ruling regime.   
That people are capable of changing things (changer des choses) immediately 
stands out in the thematic network for the dissident perceptual lens (see Figure 19), 
contributing to the broader organising theme that people want to improve their lives. 
A distinguishing feature salient in this point of view is the recurrent theme that 
public protest and even revolt (révolter) are reasonable methods of instigating that 
desired change. In their TAT stories, these research participants often described the  
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Figure 19: Dissident Lens Thematic Network
 
 
 
motivation of the people in Image 3 as desire to improve their quality of life (améliorer 
la vie). Public protest, therefore, is closely associated with social change in the eyes of 
these research participants. Their TAT stories further demonstrated recognition of 
the often unmistakeably political consequences of this position:  
Claudia: They want to improve their life, that’s why they’ve organised a 
demonstration – for change. That’s why there is a revolution; we 
don’t have any other choice. 
Kamisy: It’s not a strike, but a social coup. The adults, the children, even the 
chickens are there!  
Andoniaina: It is a strike because of inflation; the price of rice keeps rising. Or 
maybe it is against the President. 
Only a small proportion of people whose TAT stories indicated the thematic trends 
discussed here, however, overtly stated that the protestors in Image 3 were 
changer des choses !
révolter
améliorer la vie !
contre le pouvoir !
l’autorité 
n’écoute   
pas  
des grèves sont interdits !
emprisonnement politique !
censeurs !
les journaux sont intéressants!
les journaux ne sont pas intéressants !
discuter de 
nouvelles!
doit réfléchir !
la vérité !
analphabète !
pauvre !
n’a pas de l’argent 
d’acheter  
un  
journal!
!
Freedom of speech 
is valued as a way of 
improving one’s life 
but is restricted by 
censorship and 
poverty 
!
aspiration to 
improve life 
circumstances 
!
general interest 
in current affairs 
!
barriers 
to free 
speech  
restricted 
access to 
information 
!
CHAPTER FIVE 
 189 
demonstrating against the political establishment (contre le pouvoir), as indicated by the 
relatively small size of this basic theme in the thematic network.92 
Aspiration – the belief that their lives could be better – was a central theme 
to emerge from TAT stories indicative of the dissident lens. The historical pattern of 
periodic unrest in Madagascar reflects this position while suggesting a tentative 
connection between dispositions broadly supportive of demonstrations and the act 
of protest itself. Student protests in May 1972 (Covell 1987: 1, Randrianja and Ellis 
2009: 190-191, Sharp 2002: 35). Food riots in May 1978 (Mukonoweshuro 1990: 
384). Student riots lasting from December 1980 through February 1981 
(Mukonoweshuro 1990: 392). Hundreds of thousands of people taking to the streets 
in support of a crippling general strike in June 1991 (Mukonoweshuro 1994: 365, 
Robinson 1994: 576). The debilitating general strike accompanying the 2001-2002 
political crisis (Randrianja 2003). While by no means identical, these events 
nevertheless highlight the chronic pattern of often-violent political protest 
characteristic of contemporary Malagasy politics (Covell 1987, Mukonoweshuro 
1990, Mukonoweshuro 1994). Chazan (1993) identifies a similar pattern of 
reactionary protest across Africa, juxtaposing this often-destructive unrest with 
constructive participation in formal democratic processes. It may be true that 
ordinary Malagasy have historically resorted to protest rather than pursuing 
institutional avenues to participation and change. What this collection of TAT stories 
clearly indicates, however, is that some people see protest as their only option for 
meaningfully voicing discontent, particularly over nocuous economic policies. This 
conclusion is somewhat less startling when further contextualised by the similar 
conclusion reached by some research participants that elections are inconsequential, 
a perspective discussed at length in Chapter Four. 
Moreover, although research participants who told TAT stories reflective of 
the dissident lens strongly suggested that they associate free speech with change, 
roughly half of them believed that elected politicians or other people in positions of 
                                                 
92 I suspect, though cannot be certain, that the link between protest and grievances against the 
government might be stronger than indicated here. Not only does this have historical salience in 
the context of past political demonstrations, it is also reflected in the 2009 protests that 
eventually unseated President Ravalomanana. Additionally, despite assurances of confidentiality, 
many research participants remained afraid of speaking too freely and I expect that some may 
have tempered their positions in their TAT stories for this reason.  
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power do not listen to their views or grievances (l’autorité n’écoute pas). “They have the 
right to speak,” Hantanirina explained, “but we don’t know if the authorities will 
listen or not. But they do have the right.” Observations such as this raise the prickly 
question of whether international organisations and democracy monitors could be 
mistaken to habitually associate political accountability so closely with formal free 
speech rights. Could formal free speech rights, under some circumstances, 
paradoxically make it more difficult for ordinary citizens to hold feckless elites to 
account? By providing a smokescreen between the outward illusion of accountability 
and unresponsiveness to internal, grassroots criticism, formal guarantees of free 
speech and access to information may serve to simultaneously deceive external 
observers and frustrate local people. 
Religious organisations have historically played the role of arbiter between 
state and society in Madagascar. Although political regimes may have severely 
curtailed individual free speech, they could ill afford to suppress or ignore criticisms 
voiced by the Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar and its approximately 3 
million followers (Mukonoweshuro 1990: 393). While TAT stories analyzed in the 
context of the social divisions and passivist perceptual lenses below indicated that 
‘the church’93 still plays an important role in politics, there is reason to believe that 
the influence of the church on some sectors of Malagasy society might be waning. By 
way of illustration, in his story about TAT Image 3, Botozaza bluntly stated: “The 
people turn their backs on the church. That is to say that it isn’t like before. In the 
past the church was always very important.” Whereas the church once provided a 
powerful check on government, these research participants seem to have lost faith 
even in the church’s ability to counter secular seats of power.94  
 In addition to the suggestion that political elites do not listen to ordinary 
citizens, recurrent concern about barriers to freedom of speech and expression are 
                                                 
93 In their TAT stories research participants almost never specified which church (i.e. Protestant, 
Catholic, Mormon, etc.) they belong to. The Council of Christian Churches in Madagascar 
includes, as the name suggests, all of the Christian churches in Madagascar under a single 
umbrella organisation; consequently, when some research participants spoke about “the church” 
they may have meant the Christian churches as a collective, as opposed to any single 
denomination.  
94 It is worth noting that the during the 2009 political crisis, the Rajoelina camp opposed 
negotiations mediated by church leaders, arguing they lacked credibility (BBC News 2009a). 
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immediately evident in TAT stories indicative of the dissident perceptual lens. 
Surprising, though, is the lack of a single, or even dominant, explanation for this 
organising theme. The most common source of anxiety, discussed further below in 
the context of the free press, was censorship (censeurs). A minority of these people 
also indicated that they feared politically motivated imprisonment (emprisonnement 
politique) for saying the wrong thing or speaking out too strongly against the regime. 
Although relatively few people included this disposition in their TAT stories, 
concern about politically motivated arrest or imprisonment often came up outside 
the formal interview (i.e. before the recorder had been switched on or after I had 
turned it off). A final recurrent disposition reflective of perceived barriers to free 
speech is that strikes and demonstrations are forbidden anyway (des grèves sont 
interdits), so discussions of their utility or, indeed, possible consequences are 
immaterial. A few research participants included in this group pointed out that 
concern about censors and imprisonment are irrelevant because most people do not 
have the opportunity to publically criticise the government in the first place. To 
illustrate, Velohasina lamented: “They want to [protest]. They feel that it’s their right, 
but how can they go about it? That’s the problem. You don’t dare. People can 
change things like that, but we can’t organise demonstrations now. It’s forbidden.”  
Although many of these research participants interpreted Image 3 literally 
and told stories overtly about political protest, the competences and dispositions 
contained within these stories nevertheless reveal perceived limitations to freedom of 
speech more generally. While people who have adopted this point of view may 
harbour desires to speak out, the evidence provided in these TAT stories suggests 
that they are unlikely to take the risk, particularly given that they paint the 
government as disinterested and unresponsive. These TAT stories, therefore, suggest 
a rupture between, on one hand, people’s desire to enact or even demand change 
and, on the other, their tendency to believe that government sanctioned restrictions 
on free speech (e.g. censors, political imprisonment, elite indifference) obstruct 
meaningful access to the political domain.  
Active interest in current affairs represents another common characteristic of 
the dissident perceptual lens. Most research participants whose TAT stories about 
Images 3 and 4 included these clusters of basic themes said that the people in Image 
4 found newspapers interesting (les journaux sont intéressants). A plurality of these TAT 
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stories also described a discussion taking place about current affairs between the 
vendor and the man stood next to him (discuter de nouvelles), indicating that people 
discuss what they read in the newspaper with people other than just friends and 
family. While some of these research participants believe that what they read in print 
is the truth (la vérité), the thematic network illustrates that a similar proportion 
expressed that you have to reflect on what you read and make up your mind for 
yourself (doit réfléchir): 
Olivier: Some of what is in the newspaper is true, of course. But sometimes 
there is also propaganda to cover up [the government’s] misdeeds. 
Even so, it’s important to read newspapers.  
Severiny: The newspapers are censored. We can’t speak the whole truth. 
Julien: Newspapers aren’t interesting. They’re always censored so it isn’t 
worth the trouble [to read them]…It’s dangerous. If you talk too 
much you’re put in prison. It’s a dictatorship. Even the newspapers 
can’t do anything [about it]. [Making a connection between Images 
3 and 4.]   
Interpretations like these suggest deep-seated scepticism among some Malagasy 
about the reliability of the media, evidenced by accusations of censorship or 
government propaganda. While most of these research participants said that they 
find current events interesting, they simultaneously voiced scepticism that they can 
rely on newspapers to present unbiased or complete accounts of current affairs. This 
explains the apparent contradiction in some TAT stories that articulated both 
curiosity about current affairs and the opinion that newspapers are not interesting (les 
journaux ne sont pas intéressants).  
Once again the clear competence (i.e. ‘factual’ knowledge) of censorship 
raises serious questions about the depth of freedom of speech in Madagascar. 
Through the dissident perceptual lens, people see a political landscape in which 
freedom of expression exists on the surface; there are several newspapers and radio 
stations, for example. Behind this facade, however, sources of information are 
known to be stifled by government censorship. The instinct demonstrated by these 
research participants for self-censorship appears to further exacerbate speculation 
that other people, including journalists, limit what they say as well. As I explained in 
Chapter Three, general reluctance to speak openly about politics and democracy 
prompted my adoption of alternative research methods. Furthermore, the National 
Coordinator of KMF-CNOE, Voahangy Raveloson, and the Public Relations 
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Director, Jean Fidèle, confirmed that people have to exercise caution when speaking 
about politics, making the work of organisations advocating political reform 
considerably more difficult.95 It is not for me to say whether the fear that prompts 
people to self-censor is justified. The fact remains that a significant proportion of 
people who took part in this research indicated that they interpret their political 
environment through a lens coloured by fear and suspicion, which has direct bearing 
on their behaviour (i.e. they are afraid to speak openly about political topics, 
including their discontent with the current regime).  
A final concern voiced by a significant minority of research participants 
whose TAT stories fit the general thematic pattern of the dissident perceptual lens 
was restricted access to information. Several people said that the man talking to the 
newspaper vendor in Image 4 (see Figure 20) was either illiterate (analphabète) or did 
not have enough money to buy a newspaper (pas de l’argent d’acheter un journal). Indeed, 
poverty (pauvre) was a recurring theme throughout these TAT stories. This is 
somewhat surprising given that, as noted above, the research participants prone to 
telling the sorts of TAT stories analysed in this section tended to be relatively well 
educated and most likely earn a decent income by local standards. Claudia explained, 
for instance, that newspapers are too expensive for most people to buy every day, 
indicating that they are a little luxury even for people with a steady income. That said, 
while conducting  urban interviews it  was not uncommon to see pousse-pousse  drivers 
Figure 20: Magnification of Image 4
 
 
 
                                                 
95 Interview conducted at the Antananarivo office of KMF-CNOE on 29 September 2008. 
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reclined on their rickshaws flicking through tattered newspapers.  This suggests that 
even though it may not be within most people’s means to purchase a newspaper 
daily, old copies are recycled and passed from person to person. Therefore, that the 
urban poor are uninformed may be a common misperception. On the whole, I 
suspect that the descriptions these research participants offered of illiteracy and 
poverty likely reflect their perceptions of society, while their positive disposition 
toward protest and palpable frustration at their inability to effectively speak truth to 
power reflects their higher level of education.  
The global theme uniting this particular point of view, therefore, is the 
perceived importance of freedom of expression as a tool for improving one’s life 
coupled with dissatisfaction over current standards of both free speech and access to 
information. The common perception that freedom of speech is restricted has 
significant consequences for how people subscribing to the dissident perceptual lens 
understand democracy and their own political agency. Velohasina succinctly 
summarised this point of view when he concluded: “There’s no freedom of 
expression. Voilà! What is democracy? It’s freedom of expression.” Curtailment of 
free speech – by both the government and self-censorship – contributes to the 
perception of a democratic deficit, which is then refracted as positive dispositions 
toward the forbidden act of protest. The TAT stories discussed here indicate that 
these research participants understand demonstrations to be an act of last resort in 
combating malign policies and exercising their democratic rights. Possible 
conclusions about the state of democracy in Madagascar that can be drawn from this 
research are discussed at length in Chapter Seven. 
While the interpretation of Image 3 as a revolution or social movement was 
widespread among this collection of TAT stories, such heated emotion was not 
characteristic of all TAT stories told about this particular image, as analysis of the 
social divisions and passivist perceptual lenses, below, demonstrates. This striking 
differentiation of tone lends credence to the likely existence of multiple perceptual 
lenses, each conducive to a unique interpretation of both reasonable and available 
avenues for personal expression and political voice. It also confirms the relative 
ambiguity of the image: although the picture is clearly of some sort of protest, 
research participants attributed very different meanings to the scene depicted.  
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The Social Divisions Lens 
 The social divisions lens shares the disposition that protest can be acceptable 
or even worthwhile with the political worldview described in the previous section. 
This distinct point of view, however, attributes greater significance to the influences 
of religion and poverty on the capacity of people to access information and express 
their (political) views. In particular, this group of research participants was quick to 
associate public protest with socio-religious division, an impression that contributed 
to their reluctance to endorse strikes or demonstrations despite agreeing with the 
importance of free speech in principle. These TAT stories similarly appear to indicate 
that persistent social and religious divisions may influence the way in which some 
people perceive the press and other mainstream information outlets (e.g. television, 
radio). 
Demographic Trends 
The social divisions perceptual lens is representative of a roughly similar 
proportion of research participants to the dissident lens, although the demographic 
characteristics of these two groups of people differ somewhat. Evidence of this 
particular political worldview was deduced from the TAT stories told by most rural 
men and a rural woman as well as approximately one third of the urban sample (see 
Table 10).    While  this  group   of  research   participants   suggests  that   the  social  
Table 10: Social Divisions Lens Demographic Details
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divisions lens might be more pervasive among men than women, establishing this 
trend would require additional research with a larger sample. Like the dissident lens, 
this particular perceptual lens is broadly representative of the age demographics for 
the overall sample. It tended to be less representative, however, of religious orders. 
 It is worth noting that most urban research participants who told stories 
reflecting this point of view and said that they had voted in the previous presidential 
election also generally indicated that they were familiar with KMF-CNOE. Urban 
research participants included in this group who said that they had not voted, by 
contrast, most often said that they did not know about this organisation and its civic 
education efforts. All but one rural research participant said that they had voted in 
the previous presidential election; only one of these people, however, recognised the 
name of KMF-CNOE. Unlike the dissident perceptual lens, which reflects the 
perspective of highly educated research participants, no educational trend emerged 
for people whose TAT stories reflect the social divisions perceptual lens. The 
academic background of these research participants ranges from no formal education 
to a masters degree; the median educational achievement is roughly the end of 
secondary school. 
Social Divisions Lens Analysis  
 Outsiders and Malagasy alike commonly describe the schism between Merina 
and côtier as ‘ethnic’. This colloquialism, however, hides subtler and, it would seem, 
equally explosive causes of social tension identified in the Preface to Part II. Even so, 
Mukonoweshuro observes that the Merina-côtier divide has “assumed an ideological 
character, with distinct bases of support” (1990: 389). TAT stories displaying 
characteristics of the social divisions perceptual lens reflect this point of view, but 
pointedly associate social division with religious tension more often than ‘ethnic’ 
rivalry. For these research participants, the competition between Catholics and 
Protestants is an identifiable social fissure. Moreover, the Merina-côtier schism, 
though convenient, lumps all non-Merina into a single category whereas the people I 
spoke to were more likely to describe themselves as belonging to their regional ethnic 
group. Therefore, whereas ethnic labels and classifications can be quite complicated, 
religious affiliation seems to be a more easily identifiable point of rupture for these 
research participants. While religious differences may be little more than a proxy for 
ethnic rivalry, the language used by people telling TAT stories analysed in this section 
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is distinctly that of religion, so that is the language used in examining the TAT stories 
as well. The image of a protest in Image 3 raised uneasy questions for individuals 
who both advocate the advance of their own social group and retain genuine 
concerns that religious division could escalate into widespread social conflict. Careful 
analysis of these TAT stories likewise demonstrates that perceived socio-religious 
divisions have permeated how these research participants access information about 
current events.  
One principal, unifying characteristic of these TAT stories is a commonly 
identified link between social unrest and religious division. The basic theme division 
between Catholics and Protestants (division entre les catholiques et les protestants) appears 
relatively large in relation to other competences and dispositions in the thematic 
network, and thus characterised a plurality of these TAT stories (see Figure21, 
below). People who recognised this social division in Image 3 sometimes focused on 
the presence of the priest/pastor in the lower left-hand corner (see Image 3 in Figure 
18, above).96 Less common but still notable was the inclination for a minority of 
these research participants to state outright that “the church” (either Catholic, 
Protestant or of an unspecified denomination) is active in the political domain (l’église 
est active au niveau politique): 
Volatiana: The religious [orders] are very active in politics here. It’s good 
because they have a lot of influence over people. 
Tidahy: The Christian community in Madagascar is divided. The Catholics 
and Protestants often argue among themselves over political issues.  
In pronounced contrast to the dissident perceptual lens above, this political 
worldview  still  recognises  the  powerful influence of  the church.   That said, not all  
                                                 
96 While it is possible that the presence of this figure in the image influenced the content of these 
TAT stories, it was still up to individual research participants whether and how to interpret him. 
Aware of a possible socio-religious cleavage, I wanted one of the TAT Images to include a 
religious figure and conveyed this to the artist when I commissioned the images. The undeniable 
variation amongst stories about Image 3 convincingly demonstrates that the image itself does not 
cue a particular response. Not all research participants attributed the same level of importance to 
the priest/pastor; if, indeed, they singled him out for description at all. While the stories 
discussed in this section do broadly conform to Merina-côtier-cleavage stereotypes, analysis of the 
dissident lens, above, suggests that, for some people at least, religious influence is not as strong 
or important as it once was, while the discussion of TAT stories in the section that follows 
demonstrates that other research participants identify religion as a moderating influence. 
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Figure 21: Social Divisions Thematic Network
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state that the strike was against the President (contre le président). This too, however, 
could be interpreted as a sign of religious division. Although they were hesitant to say 
so when the recorder was running, some of these research participants were openly 
resentful that a Protestant Merina was President; by virtue of my research location, 
people available to take part in this study were predominantly côtier and Catholic. 
Consequently, one possible interpretation of the themes analysed here could be that 
strikes are sometimes permissible, particularly when they promote the objectives of 
one’s own (religious) community.  
The idea that strikes are ok when they support the position of a particular 
group or community is also reflected in the dominant disposition in Figure 21 that 
strikes are sometimes justified (des grèves sont bonnes parfois). The qualification 
“sometimes” distinguishes this collection of TAT stories from the rest. Whereas 
other research participants stated definitively that protests were either an acceptable 
form of self-expression (the dissident lens) or never acceptable (the passivist lens), 
the people who told TAT stories suggestive of social divisions remained decidedly 
uncommitted. It is also notable that people included in this group most commonly 
identified the scene in Image 3 as a strike, in contrast to the language of protests and 
coups characteristic of the dissident lens above.  
 I suggest that the dissident and social divisions perceptual lenses overlap 
somewhat, as TAT stories indicative of both worldviews portrayed demonstrations 
or strikes as a reasonable way of making a point to otherwise aloof political elites, at 
least under certain circumstances. Likewise, people attuned to both perspectives 
believe that it is possible to improve their lives by protesting. Herilaza, for instance, 
first described Image 3 as a general strike before going on to explain: “the people 
think that they can change their situation, so they will carry on striking.” This TAT 
story excerpt sounds remarkably similar to some of those discussed above in the 
context of the dissident lens, while the remainder of his story better fits the clusters 
of basic themes discussed here. Like the dissident lens, the social divisions perceptual 
lens is tinted by disillusionment that public displays of disquiet are not tolerated by 
the political regime. Serge, for example, expressed frustration that it was no longer 
possible to organise protests, attributing their prohibition to “the mentality of the 
President.” That these perceptual lenses overlap is not surprising nor does it 
necessarily suggest a merely superficial distinction between them. Perceptual lenses, 
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as defined in Chapter Two, are amorphous and it is entirely reasonable that 
otherwise divergent worldviews could share some common competences and 
dispositions that condition people to interpret certain situations in similar ways. 
As stated above, one such distinguishing feature of this point of view is the 
notion of social division, which permeates perceptions of the media as well as social 
relations more generally. For instance, some research participants whose TAT stories 
indicated the social divisions perceptual lens pointed out that there are newspapers 
both for and against the state (il y a des journaux pour et contre l’état). Their TAT stories 
about Image 4 also tended to suggest a moderate interest in current affairs (les gens 
veulent savoir des nouvelles, les journaux sont intéressants a quelques gens); although, a 
comparison of the respective thematic networks indicates that this disposition may 
not be as strong here as it was for the dissident perceptual lens. Furthermore, most 
people who told TAT stories conforming to the social divisions lens indicated that 
they thought newspapers told the truth (la vérité) and were rather less likely to suggest 
that people have to think for themselves when reading about current affairs. One 
possible reason for this trend is that these research participants chose to read 
newspapers known to reflect their own point of view. Rose, for example, 
acknowledged that the only newspaper she read and trusted was a bi-weekly 
publication circulated by a Catholic publisher.  
Widespread confidence in at least some media outlets is partially precluded 
by suspicion of censorship (censeurs). While Rose thought that there was still room for 
newspapers to criticise the President, she said that such scrutiny is no longer possible 
on television or the radio. She went on to cite the example of a local radio station 
that she believed had recently been closed by the government. It is, perhaps, no 
coincidence that protesters took to the streets in the early months of 2009 after 
President Ravalomanana (a Protestant Merina) temporarily closed a rival’s television 
station for broadcasting an interview with the exiled former President (and Catholic 
côtier) Ratsiraka (AFP 2009a, Lough 2009b, Bearak 2009b). Likewise, a smaller though 
still notable group of these research participants said that newspaper content was 
either not true (pas vrai) or required reflection (doit réfléchir): 
Moravelo: Despite the efforts of journalists, there are censors and some 
information can’t be distributed.  
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Pierre:  In a democratic country, people should read the newspaper; it is 
necessary to know what is going on in their community…We talk 
about freedom of the press, but there are bureaucrats who forbid 
you to write about things. If you ignore them, your newspaper will 
be confiscated [by the government].  
Pierre was also quick to point out, however, that journalists are not to blame for 
weaknesses in their reporting because they are denied the information and tools 
necessary to uncover the truth. Whereas research participants who told TAT stories 
indicative of the dissident perceptual lens regarded censorship as a form of 
suppression, the connotation in the context of the social divisions lens is that 
censorship and bias in the media further fracture an already divided society. 
Projecting the stance of the government (i.e. Protestant Merina) as the truth, for 
instance, only serves to further raise suspicions of Catholic côtiers.  
Finally, as the competences and dispositions clustered around the organising 
theme restricted access to information demonstrate, people telling these stories 
almost universally identify the cost of newspapers as a barrier to knowledge of 
current events. Most people who told TAT stories inclusive of these basic themes 
said, for instance, that the man speaking to the newspaper vendor in Figure 20 above 
could not afford to buy a newspaper (n’a pas de l’argent d’acheter un journal). Other less 
frequently cited obstacles preventing ordinary people from accessing information 
include poverty (pauvre) and illiteracy (analphabète). It was typical for research 
participants telling these TAT stories to include comments such as: 
Tidahy: Most Malagasy people are not literate yet, and even those who are 
struggle to find enough money for their daily life. 
Volatiana:  Some people want to buy newspapers but they can’t because they 
don’t have any money. They want to, but they can’t. In Madagascar, 
the majority of people are very poor. Newspapers aren’t very 
expensive, only 200Ar (approximately 10 cents or 6 pence), but 
eating is the priority. 
As I suggested in the context of the dissident perceptual lens, given that many 
research participants whose TAT stories voiced concern over illiteracy are, once 
again, reasonably well educated, descriptions of illiteracy may be a reflection on 
society as opposed to a statement of personal competence. As illustrated in the 
following section, illiteracy surprisingly did not surface as a concern for some of the 
least-educated participants in this research.  
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In closing, the social divisions perceptual lens has at least two possible 
analytical interpretations.97 On one hand, the people who told these TAT stories are 
distinctly aware of religious, social, and political division and are of a generally 
positive disposition toward freedom of expression and information, particularly 
when it supports their own point of view or social group. Their reservations about 
strikes could, moreover, be attributed to deep social divisions and memories of 
previous conflicts. The 2001-2002 conflict, which paralysed the country’s economy 
for months, divided Malagasy society along political and socio-religious lines. 
Alternatively, despite awareness of entrenched social divisions, these TAT stories 
may nonetheless indicate the existence of a pluralistic and relatively vibrant media 
(i.e. newspapers for and against the state), requiring at least a modest tolerance of 
freedom of expression. Indeed, some research participants pointed to the free press 
as a necessary feature of democracy and were critical in their TAT stories of 
politically motivated attempts to stifle it. In this interpretation, protest becomes a 
more viable option when resorted to in defence of this basic democratic right.  
The global theme encompassing the social divisions perceptual lens, then, is 
that social and religious cleavages influence perceptions of both the press and public 
protest. This dominant perspective has repercussions for characteristic attitudes 
towards freedom of expression (e.g. the qualification that strikes are sometimes 
acceptable) and access to information (e.g. publications known to support ones own 
position are trustworthy). While this perceptual lens by no means explains the 
political crisis that erupted in February and March of 2009, identification of this 
point of view among my sample of ordinary Malagasy provides much-needed context 
for the protests that broke out in response to President Ravalomanana’s forced 
closure of an independent television station. 
                                                 
97 Alternatively, it is possible that the various points of view expressed in these TAT stories could 
be indicative of a plurality of different perceptive lenses. Confirming this, however, would require 
additional research with a much larger sample. Two salient features, moreover, unify the TAT 
stories analysed in this section. First, these research participants interpret protest as indicative of 
socio-religious division. And second, they do not state definitively that strikes or protests are 
either worthwhile (the dissident lens) or inappropriate (the passivist lens). 
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The Passivist Lens 
 The passivist perceptual lens is distinct as the only point of view discussed 
here to emerge from TAT stories in which strikes and demonstrations were 
unconditionally described as wrong or bad. It is also the only perceptual lens evident 
in the TAT stories I collected in which poverty and illiteracy were not key themes to 
emerge with regard to newspapers or access to information. Although relatively few 
people from my sample told TAT stories indicative of this particular worldview, the 
distinct features of these stories made it illogical to include them in either of the two 
thematic networks already discussed in this chapter. Consequently, they indicate the 
likely presence of a third distinct perspective on free speech and access to 
information in the Antsinanana region of Madagascar. 
Demographic Trends  
 Noticeably fewer people from my sample appear to subscribe to this 
perceptual lens than either of the others discussed in this chapter (see Table 11). 
However, as this point of view was shared by most of the rural women who 
responded to this image,98   it is  reasonable to  predict that this perspective might be  
Table 11: Passivist Lens Demographic Details
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98 One of the other rural women told a TAT story reflective of the social divisions lens and the 
other did not tell TAT stories about these Images.  
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more prominent than the results from my relatively small sample would suggest. 
Most Malagasy live in rural areas, so it stands to reason that this perceptual lens 
would be more pervasive in a sample that more accurately represented the country’s 
rural population. Likewise, urban women also appear more likely to tell stories 
containing this particular cluster of themes than their male counterparts. Finally, it is 
notable that the passivist perceptual lens appears to be most common among people 
over the age of 30, suggesting that younger citizens may be more likely than their 
elders to resort to protest.  
 The research participants whose TAT stories are discussed in this section 
were more likely to vote and rather less likely to be familiar with the work of KMF-
CNOE than people whose TAT stories conformed more closely to either of the 
perspectives discussed above. Those not familiar with KMF-CNOE, both rural and 
urban, had not finished high school, while the four people who said that they did 
know the work of this organisation were all urban and had completed at least some 
higher education.  
Passivist Lens Analysis 
Although the passivist perceptual lens was less common among people 
included in this sample than the other lenses discussed in this chapter, it represents a 
unique point of view that likely yields alternative behaviour patterns to those 
described above. The accounts offered by these research participants painted protest 
in an unequivocally negative light. Instead, all disputes or controversies should, these 
people say, be discussed face-to-face and settled peacefully. As the thematic network 
in Figure 22 also demonstrates, these research participants similarly rely on 
interpersonal communication to access information. Despite having considerably less 
formal education than people who told stories exhibiting trends of the other 
perceptual lenses, the research participants whose TAT stories are discussed here 
generally did not cite poverty or illiteracy as obstacles to learning about current 
events. Perhaps the least developed of the perspectives analysed in this chapter, the 
passivist perceptual lens nevertheless surely warrants consideration.  
As the thematic network demonstrates, the TAT stories from which this 
perceptual lens was extracted were somewhat less diverse in content than the others 
discussed above (see Figure 22).    The dominant disposition in the thematic network  
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Figure 22: Passivist Lens Thematic Network
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gens veulent savoir des nouvelles) and most of these research participants said that 
newspapers are interesting (les journaux sont intéressants). Unlike the research 
participants discussed in previous sections, however, these people tended to associate 
newspapers either with advertising (la publicité) or electoral propaganda (la propagande 
électorale) rather than current affairs. This could suggest that these research 
participants tend to access newspapers primarily in the run-up to an electoral contest, 
which would not be entirely surprising given that many of them are on subsistence 
incomes with limited education. Indeed, Lalao specifically stated that people often 
read the newspaper in the run-up to elections. She also interpreted the notice boards 
behind the man reading a newspaper in Image 4 as political posters, saying: “Each 
candidate puts his advertisement on the notice board and as the election approaches 
everyone looks at it.”  
 This does not necessarily imply, however, that these research participants’ 
access to information is prohibitively restricted. In rural settings, news is more likely 
to spread by either word of mouth or radio than print media, if for no other reason 
than the inherent problems posed by physical distribution in a country with limited 
infrastructure. Therefore, even if someone cannot afford to buy a newspaper (n’a pas 
de l’argent d’acheter un journal), s/he can still discuss current events with someone else 
who is better informed (discuter de nouvelles). Niry, for instance, said that the man 
speaking to the newspaper vendor in Figure 20 above could not afford to buy his 
own newspaper, but went on to describe a situation in which this man asks the 
vendor what is in the paper that day. Alternatively, Niry explained, the poor man 
could approach the man on the right side of the image reading the newspaper and 
ask him for the day’s news. The stories told by these research participants further 
indicate that even people with only a minimal education are keen to know about 
current affairs and feel that they can meaningfully participate in public discourse, at 
least locally.  
This perceptual lens may have less to say about the nature of the free press in 
the Antsinanana region than the perceptual lenses analysed above; however, it still 
adds to our understanding of who has access to information and how people 
communicate. Although censorship was not a basic theme to emerge from these 
TAT stories, Telovavy earnestly pointed out that “there is only one national radio 
[station] in this country, so it is easy for the party in power to manipulate people in 
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the villages because [that radio station] is their only source of information.”99 That 
they associate newspapers with electoral campaigns could nevertheless demonstrate 
that people who view the landscape through this perceptual lens are interested in 
political affairs, an idea substantiated by their particularly high voter turnout in 
comparison with the other perceptual lenses discussed in this chapter.  
  Apart from indicating that public demonstrations or strikes are not good, the 
TAT stories included here reveal little about perceptions of individual free speech. 
These research participants were only moderately more concerned about freedom of 
the press. Although Todilahy asserted: “one of the pillars of democracy is access to 
information – freedom of expression with regard to the press.” It may also be that, 
for this group of people, free speech is not an immediately pressing issue. In 
particular, the rural women whose stories reflected this point of view live in a small 
village where everyone knows everyone else. Roughly half of the people who told 
these stories also told TAT stories about other images that focused on local issues 
and local politics, suggesting that they are willing and able to participate in the 
discussion of locally relevant issues. This does not seem to be the case, by contrast, 
for urban dwellers who feel voiceless and indicated that their grievances are of a 
different nature (i.e. the perceived suppression of opposition parties or constitutional 
rights like freedoms of speech and association). The global theme for the passivist 
perceptual lens, therefore, is that people sharing this perspective are interested in 
current events and value discussion. Their vigour is tempered, however, by religious 
influence and interest in primarily local affairs that they can resolve on a personal or 
community level. 
Free Speech or Just Noise? 
Whereas the perceptual lenses identified in Chapter Four generally cast doubt 
over whether elections are a reliable indicator of democracy, the three perceptual 
lenses here all affirm that free speech and access to information are important 
democratic assets. The analysis above also highlights, however, that people living 
within the same community can have very different understandings of and 
                                                 
99 Marcus and Razafindrakoto similarly observe how President Ratsiraka was able to use his 
control of state radio to “condition” voters in the period preceding the controversial 2001 
Presidential elections (2003: 30). 
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expectations for free speech as a tool for political participation. Those who see the 
world through the dissident lens, for instance think that public protest and social 
unrest, dependent on free speech rights, are the only way to get the attention of 
political elites and change one’s life for the better. Research participants whose TAT 
stories in response to Images 3 and 4 indicate the passivist perceptual lens, by 
contrast, value free speech as a mechanism for dialogue and resolving issues 
peacefully. Most research participants seemed to agree that people should be aware 
of what is going on in their country and that newspapers and other media outlets 
were an important source of information.  
Therefore, the general hypothesis of the global democracy assistance industry 
– that free speech is necessary for political participation – seems to resonate with the 
various perspectives of research participants. Expected correlations with preference 
formation and political accountability, however, remain less certain. Moreover, 
initiatives that promote free speech without regard for local perceptions and context 
(i.e. socio-religious division, widespread censorship, fear of political reprisals) may 
encounter resistance.  
Are Free Speech and Access to Information Essential to Political Preference Formation? 
The empirical data presented above broadly endorses the hypothesis that 
freedom of speech and access to information are important factors in political 
participation and the formation of political preferences. For Todilahy, whose TAT 
stories reflected the passivist lens, access to information is one of the “pillars of 
democracy.” Mamisoa, whose TAT stories suggested the dissident lens, likewise 
expressed the opinion that “Our democracy here in Madagascar isn’t real democracy 
[because] there are always censors at every level [of society].” What is most striking 
about these two statements is that they both define democracy in terms of freedom 
of expression, despite holding very different views about the implications of this 
position for identifying Madagascar as a nascent democracy. While some research 
participants, particularly those whose TAT stories were indicative of the passivist 
perceptual lens, suggested that access to information (i.e. newspapers) was 
particularly important in the run-up to elections, the majority of people I spoke to 
demonstrated a far-ranging interest in current affairs. This could bode well for 
democratic development in Madagascar from the standpoint that citizens, at least in 
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the Antsinanana region, portray themselves as willing participants in the political 
debate.  
Though not currently at the forefront of research on either democratic 
development or democracy assistance policy, the evidence provided here suggests 
that notions of preference formation and articulation deserve further study. This 
much-underestimated adjunct to freedom of expression has salient consequences for 
democratic practice. At the most basic level, to prefer something, 
…implies knowledge of two or more possible ways of resolving a public problem or 
issue, and knowledge that one favours one option over others for reasons. To have 
knowledge of two or more ways of resolving issues, there needs to be public 
acknowledgement that different sources of information must be allowed to operate, 
and open processes of persuasion facilitated. (Saward 1998: 89-90) 
As discussed above, however, general consensus in the Antsinanana region, among 
urban research participants in particular, seems to be that alternative and reliable 
sources of information can be hard to come by. In fact, it has been noted elsewhere 
that then-President Ratsiraka handpicked the only journalists allowed to report on 
the 2001 presidential race, an observation that would seem to confirm the suspicions 
of research participants (Marcus and Razafindrakoto 2003: 36).  
Research participants also demonstrated very mixed opinions on the most 
appropriate processes of persuasion, the second point raised by Saward, above. The 
dissident lens, on one hand, suggests that some people perceive public protest 
(including strikes and, for a minority, rebellion) as a reasonable means of persuasion. 
On the other hand, stories depicting the passivist lens demonstrated abhorrence for 
strikes and a strong preference for discussing issues face-to-face, likely at the local 
level. An implied need for persuasion drifts through the undercurrent of these 
respective TAT stories; the stark differences in how this need is realised, however, 
has considerable consequences for resulting conceptualisations of democracy. 
Differences such as these may not be widely recognized outside of a particular 
community or region but I found them to be very influential in shaping the contours 
of the perceptual lenses described above. Moreover, there is evidence of a positive 
correlation between a high percentage of the population preferring gradual social 
reform and democratic development (Muller and Seligson 1994: 647). Conversely, 
identifying exactly how prevalent the dissident lens is within Malagasy society could 
provide a better barometer for democratic weakness than the presence or absence of 
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formal laws or media outlets. While the area of preference formation and articulation 
deserves greater consideration, establishing what these ideas mean in the local 
context should be the first step in any democracy assistance project developed to 
address them.  
The evidence from TAT stories concurrently suggests, however, that the 
ability of people to meaningfully fulfil this role remains stunted by real or perceived 
censorship. As I noted above, fear of political imprisonment for saying the wrong 
thing or speaking out against the government was rife among people I spoke with, 
although few included this disposition in their TAT stories. Fabrice, whose TAT 
stories indicated the dissident perceptual lens, wanted to know, for example, how the 
West can consider Madagascar a democracy when people there are not allowed to 
meet for the purposes of either discussing political issues or forming new political 
parties: “If you want to have a political meeting you need a permit. If you manage to 
get a permit, you won't be allowed to meet. If you do try to meet, you'll likely be 
arrested.” The ability of ordinary Malagasy to express their opinions openly and in a 
way they find meaningful should not, therefore, be taken for granted by international 
observers. Crucially, however, it is not just the government that censors free speech 
(if, indeed, it does), but individuals themselves who self-censor out of fear. 
Warburton warns that it is this inability to “criticise and challenge” political 
representatives that leads to democratic degeneration (2009: 2). 
Free Speech Rights: The Conduit to Political Accountability? 
Whereas relatively little time or resources are currently devoted to studying 
processes of interest formation in developing countries, accountability has been a 
magic word of the democracy and good governance debate for some time. 
Established in 1996, Voice and Accountability is one of the World Bank’s six 
governance indicators. Democracy assistance organisations ranging from the United 
Nations Development Program to the National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs likewise trumpet the virtues of accountability in the context of 
democratic development. The question remains, however: Do formal free speech 
rights and access to information enable citizens to hold their (elected) officials to 
account in practice?  
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The evidence presented in this chapter is inconclusive. Research participants 
expressed widely divergent views as to whether or not free speech rights of 
individuals and the media are protected (i.e. the passivist perceptual lens) or, 
conversely, under siege (i.e. the dissident perceptual lens). Accountability, in theory 
anyway, bridges the gap between electoral contests by encouraging governance 
responsive to public evaluation and reaction (see, for instance, Merkel 2004, 
O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Santiso 2000). The free press plays an integral role in 
encouraging dialogue between political elites and their constituents, notifying the 
public of policy options and outcomes and providing a forum for their response 
(Saward 1998: 90). Claudia, however, was not alone among people I spoke with in 
saying that it is necessary for newspapers in particular to always be on the side of the 
government or risk closure. As noted earlier, Hantanirina similarly pointed out that 
people have the right to free speech, but that does not mean that the government 
will listen to what they have to say. Under such circumstances, can newspapers or 
ordinary citizens fulfil the roles ascribed to them by democratic theorists? The 
experience of these research participants suggests perhaps not. 
Government suppression of free speech and access to information is not the 
only barrier to improved accountability in eastern Madagascar. The evidence above 
convincingly illustrates that self-censorship also prevents ordinary people from 
criticising political elites and holding governments to account, thereby contributing 
to a country’s uncertain political trajectory (Warburton 2009: 2). The alarming 
frequency with which people told me they were afraid to speak openly about politics 
or overtly political issues raises the possibility that self-censorship, though not a 
theme to emerge directly from TAT stories, may contribute to weak political 
accountability in Madagascar. Despite feeling powerless to speak out against the 
ruling regime, however, TAT stories indicative of the dissident perceptual lens 
illustrate that some people in the Antsinanana region do recognise such criticism as 
their democratic right, even if they question their ability to use it without retribution 
(also see Pitkin 1967: 226, Schauer 1982: 39). 
What all three perceptual lenses analysed here indicate with clarity is that 
people are generally engaged and want to participate in politics. At one end of the 
spectrum, the passivist lens suggests that some people still perceive opportunities for 
this sort of participation and limited political critique at the local level. While these 
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TAT stories do not address issues of accountability outright, the fact that these 
research participants believe that disputes can be aired and settled through dialogue 
could indicate that the cycles of social unrest described in the introduction to this 
chapter need not be perpetual. At the other end of the spectrum, however, the 
grievances voiced by some research participants who apparently see their world 
though the dissident perceptual lens suggest that current safeguards for free speech 
and an independent media are not capable of securing elite accountability and may 
indirectly contribute to future conflagrations.  
As is so often the case, it all comes down to those people sitting on the fence, 
as it were, who come down on one side or the other at the last moment or because 
of a particular turn of events. Adherents to the social divisions lens in this case. 
Social malaise, whether attributable to economic inflation, political repression or 
some other cause entirely, can be enhanced by the conviction that the regime stifles 
meaningful participation in political decisions that directly effect their lives. It may be 
significant that protests first broke out when President Ravalomanana temporarily 
closed Rajoelina’s TV station after it broadcast an interview with exiled former 
President Ratsiraka. The ensuing protests may have been interpreted as a democratic 
opening, a rare opportunity to voice pent-up dissatisfaction. The analysis above 
points to the likelihood that some people who see the world through the dissident or 
social divisions perceptual lens may have reasonably interpreted these events as an 
unexpected opening in an otherwise closed political system. People who were afraid 
of speaking out against the government on their own may have been encouraged by 
the sight of others taking to the streets, causing the numbers of people turning up at 
rallies to escalate.  
This is not to say that the events as they unfolded in the early months of 
2009 were rationally calculated. Quite the contrary, the competences and dispositions 
that emerged from TAT stories told in the months immediately preceding the crisis 
indicate that the interpretations of events only briefly sketched here could have been 
obvious to some sectors of society, tacitly pointing to protest as an appropriate – and 
now suddenly available – avenue for addressing democratic grievances against an 
oppressive regime. Democracy experts sometimes point to the absence of protest or 
dissent as a sign of political legitimacy, if not necessarily accountability. When 
constraints on free speech are breached, however, the distinct possibility emerges 
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that “the so-called peace and consensus were, at best, part of an imposed armistice” 
(O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 49). 
Conclusion 
“Freedom of speech,” wrote Frankel, “serves a useful purpose even if it does 
nothing more than give men the chance to release their feelings by sending sounds 
out into the air” (1962: 36). In a country like Madagascar, so accustomed to sporadic 
outbursts of social unrest, there might be something to this. One theme to run 
through TAT stories about both elections and free speech is frustration. Frustration 
that your vote does not count. Frustration that you cannot speak your mind. 
Frustration that life is not getting any better. Even if they do not achieve anything 
else, protests like those that shook the country in the early months of 2009 give 
people the opportunity to release some of their frustration. While the situation may 
have quieted down, this lull is likely to be only temporary unless other pressure 
valves are established for releasing pent-up dissatisfaction.  
The intrinsic difficulty of pinning down exactly what political culture explains 
has persistently restrained scholars from using this concept in an analytical way 
(Diamond 1993: 15). The analysis of various perceptions of freedom of expression in 
this chapter however, clearly illustrates the possible political consequences of 
repressed dissatisfaction with merely formal democracy. The evidence provided by 
dissident lens TAT stories does not predict the political firestorm that overwhelmed 
the country in 2009. It does, however, provide context for interpreting people’s 
actions, and suggests that what international observers have described as 
undemocratic behaviour may actually represent frustration at the sustained denial of 
basic democratic rights and inability to demand political accountability in any other 
way. Similarly,  “[t]here is a tendency to conceive freedom of expression and other 
human rights as luxuries, rather than as priorities in societies where the majority of 
people are both poor and illiterate” (Smith and Loudiy 2005: 1114). However, some 
of the poorest, least educated people to take part in this research actually 
demonstrated through their TAT stories that they are among the most prepared to 
participate in local political forums (i.e. the passivist lens). This finding suggests that 
perhaps more should be done to promote political dialogue and debate that engages 
ordinary – even poor and illiterate – citizens at the most local levels of governance.  
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To many people consulted for this research, freedom of expression is 
democracy itself. They cannot conceive of one without the other. Consequently, 
those who perceive free speech as under threat question the reliability of their 
country’s so called democratic credentials. Freedoms of speech and the press are 
both enshrined in Madagascar’s constitution, and yet evidence of these protections in 
TAT stories was sparse at best. In the next chapter, I examine more closely research 
participants’ impressions of the rule of law and checks on the abuse of political 
power. 
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CHAPTER SIX: RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE  
In framing a government which is to be administered  
by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: 
 you must first enable the government to control the governed;  
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 
(Madison, Hamilton, and Jay 1987: 320) 
Despite the intuitive inkling that rule of law must in some way contribute to 
democracy, the establishment of a definitive relationship between these two concepts 
remains enigmatic. Are constitutionalism and rule of law starting points of 
democratic governance (see, for example, Brinks 2006, Diamond 2008b, Mattes and 
Bratton 2007, O'Donnell 2004, Przeworski 1991)? Or does it make more sense to 
think of these concepts as distinct from (though conducive to) democracy (see, for 
example, Becker 1999, Zakaria 2003)? Indeed, Barber argues that democracy “fought 
for and won” creates the constitution and the rights codified therein, not visa versa 
(1996: 146). This chapter starts from the premise that rule of law and democracy can 
– and should – be studied in tandem.  Without effective rule of law to safeguard 
democratic freedoms and underwrite democratic processes, citizenship can swiftly 
degenerate into subjugation. Diamond similarly warns that where rule of law is 
segregated from democracy, the result is too often “constitutions, but not 
constitutionalism” (2008a: 38, also see Ng 1997, Rogers 2004). The analysis below 
illustrates, however, that a wide gulf separates principled recognition of common 
“democratic” laws (e.g. universal suffrage, freedom of expression) and the formal 
adoption of a written constitution (Hinds 2008: 404).  
As Chapter One illustrates, the academic literature establishes clear 
expectations for the relationship between an impartial rule of law and democratic 
citizens. Democracy assistance organisations have widely adopted these standards, 
developing projects and initiatives that aim to make reality more closely mirror this 
ideal. In a democratic context, rule of law is meant to constrain the arbitrary use of 
power by establishing an impartial legal framework enforced by an independent 
judiciary. That no citizen – including the executive – is above the law distinguishes 
democracy from other forms of political rule. By guaranteeing civil and political 
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rights, including the power to vote elected officials out of office, democratic 
constitutions empower citizens, at least in theory, to hold their governments 
accountable (Brown and Kaiser 2007, Wahiu and Tesfagiorgis 2009). The evidence 
from TAT stories analysed below, however, illustrates that local expectations for rule 
of law in the Antsinanana region appear to diverge somewhat from these established 
Western norms. 
The perceptual lenses analysed in this chapter indicate a schism between 
those research participants who believe that the rule of law is applied impartially in 
Madagascar and those who question police motives. In a departure from previous 
chapters, following the discussion of perceptual lenses deduced from TAT stories the 
concluding analysis of rule of law as perceived by ordinary Malagasy in the 
Antsinanana region will be augmented by relevant illustrations from the two previous 
empirical chapters. This comprehensive analysis illustrates how distinguishable 
aspects of democracy intermingle, and concludes that developing democracy requires 
an integrated approach to the problems posed by, for example, weak rule of law or 
electoral reform.  
How Do Citizens in the Antsinanana Region Perceive Rule of Law? 
Exactly how non-elites in less developed states perceive and interpret their 
country’s legal systems and constitutions is less well documented than the theoretical 
expectations for how rule of law should function and why. Do ordinary people know 
their rights, for example? More importantly, perhaps, do they feel that those rights 
are adequately protected? Although many people will have little personal experience 
of the judicial system, it is likely that they will have encountered the police in some 
capacity. Consequently, in this research I sought to uncover how ordinary people 
perceive these street-level custodians of the law and the ramifications of correlating 
behavioural norms for local democracy. If, for instance, people staunchly believe that 
the police engage in petty extortion, money will almost certainly be proffered 
regardless of whether a particular policeman expects a bribe or not. For this reason, 
it is worth examining the multiple ways in which ordinary people perceive not only 
the law but also those individuals tasked with enforcing and protecting it. 
Understanding the myriad ways in which common citizens interpret the rule of law 
and its everyday application could contribute nuance to theoretically driven 
assessments of democratic deficiencies.  
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With the intention of prompting TAT stories indicative of people’s attitudes 
toward rule of law and the perceived prominence of corruption, I commissioned an 
image of someone talking to a police officer (see Figure 23). On reflection, this 
turned out to be the least successful of the images used in this research. Seven 
research participants, three of whom were members of religious orders, opted out of 
telling a TAT story about this particular image. Recalling that only four people 
consulted for this research preferred not to tell TAT stories about the images 
discussed in Chapter Four and just two abstained from explaining the images 
reviewed in Chapter Five, the relative reluctance of research participants to discuss 
this particular image is somewhat puzzling. Those who opted out were evenly split 
between men and women; six of the seven were urban and most had a university 
education. These last two characteristics, however, are partly accounted for by the 
members of religious orders. I can only speculate as to why this image worked less 
well as a prompt than the others. It is possible that the obvious portrayal of a 
government official (i.e. a policeman) increased the perceived risk associated with 
interpreting this image. Alternatively, this image contains fewer characters with which 
people might identify as part of the projective exercise. 
Figure 23: Image 5
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TAT stories told by research participants who did respond to this image also 
tended to be less detailed or complicated than those told about other images. Even 
so, they revealed the likely presence of two perceptual lenses offering contrasting 
interpretations of how the law is applied in this eastern region of Madagascar. An 
ostensible dichotomy seems to exist between those TAT stories that depicted the 
policeman as even-handed – the impartial lens – and those protesting that the man 
had been stopped without cause – the crooked lens. Additional clues about the 
perceived status of rule of law in the Antsinanana region are hidden within TAT 
stories discussed in previous chapters. I identify and discuss this supplemental 
evidence in the concluding analysis at the end of the chapter. 
The Impartial Lens 
TAT stories suggestive of the impartial perceptual lens share the common 
expectation that the police only stop people legitimately and with due cause. These 
research participants tend to agree, moreover, that when a police officer issues a fine 
you are obliged to pay it. In other words, these stories were characteristically adamant 
that the law is the law: citizens must obey it and the police must enforce it. No 
questions asked. Only a very small proportion of people telling this sort of TAT 
story indicated even passing suspicion that a police officer might manipulate the law 
for personal gain. The law, from this point of view, is both well respected and 
impartially applied.  
Demographic Trends  
It is notable that few TAT stories told by people living in the rural village 
showed signs of this perceptual lens, and that all of those that did were told by men 
(see Table 12). Indeed, just over half of all men interviewed for this research told 
TAT stories indicative of the impartial perceptual lens, compared with less than one 
third of women interviewed. This potential gender bias could provide an interesting 
point of departure for additional research on how people perceive the rule of law. 
For instance, do (rural) women experience the law differently from men? And, if so, 
why? Age does not seem to have been a determining factor in how people 
interviewed for this research perceive the rule of law, although slightly fewer 18-30 
year olds did tell TAT stories included here than I might have expected from the 
sample  demographics.   Finally,  both members  of  religious  orders who  told  TAT  
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Table 12: Impartial Lens Demographic Details
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stories about Image 5 are included in this group. While the inclusion of both of these 
research participants here may be noteworthy, it is impossible to draw substantiated 
inferences as to what this might mean. 
Impartial Lens Analysis 
 That the policeman legitimately stopped the man walking his dog (arrêter 
légitimement) unites all TAT stories indicative of this perceptual lens; see Figure 24. 
Having presumed that the policeman stopped the man for a valid reason, these 
research participants then searched for what that reason might be in the image, most 
often identifying something to do with the dog (e.g. dogs are not allowed in that area, 
the dog was behaving badly). This position was reinforced in many TAT stories 
about Image 5 by the similar disposition that the law is the same for everyone (la loi 
est pour tout la monde).   
Hery: The law is the law. It isn’t for the police [to decide], it’s for 
everyone. 
Volatiana: Even rich people have to accept the law. 
Statements such as these suggest that, from this point of view, rule of law in 
Madagascar (or at least the Antsinanana region) is reasonably strong and is applied 
impartially. Similarly, research participants telling this sort of TAT story occasionally 
pointed out that it is the responsibility of the police to uphold the law. For example, 
Todilahy  explained  in  his  TAT  story  that  without  the  police  to  enforce the law  
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Figure 24: Impartial Lens Thematic Network 
 
 
“everyone would do whatever they wanted. In a democracy you can’t just do 
whatever you want.” Although this disposition, that the police uphold the law (la 
police garde la loi), was only explicitly stated in a minority of TAT stories, the 
connotation was more widespread, as the TAT story excerpts above illustrate.  
 As indicated in the thematic network, these TAT stories also demonstrate a 
common respect for the police. In accordance with the belief that the police stop 
people only when they have a legitimate cause, these research participants also 
tended to agree that police officers should be respected (respecter la police) and people 
must comply with whatever sanctions (e.g. fines) the police issue (on doit payer 
l’amende): 
Guillaume:  The man [with the dog] respects the policeman, even though the 
policeman is angry with him. 
Léa:  The man just looks at the policeman and doesn’t have anything to 
say because he knows he is at fault. He knows that he has to accept 
the fine. He accepts the law of the police. 
Serge:   The man with the dog knows that he will have to pay the fine. 
Although these research participants commonly asserted in their TAT stories that the 
man walking his dog respects the policeman, it remains unclear whether this 
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deference alludes to respect for the rule of law or if, perhaps, it is due to the 
policeman personally as a recognised authority figure. The excerpt from Léa’s story 
above, for instance, clearly states that the man “accepts the law of the police.” 
Therefore, do people think that the police make the law, rather than simply enforce 
it? While it is impossible to know exactly what this woman meant when she made 
that particular comment, it does raise additional questions about the perceived 
relationship between the police and the rule of law that might be worth pursuing 
elsewhere.  
Identification of “the law of the police” may indicate that rule of law can take 
a rather different shape in local contexts from what external democracy assistance 
professionals expect, even in places where local people perceive the rule of law to be 
strong. According to the Round IV Afrobarometer survey, for instance, 60% of 
Malagasy respondents answered that they agreed or strongly agreed with the 
statement “The police always have the right to make people obey the law” 
(Afrobarometer 2008). Only 19%, by contrast, said that they either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed.100 While both the Afrobarometer data and the qualitative analysis 
of TAT interviews could indicate that many people perceive rule of law in 
Madagascar as relatively strong, the more nuanced information provided in the TAT 
stories raises questions about how ordinary people understand the law in relation to 
the police. While Afrobarometer may have asked this question to gauge whether 
people think the law should be applied impartially, I suspect that people taking part 
in this research would have interpreted this question rather differently from the one 
intended, and subsequently analysed.   
One possible explanation for why some people told TAT stories indicative of 
a strong rule of law is “the tacit normative idea that government stands in the same 
relationship to its citizens as a father does to his children,” which Schatzberg 
identifies as a linchpin of political legitimacy in much of sub-Saharan Africa (1993: 
455). While it is difficult to gauge from the relatively limited sample of TAT stories I 
gathered how pervasive this disposition is in eastern Madagascar, Lucien observed: 
“the police are like parents. If a child does something that is not right, his parents 
                                                 
100 An additional 15% of respondents said that they neither agreed nor disagreed and 6% said 
that they did not know.  
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must talk to him about it.”101 In this context, the police, and authority figures more 
generally, are seen as a guiding influence instead of the punitive force more common 
among stories indicative of the crooked perceptual lens discussed below.  
Finally, TAT stories indicative of the impartial perceptual lens only rarely 
included an element of bribery or manipulation, as the thematic network clearly 
illustrates. Some of these research participants made off-hand or side remarks 
tangential to their main TAT stories, similar to these excerpts: 
Lucien: The police take advantage of people. Even if your papers are in 
order, they will always try to find something problematic so that 
they can demand money.  
Stéphane: The man with the dog is afraid. He is afraid that he will have to pay 
a fine.  
Even so, the small sizes of the phrases police take advantage of people (la police profite 
des gens) and fear (peur) reveal that both of these dispositions, though relevant, are not 
characteristic of the plurality of TAT stories analysed here.  Moreover, as Stéphane’s 
comment above demonstrates, some of these research participants spoke of fear in 
the context of poverty and dreading to pay a fine, rather than fear of the police 
officer himself. This distinction is important, and contributes to the differentiation 
between the impartial and crooked perceptual lenses.  
In summary, the impartial perceptual lens is distinguishable by the global 
theme that some people expect the law to be applied evenly and justly, particularly 
across economic classes. Moreover, people who maintain this point of view respect 
the police as the official keepers of public order. On the whole, this perspective 
coincides with the theory laid out by democracy theorists and prioritised by the 
democracy assistance industry. Granted, these TAT stories tell us little about how 
political elites or the judiciary behave in relation to established law. That these 
research participants expected the police officer to apply the law impartially would, 
however, generally bode well for the anticipated behaviour of other custodians of the 
law as well. Therefore, it is possible to tentatively deduce that the impartial 
perceptual lens frames a political worldview in which democratic freedoms are not 
                                                 
101 One anonymous response to the written interview questions likewise explained: “the people 
are considered children and the officials play the role of parents who must be obeyed.” 
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generally under threat from overbearing representatives of the state and people of all 
social classes expect to be treated equally under the law.  
The Crooked Lens 
The crooked perceptual lens has an altogether different tint to that discussed 
above. In brief, the TAT stories analysed in this section almost universally suggest 
that the police abuse their power to extort money from people. A second organising 
theme to emerge from these stories is that the law is neither impartial nor applied 
evenly across society. As the analysis below demonstrates, there was widespread 
suspicion amongst this group of research participants that people able to give the 
police money will not be charged with any crime whether or not they have 
committed an offense. Finally, in their TAT stories these people widely suggested 
that the man walking his dog in Image 5 did not know what the law was; a potentially 
worrying trend. Taken together, these themes reflect entrenched mistrust of the 
police and serious misgivings about not only how the law is applied but, crucially, 
what it stipulates.    
Demographic Trends  
While the number of research participants who seemingly subscribe to this 
point of view is roughly similar to that adhering to the impartial lens above, these 
two groups of people have distinct demographic characteristics. Whereas TAT 
stories told by male research participants most often exhibited signs of the impartial 
lens, the crooked lens emerged slightly more often from TAT stories told by women, 
particularly those living in the rural village (see Table 13). Of the people included in 
this sample, rural participants tended to tell TAT stories with more fearful or 
suspicious overtones, dispositions that may be at least partially attributed to the fact 
that rural people are likely less accustomed to a formal police presence. In contrast, it 
was not uncommon to see police officers standing on street corners or patrolling 
busy areas in the city.  
It is impossible to tell from this sample whether age is a distinguishing 
demographic feature among research participants who told this type of TAT story. 
While slightly more 18-30 year olds told TAT stories analysed here than in the 
previous section, similar numbers of research participants from the 31-45 and 45-60 
years old  age groups also told TAT  stories about Image  5 suggestive of the crooked  
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Table 13: Crooked Lens Demographic Details
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lens. This perceptual lens was particularly evident amongst both male and female 
university students (five of the six I interviewed), which accounts for over half of the 
18-30 year olds in this group. I cannot speculate as to why university students were 
particularly prone to telling stories featuring a weak rule of law. It is worth noting, 
however, that their stories illustrated examples of police corruption or the law being 
enforced unevenly rather than ignorance or uncertainty regarding the content of the 
law.  
Crooked Lens Analysis 
 Nearly all of the research participants in this group interpreted the policeman 
in Image 5 in a predatory way, explaining that the police take advantage of people (la 
police profite des gens); this disposition is prominently displayed in the thematic network 
(see Figure 25). Many of these TAT stories went on to describe a situation in which 
the police officer’s actions were primarily motivated by money. The general plot of 
most of these TAT stories began with a man out walking his dog; then the police 
officer stops the man for no apparent reason. If he pays what the policeman asks 
(amande), the man will be allowed to go on he way. If not, he will be charged with 
some minor infraction.  
Soazy: Everyone is afraid of the police because oftentimes they take 
advantage of people. Even if this man [with the dog] hasn’t done 
anything wrong, the policeman will try to demand money from 
him.  
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Figure 25: Crooked Lens Thematic Network
 
 
Mariamo: Everyone is afraid of the police. They try to get money from you 
even when you haven’t done anything wrong. 
Mirana: It is difficult for chauffeurs because they need to keep all of their 
papers with them. But because the police are always looking for 
ways to get money, they try to find problems with the chauffeurs’ 
papers.  
Kalo:   In my opinion, the policeman only wants money.  
A theme common among TAT stories discussed here, plainly evident in the excerpts 
above, is that the man walking his dog was possibly – probably – stopped for no 
valid reason at all (arrêter pour aucune raison). Although few of these research 
participants stated this outright (e.g. the police officer only wants money), as 
indicated by the small size of this disposition in the thematic network, it was 
commonly implied. Deviating from the image, Mirana and Kotomaro specifically 
pointed out that this causes particular problems for drivers (e.g. taxi drivers, minibus 
drivers) who are required to carry dossiers of paperwork. When several people take 
amende!
arrêter pour 
aucune raison!
corrompu!
emprisonnement politique!
!
The police are out 
to make a profit and 
rich people can do 
as they like 
!
suspicious of 
police motives 
 the law is 
not 
applied 
neutrally 
 
uncertainty 
about the 
law 
la police profite des gens!
le policier demande de 
l’argent!
c’est fini si on 
paye la police!
la loi 
n’existe 
pas pour 
les riches!ne 
connaît 
pas la loi!
peur!
CHAPTER SIX 
 226 
shifts using the same vehicle, it is not difficult to see how papers might get lost, 
making these sorts of drivers easy targets for predatory police officers.102 
It is initially striking that these research participants only used the word 
corrupt (corrompu) very infrequently (see Figure 25). The characterisation of 
corruption proffered by Huntington is typical of the literature; he defines corruption 
as “behaviour of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to 
serve private ends” (1968: 59). It is revealing that Botozaza, who works for BIANCO 
– the President’s anti-corruption body – told the TAT story most concerned about 
“corruption.”103 To this man, the “accepted norm” is for police officers to be 
impartial enforcers of the law. Taking money from a civilian, whether they have 
broken the law or not, in exchange for not reporting the supposed offense 
constitutes deviation from this norm for personal enrichment. More interesting, 
however, is that this is apparently not the way most of these research participants 
understand such an exchange. Quite the contrary, the accepted norm in most TAT 
stories seems to be that the police would demand money. That people disagree with 
or do not like this norm does not necessarily mean that they do not accept it. 
Consequently, the behaviour of the policeman is not understood as being “corrupt” 
but just the way things are. Indeed, Huntington concedes that, in developing states, 
corruption as he has defined it is “not so much the result of the deviance of 
behaviour from accepted norms as it is the deviance of norms from the established 
patterns of behaviour” (1968: 60). But where the norms at issue are not internalised 
by local people or recognisable through their perceptual lens, assessing behaviour in 
terms of “corruption” may be a temptation best avoided. 
                                                 
102 I experienced this once during fieldwork. A policeman randomly stopped my taxi driver and 
asked for his dossier. One of the papers was missing, which the driver had apparently left at 
home. Someone had to bring the paper to us (which took about an hour) before we were allowed 
to leave. After everything was in order, the driver slipped the policeman some money. I had used 
this driver before, and he explained once we were back on our way that it was necessary for him 
to pay the policeman like that if he did not want to have more problems later.  
103 Transparency International published its 2008 country rankings just before I interviewed the 
BIANCO employee. Newspaper headlines universally heralded Madagascar’s progress at tackling 
corruption. When I met with the BIANCO employee, however, he asked me who Transparency 
International is, how they collect their data, and how they calculate country rankings. He put little 
faith in their assessment of Madagascar, speculating that approximately half of any project budget 
gets siphoned off through bribery and patronage. 
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When research participants included in this perceptual lens group spoke 
about deviations from the rule of law and the policeman’s personalistic behaviour, 
the word corruption was only used very infrequently and no one used the word 
‘bribery’ even when, from my perspective, that was what the story was about. 
Instead, it makes more sense to address deviations in the rule of law in a manner 
similar to that of local people, in this case exchanging the language of corruption for 
that of manipulation. The difference in connotation, though slight, has significant 
ramifications. In the first instance, the law is broken but the infraction is ignored. In 
the second instance, however, the rules are bent to serve individual interests. 
Accounting for approximately half the people I spoke with, these research 
participants routinely suggested in their TAT stories that rule of law is weak and 
easily manipulated by people with power (i.e. the police) or money (i.e. rich people). 
This has stark implications for democracy assistance policies that seek to prop-up a 
weak rule of law with technical support. Buttressing the legal framework alone will 
not prevent the sort of uneven application of the law described in these TAT stories. 
It is not necessarily the laws that need strengthened, but the way in which they are 
applied and interpreted at street-level, something for which there are no standardised 
solutions. 
Another perception commonly voiced in these TAT stories is that 
application of the law is far from impartial. The competence that an encounter with 
the police will end once you pay up (c’est fini si on paye la police) dominates the lower 
right-hand corner of the thematic network for this perceptual lens. It was commonly 
understood among these research participants that if a person paid the police, the 
charge (deserved or malicious) would be forgotten. This expectation, however, was 
attributed in some TAT stories to the police officer and in others to the pedestrian. 
First, following on from the belief that the police are only motivated by money, some 
TAT stories attributed the expectation that any charge can be dropped for the right 
price to the police officer: 
Faramalala:  The policeman could fine him. Or, he could simply ask for a bit of 
money and after that everything is fine.  
Severiny:  The man knows that if he gives some money to the policeman he 
won’t be punished and that if he doesn’t, he will.  
Voary: The police always look for problems so that they can demand 
money from people. If someone who has done something bad pays 
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the police quickly, it’s all finished. It is money that counts for the 
police.  
In all of these excerpts, the policeman expects to be paid (la police demande de l’argent). 
The pedestrian knows this, but is not seen by these research participants to instigate 
the exchange.  
This point of view is somewhat different, however, from that of other people 
whose TAT stories similarly suggest that they perceive police behaviour through the 
crooked lens and likewise believe that the encounter will be over once the policeman 
is paid. This second group of research participants, however, told TAT stories in 
which the man walking his dog is described as “rich.” The ensuing TAT stories 
generally presumed that the man was guilty of some minor infraction and explained 
how he could essentially buy-off the policeman: 
Botozaza: So, the man walking his dog pretends that he doesn't know the rule 
and that's why I think that he will bribe the police. I think that he is 
an intellectual or he is rich and that he has an easy life. 
Sthella:  The law doesn’t exist for this rich man.  
The pervasive disposition in these stories is that the law does not apply to rich 
people (la loi n’existe pas pour les riches).104 Julien read beyond the image and applied this 
assessment to the courts in addition to the police. Recalling a compensation hearing 
for the families of victims who had died when an overcrowded passenger ferry sank, 
he said: “Even the judges are corrupt. They discriminate between the rich and the 
poor. People who knew someone at the court were given much more 
[compensation] than people who didn’t know anyone.” While both scenarios depict 
the rule of law as weak, disagreement emerges over who is culpable for this: rich 
people or the police.  
Finally, most TAT stories indicative of the crooked perceptual lens included 
an element of uncertainty about the law, occasionally explaining that the man walking 
his dog did not know the law or understand why he had been stopped by the police 
officer (ne connaît pas la loi). If people do not know the law or their rights, breaking the 
law becomes like playing a game of Russian roulette – it is only a matter of time 
                                                 
104 “There is an aspect of tyranny to the regime in power,” one written interview response 
concluded, “because the laws only apply to the masses and the dominant class do what they like.” 
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before you are bound to get into trouble. Reiterating the not uncommon perception 
among research participants that the police determine the law; Ralay explained: “It is 
often like that here. The police say that there is a law but the people don’t know what 
it is or why.” This uncertainty about the law was often accompanied in these TAT 
stories by fear (peur). Sometimes these people indicated that the pedestrian was afraid 
because he knew he would have to pay the policeman, while others, like Kamisy, 
offered other explanations such as lack of an identity card. A minority of people I 
spoke to suggested that the man was afraid he would be arrested for politically 
motivated reasons (emprisonnement politique). This disposition harks back to TAT 
stories about elections analysed in Chapter Four in which research participants 
similarly suggested that the ruling political party could manipulate the law to punish 
dissenters or members of opposition parties. I return to the idea of politically 
motivated imprisonment again at the end of this chapter.  
While it is possible that the ‘?’ in Image 5 may have influenced the direction 
of some of these TAT stories, the evidence suggests that this is unlikely (see Figure 
23). Common emotions attributed to this character in TAT stories included 
astonishment and shock as well as confusion. Consequently, there is sufficient reason 
to be confident that people who told TAT stories in which the man did not know 
the law were projecting their own insecurity onto that character. This could suggest 
either that these people do not think that they are sufficiently familiar with the law 
or, alternatively, that they think it is reasonably likely that an ordinary person would 
not be. Putting a slight twist on this logic, Botozaza was certain that the man did 
know the law and was only pretending to be confused. 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that perceptions are as true as facts. 
With regard to the TAT stories discussed in this section, I have additional reason to 
believe that the competences and dispositions expressed by these research 
participants likely reflect actual occurrences. Returning to Madagascar after a short 
trip to Reunion, a French NGO worker I met in the field got stopped at the border; 
her visa was about to expire. The immigration officer bluntly asked what she could 
offer him. In the end, she traded a bottle of rum for her entry clearance. I 
acknowledge the possibility that foreigners and local people may receive different 
treatment; even so, this anecdote provides circumstantial evidence generally 
supportive of the perceptions expressed by this group of research participants. In 
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2008, Diamond identified strengthening the rule of law as the “most urgent 
imperative” of democracy assistance (2008b: 46). The crooked perceptual lens 
provides additional grounds for his conclusion.  
What Hope for Democracy?  
Forcefully criticising the unconstitutional power transfer in Madagascar, 
Wahiu and Tesfagiorgis (2009) assert that constitutions provide “the real African 
choice for regime change.” Constitutions, they claim, intrinsically empower citizens 
to hold their governments accountable. For example, by requiring that changes to 
presidential term limits adhere to a legal procedure, constitutions alert people to the 
danger posed by over-zealous elites (Brown and Kaiser 2007: 1146, Wahiu and 
Tesfagiorgis 2009).105 Fixation on the existence of formal constitutional order can, 
however, be a distraction, blinding outside observers to substantive democratic 
deficiencies. As Hinds (2008) illustrates in the Caribbean context, the absence of 
coups does not necessarily indicate democratic vigour or, I would argue, functioning 
constitutional order. 
The original research presented in Chapters Four through Six warns against 
divorcing democratic form from democratic content. Prior to the 2009 political 
upheaval, Madagascar’s formal constitution had proven rather durable.106 Established 
in 1992, the constitution was amended in 1995, 1998 and 2007 following the 
established legal procedure. But to what extent do these written rules protect 
democratic freedoms, promote political equality and harness elected political 
officials, the executive in particular, in practice? While it is difficult to judge the 
prevalence of attacks on constitutional rights, the evidence provided in TAT stories 
                                                 
105 There seemed to be some confusion among people I spoke with about what the 2007 
constitutional amendment actually entailed. That Ravalomanana had changed the constitution to 
enable him to run for a third term was a recurrent belief among people I spoke to. In reality, the 
1992 constitution in place at the time research was conducted still maintained that the President 
may only hold office for two consecutive terms (Article 45). The Round 4 Afrobarometer survey 
found that 47% of Malagasy agreed that the constitution should limit the president to serving a 
maximum of two terms in office while 35% thought that there should be no constitutional limit 
on how long the president can serve. 14% of those interviewed did not know and 4% said that 
they did not agree with either statement (2009a: 8).   
106 At the time of writing, the country is in a state of constitutional crisis. It remains to be seen 
whether the constitution that existed prior to the political turbulence will be retained or whether 
ongoing, though intermittent, negotiations will result in a new document.  
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suggests that Ravalomanana’s polished international image concealed a flawed 
domestic reputation.  
Formal defence of rule of law must be substantiated by informal self-
monitoring and restraint (Whitehead 2002: 118). Although not representative of the 
positions taken by all research participants, “the government,” “the ruling party,” and 
“the President” were all accused of abusing their power in TAT stories subtly 
indicative of constitutional breaches or at the very least providing reason to question 
whether constitutional provisos are capable of effectively constraining the executive. 
Contrary to the professional assessment made by Wahiu and Tesfagiorgis (2009) that 
there must be an “immediate restoration of the legitimate constitutional and 
democratic institutions,” TAT stories indicative of the crooked lens suggest that 
many people in Madagascar may question the democratic merits of simply restoring 
the old order, having only intermittently experienced or perceived a government 
constrained by rule of law themselves (O'Donnell 2004: 42, Rogers 2004: 120). From 
this vantage point, international calls to simultaneously restore the old order and 
reinstate democracy may strike an inconsistent or hypocritical tone. 
Fabrice expressed particular frustration with this constitutional dualism. “All 
of the democratic institutions exist in Madagascar,” he conceded, “but they are 
detached from the people.” The international democracy assistance industry 
promotes rule of law as a mechanism for protecting democratic freedoms and 
creating a predictable political environment (Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007: 36). 
But is this claim substantiated by practical experience? Freedoms of expression and 
the press as well as freedom to form political parties are all enshrined in 
Madagascar’s  1992  constitution  (see  Figure 26).  Even  so,  we  would  do  well  to  
Figure 26: Excerpts from Madagascar's 1992 Constitution
 
The freedoms of opinion and expression, communication, the press, association, assembly, 
movement, conscience, and religion are guaranteed to all and may only be limited with respect to 
the rights and liberties of others or in the interest of maintaining public order. 
– Article 10 
 
Every person has the right to freely organise with others to form associations insofar as such 
organisations conform to the law.  
 
This right also applies to the creation of political parties. 
 – Article 14  
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remember that laws “do not exist in isolation” but are indelibly linked to “a larger, 
more complex normative universe” (Werhan 2001: 898).  
Each of the perceptual lenses identified through this research provides a 
limited glimpse into the normative worldviews of research participants, providing 
insight into the complex relationship between constitutional rights and the ways in 
which ordinary people actually experience politics. As Chapter Seven clearly 
illustrates, some research participants explicitly defined democracy in terms of rights, 
particularly the right to free speech (also see Chapter Five). These people regularly 
questioned whether Madagascar could be considered a democracy when ordinary 
people are denied basic democratic rights. It was not uncommon for TAT stories to 
suggest inequality of citizenship, whether by descriptions of social hierarchy, 
accounts of denied voting rights, or indications of police manipulating the law for 
personal gain. The remainder of this chapter compares rights enshrined in the 1992 
constitution with the perspectives recounted in TAT stories, and considers the 
possible ramifications for Madagascar’s ongoing democratic development.   
Constitutional Assurance of Electoral Process 
 Elections are by nature a technical and legalistic process. In evaluating a 
country’s electoral procedures, democracy assessment measures often look for 
formal legal and constitutional safeguards. Freedom House (2009) rankings depend 
in part, for instance, on whether a country’s electoral laws are deemed free and fair. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit similarly examines laws regulating political 
campaigns and gives high marks if “clear, established and accepted” constitutional 
mechanisms are in place for transferring power once electoral results have been 
declared (2008: 20). These technical measures, though quite capable of tracking 
quantitative changes in electoral turnout and competition, tell us very little about the 
quality of electoral experiences as perceived by a country’s citizens. Do people 
believe that their votes are of equal value, for instance, or are some sub-groups 
perceived to benefit unfairly from extra-constitutional arrangements? Furthermore, 
does voting actually provide people with the opportunity to constrain – or eject – an 
overzealous executive?  
 Madagascar’s 1992 constitution provides reasonable, technical affirmation 
that the country’s political leaders (i.e. the President of the Republic and members of 
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the National Assembly) are chosen through free and fair elections. In recent years, 
the international community has generally accepted electoral contests in Madagascar 
as free and fair in adherence to constitutionally mandated procedures (SADC 2006, 
United States Department of State 2007). Also noteworthy, however, is the 
significant omission from the 1992 constitution of any distinguishable Article that 
specifically ensures universal adult suffrage. Instead, this right is identified in 
conjunction with the legal organisation of the state. Article 45, for instance, states 
that the President is elected by direct universal adult suffrage for a five-year term. 
Article 67 likewise states that members of the National Assembly are elected through 
direct universal adult suffrage.  
Given the authority credited to constitutional provisions by democracy 
assistance and assessment policies, whether local people attribute similar strength to 
their constitutionally guaranteed rights warrants consideration. While the perceptual 
lenses identified in Chapters Four through Six provide only a partial glimpse into 
local worldviews, recalling how research participants interpreted elections adds depth 
to the analysis of local perceptions of rule of law. In this section I consider how 
ordinary people taking part in this research suggested they perceive political 
competition and representation, two provisions implicit in democratic rights to vote, 
organise political parties, and run for political office (Saward 1998: 62).  
Political competition 
To what extent do constitutional provisions granting people freedom to 
organise political parties actually facilitate genuine political and electoral competition? 
The evidence provided by TAT stories in Chapter Four suggests that political 
competition in the Antsinanana region remains limited. While support for a pluralist 
political party structure appears to exist among ordinary citizens, many of the people 
I spoke to voiced concerns that the ruling party prevents other parties from 
mounting a genuine opposition (see Chapter Four). The right to freely organise 
political parties is specifically guaranteed under Article 14 of Madagascar’s 1992 
constitution (see Figure 26, above). Research participants seem remarkably detached, 
however, from the approximately 160 political parties registered across the country, 
generally identifying just two options – either for or against the ruling regime – in 
their TAT stories. If people think that their only options are to vote for or against 
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the party in power, the mere existence of multiple political parties may not actually 
offer voters genuine choice. 
Moreover, the role and identity of the political opposition remains unclear 
for most people who took part in this research. One theme common to both the 
positive and tedious perceptual lenses is that electoral competition provides choice 
without real significance. While making no overt reference to political competition or 
opposition parties, TAT stories indicative of the positive lens sometimes indicated 
that people exercise free choice when voting. This implies the presence of multiple 
candidates on the ballot paper but raises suspicions about whether these research 
participants find political competition meaningful. The tedious lens similarly indicates 
that research participants struggled to distinguish the political objectives of one party 
from those of any other. These people concluded that voting does not provide a 
significant choice because no matter who wins the election, the outcome will always 
be the same. This general consensus among people taking part in this research 
substantiates the analogy made by a Malagasy journalist comparing voting to flipping 
a coin (Raharizatovo 2008: 10). 
It is of interest that TAT stories indicative of the pluralist lens distinguished 
between political competition and political opposition. While most of these research 
participants acknowledged the presence of political competition in Madagascar (i.e. 
that more than one candidate appears on the ballot) some were sceptical that it was 
possible to mount a genuine political opposition to the party in power. People whose 
TAT stories suggested the pluralist lens often adamantly declared that potential 
opposition candidates are prevented from organising their supporters or holding 
meetings to discuss their views. That known opposition supporters would be denied 
their voter registration cards was common knowledge among research participants 
whose stories suggested the pluralist perceptual lens. Indeed, Velohasina questioned 
Madagascar’s status as a democracy specifically because people are not allowed to 
openly compete over conflicting political agendas. The constitutional right to 
organise a political party counts for little if that party is then effectively denied entry 
to the political domain (Ng, 1997: 21, Saward 1998: 52). Consequently, from this 
perspective constitutional provisions for political competition fail to secure pluralistic 
political debate, leaving voters unaware of the positions held by opposition 
candidates who would offer them a genuine choice.  It is also worth noting that there  
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Figure 27: Distribution of Electoral Process and Rule of Law Perceptual   
                  Lenses
 
 
was little correlation between how research participants described elections and how 
they portrayed the rule of law in response to Image 5 (see Figure 27). Although 
people whose TAT stories reflected the pluralist perceptual lens generally thought 
that the political opposition was treated unfairly, this did not necessarily appear to 
influence their perception of the police and the rule of law more generally. 
Despite Madagascar’s constitutional provision that people are free to 
organise political parties, the evidence provided by TAT stories clearly suggests that 
Malagasy in the Antsinanana region perceive a political landscape characterised by 
one party dominance. Accusations that opposition supporters are prevented from 
meeting indicate that, in the eyes of at least some Malagasy voters, the ruling party 
stands above the law and uses its hold on power to suppress dissent, a blatant 
“violation of the basic grounds” on which democracy is founded (Saward 1998: 62). 
Bertelsmann Stiftung counted over 160 political parties when conducting its 2008 
democracy assessment, providing clear evidence of “generic equality” to organise 
political parties; however, potential candidates find themselves in a position of 
“sharp de-facto inequality” from the point of view of people interpreting elections 
through the dissident or pluralist perceptual lens (O'Donnell 2004: 38-39). Denying 
opposition supporters equal opportunity to vote for alternative candidates gives the 
incumbent party an unfair advantage and violates a basic tenet of democratic 
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governance, namely that each citizen has equal voice (Saward 1998, Schmitter and 
Karl 1991: 82). The constitutional provision of a multi-party political system may 
not, therefore, accurately indicate the depth of political competition. As I concluded 
in Chapter Four, there appears to be little resonance of genuine political competition 
at the level of the electorate despite widespread acknowledgment that several names 
are generally included on electoral ballots.  
Political representation 
As noted above, the 1992 constitution specifies that the President and 
members of the National Assembly be elected by universal adult suffrage. Articles 45 
and 67 of the constitution may stand Madagascar in good stead with international 
democracy monitors, but do these voting rights lead to representative governance 
from the point of view of the electorate? The TAT stories in Chapter Four suggest 
that people may be divided over whether they can make their voice heard in the 
political arena. In particular, the evidence suggests that research participants primarily 
concerned with local issues are more likely to believe that political decisions made by 
elected representatives represent their interests. Urban Malagasy, however, were 
more likely to question whether their vote would have any practical consequence.  
Political representation should denote some semblance of citizen control 
over government decisions and corresponding capacity to reprimand (i.e. vote out) 
offending political officials (Pitkin 1967, Wedeen 2004). The 1992 constitution 
clearly specifies that members of the National Assembly fill this role in Madagascar. 
Political representation should not however, be reduced to the election of officials 
(Wedeen 2004: 278). As noted above, serious questions remain about the integrity of 
Madagascar’s electoral competition and the parties that take part in it. Moreover, a 
distinction must be made between decisions representative of the will of citizens and 
those taken on their behalf (Weale 2007: 188). Though not everyone can be pleased 
(or appeased) all of the time, only when political decisions reflect the general will of 
the people can a government be described as representative. Ravalomanana’s 
negotiation of a 99-year lease over 3.2 million acres of land with the South Korean 
firm Daewoo Logistics, by contrast, was a decision made on behalf of the people but 
without their consent (Blas 2008, Spencer 2008, Walt 2008). Handing over half of the 
country’s arable land to a foreign company for free surely qualifies as the “distortion 
of purpose” Weale (2007) warns against (also see Jung-a, Oliver, and Burgis 2008).  
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Theoretically, elections provide a forum for interest articulation, offering the 
electorate the opportunity to express their collective priorities (Ake 1993, Bradley 
2005, International IDEA n.d.). The local perceptual lens suggests that some 
research participants did indeed think that they could make their interests known at 
the local level. Pervasive deference to authority also permeated these TAT stories, 
however, diminishing to some extent the likelihood that ordinary people will assert 
themselves in the presence of political officials. The tedious perceptual lens, on the 
other hand, made it quite clear that people find voting burdensome when it does not 
provide a genuine opportunity for improving their circumstances.  Although the 
1992 constitution gives people the right to vote for their political representatives, 
research participants whose TAT stories depicted the tedious perceptual lens 
suggested resignation that voting will not result in policies representative of their 
interests. Formal guarantees of electoral competition do not alone necessarily enable 
the opposition to mount an effective challenge to the political establishment (Ng 
1997: 22, Rogers 2004: 16).  
Although the people I interviewed expressed a plurality of views with regard 
to voting and elections, the various TAT stories all seem to warn against 
misconceiving constitutional provisions as solid guarantees of electoral rigour. The 
TAT stories about electoral competition and participation fully analysed in Chapter 
Four and reviewed again here indicate that rights enshrined in the 1992 constitution 
are only weakly and irregularly experienced by some sectors of society. Electoral 
participation without political representation was a common premise underlying 
TAT stories told about elections, those reflective of the local perceptual lens 
providing the notable exceptions to this rule. Some research participants, largely 
those whose TAT stories reflected the positive lens, gave no indication that they 
were particularly troubled by this lack of political accountability. People whose 
stories contained theme clusters in line with the tedious and pluralist points of view, 
however, were more likely to tell TAT stories tinged with frustration.  
Constitutional Protection for Free Speech Rights   
In Chapter Five I argued that many Malagasy closely associate freedom of 
expression and access to information with democracy, an impression that seemed to 
weigh on reflections of their own political experience. The analysis in that chapter 
also established, however, that although people may be generally (and genuinely) 
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inclined to engage in political debate, censorship severely curtails their ability to do 
so. This assessment is reiterated above in the discussion of restrictions experienced 
by the political opposition. There seems to be a perception running through the TAT 
stories of some research participants that dissident voices are silenced by the ruling 
regime. In this section, I jointly assess common perceptions of freedom of speech 
and rule of law to unravel the contribution that these variables make to the standard 
of democracy experienced by ordinary Malagasy in the Antsinanana region.  
Substantive democracy requires a subtle balance between protecting civil 
rights and maintaining the rule of law (Merkel 2004: 39). Which is not to say that 
these two objectives are always at cross-purposes: civil rights soon fall victim to 
autocratic impulses when not protected by the rule of law. Excessive concern for 
public order, however, can result in the suppression of basic civil rights including, for 
example, freedoms of speech and association. Recognising this delicate balance, 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifies that everyone has 
the right to freedom of opinion and expression (also see Warburton 2009: 2). Eager 
to conform to international standards, at least in writing, Article 10 of Madagascar’s 
1992 constitution similarly enshrines freedoms of opinion, expression, and the press 
in law (see Figure 26).  
Although these civil liberties are etched into the 1992 constitution, TAT 
stories analysed in Chapter Five portray a political landscape dominated by concern 
for public order to the detriment of individual rights. Many research participants 
seemed inclined to self-censor, stifled by fear of being overheard saying the wrong 
thing. Patrick, for instance, adamantly stated: “sometimes people who say things 
against the government are put in jail.” Mamisoa, a young priest, was more specific: 
“Because of the political crisis in 2000, there are a lot of political prisoners still in jail 
now who have been imprisoned by the state. The authorities and the tribunals,” he 
continued, “they can’t say anything against the government. Against the President.” 
Although political imprisonment was not a dominant theme to emerge from TAT 
stories, the expectation that ordinary people could be jailed for saying the wrong 
thing, often based on hearsay rather than personal experience, came up surprisingly 
often in casual conversation. Most people had a story to tell about someone who had 
been unjustly imprisoned for speaking out. Even if these stories are little more than 
rumour and speculation, they nonetheless directly influence how people behave. My 
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urban research assistant, for instance, was fearful of being arrested if someone in 
authority became suspicious of my research. Similar apprehension on the part of 
research participants likewise influenced my snowball sampling and need to ensure 
the anonymity of people who agreed to take part in this research (see Chapters Three 
and Five). Despite constitutional protection for free speech, many research 
participants were not confident that they could exercise this right in practice, at least 
not if they were talking about politics.  
Moreover, some research participants explained how suppression of free 
speech could likewise persuade members of the ruling party to tow the party line. 
Stéphanie, for instance, said that “even people high on the ladder [bureaucrats, civil 
servants] who don’t agree [with the ruling party or President] say that they do agree 
to keep their jobs,” indicating a clear perception that dissenters will be punished. 
Claudia said simply: “It is always necessary to be on the side of the government.” 
Again, party unity and order take priority over individual free speech rights. The 
scenarios described by research participants contrast starkly with the evaluation made 
by the Economist Intelligence Unit that “all citizens are free to express themselves 
on all political issues” (2008: 15). While constitutional provisos embed freedom of 
expression in national law, reality, it would seem, falls far short of the ideal.  
Media censorship was also common knowledge among people I interviewed 
and was an obvious basic theme for both the dissident and ambiguous perceptual 
lenses analysed in Chapter Five. In a democracy, freedom of information is necessary 
for “citizen awareness;” in order for a government to be representative, citizens must 
know what it is doing and be able to influence decisions (Saward 1998: 63). 
However, research participants whose TAT stories contained clusters of basic 
themes common to the social divisions perceptual lens were largely resigned to 
censorship, particularly of the press. They sometimes insisted, though, that 
misinformation should not be attributed to the journalists themselves, as they lack 
the tools necessary to uncover the truth, but rather to the tightly controlled nature of 
the political arena. 
While the evidence provided by TAT stories reflective of the dissident 
perceptual lens reinforced the notion that freedom of speech and access to 
information are valued democratic rights, they also highlighted practical challenges to 
the everyday practice of these rights. According to the 1992 constitution, the rights  
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Figure 28:  Distribution of Freedom of Expression and Rule of Law  
Perceptual Lenses
 
 
 
guaranteed under Article 10 can be limited in the interest of maintaining public 
order. This condition is reflected in TAT stories indicative of both the dissident and 
social divisions perceptual lenses in Chapter Five. In dissident TAT stories, free 
speech and access to information become key points of political contention. While 
the government is often portrayed as having the upper hand, research participants 
whose stories suggested the dissident lens clearly thought that ordinary people could 
reassert their authority by taking to the streets. Some of these people also lamented, 
however, that public demonstrations were forbidden under Ravalomanana. It is 
perhaps not surprising that people whose TAT stories reflected the dissident lens 
were slightly more likely to also suggest that Madagascar’s laws are easily 
manipulated, as Figure 28 illustrates. Research participants whose TAT stories 
indicated the social divisions lens, by contrast, were more likely to stress the 
importance of maintaining social order, as the analysis in Chapter Five suggested. 
Extremely conscious of pervasive socio-religious divisions, these people were 
generally less critical of restrictions on individual free speech and somewhat more 
inclined to believe that Madagascar has a robust rule of law. 
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Conclusion 
“Many individuals are citizens with respect to political rights,” O’Donnell 
observes, “but not in terms of civil rights. Indeed, they are as poor legally as they are 
materially” (2004: 42). This reflection is particularly apt in the case of Madagascar. 
One of the poorest countries in the world, many of the people I interviewed 
demonstrated an incisive awareness that they are routinely denied their basic 
democratic rights. Chapter Four affirmed that political rights in Madagascar 
remained largely intact at the time research was conducted. Although some research 
participants clearly indicated that they do not find voting worthwhile and a few 
charged that they are denied their voting rights altogether, most of the people I 
spoke to did say that they had voted in the previous presidential election. The 
existence of over 160 officially registered political parties likewise attests to the fact 
that people are able to organise political parties, even if these parties are unable to 
mount an effective opposition. There is evidence in Chapter Five, however, that free 
speech rights have come under sustained attack. These political worldviews identified 
from TAT stories foreshadow the fiery public response to Ravalomanana’s closure of 
a rival’s television station in January 2009.  
Although not characteristic of the majority of TAT stories, there were two 
instances when people, both urban and well educated, explained their understandings 
of democracy specifically in terms of the rule of law. First, Todilahy suggested: 
“When you are in a democracy, you can’t just do whatever you want. There are laws 
to follow.” He continued, “It is always necessary to have police to enforce the law. If 
not, everyone would do what they wanted.” Julie similarly explained “Democracy 
means limits. Everyone can’t do what they want.” A bit later in her TAT story she 
went on to say, “There are a lot of people who don’t understand democracy. 
Democracy is not the same for everyone. It is different for ordinary people than for 
the people in power. There is a hierarchy.” While both of these accounts suggest that 
rule of law is a necessary component of democracy, they differ significantly in their 
accounts of how the rule of law should be applied. Whereas Todilahy seems to 
interpret rule of law as an even-handed mechanism for maintaining order, Julie 
clearly indicates that there are different rules for elites and ordinary people.  
While the 244 TAT stories that I collected during field research clearly 
indicate that people I spoke with in eastern Madagascar want to believe in 
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democracy, important divisions emerged over what democracy means and how it can 
best be secured. Some research participants like Julie acknowledge and accept that 
ordinary people and political elites are subject to different rules, but maintain that 
this de facto inequality is justified because democracy requires order. Others, 
however, told TAT stories suggesting that average citizens see little problem with 
using undemocratic means (e.g. strikes, protests) to unseat political elites who abuse 
their power and withhold or suspend constitutional liberties. As the next chapter 
demonstrates, although this rationale does not adhere to standards set by the 
international community, it does surface in the literature on democratic development. 
Mungiu-Pippidi, for instance, warns that “the unaccountable behaviour of rulers 
legitimates unlawful behaviour by citizens” (2006: 90). Whether or not unlawful 
behaviour is ever legitimate is not a question considered in this thesis. The evidence 
above does illustrate, however, how formal constitutional rules can become detached 
from lived political experience.  
The evidence presented here suggests that democracy assistance projects that 
focus too closely on formal legal processes may not be seeing the whole picture. 
Technical quick fixes to perceived constitutional shortcomings can work in some 
instances but are unlikely, on their own, to alter the commonplace experiences of 
ordinary people. The comparative analysis above of formal constitutional safeguards 
and how ordinary Malagasy perceive them forcefully demonstrates that formal rules, 
while important, do not indubitably guarantee democratic rights. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to examine a full range of democracy promotion projects in 
minute detail. The general policy positions cited in Chapter One, however, appear to 
emphasise legal protection for individual rights, particularly insofar as they shore up 
elections, while ignoring informal social norms. Evidence from the Antsinanana 
region substantiates the hypothesis that this can result in “an atmosphere of 
institutionalised crisis” in which norms espoused by elites and ordinary people alike 
become resistant to reform (Rogers 2004: 114). Rather than safeguarding the most 
basic features of democracy, policies that bolster constitutions without carefully 
considering local norms and expectations may only serve to further discredit 
nominally democratic politics.  
The indicators and criteria that provide the contours for contemporary 
attempts to assist and assess democratic development are useful for promoting 
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formal, quantifiable changes in governance. The empirical analysis in Chapters Four 
through Six suggests that the themes adopted by the global democracy assistance 
industry are appropriate. People in Madagascar understood, albeit in various ways, 
that electoral process, freedom of expression, and rule of law all related in some way 
to democratic practice. The experiences and expectations related through TAT 
stories suggested, however, that the ways in which external experts apply these 
indicators through various initiatives remains inadequate (also see Karl 1990). The 
evidence has consistently demonstrated that Western, expert assessments of 
Madagascar’s democratic credentials conflict with the experience of ordinary people. 
More promising, however, is the indication that despite rampant political cynicism 
aspirations for more democratic governance remain intact. Initiatives to assist future 
democratic development in Madagascar could tap into these indigenous democratic 
ambitions; doing so, however, will require a different approach – one that 
acknowledges that democracy assistance professionals may not always know best. In 
the next chapter, I advocate an alternative way of thinking about democracy 
assistance that integrates international objectives with local perceptions of 
appropriate political behaviour.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: S(T)IMULATION 
A style does not go out of style as long as it  
adapts itself to its period. When there is an  
incompatibility between the style and a certain state of mind,  
it is never the style that triumphs. 
(Coco Chanel, cited in Icon Group 2008: 2) 
Historically, democracy assistance and assessment have been largely Western 
projects based on technical blueprints with little reference to individual country 
contexts and socio-political conditions (Bradley 2005: 410, Grugel 2002: 139, Kaplan 
2008a: 18, Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007: 48). It is hardly surprising, therefore, 
that a wealth of research has been compiled on the supply-side of democracy 
assistance while the “functioning effects” (Leininger 2010: 76) or “democracy 
dividend” (Price 2009: 169) of this global effort remains less certain (also see 
Carothers 2002: 8, Diamond 2008a: 315). Even democracy indices purporting to 
measure trends in democratic development give only a very limited indication of how 
democracy works locally, based as they are on discrete Western criteria and 
assessments. This preoccupation with supply-side objectives rather than substantial 
results has generated an abundance of democracy initiatives that suffer “from 
unrealistic visions that feed unreal expectations, or go too much against the grain of 
the system, or lack persistence and commitment” (de Lange 2010: 25). Some projects 
intended to strengthen democracy have instead only served to further undermine it 
(Mwenda 2007, Sunstein 1993: 352). “Intentional plans are always important, but,” 
Ferguson cautions, “never in quite the way the planners imagined” (2002: 402). 
Although it is generally recognised that democracy will likely struggle to take 
root where it is not supported by the host society, political culture has been largely 
regarded as too ambiguous – too fuzzy – to be integrated into mainstream analysis of 
democratic development. Where indigenous culture has been acknowledged, its 
inclusion has remained superficial. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s political 
culture indicator, for example, focuses narrowly on perceptions of political leadership 
and whether or not democracy is capable of maintaining social order and economic 
growth. None of these factors tell us anything about what people expect from their 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 245 
government or how they interpret political behaviour and events. Hyden’s 2010 
working paper on political accountability in Africa provides one recent exception to 
this general rule that might signal a promising trend for forthcoming and future 
research. 
Identifying how ordinary people interpret not only their country’s political 
system but also the objectives of democracy assistance initiatives can help redress the 
current imbalance between the ambitions of the democracy assistance industry and 
those of their supposed beneficiaries. Doing so, however, requires that more 
attention be paid to local concerns and particularities, exactly the sort of “fuzzy 
norms” that Huntington insists “do not yield useful analysis” (1991: 9). The original 
data collected on political culture(s) in the Antsinanana region of Madagascar and 
analysed in Chapters Four through Six demonstrates, to the contrary, that political 
culture can be studied in a pragmatic and meaningful way when conceptualised as 
perceptual lenses and investigated using collaborative research methods.  
This chapter brings together the nine distinct perceptual lenses identified in 
previous chapters to assess how local, non-elite interpretations of both democracy 
and Madagascar’s democratic development compare to those of international 
experts. The chapter begins, however, with a brief account of one USAID 
democracy assistance initiative in Madagascar, identifying both stated objectives and 
persistent difficulties encountered in their implementation. I provide interpretive 
context for these project setbacks using evidence from the perceptual lenses 
identified in previous chapters. The area where I conducted fieldwork is a USAID 
“priority zone” and this particular policy initiative was implemented there. I go on to 
draw inferences about how people in the Antsinanana region interpret democracy 
from both TAT stories and explanations of democracy offered by research 
participants. Although three different interpretations of democracy result from this 
analysis, only one of these bears any real resemblance to that promoted by the 
international democracy assistance industry. This analysis leads me to conclude that a 
distinction must be made between the doctrinal approach to democracy assistance 
that currently dominates policymaking and a more strategic course of action that 
incorporates context sensitive knowledge.  
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MISONGA: A 60-Second Case Study 
In 2004, USAID launched Managing Information and Strengthening 
Organisations for Networked Governance Approaches (MISONGA), an $8.2 million 
project designed to supplement the good governance strategy already outlined in 
President Ravalomanana’s Madagascar Action Plan (MAP).107 PACT and Catholic 
Relief Services, both organisations with past experience working in Madagascar and 
existing field offices, were contracted to implement the project between 2004 and 
2006. At the outset, these organisations identified civil society participation and 
effectiveness as “[t]he greatest challenge [to] building a more democratic society” in 
Madagascar (Pact Inc. and Catholic Relief Services 2006: 5). MISONGA’s three 
strategic objectives – strengthening civil society, improving access to information, 
and improving government responsiveness – aimed to address this shortcoming 
(Pact Inc. and Catholic Relief Services, 2004); reducing corruption was later added as 
a fourth objective (Pact Inc. and Catholic Relief Services 2006).  
The close proximity of these strategic objectives with the formulaic 
democracy assistance priorities identified in Chapter One (i.e. electoral process, 
freedom of expression, rule of law) is illustrated in Figure 29. Together, these priority 
areas establish political participation, political representation, and political 
accountability as three pillars of the democracy assistance agenda. MISONGA 
proposed to strengthen these pillars of democracy by “providing technical support in 
the areas of institutional development, organisational development, advocacy, 
financial management, and strategic management” (Pact Inc. and Catholic Relief 
Services-Madagascar 2004: 3). The three original objectives identified by MISONGA 
planners (i.e. strengthening civil society, improving access to information and 
improving government responsiveness) all fall well within the established parameters 
of technical democracy assistance, focusing primarily on capacity building (e.g. ICT 
and advocacy training) and the creation of infrastructure (e.g. radio broadcasting and 
ICT  facilities).108   Additionally,  organisations   receiving   MISONGA  training  and  
                                                 
107 The Madagascar Action Plan is another name for the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP). 
108 Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz identify support for independent media outlets, including 
journalism training and equipment provision, as the second most funded priority of democracy 
assistance (2007: 44). 
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Figure 29: Three Pillars of Democracy Assistance
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suggest that several dimensions of the project (e.g. e-governance, promoting political 
advocacy) simply proved untenable. The grand ambitions of the project led to 
unrealistic expectations; that it would be possible to establish a sustainable e-
governance platform in a country more accustomed to carbon paper than computers, 
for instance. Indeed, the appropriation of the project’s meaning by local people 
indicates the degree to which project objectives remained disconnected from the 
people they were intended to inspire. In Malagasy, the word misonga means “scaling 
up;” however, the project was commonly referred to as misamonga meaning “joke” 
because of it’s failure to recognise local culture and practices (Ferguson 2007). 
Animosity directed toward President Ravalomanana in TAT stories further suggests 
that project coordinators may have been mistaken to assume that the President’s 
support “assured” the general population of his commitment to liberal democracy.  
In the end, MISONGA experienced a mix of successes and failures. 
Community and regional leaders did participate in skills training and several civil 
society organisations, including Transparency International and l’Association des 
Femmes Maires de Madagascar (the Association of Women Mayors of Madagascar), 
received small grants for budget support and organisational development (Pact Inc. 
and Catholic Relief Services-Madagascar 2004: 6-7). Advocacy training and strategic 
development assistance were also trumpeted as successes in the final report (Pact 
Inc. and Catholic Relief Services 2006). Disproportionate reliance on the expertise 
and objectives of USAID and its partners, however, resulted in several “challenges” 
only briefly addressed by project coordinators. The strategic objective of fostering 
advocacy among civil society organisations, for example, proved particularly flawed 
because “the political environment was not favourable to this type of action” (Pact 
Inc. and Catholic Relief Services 2006: 16). Establishing an e-governance platform 
likewise proved largely unworkable because “local personnel lack[ed] technical skills 
making it difficult to transfer competencies” (Pact Inc. and Catholic Relief Services 
2006: 24). To paraphrase Dryzek, purveyors of democratic “hardware” should not 
presume that supportive local attitudes will immediately emerge in response to highly 
technocratic efforts (1996: 122). Had policy developers paid slightly less reverence to 
industry fashion and looked rather more closely at local circumstances, some of these 
difficulties could have been foreseen and, perhaps, avoided. 
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MISONGA was formulated after, and perhaps in response to, the political 
crisis that paralysed Madagascar for six months between 2001 and 2002. When 
initially implemented in 2004, policy makers identified Madagascar’s most pressing 
challenge to building a more democratic society as “increase[ing] participation and 
effectiveness of civil society in developing solutions to address social and economic 
issues, as well as, natural resource depletion” (Pact Inc. and Catholic Relief Services 
2006). Just over eight years later, Madagascar is again faced with political turmoil 
resulting from a presidential legitimacy crisis. More effective civil society movements 
and increased participation in politics more generally are still necessary precursors to 
substantive democratic governance in this country. Crucially, however, although 
democracy assistance organizations have appropriately identified these problem 
areas, policy efforts to date – MISONGA among them – have underestimated the 
complexity of the relationship between civil society and democratic development 
(Grugel 2002: 115, Quigley 1997: 565). It is, perhaps, not entirely surprising then that 
they have done little to fill the void. 
Expectations and perceptions of ordinary citizens take on new significance in 
light of the practical problems and resistance encountered by MISONGA 
coordinators. Although USAID cited lack of funding as its official reason for 
terminating the project half way though, it is difficult to imagine that the project’s 
lacklustre mid-term results would not have contributed to this decision. Project 
organisers acknowledged that the objective of improving advocacy by civil society109 
organisations failed to gain traction because local organisations worried about being 
perceived by the political establishment as mounting an opposition movement (Pact 
Inc. and Catholic Relief Services 2006: 16).110 Ambitious project objectives that work 
at cross-purposes with local beliefs and expectations will likely encounter resistance, 
as this example illustrates (Dryzek 1990: 135). There is, consequently, practical value 
in coming to terms with different and “unofficial” versions of reality; that the 
existing political environment is not conducive to overt competition in this case 
                                                 
109 For a discussion of the contested boundaries and scope of “civil society” in the context of 
democratic development, see Pankhurst (2000).  
110 Sørensen pointedly questions the efficacy of democracy assistance targeting civil society 
groups, arguing that even with substantial assistance they remain too small to meaningfully 
challenge powerful regimes (2000: 304).  
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(Nazarea et al. 1999a: 219). External policy support cannot foster democratic 
practices where they do not complement existing political expectations and accepted 
behaviour patterns (Grugel 2002: 135). As Mintzberg points out, failure to 
implement a policy effectively must also point to a deficiency in policy formation 
(2000: 25). In the following section, I examine whether local understandings of 
democracy and appropriate political behaviour identified from TAT stories can help 
suggest where MISONGA may have gone wrong.  
What Does Democracy Mean Here? (A Partial Answer) 
The TAT stories told by research participants provide unique insight into 
how ordinary people in eastern Madagascar interpret electoral processes, 
opportunities for political participation and impartiality of the rule of law. As 
anticipated in Chapter Two, individual perceptions of the political sphere identified 
from TAT stories do not overlap or correspond perfectly. There are, however, some 
pronounced trends in the types of stories people told about elections, protests, and 
police encounters, suggesting the possibility that three distinct conceptualisations of 
democracy may exist in the Antsinanana region. Among people consulted for this 
research, democracy was generally conceptualised as (i) an ambiguous aspiration, (ii) 
a particular set of rules, or (iii) (impossible without) freedom of expression. While 
rules-based understandings of democracy broadly coincide with Western 
expectations, it appears as though processes of redefinition are also at work 
(Dagnino 2007: 549). Although research participants occasionally associated 
democracy with political life in Madagascar, they more often contrasted a democratic 
ideal with their own, less satisfactory political experience. 
Democracy is a Big Question Mark 
A plurality of people consulted for this research never took a definitive 
position on either the value of elections or freedom of expression in their TAT 
stories, instead saying that elections are generally worthwhile (the positive lens) and 
protests are sometimes justified (the social divisions lens). This raises the prospect 
that some Malagasy may have a rather ambivalent or uncertain take on contemporary 
political events and their country’s democratic trajectory. Although these research 
participants may not have expressed a definitive opinion about either the quality or 
inclusiveness of national politics, they often indicated that they took an interest in 
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distinctly local issues that have an immediate effect on their daily lives. Likewise, 
TAT stories often indicated that research participants with this outlook were inclined 
to engage in political debate at the local level (the local lens). This position is similarly 
reflected in the general interest these research participants expressed in current 
events, even if they were sometimes unable to access newspapers or other sources of 
information on a regular basis. This combination of perceptual lenses, suggests the 
presence of a political culture that remains hopeful for Madagascar’s democratic 
prospects even if people are unable to pinpoint what ‘real democracy’ might look like 
(Grugel 2002: 87). Claudia aptly summed up this position when she concluded: 
“democracy is a big question mark.” Even so, she remained optimistic that “little by 
little Madagascar is moving toward real democracy.”  
Indeed, one could say that people with this worldview are wearing bifocals. 
Particular circumstances (e.g. how well elections are organised, who is protesting) 
help determine whether they perceive the political sphere broadly speaking – and 
democracy in particular – in a positive or negative light.111 With regard to elections, 
for example, these research participants repeatedly suggested that people were 
generally inclined to vote and looked on the act of voting favourably. From these 
responses, I suspect that a simple poll or survey of these research participants would 
likely have generated a high quantitative score for the value that respondents 
attribute to elections and political participation. Probing deeper, however, TAT 
stories revealed that some people, though positively predisposed toward elections, 
thought of voting as a duty or obligation rather than a free choice. Some voiced 
uncertainty about whether people could be punished for not voting and suggested 
that they voted to protect themselves against possible retribution for abstaining. In a 
similar vein, an anonymous written interview confided: “The political structure in 
Madagascar is very fragile because the labouring masses are reduced to poverty. The 
people are so destitute, the only thing left to sell is their vote.” It would be mistaken, 
therefore, to presume that people value their vote ideologically as a way of 
participating in the political process or showing dissatisfaction with elected officials 
who have failed to meet public expectations. Instead, these research participants 
                                                 
111 For an examination of how and why people switch between alternative cognitive frames (i.e. 
perceptive lenses), see Oberschall (2000). 
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expressed an altogether more pragmatic understanding of the voting process that 
focused either on a) immediate benefits associated with voting for a particular 
candidate, or b) trying to avoid future penalties associated with voting for the ‘wrong’ 
candidate (or abstention). 
These TAT stories further suggested the distinct possibility that many 
Malagasy, though knowledgeable of technical voting procedures, may actually vote 
out of routine or a feeling of obligation instead of any expectation that their vote will 
make a difference to national political outcomes or the actual representation of their 
interests. To illustrate, another anonymous written interview specified: “In 
Madagascar, we have democracy of the strong, but it excludes the weak and the 
opposition. Most people remain mute and unable to act.” Even so, as the graph of 
voter turnout among research participants in Chapter Four illustrates, most people 
said that they had voted in the previous presidential election (see Figure 13). This 
adds to the uncertainty with which we can claim that elections provide Malagasy 
voters with a meaningful venue for political participation, indicating instead a game 
of musical chairs among political elites (Whitehead 2001: 453). Likewise, the extent 
to which these people interpret electoral processes as an opportunity for securing 
political representation – especially at the national level – remains ambiguous. Many 
TAT stories indicative of the positive lens included, remember, an element of 
ambiguity about what elections are for despite the clear inclination of research 
participants to take part (see Chapter Four). 
Research participants who seemed rather unsure about the real purpose of 
elections often also seemed somewhat unsure about what constitutes appropriate 
boundaries for personal freedom of expression. As Chapter Five revealed, TAT 
stories told by research participants indicative of the social divisions lens shared a 
common theme that strikes or demonstrations, while not desirable, are sometimes 
necessary. The analysis of this perceptual lens in Chapter Five also illustrated that 
these research participants exhibited a moderate interest in current affairs only 
infrequently punctured by scepticism about press reliability. Some research 
participants additionally described poverty and illiteracy as barriers that may deter 
some people from accessing information, at least via newspapers. Though 
inconclusive, the competences and dispositions volunteered by these research 
participants in response to the images suggest little more than a tenuous link between 
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political participation and freedom of expression. That said, general interest in 
current affairs indicates that these research participants may put greater value on 
freedom of expression (and freedom of the press) as a tool for gaining information 
and forming (political) preferences. There is little evidence from TAT stories, 
however, that these research participants associate a pluralistic media with the ability 
to hold elected officials accountable in the way that democracy assistance experts 
generally do.  
Although it is impossible to say with any certainty, thematic patterns 
contained in these TAT stories suggest that people who understand democracy in an 
ambiguous way – as a big question mark – would likely have responded well to 
several of MISONGA’s initiatives, particularly those aimed at improving access to 
information and increasing government responsiveness at the local level. Research 
participants seemed genuinely interested in current events indicating that MISONGA 
efforts to improve radio broadcasting capabilities, particularly in rural areas, would 
have been met with appreciation. I further suspect that it is unlikely that people 
subscribing to this particular political culture would have called the project 
misamonga (a joke); at least not at the outset. Although it seems unlikely that these 
research participants share the expectations for political participation, representation, 
and accountability adhered to by the democracy assistance industry, the combination 
of participation and restraint characteristic of their TAT stories suggests that they 
may nevertheless respond reasonably well to democracy assistance efforts.  
Rules-Based Democracy 
A significant minority of those interviewed for this research indicated, by 
contrast, that they understand democracy as a particular set of rules or a prescribed 
way of doing things. As Todilahy pointed out: “In a democracy people can’t just do 
whatever they want. There are rules.” An anonymous written interview similarly 
opined “Democracy is the voice of many people; it is necessary to accept the 
majority [position].” Dispositions characteristic of the positive, passivist, and 
impartial perceptual lenses analysed in previous chapters suggest that these rules 
likely include: (i) citizens should vote, (ii) disputes should be settled through 
discussion and (iii) the law applies to everyone without prejudice. This point of view 
has much in common with that characteristic of the international democracy 
assistance industry, as I illustrate below.  
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Where elections are concerned, these democratic rules include taking part in 
transparent electoral processes, although none of the people taking part in this 
research ever spoke about electoral participation as a human right. Julie, of instance, 
was very enthusiastic that: “During the elections we have democracy. The people are 
free to choose their candidate. Here, the opposition party is free [to participate]. To 
vote is to exercise free choice.” Interestingly, Mattes and Bratton found that positive 
assessments of democracy among Africans were most often offered by people who 
supported the winning political party (2007: 203) It is worth mentioning, therefore, 
that Julie was not bashful about her support for President Ravalomanana, although it 
is impossible to know what proportion of research participants who told TAT stories 
indicative of rules-based democracy likewise supported the President. In any case, 
this confidence in electoral transparency bears little resemblance to the uncertainty 
expressed by research participants whose TAT stories provided evidence of 
alternative perceptions of electoral processes in Madagascar. Moreover, people 
adopting this worldview seem likely not only to perceive electoral processes as 
transparent but also to interpret national politics as transparent by association: 
“Democracy is how you make politics transparent,” another person wrote in an 
anonymous interview. As Chapter Four explained, familiarity with elections coupled 
with an urge to participate reflects the sort of attitude anticipated by both democracy 
assistance policies and the vast literature on democratic development. The meaning 
associated with participation in democratic elections here seems to be political 
transparency, although it remains unclear from this analysis exactly how transparency 
in this context relates to political representation or elite accountability.  
Research participants telling TAT stories indicative of a broad 
conceptualisation of rules-based democracy did not interpret political protest as an 
appropriate course of action (see Chapter Five) and indicated that the law is applied 
impartially (see Chapter Six). Notably, research participants consistently affirmed that 
people need to obey the law regardless of social class. In the words of Hery, “The 
law is the law…it’s for everyone.” As analysis of the impartial perceptual lens in 
Chapter Six demonstrated, some research participants likewise asserted that even rich 
people have to obey the law. Presumably, this position extends to people in positions 
of power, although TAT stories indicative of the impartial lens did not identify the 
man walking his dog in Image 5 as a powerful person. Furthermore, though not 
stated explicitly in TAT stories indicative of the passivist perceptual lens, it was not 
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uncommon for other research participants to suggest that political protests are illegal. 
If this is indeed a common perception, it seems logical that people adhering to a 
rules-based notion of democracy would identify protest as an unreasonable form of 
freedom of expression because it is against the law.  
That said, people who told TAT stories apparently supportive of rules-based 
democracy clearly indicated that they value freedom of expression as a tool for both 
preference formation and political participation. Research participants who told TAT 
stories indicative of the passivist lens often indicated their categorical disapproval of 
open protest, arguing that it is always better to talk about problems or disagreements 
calmly. This position seems to reaffirm, moreover, the apparent proclivity of 
research participants to participate in local politics (e.g. by attending community 
meetings) where issues of common concern like taxes, security, and education can be 
discussed and resolved collectively (see Chapter Four). Positive dispositions toward 
political discussion like these indicate that some people may indeed identify speaking 
about local issues with meaningful political participation. It was likewise common for 
people telling TAT stories indicative of rules-based democracy to express interest in 
current events. While people could have various reasons for wanting to read the 
newspaper, some research participants who told TAT stories indicative of the 
passivist perceptual lens said that it is particularly important to read newspapers in 
the run-up to elections. This position provides additional evidence that freedom of 
expression is related to preference formation and, by extension, political 
representation. 
The three pillars of democracy assistance in Figure 29 identify the interrelated 
expectations for electoral processes, freedom of expression, and rule of law ingrained 
in democracy assistance efforts like MISONGA. I expect that people who have 
adopted a rules-based understanding of democracy would broadly agree with the 
emphasis democracy assistance places on electoral process, freedom of expression, 
and rule of law. It is rather unlikely that most research participants whose TAT 
stories indicated this particular political culture would be familiar with the democratic 
standards set by international organizations or foreign academics. That said, the 
liberal, rules-based definition of democracy maintained by the international 
democracy assistance industry is nevertheless largely compatible with this local point 
of view. The positions outlined in TAT stories lead me to believe that MISONGA 
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efforts to buttress political participation and representation through improving 
access to information and strengthening civil society organisations would resonate 
with people subscribing to this political culture. What is less clear, however, is how 
these research participants would have interpreted MISONGA’s anti-corruption 
initiatives. On one had, targeting corruption strengthens the rule of law; on the other, 
the impartial perceptual lens did not identify corruption as a problem.  
Democracy Cannot Exist Without Freedom of Speech 
Finally, at the opposite end of the spectrum, roughly one-third of people 
whose TAT stories strongly indicated support for political protest (the dissident lens) 
also indicated that they had little or no faith in elections (the tedious lens) or the 
impartiality of police (the crooked lens). Moreover, slightly under half of the people I 
spoke to either strongly indicated that democracy cannot exist without freedom of 
speech or else explicitly defined democracy as freedom of speech. While there is not 
enough data to draw statistically relevant conclusions, the apparent association 
between democracy and free speech made by some research participants clearly 
suggests a third possible political culture.112 This particular worldview has little faith 
in electoral processes or the impartiality of the law. That research participants telling 
these sorts of TAT stories depicted protest as the only remaining way to make their 
voices heard might help explain why they perceive democracy as (impossible 
without) free speech. It also offers an interpretation for why they failed to 
understand how Western observers could think Madagascar was a democracy at all.  
Extreme voter fatigue generally characterised TAT stories indicative of this 
point of view. What is the point of voting, research participants asked, if the party in 
power decides the results long before election day? This sentiment common among 
TAT stories indicative of the tedious lens contrasts sharply with the more positive 
accounts of voting discussed above. It also runs counter to the expectations of 
democracy assistance providers, who associate voting in elections with political 
participation. The diagram in Figure 29 illustrates how the rule of law theoretically 
                                                 
112 Survey data collected by Marcus a decade ago likewise indicates that, for many Malagasy, 
democracy has less to do with formal state functions than “the personal freedoms it offers” 
(Marcus, Mease, and Ottemoeller 2001: 130).  
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enhances political participation by protecting electoral participation. An anonymous 
written interview response revealed, however, that “everyone has the right to vote 
but manipulations exclude a lot of people;” examples of these “manipulations” are 
discussed in Chapter Four. Although the majority of people expressing this point of 
view also often indicated that they had voted in the previous presidential election, 
their certainty that electoral results are manipulated raises questions about the 
reliability of elections as indicators of political representation or, indeed, meaningful 
political participation.  
In contrast to their descriptions of hollow elections, research participants 
expressing signs of a political cultural worldview that closely associates democracy 
with free speech believed that political protest could make a difference. It is this 
interpretation of protest as legitimate political action, coupled with the belief that 
democracy cannot exist where freedom of expression is stifled, that distinguishes this 
point of view from the other two discussed above. “Public participation in political 
decisions is possible when there are protests against the people in power,” one 
person stated in an anonymous written interview. Other research participants 
similarly lamented that the only way for normal people to experience democracy and 
exercise their political voice is voting, despite putting little faith in the electoral 
system (see Chapter Four). Indeed, Pierre thought that people had no choice but to 
protest if they wanted to improve their lives, finding electoral participation 
ineffective and a waste of time. This point of view contrasts sharply with the 
expectations of democracy experts, who perceive electoral processes as a means of 
both political participation and political representation. 
Tellingly, people who defined democracy in this way also tended to say that 
they had never experienced democracy or that democracy does not exist in 
Madagascar, citing pervasive censorship. Not only did people who told these sorts of 
TAT stories suggest that the press was unreliable and cowed by the government,113 
rumours of political imprisonment were rampant and caused palpable anxiety. As I 
pointed out in Chapter Five, a small number of research participants who told TAT 
                                                 
113 The 2008 Bertelsmann Stiftung Madagascar country report concurs that journalists and editors 
“are sometimes too hesitant” to fully exercise their freedoms and that censorship is not unheard 
of (2007: 6-7). 
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stories vehemently supportive of free speech rights said during their TAT interviews 
that they were afraid to speak openly for fear of being overheard. Others voiced 
similar concerns after the recorder had been switched off, fears substantiated in an 
interview with national representatives of Madagascar’s largest civil society 
organisation, KMF-CNOE. Indicative of this point of view, one anonymous 
respondent to the written interview questions expressed his/her dissatisfaction with 
Malagasy politics by writing: “In my opinion, democracy is the combination of 
freedom and truth. Power comes with freedom, the power to speak the truth.” This 
helps explain why so many of these research participants expressed feelings of 
powerlessness and voicelessness in the political domain, whether because of 
pervasive censorship, the illegality of political protest, or the futility of voting. 
From this analysis, it seems reasonable to assume that people with this 
political cultural outlook may have appreciated MISONGA’s intention to improve 
access to information and, by association, promote political participation. The 
competences and dispositions contained in TAT stories lead me to suspect, however, 
that people who define democracy as freedom of expression would have been 
immediately suspicious of the project’s motives when President Ravalomanana 
appeared alongside project organisers at the national launch. Contrary to the 
assessment made by PACT and Catholic Relief Services that the President’s 
association with the project would add to its legitimacy, the suspicion of President 
Ravalomanana expressed in some TAT stories contributing to the identification of 
this particular worldview indicate that his involvement may have discredited the 
project from the beginning; although, it is impossible to gauge from this sample 
exactly how damaging this may have been. “The notion of political equality is 
virtually nonexistent in Madagascar,” one anonymous written interview disclosed, 
“Only the party in power can function normally and at the same time it influences 
the media. The opposition, by contrast, always come up against obstacles like censors 
and sabotage.” While it is impossible to know the extent to which this perspective is 
based in fact, people nevertheless perceive this as true with very real consequences 
(Thomas and Thomas 1928: 572). Given that this political cultural perspective 
identifies the regime in power as the instigator of both media and self-censorship, it 
is not difficult to understand why some people may have interpreted outside efforts 
endorsed by President Ravalomanana to improve access to information and increase 
government responsiveness as little more than a joke.  
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It is not entirely surprising that democracy, when viewed through this 
composite lens, is more abstract  – and thought by some to be unattainable. 
According to Velohasina, 
The President says ‘democracy this’ and ‘democracy that’ but the reality doesn’t 
match. The problem is that the President and other ministers go abroad and say 
things that bear no relation to life here, real life in Madagascar. Real democracy is 
when power is in the hands of the people. Here, people talk about democracy but 
we have never experienced it. 
Julien similarly explained: “In my opinion, democracy is the right to express yourself. 
People have the right to criticise their leaders when they have done something 
wrong. The people and the workers have the right to strike and reclaim their rights.” 
These people distinguish freedom as elemental to democracy, including the freedom 
to vote in a transparent election and freedom to voice opinions in opposition to the 
ruling party, principles not incongruous with those outlined in Figure 29. It is more 
difficult, however, to reconcile the sorts political behaviour endorsed by democracy 
assistance policies with those depicted in TAT stories indicative of the tedious and 
dissident perceptual lenses. Research participants who defined democracy as freedom 
of expression identified opting not to participate in flawed electoral processes and 
taking part in political protests as appropriate responses to what they perceived as 
Madagascar’s democratic deficit.  
Through this composite perceptual lens, the existing political system prevents 
genuine democratic development by denying ordinary people the freedom to 
publically disagree with decisions made by powerful elites. This has distinct 
consequences for the quality of the participatory relationship between citizens and 
democracy because the perceived socio-political context influences the sorts of 
political behaviour people think they are capable of (Dryzek and Holmes 2002). 
Their desire to participate in a meaningful discussion about what sort of political 
system they want to be members of and inability to do so contributes to the 
dissatisfaction voiced by people who perceive democracy as freedom of expression 
(Dagnino 2007: 552). As I suggest below, attempts to mediate the current political 
stalemate that propose holding new elections without addressing – or even 
recognising – these grievances will likely prove short-sighted. 
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Democratic Crisis or Crisis of Confidence? 
It is not difficult to understand why outside observers were surprised by the 
violence and discontent that gripped Madagascar in the early months of 2009. While 
almost anyone would admit that the political system was far from perfect, the 
country seemed to be charting a slow-but-steady course toward democracy. 
Moreover, the results from Afrobarometer’s most recent survey, conducted in June 
and July 2008, indicate widespread support for Ravalomanana. So where did it all go 
wrong? I have sought to demonstrate here that the tools we commonly rely on to 
assess democracy in developing countries are useful but insufficient and, crucially, 
may fail to take into account how local people perceive their own political 
environment (also see Koelble and Lipuma 2010). The flattering portrait of 
Madagascar painted by democracy indices in Chapter One seems to bear only a 
partial resemblance to the country as viewed through the eyes of its own citizens. 
The results of my qualitative study are neither as statistically representative nor as 
conclusive as conventional datasets; nevertheless, they provide a more nuanced basis 
for interpreting the 2009 political crisis than existing democracy metrics.  
One month into the crisis, a Malagasy journalist offered this observation: 
“the people in the capital, Antananarivo and all over the Madagascar [sic] are divided 
into two. Some of them are really for Marc Ravalomanana, and some of them are 
also for Andry Rajoelina, and there is also another part that stays on quiet [sic] and on 
the fence” (Clottey 2009). This observation largely coincides with the three political 
cultures regarding democracy identified above: people who describe democracy as 
rules-based are likely to support Ravalomanana114, those who define democracy as 
freedom of expression probably side with Rajoelina, and research participants for 
whom democracy is a big question mark are the “fence sitters.” 
The analysis above demonstrates that some people (i.e. those who perceive 
democracy as rules-based) were likely broadly supportive of the existing political 
system prior to January 2009 when the first signs of unrest became apparent. People 
whose political outlook conforms at least somewhat to international expectations of 
                                                 
114 As illustrated in the Preface to Part II, during the 2009 political crisis Ravalomanana relied on 
rules-based rhetoric while Rajoelina’s political message had a distinct freedom of expression 
element. 
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democracy seem likely to accept the international assessment that the country is in 
the midst of a democratic crisis as well as subsequent mediation efforts and the new 
elections they endorse. Likewise, Malagasy citizens who remain unsure of what 
democracy means might reasonably go along with international mediation efforts 
despite any lingering reservations about the political status-quo prior to the most 
recent upheaval. Based on the analysis above, I suspect that neither of these groups, 
accounting for slightly over half of the people I interviewed, is likely to be convinced 
by the unilateral claims to legitimacy made by Rajoelina’s High Transitional 
Authority.  
People who see the world through the tedious and dissident perceptual 
lenses, by contrast, clearly expressed their disillusionment with President 
Ravalomanana’s unfulfilled promises of democracy. This malaise can be attributed to 
at least two distinct causes. First, people for whom democracy means freedom of 
speech remain unconvinced by electoral processes and are unlikely to be persuaded 
by official election results. In the eyes of these research participants, President 
Ravalomanana’s legitimacy had long since been called into question. Secondly, this 
dissatisfaction was enhanced by the conviction that the regime stifled political speech 
and meaningful participation through censorship and, albeit to a lesser extent, by 
banning political protest.115 It may be significant, therefore, that protests first broke 
out when President Ravalomanana temporarily closed Rajoelina’s TV station after it 
broadcast an interview with exiled former President Ratsiraka. This could have been 
interpreted by some people as a final hypocritical assault on democratic freedoms. In 
which case, the protests that ensued may have been perceived as a democratic 
opening – a rare opportunity to voice pent-up dissatisfaction.116  
                                                 
115 After the crisis broke out, a former minister was quoted as saying “The current crisis is caused 
by violations of democratic values…There may be several newspapers, public and private radio 
and television channels…But the people’s aspirations are not being taken into account” (AFP 
2009b). Six opposition leaders were also arrested in early February, purportedly for organising a 
public meeting without permission (Associated Press 2009). These reports lend credibility to the 
accusations of censorship and politically motivated arrest voiced by some research participants, 
suggesting that their perceptions may have indeed been based on actual events rather than 
hearsay or fabrication.   
116 It would be interesting to dissect Madagascar’s 2009 political crisis in terms of “rightful 
resistance,” although it is beyond the scope of this analysis to do so in any detail. In brief, rightful 
resistance operates on the edge of the law to expose hypocrisy by exploiting divisions among 
elites; it is “invariably noisy, public, and open” (O’Brien 1996: 33-34). From the sparse 
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Crucially, people who interpret democracy as freedom of speech seem 
unlikely to agree with the characterisation of the current impasse as a democratic 
crisis or be placated for long by the internationally mediated solution of a unity 
government and pending elections. In their eyes, the political sphere prior to 2009 
was dominated by an autocratic regime that limited free speech, suppressed 
supporters of the opposition, and undermined fair electoral procedures. In short, 
there was no democracy to preserve. Moreover, democracy has often been achieved 
through struggle: “it is something to be taken, not given” (Barber 1996: 144-145). 
Writing about the Latin American context, Dagnino similarly affirms: “the struggle 
for rights, for the right to have rights, had to be a political struggle” (2007: 551). 
While not all research participants who associated democracy with freedom of 
expression told TAT stories depicting political struggle, their frustration signals a 
churning desire to take control of their own political future. It would seem that the 
widespread legitimacy of mediation efforts relies at least in part on addressing the 
grievances of this political culture group; precisely how that might be accomplished, 
however, is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
On a more technical point, there are few indications that concerns about 
electoral fraud will be addressed or that substantive safeguards will be instituted to 
protect free speech for supporters of opposition candidates prior to the organisation 
of new elections. Research participants who I suspect see their world through the 
tedious and dissident perceptual lenses voiced serious concerns about the ability of 
opposition parties to organise, let alone campaign openly (see Chapter Five). Under 
these conditions, elections do not provide voters with genuine choice nor, for that 
matter, should their results be taken at face value as a sign of political legitimacy (Ng 
1997: 22). Holding elections at the earliest possible opportunity, therefore, might 
increase the legitimacy of Madagascar’s political leadership in the eyes of some – and 
the international community in particular (Lough 2009c, Lough 2009d) – but are 
unlikely to address the very real concerns of disgruntled would-be democrats. 
                                                 
information available, this concept would seem to apply reasonably well to the protesters in the 
early days of the unrest before it exploded into a full-blown crisis. Protesters exploited the rift 
between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana while exposing the latter’s hypocrisy on free speech rights. 
In other words, they used their participatory rights to challenge the legitimacy of a particular 
political elite, not the political system itself. Determining just how far the concept of rightful 
resistance applies to this case would, however, require substantial additional research.  
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 Persistent socio-political inequality was also a latent theme of many TAT 
stories. The real issue here, however, is not economic but political: are state resources 
distributed equitably? TAT stories often revealed a pragmatic outlook that recognised 
and accepted the established social hierarchy. Some research participants indicated, 
for instance, that they remain resigned to social inequality and identified a 
paternalistic role for the governing elite, sometimes literally equating the government 
to a parent. Others, however, voiced frustration that their lives were not getting any 
better despite new mining ventures exploiting the country’s vast mineral wealth. The 
land deal that President Ravalomanana brokered with the South Korean firm 
Daewoo Logistics is just the most blatant example of an agreement made by his 
regime on behalf of the country but not perceived by all to be in the country’s best 
interests (Bearak 2009b, Dyer 2009, Jung-a, Oliver, and Burgis 2008, Mahr 2009). 
Indeed, rescinding this deal was one of the first things Rajoelina did as head of the 
High Transitional Authority (Dyer 2009). It is the unchecked behaviour of elected 
political elites, rather that economic stagnation alone, that leads to increased 
disenchantment with formal democratic regimes (Diamond 2008a: 165, Mattes and 
Bratton 2007: 198-201, Zakaria 2003: 14).  
Continued failure to meaningfully address the hopelessly fractured party 
system and safeguard arenas for genuine political debate may lead to increased 
disenchantment with the promise of democracy, while failing to break the cycle of 
unrest and suppression that has characterised much of Madagascar’s post-
independence political history (Marcus and Ratsimbaharison 2005). Instead of 
interpreting the events of early 2009 as a democratic crisis with an abominable coup 
at its apex, the analysis of local conceptualisations of democracy above suggests that 
it might be more instructive to interpret them as a crisis of confidence in both 
existing political elites and institutions – elections included – that some people do 
not perceive as democratic. “Democracy is an experiment,” Menand reminds us, 
“And it is in the nature of experiments sometimes to fail” (2001: 433). The political 
turmoil in and of itself need not be a disaster. Just as a failed scientific experiment 
can lead to new knowledge, better understanding, and even future success, so too 
can political upheaval. The real crisis will result if international experts and domestic 
political elites do not identify the underlying causes of political unrest and learn to 
meaningfully address them.  
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Strategy vs. Doctrine: Finding A New Way Forward 
When angry hordes took to the streets of Antananarivo in the early months 
of 2009, outside observers struggled to contextualise the scenes of unrest. The 
sudden eruption of mass public demonstrations seemed incongruous with the 
relative strength and stability attested to by democracy assessment indices, public 
opinion data, and the expert assessment of international financial institutions. 
International concern deepened when, in March 2009, President Ravalomanana 
resigned and power was unconstitutionally transferred to his young rival, Rajoelina.  
It is hardly surprising that journalists covering the political upheaval in 2009 
succumbed to the dogged demands of a 24-hour news cycle, called ‘coup’ and swiftly 
moved on to the next (no doubt similarly truncated) news item. More worrying has 
been the unequivocal response of the international community to this perceived 
democratic crisis. Despite the rapid organization of a High Transitional Authority 
and the promise of elections by October 2010,117 Rajoelina has been almost 
universally shunned on the international stage. Development assistance has dried up, 
and fledgling civil society organizations grapple ill-equipped with the crucial task of 
devising a national peace and reconciliation process. A tentative agreement on the 
construction of a unity government was reached through internationally mediated 
talks in early November 2009. This agreement was never fully implemented, 
however, and all indications suggest that prospects for the inception of an effective 
interim power-sharing agreement remain slim. 
When the position of the international community is added to the analysis of 
local conceptualisations of democracy above, two contradictory interpretations of the 
current political stalemate begin to emerge. The international community has 
observed a democratic crisis, an assessment most likely shared by those Malagasy 
who likewise interpret democracy as rules-based. Setting Madagascar back on a 
course to democratic development will require the adoption of a new constitution 
closely followed by free and fair elections. The perspective of some research 
participants that democracy cannot exist without freedom of expression coupled 
with the dogged protests that eventually led to President Ravalomanana’s sudden 
                                                 
117 Presidential elections have been scheduled for 26 November 2010 (Iloniaina, Richard and 
Ireland 2010). 
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resignation alternatively suggests that a significant portion of the Malagasy 
population may harbour entrenched uncertainties about past electoral procedure and 
perceived restrictions on free speech rights. Internationally brokered mediation 
efforts to date have completely overlooked these very real concerns.  
 It is in the very nature of policy development that opposing parties vie over 
definitions of the problem and control of the cure (Schön and Rein 1994: 29). In the 
context of democratic development, however, the debate is almost always lopsided; 
both the ‘problem’ and what should be done about it are defined almost exclusively 
by international experts rather than local actors (Quigley 1997: 566). Having 
demonstrated the interconnectedness of actors, interests, and worldviews (i.e. 
political cultures), it stands to reason that approaches to resolving Madagascar’s 
ongoing stalemate that do not recognise the distinct worldviews of different 
stakeholder groups are unlikely to provide lasting stability. Likewise, if we accept that 
democratic development depends on an amalgamation of international and domestic 
support, then it seems that we need to reconsider the importance of local contexts 
and conditions, including the conceptualisations of democracy supported by local 
actors (Almond 1996: 9-10, Andrews 2008: 399, Hyden 2010: 11, Quigley 1997: 566, 
Whitehead 2001: 24). In short, there must be a transformation in the way the global 
democracy assistance industry and international experts relate to the citizens in 
developing countries whose vested interests may stand at odds with standardised 
projects and proposals (Diamond 2008a: 315).  
The differentiation between doctrine and strategy made by Kilcullen in the 
context of response to counterinsurgency also applies to democracy assistance policy 
(Wolf 2009). The almost formulaic reliance of international actors on rapid ‘free-and-
fair’ elections and the creation of power sharing agreements or unity governments in 
recent years represents a rigid, doctrinal approach to addressing the complex, 
context-specific problems that have destabilised Madagascar (BBC News 2009b, 
Iloniaina 2009b, Lough 2009d).118 In March 2010, the International Crisis Group 
published new policy recommendations for ending the political crisis in Madagascar 
that notably dismiss the potential of a establishing an interim power-sharing 
                                                 
118 Power-sharing unity governments have also been endorsed in recent years as solutions to 
political crises in other polities, including Zimbabwe, Iraq and the Palestinian territories. 
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agreement. Despite calling for a change of direction, however, the report 
nevertheless concludes that a new constitution followed by elections represents the 
“only realistic option” for brokering a settlement among competing political elites 
(International Crisis Group 2010, Kroslak and Larbuisson 2010). This patently un-
original solution blindly ignores the pent-up frustration and explosive agency of non-
elite stakeholders whose street protests have not only undermined but actually 
unseated elected officials in the past. 
The realization of more than illusory results requires that we untangle 
strategy from doctrine, at which point it becomes possible to approach challenges to 
democracy on a contextual basis and according to local standards (de Lange 2010: 23, 
Hope 2009: 82). Distinguishing doctrine from strategy with regards to democracy 
assistance policy would require substantial, additional research and goes some way 
beyond the purview of this thesis. Therefore, in this section I will just briefly outline 
the key differences between doctrine and strategy before suggesting in broad strokes 
how a more strategic approach to democracy assistance could meaningfully 
incorporate conceptualisations of democracy and expectations for political 
engagement ensconced in local political cultures. 
Doctrine 
The word “doctrine” has several discrete definitions with varying 
connotations. Taken together, however, they neatly typify the predominant policy 
approaches adopted by the global democracy assistance industry. According to the 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary, “doctrine” can be: a) something taught; b) a position 
or set of principles contained in a knowledge or belief system, a dogma; c) a legal 
principle established by previous decisions; d) a fundamental government policy, 
particularly in the area of international relations; e) a set of military strategies. 
Common to all of these meanings is the connotation of a default position; an 
established point of departure upon which future decisions are based.  
The discussion of democracy assistance and assessment criteria in Chapter 
One established electoral procedure, freedom of expression and rule of law as key 
elements of most contemporary democracy assistance agendas. This was further 
substantiated by the brief account of MISONGA project priorities, above. In this 
section, I will demonstrate these democracy assistance criteria have taken on 
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doctrinal status within the industry. As previously noted, regardless of location or 
context, “democracy on the instalment plan” characterises many if not most 
democracy assistance programs. Indeed, it has been revealed that funding debates 
amongst policymakers at DFID are regularly dominated by talk of which 
prerequisites to prioritise instead of which countries could benefit most from 
particular types of aid (Youngs 2008: 16).  
This preoccupation with prioritisation is not entirely surprising when one 
considers that the criteria for democratic development are (a) widely taught and 
discussed in the literature on democratic development. As outlined in Chapter One, 
these indicators espouse (b) a set of principles (e.g. political participation, political 
representation, political accountability) that dogmatically constrain the realm of 
reasonable policy objectives. Although neither electoral process nor freedom of 
expression is itself a legal principle, the regularity with which they are included in 
democracy assistance projects nevertheless suggests (c) the institutionalisation of 
certain practices and expectations both within particular agencies and across the field 
more generally. While the rallying cry “democracy!” may have been replaced in recent 
years by “good governance!” the establishment of free and fair elections 
supplemented by freedom of expression and enshrined in rule of law are (d) 
fundamental policy priorities of both international and bi-lateral democracy 
assistance programmes supplemented by vocal commitments from leaders of 
developing countries with respect to their domestic agendas. Finally, while these 
criteria in and of themselves are not (e) military strategies, it is not unheard of for 
democracy to be promoted at gunpoint; the muddled agendas tasked with 
establishing electoral democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq immediately spring to mind. 
The above analysis based on a five-pronged definition of “doctrine” compellingly 
suggests that electoral process, freedom of expression and rule of law currently 
espoused by the global democracy assistance industry have taken on a doctrinal 
character (also see Whitehead 2001: 451). This position is further supported when 
contrasted with a similarly detailed examination of “strategy,” below. 
Strategy 
In stark contrast to the dogmatic nature of doctrine, strategy is – by 
definition – creative and flexible, adaptable to the nuances of particular situations. 
My starting point is once again the multi-layered definition provided by Merriam-
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Webster; to paraphrase that dictionary “strategy” is: a) the science and art of 
employing resources to their maximum effect in supporting policies of peace or war; 
b) a careful plan; c) the art of creating and implementing plans in pursuit of a goal; d) 
an adaptation or set of adaptations conducive to evolutionary success. One feature 
that immediately differentiates “strategy” from “doctrine” is the notion that strategy 
is an art – a creative and interpretive process – whereas doctrine tends to be rigidly 
and historically entrenched. This characteristic inventiveness similarly crops up in the 
literature on social-strategy (Paquette 2002) and management (Mintzberg 2000, 
Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel 2009), both of which have policy-making and 
planning dimensions.   
It is, moreover, crucial to differentiate between indoctrination – characterised 
by blind adherence to a given philosophy – and learning, which promotes critical 
inquiry and debate. This distinction is important because genuine learning “inevitably 
plays a key role, if not the key role, in the development of all strategies that are novel” 
(Mintzberg 2000: 227, emphasis original). Indoctrination, meanwhile, could be said 
to lead to the recycling of tired and tried ideas in ways that might look bright and 
shiny or have fancy new labels but are, nevertheless, no longer fit for purpose. 
Accordingly, I argue here that good governance and democracy promotion projects 
like MISONGA have been handicapped by blind adherence to doctrine. On the 
upside, it stands to reason that policy makers and practitioners open to serendipitous 
discovery and capable of appreciating the distinct nuance of individual country 
contexts can make inroads in what has been an often frustrating endeavour.  
The notion that democracy assistance would benefit from an approach that 
recognises the uniqueness of individual countries is not new (Barber 1996: 144). Nor, 
for that matter does it necessarily insinuate a shift away from studying democratic 
development in comparative context. Instead, it proposes that we suspend our 
prejudices, forget what we know about what democracy is supposed to look like, and 
allow for the possibility that in order to achieve substantive results the system might 
need to look somewhat different. There is ample evidence if one looks across Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America that the transfer of democratic institutions has not yielded a 
uniform approach to democratic governance (Grugel 2002: 123). The rationality of a 
“standardised blueprint” (Collier 2007: 149, Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007: 4) is 
irreconcilable with the idea that “it is the citizens of a society themselves” who must 
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determine what their democracy will look like (Price 2009: 170). In this vein, Joseph 
(1997: 365) and Saward (1998: 57) both attempt to define democracy without 
reference to elections while O’Donnell distinguishes between rule of law and “a 
reasonable application of what the rule of law is supposed to be” (2004: 34). Perhaps 
more importantly, there appears to be growing acceptance of the need for a more 
strategic approach within the democracy assistance industry, briefly discussed in the 
following section. 
While, for the sake of argument, the above discussion starkly differentiates 
between strategy and doctrine, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel use the example of 
the ‘little black dress’ (i.e. LBD) to illustrate how it is possible for the best of 
strategies to endure for decades, essentially establishing a doctrine of basic principles 
in the long-term. If this is the case, then the little black dress might be able to offer 
some useful pointers for future democracy assistance policies. Coco Chanel designed 
the original little black dress in the 1920s. Variations on her timeless classic are, 
however, still found across a wide spectrum of women’s fashion retailers today. 
According to Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, policy strategies designed following 
the “LBD model” would “eschew the faddish, and focus instead on basic elements 
of an enduring nature, incorporating a versatility and openness that invited their 
‘wearers’ to add the adornments that [sic] saw fit to the occasion at hand.” They go 
on to say:  
Perhaps most importantly, they would make us feel better about ourselves when we 
worked with them. And not in an insincere, preachy kind of ‘call-to-greatness’ way, 
but in a quiet way that emphasised our positives while acknowledging our flaws, all 
in the service of offering us hope for a better/thinner tomorrow. (Mintzberg, 
Ahlstrand, and Lampel 2009: 29) 
In other words, it is possible to remain consistent in what you are creating (i.e. a little 
black dress, democratic governance) while experimenting with different approaches 
in how you go about constructing it (Carothers 2009b).  As the next section 
illustrates, effective policies rely on both sound doctrine and adept strategy, the 
essential trick lies in finding a balance between learning from experience and context 
appropriate innovation.  
Toward a New Strategy for Democratic Development 
Having ballooned into a multi-billion dollar industry, a “real consensus” has 
now emerged that sustainable development – democratic or economic – requires 
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more than simply “throwing money and external knowledge at problems” (Hope 
2009: 82). This is not to say that money and external knowledge are not useful; they 
are, and should be applied prudently. Nor is it enough, however, to merely 
understand how democratic politics is conceptualised locally. Rather, I propose that 
one guiding objective of a more strategic approach to democracy assistance must be 
to generate insights from local understanding that clarify how external assistance 
(whether money, knowledge, or both) can enhance indigenous trajectories of 
democratic change (Dryzek and Holmes 2002: ix, Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith: 2005: 
220, Kaplan 2008b: 156). As Pritchett and Woolcock note, “one size does not fit all” 
does not mean that “any size fits any” or “anything goes” (2003: 193). In other 
words, in advocating a more pluralistic vision of democratic development we must 
not lose sight of democracy’s central tenant, namely citizen control over government; 
that “some interpretations of democracy may be better than others” still stands 
(Lawson 2000: 82-83). Political culture(s) can, however, provide an indication of 
“which size fits which,” giving professionals engaged in policy formation and 
implementation a better idea of local factors that will likely influence what works 
(Andrews 2008: 397).  
Indeed, support for a more strategic approach to democracy assistance has 
already started to emerge from established academic (Andrews 2008: 397. Barber 
1996: 145, Bradley 2005: 409, Browne 2001: 149, Burnell 2000: 25, Diamond 2008b: 
48, Shapiro 2003: 147) and policy circles (Carothers 2009b, Hope 2009, Kaplan 
2008a, Pritchett and Woolcock 2003, UNDP 2010b). Moreover, there appears to be 
growing consensus that democracy and good governance rely not only on 
institutional capacity, but on human commitment as well (Dietz et al. 2009: 20, Hope 
2009: 79). For instance, Hyden persuasively argues that African politicians must be 
“allowed to ‘live’ their own rules” even as countries grapple with democratic reform. 
Binding African politicians in “Western institutional straightjackets,” he speculates, is 
more likely to further frustrate democratic progress than facilitate it (Hyden 2010: 2). 
In other words, commitment to democratic reform may improve with recognition of 
local customs and behaviour patterns that make sense to and, crucially, address the 
needs of local people (Pritchett and Woolcock 2003).  
Similar emphasis has been placed on grassroots initiatives that go to the heart 
of democratic participation (Price 2009: 169, Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007: 5). 
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The potential of supplementing (or even substituting) institutional and technocratic 
development assistance with initiatives that bolster human capacity and “indigenous 
assets” to solve problems locally is another avenue that has yet to be fully explored 
(Kaplan 2008a, Raab 2008). Despite the increasing popularity of democracy 
initiatives that ‘make sense’ locally, Grugel warns that we should remain cautiously 
optimistic until we know whether this approach generates new sets of problems 
(2002: 137). She has a point; the scrap heap of technocratic projects that have failed 
to deliver suggests, however, that blind adherence to doctrine does not provide the 
way forward. 
In Chapter One I criticised democracy assessment indices as over reliant on 
external, often Western assessments. While the producers of popular indices like 
Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit show no signs of overhauling 
their monitoring procedures, Erkkilä and Piironen (2009b) identify a shift away from 
this sort of composite index towards more disaggregated measurements of 
democratic development. Representative of this shift, International IDEA has spent 
the past several years developing a country-led democracy assessment framework 
based on the principles of popular control and political equality (Beetham et al. 2001: 
13). In addition to raising public awareness of democracy and democratic reform, the 
State of Democracy Assessment Methodology aims to provide systematic evidence 
of citizens’ concerns and perceptions (Beetham et al. 2008). UNDP has developed a 
similar procedure for country-led democracy assessments that support countries in 
“undertaking a reflective and systematic evaluation” of domestic governance (2009: 
8).119 In contrast to mainstream indices that aggregate several indicators into a single 
score, these audit procedures provide citizens with a disaggregated evaluation of their 
country’s democracy that defines areas of both strength and weakness (Beetham 
1994b: 34).  
The wider recognition of democracy assessment procedures such as these 
could have important ramifications for future democracy assistance policy. 
                                                 
119 International IDEA and UNDP have joined forces in support of Chile’s country-led 
democracy assessment. This project has a clearly stated objective of “developing a democracy 
assessment framework through a national collective and inclusive reflection process,” and 
definitively  “does not intend to identify how democratic democracy is in Chile in comparison with 
other countries, or with an externally defined normative ideal” (UNDP 2010a). 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
 272 
Assessments that are embedded in local context could be used, for example, to better 
determine different needs from country to country. In this vein, Price suggests that 
an annual assessment of global democracy modelled after the US State Department’s 
annual country reports could provide an additional tool useful to policy developers 
(2009: 168). I maintain, however, that a qualitative assessment like that proposed by 
Price must not fall into the all-to-common pattern of overreliance on expert 
assessments, but should instead encourage the wider employment of country-led 
techniques like those pioneered by IDEA and UNDP. Moreover, country-led 
democracy assessments have added value in stimulating domestic dialogue about 
democracy and what democratic development should look like locally in addition to 
producing an assessment of use to international actors. While country-based 
assessments are not immune to prejudice and abuse, they are more likely than 
traditional indices to capture political cultural trends and, therefore, represent a step 
in the right direction. 
One visible sign of a shift in favour of more grounded policies is the turn 
toward distinctly “participatory” and “evidence-based” approaches to policy 
development (Dietz et al. 2009, Olken 2010, Pretty 1995, Pritchett and Woolcock 
2003, UNDP 2010b; for a critique, see Lazarus 2008). Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) ostensibly advocate taking a more participatory and local approach 
to policy formulation. However, the capacity and willingness of the PRSP process to 
meaningfully engage traditionally disenfranchised groups has come under attack 
(Cheru 2006, Craig and Porter 2003, Lazarus 2008). Pretty, for instance, notes that 
emphasis on “participation” often results in people being “dragged into” exercises of 
little or no interest to them (1995: 1251). Cheru (2006) likewise sites lack of 
government commitment and the resistance of donors to cede control as serious 
challenges to genuine participation of local stakeholders (also see Hellinger 1992).  
Public opinion surveys have also grown in popularity. Indeed MISONGA 
project organisers budgeted $50,000 for an anti-corruption baseline survey to identify 
common perceptions of corruption in Madagascar (Pact Inc. and Catholic Relief 
Services-Madagascar 2004: 17). Unfortunately, use of this particular survey appears to 
have been limited to identifying project indicators, and it is unclear to what extent 
MISONGA organisers sought genuine citizen participation in defining either the 
problem or possible solutions. While projects that are not comprehensible or 
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accessible to local people run the real risk of alienating them, adherence to local 
standards requires local knowledge. As evidenced by criticism of PRSPs, this is where 
context specific strategy making begins to encounter technical difficulties. How can 
outsiders become intimately aware of local needs and perceptions?  
Kilcullen addresses this dilemma by acknowledging that there is a trade-off 
between effectiveness and control. Development assistance organisations may “fear” 
that public involvement in policymaking processes is difficult to control, but Pretty is 
quick to point out that “stage-managed forms of participation” will most likely result 
in distrust and even greater alienation (1995: 1252). Kilcullen’s response to this 
dilemma is the verdict that “local initiatives afford less control but carry greater 
likelihood of success” (2009: 16). Consequently, collaborative and participatory 
research methods like the modified TAT have a larger roll to play in the overall 
approach to creating context-appropriate democracy assistance strategies. Not only 
does this imply studying social rolls and relations within any given society, but also a 
new focus on non-elites and “non-state-based frameworks” (Kilcullen 2009: 296). 
The people most affected by a policy should, in other words, be included in both the 
design and evaluation of subsequent democracy assistance programmes (Fierke 2001: 
144, Light 2001: 92, UNDP 2010b). Admittedly, this may require a paradigm shift in 
how democracy assistance is administered, which could easily raise problems of its 
own.  
The operationalisation of political culture as perceptual lenses identifiable by 
patterns of competences and dispositions emphasises the interactive and non-linear 
relationship between ordinary citizens and democracy. It has the additional advantage 
of bridging what people think with how they behave, making connections between 
attitudes and actions and further linking them to political structures and processes 
(Paquette 2002: 54). These findings are timely. There is growing recognition within 
the literature that democratic governance and democracy assistance initiatives are 
susceptible to cultural interpretation and, consequently, that local perspectives are as 
important as ‘expert’ knowledge (Armon 2007, Hellinger 1992, Kaplan 2008a, Mattes 
and Bratton 2007, Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz 2007, Whitehead 2002). Whether 
democracy will be an integral part of society or remain an externally imposed set of 
rules surely depends at least in part on whether the significance of local cultures gains 
mainstream recognition within the democracy assistance industry.  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, the long-term prospects for deepening democracy in places 
like Madagascar depend in part on how – and how well – democracy promoters 
engage with the communities they propose to reform. Doctrinal adherence to 
“democracy on the instalment plan” (di Palma 1990: 17) and “better of the same” 
(Pritchett and Woolcock 2003: 198) is not good enough and may, albeit 
unintentionally, cause increased cynicism among the public, as “misamonga” 
sometimes did. Instead, the democracy assistance industry must rediscover “a sense 
of humility” in its approach to helping the citizens of developing democracies help 
themselves that is open to alternative, local interpretations of both the problem and 
its solution (Price 2009: 169, also see Kilcullen 2009). A strategic approach to 
addressing democratic deficiencies, by contrast, would include procedures for 
identifying and resolving local grievances and, according to Kilcullen, should be 
developed “on a local basis and in accordance with local standards” (Wolf 2009). 
Whereas doctrine tends to be rigidly entrenched, strategy represents a creative and 
inventive process that skilfully combines specific expertise with context appropriate 
innovation (see, for example, Mintzberg 2000, Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel 
2009, Paquette 2002).  
With regard to democracy assistance efforts like MISONGA, the policy 
objectives (e.g. improving access to information, strengthening civil society, 
improving government effectiveness, and reducing corruption) have merit but the 
way in which outside experts went about addressing them failed to acknowledge local 
concerns or points of view. I admit that it would be difficult – impossible even – for 
any outside organization to fight censorship within another country without the 
consent of the people in power. Indeed, I was told more than once during my time in 
Madagascar that Transparency International faced just this sort of blockade under 
Ravalomanana’s administration. However, there are creative solutions to problems 
like illiteracy and lack of basic knowledge about legal rights that could have an impact 
if given reasonable funding and support. To illustrate, KMF-CNOE, realized that the 
constitution would be more accessible if it was translated in a way that normal 
people, even those who weren’t very well educated, could understand. Their solution 
was to commission an artist to create a comic book version of the document (KMF-
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CNOE and Nova Stella 2009). Unfortunately, the initial print-run was small due to 
funding constraints, resulting in limited distribution.  
A more strategic approach to addressing the 2009 political crisis than the 
proposed palliative of a unity government could have resembled that advocated by 
Tim Bryar (2009) with regard to Fiji. Specifically, the international community should 
condemn the nature of the political transition but then find opportunities for 
engaging with the new “transitional authority” that would hold it to account. For 
example, the continuation of international aid could have been used as leverage to 
persuade Rajoelina not to amend the constitution to lower the age at which one can 
legally run for President, thereby ensuring that he remain the leader of a transitional 
authority.120 In this scenario, the ensuing 18-24 months could have been a golden 
opportunity for supporting civic education efforts, building a genuine political party 
structure, fostering an environment in which opposition parties have the right and 
ability to organise, and untangling problems of voter registration and 
disenfranchisement. Initiatives like these would build public confidence in 
constitutional negotiations and eventual electoral competition.  
In other words, there may have been an opportunity to build democracy 
from the ground up without a single, dominant political figure taking advantage of an 
intimidated population to act without restraint. Though not a quick fix, this sort of 
effort could result in a resolution acceptable to hitherto ignored non-elite 
stakeholders unlikely to be placated by yet another round of meaningless elections. In 
fact, elections held prematurely despite the absence of competitive parties fielding 
viable candidates may further discredit electoral processes while extending the chain 
of uncertain regimes (Bryar 2009, Iloniaina 2009d, Schedler 2001). Democratic 
                                                 
120 In May 2010, Rajoelina publically announced that he would not be standing in the presidential 
election to be held later this year (Iloniaina, Lough, and Ireland 2010). At the same time, he 
published a timetable for new elections; a constitutional referendum on 12 August 2010 will be 
followed first by Parliamentary elections on 30 September 2010. The Presidential contest will take 
place last on 26 November 2010. Somewhat overshadowed by Rajoelina’s confirmation that he 
will not make a bid to remain in power, it is notable that the Parliamentary poll is scheduled before 
the Presidential election. In the past, Parliamentary elections in Madagascar have often followed 
Presidential elections allowing loyalists of the newly crowned executive to gain control of the 
National Assembly on his coattails. By holding the Parliamentary contest first, political parties 
will have to organise and campaign for people’s votes without knowing who the next President 
will be. In June 2010 the constitutional referendum was postponed indefinitely because the 
constitutional charter had not been completed (Lewis 2010).  
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institutions, elections included, have to earn the favour of citizens; democratic 
structures that do not engage and protect people are not worthy of their continued 
support (Diamond 2008b: 39). Prescriptive policies like those most often adopted by 
the international democracy assistance industry may succeed in simulating Western 
institutions without ever stimulating substantive democratic reform. While the 
African Union, United States and Norway, among others, have taken the moral high 
road in the short-term, the long-term consequence seems to likely be continued 
weakening of Madagascar’s already fragile democracy.  
In this thesis, I have sought to demonstrate the vital relevance of attitudes, 
values, and subjective points of view to democratic development. “Common sense” 
standards and solutions, no matter how basic, rarely translate exactly. The analysis in 
Chapter Four of local perceptions of elections and electoral competition clearly 
suggest that not even simple, electoral definitions of democracy are immune to 
contextual pathogens. Where societies put little stock in elections and the political 
parties vying for power, alternative definitions arise. Careful analysis of the 
worldviews of ordinary people in eastern Madagascar raises doubts as to the implied 
un-fuzzy nature of elections and other institutional indicators of democracy. It 
further suggests that freedom of speech and other alternative definitions, though 
fuzzy, may nonetheless provide useful analytical concepts for discussing democracy 
and democratic development in developing countries.121 
  
                                                 
121 Schedler likewise contends that fuzzy, ‘essentially contested’ concepts are a fact of political 
reality. Consequently, the insistence of some scholars to stick to the ‘hard facts’ can only lead to a 
mismatch between conceptual assumptions and empirical trends (Schedler 2001: 18). 
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CONCLUSION 
It never strikes us that things don’t need to be fixed.  
They really don’t. This is a great illumination.  
They need to be understood.  
(DeMello 1992: 37) 
 When I began this research, speculation was rife that democracy was in 
decline. This was accompanied by growing recognition that tackling the problem of 
hybrid regimes would require new approaches to democracy assistance (see the 
Introduction). Historically, democracy assistance and assessment have been 
predicated on a relatively narrow prescriptive understanding of critical democratic 
institutions. Not surprisingly key priorities espoused by the global democracy 
assistance industry – and the policies for tackling them – became highly formulaic. 
Framing the problem of persistent hybridity according to standardised objectives of 
democratic development results in top-down policies geared toward fixing and 
reforming malfunctioning institutions. Throughout this thesis, I have argued that 
paying greater attention to local political culture(s) provides clues conducive to 
bottom-up analysis of why hybrid regimes may not always function according to 
established international standards.  
I have argued in the preceding chapters that democracy can be perceived and 
interpreted from a number of angles, and that one’s perspective matters. The 
international community has adopted a particular perspective that may not be 
universally shared. Neville reminds us that: 
Human freedom is limitless, once you realise that any ordered world is all a brave 
construction, a fragile building that can be reconstructed as you wish, that identity 
can be consciously constructed as a mask. Though it’s in the slippage between the 
created mask, the illusion, and the real identity (assuming of course that there is a 
real identity, a human community that has integrity and beauty and history) where 
evil enters in. (2001: 231) 
This observation readily applies to the tumultuous events that unfolded in 
Madagascar at the end of January 2009. Indeed, one person who participated in my 
research lamented that la réalité est bien masqué – reality is well concealed. President 
Ravalomanana fostered – and personally embodied – a particular construction of 
Malagasy democracy; one that readily appealed to donors. During his tenure that was 
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the only political reality the outside world saw. Many of the ordinary people I met, 
however, had trouble reconciling their lives and experiences with the image expertly 
projected by the President and refracted by international assessments of the country’s 
democratic credentials. The “slippage” between Ravalomanana’s Madagascar, 
international democracy assistance initiatives and the experience of some sectors of 
Malagasy society did not occur all of a sudden; it resulted from a prolonged period of 
frustration. When Rajoelina took public issue with the closure of his television 
station, people who had previously felt powerless took advantage of a rare 
opportunity to reconstruct the political system so that it better reflected their 
democratic aspirations.  
The originality of this work lies in its exploration of a highly contested 
concept (political culture), using an innovative visual research method (the modified 
TAT) in a country not often researched by (particularly Anglophone) political 
scientists (Madagascar). The research problem – identifying how local understandings 
of politics and democracy might influence a country’s democratic development – 
dictated the formulation of concepts and choice of methods, even when this required 
pushing established boundaries and integrating approaches from other disciplines. 
Moreover, little research to date has focused on the “demand side” of democracy 
assistance (Burnell and Schlumberger 2010: 8, Merkel 2010: 26), although interest in 
local perceptions of politics and democracy appears to be growing (Hyden 2010, 
Leininger 2010, Rakner, Menocal and Fritz 2007). This research is also timely in that 
it proposes both a theoretical framework and innovative methodology for exploring 
how ordinary people perceive democracy in their countries and relating these 
perceptions to specific policy goals.  
Some Concluding Remarks 
While writing Chapter Seven, I was reminded of the famous first paragraph 
of A Tale of Two Cities: “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the 
age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness...it was the spring of hope, it was the 
winter of despair…” (Dickens 2003: 5). The positions expressed by research 
participants, particularly with regard to democracy in Madagascar, often echoed this 
superlative tone. For people who interpreted democracy as rules-based and 
supported President Ravalomanana, the period when I visited Madagascar was 
indeed the best of times. They had a charismatic, duly elected President who was 
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attracting impressive amounts of foreign investment to the island. Things were 
looking up. Conversely, research participants who equated democracy with freedom 
of expression were prone to describing Ravalomanana as an oppressive dictator who 
rigged elections, suppressed the opposition, and was more interested in self-
enrichment than national development. In short, things were as bad as they had ever 
been.  
The democracy assistance objectives outlined in Chapter One and political 
cultures identified in Chapter Seven provide evidence that democracy is indeed “the 
name for what we cannot cease to want” (Dunn 1979: 27, emphasis original). The 
ubiquitous appeal for “democracy” conceals the fact that various stakeholders may 
actually interpret it in starkly different ways. If it is to ultimately succeed, democracy 
assistance must integrate numerous (sometimes conflicting) points of view, the 
experience of international donors, and the ambitions of local people. “One can 
conceive a unicorn, describe it, destroy whole forests in a determined effort to find 
one, and,” Kirkpatrick concludes, “still finally fail” (1981: 339). After working on this 
project for the past several years, it occurs to me that doctrinal democracy assistance 
policies that attempt to simulate established democracies elsewhere are not so 
different from detailed plans for catching a unicorn.  
By contrast, stimulation of democratic governance responsive to locally 
defined needs still seems like a worthwhile pursuit, even if we do not yet know how 
to go about it. Overcoming complex obstacles to democratic development, 
protracted hybridity included, will require innovative policies and new ways of 
thinking about democracy that both challenge and complement existing paradigms 
(Kaplan 2008a: 1). I have argued here that one important aspect of critically assessing 
(and improving) democracy assistance policy must be finding out how the people we 
are trying to “assist” define their own context, expectations, and aspirations. In this 
regard, country-led democracy assessment initiatives are a step in the right direction. 
I fully recognise that this study is not without limitations. The most 
restrictive of these, particularly with regard to the potential for generalising the 
research findings, is that I was limited to conducting research with a relatively small 
sample of local people in a particular location during a single field visit. I would have 
liked to return to the field a second time in the summer of 2009 to discuss my 
thematic analysis of TAT stories with research participants. This would have helped 
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to validate my interpretations of themes contained within TAT stories. Moreover, I 
would have been able to find out what research participants made of the multiple 
perceptual lenses I identified. Unfortunately, time and financial constraints as well as 
the ongoing political unrest prevented me from making a second trip to Madagascar. 
Even so, this research contributes to theoretical discussions of political culture and 
social science research methods as well as democracy assistance and assessment.  
Thesis Outputs: Meeting My Research Objectives 
The research question posed in the Introduction to this thesis was: How 
might local political culture(s) shape and constrain substantive democratic 
development? I have achieved what I set out to do to the extent that I developed a 
textured political culture concept and then piloted an innovative method for 
researching it. This empirical research has enabled me to convincingly demonstrate 
that the ways in which ordinary people understand their own political environment 
(and democracy in particular) often differ from the perspective of democracy 
experts. The case of MISONGA illustrated the pertinence of local political cultures 
to the application of democracy assistance policy. Fashionable democracy assistance 
objectives like improving advocacy by civil society groups and initiating e-governance 
platforms proved largely untenable given local competences and dispositions. That 
said, the political cultural predispositions identified indicated that most of the people 
who participated in this research do desire more responsive governance and reliable 
access to information. A more strategic approach to democracy assistance policy 
would integrate donor resources and objectives with locally defined problems.  
I also demonstrated that the political culture concept developed here raises 
significant questions about the reliability of externally driven democracy assessment 
exercises. I originally chose Madagascar for my case study because the country 
performed so well on an array of influential democracy and good governance indices 
despite being one of the poorest countries in the world. Though still some way from 
being a full-fledged consolidated democracy, there seemed to be general agreement 
that Madagascar was firmly on the right track. This general assessment based on the 
conclusions of democracy indices helps to explain why the 2009 political crisis came 
as such a surprise to many outsiders. Assessments of electoral process, freedom of 
expression, and rule of law offered by research participants sometimes corroborated 
those made by the indices (i.e. the positive lens, the social divisions lens, the impartial 
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lens). Oftentimes, however, the experience of research participants was not 
accurately reflected by Madagascar’s international ranking (i.e. the tedious lens, the 
dissident lens, the crooked lens). This more pessimistic point of view provides much-
needed context for objective assessment of Rajoelina’s rise to power. 
 In addition to answering my research question, this thesis contributes to the 
literature on democracy assistance and democratic development in the areas of 
theory, methods, and policy analysis.  
Theoretical Advancements – A Viable Political Culture Concept 
For political culture to be a useful concept in political science, it must be 
shown to have demonstrable consequences (Diamond 1993: 15). Political culture has 
a troublesome reputation for being exceedingly difficult to define, a criticism I 
examined at length in Chapter Two. This has often led to either the identification of 
prescriptive ‘democratic’ cultures or truncation of the concept before it is applied 
analytically. However, in this thesis I have made a case for embracing political culture 
precisely because it is complex and messy. Human experience is complex and messy; 
the increased burden of grappling with a more complicated culture concept is 
justified by its increased interpretive power (Frank 1989: 85). I have demonstrated 
that competing political cultures, conceptualised as perceptual lenses identifiable by 
patterns of competences and dispositions, have had observable consequences for 
democratic development in Madagascar. Whether someone adheres to the political 
cultural worldview that democracy is rules-based or inseparable from free speech has 
direct bearings on what that person will identify as appropriate political behaviour. 
Indeed, the political crisis that paralysed Madagascar for much of 2009 is reflected in 
these competing interpretations of democracy, as I illustrated in Chapter Seven. 
These events further suggest that how ordinary people interpret the political sphere 
can have very real consequences, although the causes may not always be immediately 
intelligible to outsiders.  
Despite a tendency for the democracy assistance industry to adopt 
prescriptive policies in favour of certain democratic institutions, the vast 
differentiation between developed democracies is proof that there is no single 
democratic endpoint (Dryzek and Holmes 2002: 13). Likewise, I find it difficult to 
accept that there is a single ‘democratic culture’. All of the perceptual lenses 
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identified in this thesis embraced elements of democracy; although what research 
participants meant by ‘democracy’ varied, as did their assessments of Madagascar’s 
democratic credentials. Recognising the multifaceted ways in which people interpret 
their political environment and define their democratic aspirations has been shown 
here to have considerable interpretive power with regard to why democracy 
assistance policies that look good on paper sometimes fail to achieve their objectives 
in practice. 
Methodological Developments – The Modified TAT 
When visual research methods work, you learn something new that you 
probably would not have by employing more traditional research techniques. It is 
common for researchers using visual research tools to boldly express the belief that 
they would not have achieved the same quality of data, or indeed the same data, by 
using other methods (see, for example, Banks 2007: 4, Stanczak 2007: 8). I am 
similarly convinced that my research in Madagascar would not have been possible 
using traditional interview techniques. Even if I had eventually managed to persuade 
people to participate, I would have remained sceptical about the reliability of any data 
collected. By adopting (and adapting) the modified TAT, however, I was able to talk 
to people about their socio-political world in a manner that was both frank and not 
threatening.  
I consider the modified version of the TAT used for this research a pilot for 
how the method and similar visual research tools can be meaningfully applied to 
research problems. Furthermore, image-based research tools have abundant potential 
to supplement surveys and traditional interview techniques in the context of an 
integrated research design. Bearing this in mind, I have tried to be as specific – and 
as transparent – as possible in explaining both what I did and why. This concern for 
transparent disclosure applies not only to recounting how I used the modified TAT, 
but also how I went about analysing the data and creating thematic networks. I 
suspect that it would be difficult for others to replicate my research exactly; people’s 
attitudes and points of reference will have shifted somewhat in response to the 2009 
political crisis. It should be possible, however, to follow the steps I have taken here 
for the purposes of conducting new research in Madagascar or elsewhere. Moreover, 
I have tried to offer reflections in hindsight on what I would have done differently, 
and suggested ways in which the method might be improved.  
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Policy Recommendations – Strategy vs. Doctrine 
I have argued in this thesis that democracy assistance policy has become 
doctrinal, relying heavily on formulaic and prescriptive initiatives that often 
concentrate on the performance of particular institutions. While these policies have 
no doubt had some positive effects on global democratic development, hybrid 
regimes like Madagascar seem to pose a new problem requiring a fresh solution. In 
the rush to fix these nascent democracies, we have failed to understand them. “How 
well informed are you about the reality you seek to change? How conscious are you 
of the perceptions of other stakeholders? What are you doing to use and improve the 
knowledge you have?” (Powell 2006: 520).  These questions are central to strategic 
democracy assistance; in the case of international involvement in Madagascar, they 
seem to have gone largely unanswered. As the political unrest experienced by 
Madagascar in 2009 poignantly demonstrates, the complex social and political 
dynamics at work in hybrid regimes require careful analysis. The political cultures 
maintained by ordinary people warrant consideration, something that democracy 
assistance providers have historically neglected to do.  
As the Obama Administration took office, Congressman David Price, Chair 
of the House Democracy Assistance Commission, advocated a new approach to US 
democracy assistance policy. At the core of his argument lies clear recognition that 
“it is the citizens of a country themselves who must choose their own best way” 
(Price 2009: 169-170). Taking this recommendation seriously, however, will require a 
reassessment of the doctrinal imperative of institution building. “Electoral 
democracy does not solve matters,” Dryzek observes (2005a: 226); and yet the 
international community adamantly demanded the rapid organisation of new 
elections in response to Madagascar’s political turmoil. Reflecting on Madagascar’s 
2002 political crisis, Marcus and Razafindrakoto concluded:  
when electoral participation…was trumped by participation through social action, 
the will of the people was able to overcome ossification of not-so-democratic 
“democratic” institutions and to give renewed hope to a citizenry that had all but 
given up. (2003: 46)   
The same analysis applies to the most recent unrest. Strategically crafted democracy 
assistance policies that fully acknowledge the underlying public frustration with not-
so-democratic “democratic” institutions might reduce the likelihood of history 
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repeating itself yet again. Something that doctrinal devotion to electoral processes 
has thus far failed to do.  
Where Do We Go From Here? 
The theoretical, methodological, and policy innovations generated by this 
project have much to contribute to future research agendas. First, the political 
culture concept developed and tested in this research must be applied elsewhere 
before generalisations can be made regarding the significance of political culture to 
substantive democratic development. The conclusions reached by this, albeit limited, 
study do indicate, however, that this is an avenue worth pursuing. Moreover, the idea 
that political culture can be used as an analytical tool for incorporating the 
understandings, capabilities, and expectations of ordinary people with more 
grounded policy initiatives could have wide-ranging applications beyond the limited 
concerns of democracy assistance. Climate change immediately comes to mind as a 
contentious issue with numerous stakeholder groups that will need to be reconciled 
in order for policies to be effective. Similarly, I often wondered whether the 
inflammatory ‘debate’ over health care reform in the United States was rooted in 
identifiable political cultural differences. The range of issues to which this theory 
could be applied is virtually limitless.  
Secondly, visual research methods represent an exciting opportunity to 
stretch the bounds of what we consider standard research techniques. Although, to 
my knowledge, the modified TAT has only been used a handful of times for the 
purposes of social science research beyond the field of psychology, it has consistently 
demonstrated considerable potential. More importantly, it provides researchers 
investigating sensitive topics with a tested alternative to surveys or (semi-)structured 
interviews that may be inappropriate. As noted above, I consider my use of and 
modifications to the TAT a pilot for how this method might be applied elsewhere.122 
With further refinement and more extensive application, I believe that this tool could 
gain widespread acceptance among qualitative researchers. 
                                                 
122 For instance, potential exists for integrating visual research techniques like the modified TAT 
with existing country-led democracy assessment procedures.   
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On a similar note, despite the growing number of researchers venturing to 
dabble with visual methods, these tools remain largely unrecognised and segregated 
by their disciplines. Scattered haphazardly through fields ranging from sociology to 
health science, anthropology to clinical psychology, an array of image-based visual 
research methods have evolved essentially in parallel with only limited reference to 
their cousins situated in other areas of research (see, for instance, Gotschi, Delve, 
and Freyer 2009). However, because this veritable cache of information remains 
disaggregated and buried deep in journal archives, visual research techniques linger 
like “waifs at the margins” and visual research remains unrecognised as an integrated, 
interdisciplinary methodology (Harper 2002: 15). Additional work is required in 
order to pull together the existing literature of various visual research techniques.123 It 
is, perhaps, unsurprising that substantially different (i.e. image-based) research 
methods elicit substantively different data from their more traditional counterparts. 
To date, however, the fact that visual research methods do result in data sets distinct 
from other techniques has often remained a casual aside or subtle afterthought. More 
can and should be made of this fact.  
One question raised by this research is whether existing democracy 
assessment tools and metrics are producing data that is inaccurate or merely 
incomplete.124 The analysis above demonstrates that some local perceptions of 
democracy stand squarely at odds with the evaluations made by expert international 
observers and influential democracy assistance organisations. This research has not 
addressed, however, whether the discrepancy results from failure of democracy 
assessment exercises to pick up on major democratic deficits that are nevertheless 
recognised by local people. Or, instead, whether what matters most to local people 
remains undocumented because it remains ‘below the radar’ of international 
observers and organisations. Determining which of these possibilities is the case 
could contribute toward the future development of more accurate democracy 
assessment processes and criteria.  
                                                 
123 I begin this sizeable task in a forthcoming article to be published in Field Methods. 
124 I would like to thank Laurence Whitehead for raising this provocative point. 
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Finally, there is an urgent need for independent, objective research into 
country-led democracy assessment procedures. As this is still a relatively new 
technique to emerge from the democracy assistance industry, it is not surprising that 
most of the information currently available is produced by the organisations 
involved. Independent research across a range of initiatives in different countries 
could help identify best practice. It also remains to be determined exactly how the 
findings of country-led democracy assessments could be best used to advocate more 
strategic, reflexive and evidence-based democracy assistance policies.  
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APPENDIX 2: PARTY COMPETITION IN MADAGASCAR 
Acronyms: 
PSD Social Democratic Party 
AKFM Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar 
UNDD National Union for Development and Democracy 
MMSM Translation of acronym not known 
MFM Movement for Proletarian Power 
RPSD Rally for Socialism and Democracy 
PSD Translation of acronym not known 
GRAD-Ilafo Action and Reflection Group for the Development of Madagascar 
CFV Committee of Living Forces 
CSCD Confederation of Civil Societies for Development 
AKFM-
Fanavaozana 
Congress Party for the Independence of Madagascar-Renewal 
CSDDM Support Group for Democracy and Development in Madagascar 
Accord Christian Action of Regional Cadres and Businessmen for 
Development 
Farimbona Acting Together 
Vatomizana Measures and Weights 
PMDM Militant Party for the Development of Madagascar 
LEADER-Fanilo Economic Liberalism and Democratic Action for Recovery 
Fivoarana Progress 
FAMINA Association of United Malagasy 
AREMA Vanguard of the Malagasy Revolution  
AVI Judged by Your Work 
AFFA Action, Truth, Development, and Harmony 
TIM I Love Madagascar 
FP National Union 
 
Note: Elections held between 1977 and 1989 are considered non-competitive because all 
participants were required to be part of a single socialist coalition, the National Front for the 
Defence of the Revolution (FNDR). 
 
Source: African Elections Database 
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APPENDIX 3: WRITTEN INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1) Qui sont les citoyens malgaches? 
Who are Malagasy citizens? 
 
2) Est-ce qu’il y a la transparence dans la domaine politique? 
Are politics transparent? 
 
3) Les processus pour voter, sont-ils inclusifs? 
Are voting processes inclusive? 
 
4) Est-ce que les parties politiques marchent bien? 
Do political parties work well? 
 
5) Les parties politiques, sont-ils inclusifs de toutes sortes de gens? 
Do political parties include all sorts of people? 
 
6) Est, ce que vous êtes confident que les homes politiques et les services sociaux 
ne sont pas corrompu? 
Are you confident that politicians and social services are free from corruption? 
 
7) Les medias (les journaux, la radio), sont-ils représentatifs de l’opinion publique? 
Are the media (newspapers, radio) representative of public opinion? 
 
8) Est ce qu’il y a les occasions pour la publique à participer dans des décisions 
politiques? 
Are there opportunities for the public to participate in political decision making? 
 
9) En tant que citoyen, quels sont vos devoirs? 
What are your responsibilities as a citizen? 
 
10) En tant que citoyen, quels sont vos droits fondamentaux ? 
As a citizen, what are your fundamental rights? 
 
11) Selon vous, ces doits sont ils garantis par l’état? 
In your opinion, are these rights guaranteed by the state? 
 
12) A votre avis, quelle est la démocratie? 
What is democracy, in your opinion? 
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APPENDIX 4: VINE PRÉCIS  
31 October 2010 
 
The Visual Interpretation Narrative Exercise (VINE) is an innovative, image-
based interviewing technique. Instead of posing questions directly, the researcher 
asks research participants to tell short stories about a series of cartoons or other 
abstract images. Incorporating terms and empirical tools from formerly disparate 
research communities, the VINE method is an eclectic approach for researching the 
nexus between democracy assistance objectives and the experience of ordinary 
citizens. Findings resulting from pilot research in Madagascar raise questions about 
how accurately external expert assessments of democratic development reflect local 
perceptions, beliefs, and expectations.  
Image-Based Research Methods  
This innovative interviewing technique sits comfortably among other image-
based research methods that have consistently demonstrated ‘significant untapped 
potential and vigor across a broad scope of disciplines’.i Visual research methods 
including photo elicitation,ii participatory mapping,iii photovoice,iv and FotoDialogov 
are breaking new ground in disciplines ranging from sociology and anthropology to 
health science and education studies. Likewise, in addition to widespread adoption 
and adaptation within its native field of psychology, the Thematic Apperception 
Testvi has previously been modified for interdisciplinary research projects in both the 
Philippinesvii and Madagascar.viii  
Image-based research tools rely on the principle of projective interpretation; 
what we perceive in the present is invariably influenced by past perception and 
experience organized and stored in our memories.ix When research participants tell 
short stories about abstract images during the course of an image-based research 
procedure, they naturally construct narratives derived from their own personality 
traits and unique experience. Visual research methods are, therefore, particularly 
suitable for identifying the inherently subjective ways in which people tacitly ‘name 
and frame’ their (socio-political) environment.x Moreover, it is difficult for people to 
‘fake’ their interpretation of an image, a known weakness of survey methods, because 
subjective perspectives are largely unconscious.xi Most importantly, the abstract 
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nature of the image-based research techniques can enable researchers to approach 
contentious or sensitive topics in a nonthreatening, roundabout way that may result 
in the collection of data inaccessible via more direct questioning. 
Visual tools can, likewise, be particularly useful when doing research in other 
language cultures. The ability to ‘read’ a photograph or other visual image transcends 
educational and, to a point, linguistic barriers because it does not depend on fluency 
in a particular language or knowledge of grammatical rules. Feelings, opinions, and 
the respondent’s perceptions of reality are all displaced onto the image, facilitating 
the discussion of complex or sensitive material.  
Commonly blurring the traditional roles of interviewer and interviewee, 
visual research techniques are often described as collaborative and respondent-led. 
The image invites research participants to identify what is meaningful and important 
while simultaneously imposing order on the information being gathered.xii In other 
words, both participants become just two people trying to work out the meaning of 
an image together.xiii Although the researcher and research participant may initially 
interpret an image quite differently, over the course of the interview they should be 
able to reach a common understanding as ‘fellow travelers’ in the research process.xiv 
Indeed, the physical presence of the image can aid in developing rapport with 
research participants.xv  
The Pilot 
I developed and piloted the VINE method in Madagascar during five months 
of doctoral research in late 2008. My research objective was to uncover how ordinary 
people in Madagascar interpret democracy and their own political experience. 
However, due to the tense political climate at that time, traditional interview 
techniques and direct questioning proved unworkable. People were generally 
reluctant to speak candidly about overtly political topics, and were sometimes openly 
fearful of being overheard saying the ‘wrong’ thing. The Visual Interpretation 
Narrative Exercise is, therefore, designed to facilitate research of sensitive topics in 
challenging environments.  
The first step in piloting the VINE technique was to commission a set of 
visual prompts. I discussed general themes of interest with a local artist (e.g. 
elections, political authority, freedom of speech, etc.) who was then at liberty to 
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interpret these themes in a way she deemed locally appropriate. This collaborative 
process resulted in a set of five contextually relevant sketches that people of all 
socio-economic classes and educational backgrounds could interpret relatively easily.  
The inherently abstract nature of the cartoons helped to disarm research 
participants. Most people immediately accepted that I was not going to probe into 
their perceptions of particular events or political figures that they remained wary of 
speaking about directly. The chicken depicted in Image 3 and the dog in Image 5 
introduced an element of comic relief to the interview procedure; research 
participants often became noticeably more relaxed and communicative after spotting 
these animals. In fact, despite never asking research participants for definitions of 
democracy outright, people often volunteered their views on democracy in the 
context of one or more of the stories prompted by these images.  
At the outset of the VINE interview procedure, research participants were 
handed the stack of cartoons and instructed simply to tell a short story about what 
they saw in each image. Research participants were then free to respond to the 
images in any sequence they chose, sometimes stringing stories about two or three 
images together. When encountering visual research methods for the first time, 
people commonly begin to assess an image descriptively, applying labels to the things 
that they most confidently recognize.xvi I noticed, however, that research participants 
often grew in confidence as the interview progressed, sometimes returning to an 
image at the end to expand on the original story. Interviews lasted around 30 minutes 
on average, with stories about each image taking approximately 5 minutes to tell.  
Unlike some visual research methods in which the researcher plays the role 
of silent observer, I often conversed with research participants during the VINE 
interview. I would, for example, sometimes inquire about what had led up to the 
event described. At other times, I sought clarification as a means of probing for 
meaning. Crucially, neither my research assistants nor I ever attempted to correct or 
otherwise interfere with a research participant’s interpretation of the images. 
I used the VINE method with 51 people (27 men, 24 women) from two sites 
(one rural: 11 interviews, one urban: 40 interviews) in the Antsinanana region of 
eastern Madagascar. All research participants were non-elites of various backgrounds 
and professions. While some research participants were highly educated, others had 
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received very little formal education. One advantage of the VINE method is that it is 
equally accessible to people of all socio-economic backgrounds; it worked just as well 
in the rural village as it did in the urban center. Stories were generally told and 
recorded in French; when a research participant preferred to tell his or her stories in 
the local dialect, a research assistant provided simultaneous translation to French.  
The abstract nature of the VINE technique enabled me to approach 
contentious political themes in a way that was acceptable to research participants. 
Though guided by my broad research themes, the data collected accurately reflects 
local perceptions of democracy and the genuine concerns people harbored about 
their country’s political future.  
Data Analysis 
My primary objective in analyzing the stories was to build a schematic 
framework or model capable of accurately describing local political logic and how 
this logic might become manifest in political behavior. This was achieved using a 
three-stage analysis strategy entailing: (1) systematic deconstruction of VINE stories 
into thematic text segments (i.e. data extrapolation); (2) exploration of pervasive 
themes and theme clusters; and (3) interpretation and analysis of the information. 
This process facilitated the identification and examination of concepts that ordinary 
people actually use to interpret their political environment. It also shed light on how 
Analsysis 
Stage A 
• Breakdown of  Text  
• Dissect text into thematic fragments 
• Identify competences and dispositions 
Analysis 
Stage B 
• Exploration of  Text  
• Select and arrange basic and organising themes 
to identify global themes 
• Create, verify and refine the network(s) 
Analysis 
Stage C 
• Interpretation of  Exploration  
• Describe and summarise the thematic network(s) 
• Interpret patterns 
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concepts commonly associated with democracy (e.g. elections, political competition) 
are re-appropriated in new settings. 
First, the 244 short stories collected using the VINE method were 
transcribed and analyzed for competences and dispositions in the spirit of 
reconstructive democratic theory. Competences include knowledge of and access to the 
political sphere. They also include beliefs or convictions about one’s ability to act in 
particular circumstances and what those actions signify. They are known facts and 
available actions. Dispositions, by contrast, include feelings in addition to attitudes, 
inclinations, and tendencies. They are more emotive than competences and are only 
indirectly linked to action or agency. 
The classification of a word or phrase as a competence or disposition was 
not arbitrary, but rather reflects the context of this particular theme within the VINE 
story. I distinguished, for example, between whether research participants indicated 
that they could do something (i.e. a competence) or that they wanted to do it (i.e. a 
disposition). For example, saying that people can take part in protests (i.e. a 
competence) is not the same as indicating that people want to protest (i.e. a 
disposition) but are not actually able to. The competences and dispositions then 
became codes for first order themes. In an effort to remain true to the original 
stories for as long as possible, I completed initial data organization and analysis in 
French, switching to English only after themes had been identified.  
Next, competences and dispositions included in stories told by research 
participants were analyzed for more abstract meanings using thematic networks.xvii 
Thematic networks, which emphasize the interactive and non-linear aspects of 
themes, are useful for organizing discrete competences and dispositions into a visual 
blueprint that transparently links the language used by research participants to more 
abstract analytical ideas. Though analytical constructs, thematic networks 
nevertheless approximate the contours of the lenses through which different social 
groups likely view the political sphere. Furthermore, in the process of creating 
thematic networks I was able to identify clusters of people who interpret their 
political environment in similar ways.  
The story told by thematic networks is, however, more than a simple 
aggregation of individual points of view. This method of data analysis achieves a 
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balance between description and interpretation by creating a web of interconnected 
themes of varying orders of abstraction. Additionally, first order themes (i.e. 
competences and dispositions) can be displayed in proportion to their frequency,xviii 
suggesting how variations among individual points of view relate to shared 
interpretations. As a result, thematic networks created using VINE data provide new 
depth of insight into how the familiar ideas and language commonly associated with 
democracy can be re-appropriated by local actors. Instead of relying solely on the 
researcher’s own theoretical and linguistic traditions, this model emphasizes 
indigenous concepts and codes of meaning. 
Conclusions 
The expectations laid down by democratic institutions, whether implicit or 
explicit, are neither neutral nor universal. Likewise, how individuals construct and 
interpret their political reality has direct bearing on ‘the roles they think they can, do, 
and should play in relation to that reality’.xix During research in Madagascar, the 
VINE method proved to be an invaluable research tool, both for learning how 
ordinary people interpret commonplace socio-political situations and for creating an 
environment in which they felt safe to speak openly. Moreover, careful analysis of 
VINE data provided additional context for the political turmoil that unseated 
President Ravolamanana in the spring of 2009, much to the surprise of international 
observers.  
Visual Interpretation Narrative Exercises provide a rigorous tool for 
investigating whether policy makers and non-elite stakeholders perceive problems in 
the same way and, indeed, if they perceive the same problems. This method could be 
applied alongside traditional research techniques in order to gain a more nuanced 
appreciation of how people in developing democracies interpret and understand their 
own political context. The VINE method could, for instance, be meaningfully 
integrated into country-led democracy assessment exercises like those encouraged by 
UNDP and International IDEA. It could also be incorporated into the development 
of democracy assistance policies that are grounded in local needs. 
                                                 
i Gregory C. Stanczak, ed. Visual Research Methods: Image, society, and representation (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2007): 3. 
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ii See, for example, Marcus Banks, Using Visual Data in Qualitative Research (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2007); Marisol Clark-Ibáñez, ‘Inner-City Children in Sharper Focus: Sociology of 
Childhood and Photo Elicitation Interviews’, in Visual Research Methods: Image, Society and 
Representation, ed. Gregory C. Stanczak (London: SAGE Publications, 2007); Douglas Harper, 
‘Talking About Pictures: A Case for Photo Elicitation’, Visual Studies 17, no. 1 (2002): 13-26; 
Jeffrey Samuels, ‘Breaking the Ethnographer’s Frames: Reflections on the Use of Photo 
Elicitation in Understanding Sri Lankan Monastic Culture’, American Behavioral Scientist 47, no.12 
(2004): 1528-1550. 
iii See, for example, Susan Maman, et. al., ‘Using Participatory Mapping to Inform a Community-
Randomized Trial of HIV Counseling and Testing’, Field Methods 21, no. 4 (2009): 368-387; Eric 
Margolis, ‘Visual Ethnography: Tools for Mapping the AIDS Epidemic’, Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography 19, no. 3 (1990): 370-391;  Kimberley E. Medley and Humphrey W. Kalibo, ‘An 
Ecological Framework for Participatory Ethnobotanical Research at Mt. Kasigau, Kenya’, Field 
Methods 17, no. 3 (2005): 302-314. 
iv Caroline Wang and Mary Ann Burris, ‘Photovoice: Concept, Methodology, and Use for 
Participatory Needs Assessment’, Health Education and Behaviour 24, no. 3 (1997): 369-387; 
Caroline C. Wang, et. al., ‘Flint Photovoice: Community Building Among Youths, Adults, and 
Policymakers’, American Journal of Public Health 94, no. 6 (2004): 911-913. 
v Flavia S. Ramos, ‘Imaginary pictures, real life stories: the FotoDialogo method’, International 
Journal of Qualitative Studeis in Education 20, no. 2 (2007): 191-224; Flavia S. Ramos, ‘The 
FotoDialogo Method: Using Pictures and Storytelling as Learning Tools’ (Washington D.C.: 
World Bank Group: Adult Outreach Education, 1999). 
vi Henry A. Murray, Thematic Apperception Test  (Cambridge, MA: the President and Fellows of 
Harvard College, 1943). 
vii Virginia Nazarea et. al., ‘Defining Indicators Which Make Sense to Local People: Intra-Cultural 
Variation in Perceptions of Natural Resources’, Human Organisation 57, no. 2 (1998): 159-70. 
viii Cathy Farnworth, ‘Achieving Respondent-Led Research in Madagascar’, Gender & Development 
15, no. 2 (2007): 271-85. 
ix Karl Eggert, ‘Malagasy Commentary’, Ethnohistory 48, no. 1-2 (2001): 309-18, 310; Robert E. 
Pittenger, Charles F. Hockett, and John J. Danehy, The First Five Minutes: A Sample of Microscopic 
Interview Analysis  (Ithica, New York: Paul Martineau, 1960). 
x Donald A. Schön and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 26. 
xi David J. Elkins and Richard E. B. Simeon, ‘A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does 
Political Culture Explain?’ Comparative Politics 11, no. 2 (1979): 137. 
xii Harper, Talking About Pictures, 20.  
xiii Banks, Using Visual Data, 70; John Collier and Malcolm Collier, Visual Anthropology: Photography 
as a Research Method (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986), 105. 
xiv James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an age of diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995): 23.  
xv Steven J. Gold, ‘Using Photography in Studies of Immigrant Communities: Reflecting Across 
Projects and Populations’, in Visual Research Methods: Image, Society, and Representation, ed. Gregory 
C. Stanczak (London: SAGE Publications, 2007): 145; Jeffrey Samuels, ‘When Words are Not 
Enough: Eliciting Children's Experiences of Buddhist Monastic Life Through Photographs’, in 
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Publications, 2007). 
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xvi Marcus Banks, Visual Data in Social Research (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), 3.   
xvii Jennifer Attride-Stirling, ‘Thematic Networks: An Analytic Tool for Qualitative Research’, 
Qualitative Research 1, no. 33 (2001): 385-405. 
xviii Wordle (www. wordle.net) is a free, web-based tool for creating “word clouds” from a text. 
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